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W I t n e s s e s  were integral to a wide range of devotional and legal practices 
throughout the Middle Ages. As the crowds at martyrs’ trials, the audiences 
of mystery plays, and the readers of saints’ lives, they were repeatedly invoked 
in the traditions, rituals, and texts that shaped and articulated the ideals of 
Christian communities to testify to the sanctity and efficacy of Christian 
doctrine. Likewise, in ordeal trials, last wills and testaments, and writs of 
complaint, witnesses attested to the integrity of a law-abiding community. 
This book focuses on both devotional and legal witnessing practices in the 
later Middle Ages, arguing for the centrality and the plasticity of witnessing 
in fourteenth- and fifteenth-century English culture. It describes witness-
ing as a diverse set of customs and procedures that sought to produce and 
authenticate different communities and kinds of authority. The swearing 
of an oath, the communal experience of a miracle, the oral testimony of a 
defendant, and courtroom documents alike provided religious and secular 
officials ways to construct and police doctrinal, customary, and royal com-
munities. Yet witnessing practices could also be used to dispute or reframe, 
rather than shore up, doctrinal and legal communities. For example, as chap-
ter 3 explores, outlaws sometimes deployed witnessing discourse to authorize 
communities that lived beyond the disciplinary reach of the crown. Likewise, 
as described in chapter 5, some Lollards used fifteenth-century depositional 
formulae to imagine a coherent community of heterodox believers even as 
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ecclesiastical officials sought to censure such communities through the stra-
tegic use of testimonial rhetoric.
 In particular, this book illustrates that witnessing practices offered medi-
eval vernacular writers a language and a framework to examine the vari-
ous ways devotional, moral, legal, or ethical obligations to one’s community 
might be understood and to challenge how the authority to determine those 
obligations could be asserted.1 Writers such as Chaucer and Langland, as 
well as lesser-known theologians such as John Waldeby and William Thorpe, 
depicted episodes of witnessing in their work to explore the overlaps and ten-
sions between different kinds of legal or doctrinal communities. Accordingly, 
they imagined their own literary productions both attesting to and critiquing 
ecclesiastical and legal modes of community-formation and -articulation. 
 The late medieval witnessing ideals and practices this book explores 
emerge from a long history of devotional and legal forms of testimony. In the 
earliest martyr stories, for instance, witnesses are key to describing the com-
munal experience of divine judgment, and they do so through the double 
testimony of the martyr’s tortured body and the witnessing audience. Cru-
cially, this audience of witnesses includes both eyewitnesses who are present 
at the event and readers of the legend. To take one example, the third-century 
martyrdom of St. Perpetua establishes a continuum of witnesses that imag-
ines Perpetua’s body as the central, spectacular expression of steadfast faith 
that can assemble and unite a Christian community, present and future. For 
her devotion to a Christian god and her defiance of her pagan father, Per-
petua is first scourged in front of a crowd and then attacked by an angry 
bull. When the bull fails to kill her, her neck is cut with a sword. At least one 
description of her martyrdom begins with a prologue that calls upon readers 
to be quasi-witnesses to her steadfast faith:
The deeds recounted about the faith in ancient times were a proof of God’s 
favor and achieved the spiritual strengthening of men as well; and they 
were set forth in writing precisely that honor might be rendered to God 
and comfort to men by the recollection of the past through the written 
word.2
 1. For discussions of witnessing practices and community-formation, particularly in the 
sixteenth century, see Andrea Frisch, “The Ethics of Testimony: A Genealogical Perspective,” 
Discourse 25.1 (2004): 36–54. For a discussion of witnessing practices and travel literature, see 
Mary B. Campbell, The Witness and the Other World (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1988).
 2. “Si uetera fidei exempla et Dei gratiam testificantia et aedificantionem hominis operan-
tia propterea in litteris sunt digesta ut lectione eorum quasi repraesentatione rerum et Deus hon-
oretur et homo confortetur.” The Acts of the Christian Martyrs, trans. Herbert Musurillo (Oxford: 
Clarendon, 1972), 106.
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 The text presents itself as a diachronic tool that can produce a devotional 
community across time and space, imagining the martyrdom of St. Perpetua 
as an event that must be witnessed both by the crowd at her trial and by 
future readers. Indeed, the prologue reinforces the link between the eyewit-
nesses who saw Perpetua’s brutal death and the text’s readers. “And so, my 
bretheren and little children,” the prologue says, “that which we have heard 
and have touched with our hands we proclaim also to you, so that those of 
you that were witnesses may recall the glory of the Lord and those that now 
learn of it through hearing may have fellowship with the holy martyrs and, 
through them, with the Lord Jesus Christ.”3 The prologue promises that the 
sense of fidelity to Perpetua will transfer from the intimate experience of the 
eyewitnesses—those who “have heard and have touched with our hands”—to 
the more distant knowledge of those who have heard about the martyrdom, 
and then to the even more distant knowledge of those reading the text. Wit-
nessing thus expands to encompass a wide range of audiences, from observ-
ers to listeners to readers; those immediately present at her trial and death 
and those detached from it can equally claim to have “witnessed” her mar-
tyrdom, and by extension, to have experienced the divine wisdom of God.
 The story of St. Perpetua demonstrates the importance of witnessing 
in producing devotional communities as well as its flexibility to accom-
modate those unable to observe martyrological suffering firsthand. Indeed, 
in this and other martyrologies, the act of attesting to one’s faith must be 
performed publicly and spectacularly: the body of the martyr is a touch-
stone that unites the witnesses watching her suffering with the “witnesses” 
reading the descriptions of that suffering. Similarly, following the logic 
of communal witnessing depicted in martyrologies such as St. Perpetua’s, 
medieval mystery plays constructed witnesses out of their audiences so that 
they could attest to the miracle of Christ’s resurrection, offering testimony 
based on the eyewitness “evidence” offered by dramatic reenactment. Thus, 
for example, in the Wakefield Resurrection play, Christ repeatedly implores 
the audience to “behold” his body and, in doing so, to recognize the fullness 
of his love:
And therfor, thou shall understand,
In body, hede, feete, and hand,
Four hundreth woundys and five thowsand
 3. “et nos itaque quod audiuimus et contrectauimus, annuntiamus et uobis, fratres et fili-
oli, uti et uos qui interfuistis rememoremini gloriae domini et qui nunc cognoscitis per auditum 
communionem habeatis cum sanctis martyribus, et per illos cum domino nostro Iesu Chris-
to . . . ,” Acts of the Christian Martyrs, 106–7.
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Here may thou se;
And therto neyn were delt full even
For luf of the.4
This play asserts that because the audience can “see” the wounds on the actor 
playing Christ, they can also access the magnitude of Christ’s grace. Similarly, 
in the Chester Emmaus play, Christ presents himself to Thomas and makes 
him believe that he has risen again by saying, “Yea, Thomas, now thou seest 
me.” He addresses his disciples and the audience at the same time, implor-
ing them both to recognize the play as testimony of Christ’s divine power: 
“Christ geve you grace to take the way / Unto that joy that lasteth aye!” (273–
74). These plays construe Christian witnessing as a hybrid of individual eye-
witness experience and communal knowledge and faith, unifying members 
of the audience by insisting the plays be understood as the common experi-
ence of watching doctrinal history unfold before their eyes. Each member of 
the audience becomes an eyewitness to Christian eschatology and can thus 
consider him- or herself as a member of a community that already knows 
and believes the “evidence” rehearsed on the stage.5
 For such witnessing claims to operate effectively—that is, to construct 
and rehearse a community’s integrity—the testimonies of belief must be con-
sidered accurate and authentic. Thus, it was crucial that the multiple forms 
that witnessing could take (eyewitnessing, listening to a sermon, seeing a 
play, reading a text) be rendered parallel modes of testifying. For example, to 
authenticate his Life of St. Cuthbert, Bede explains how he relied on all kinds 
of testimony:
what was done in the Church throughout the province of the Northumbri-
ans, from the time when they received the faith of Christ till this present, 
I received not from any particular author, but by the faithful testimony of 
innumerable witnesses, who might know or remember the same; besides 
what I had of my own knowledge. Wherein it is to be observed, that what 
I have written concerning our most holy father, Bishop Cuthbert, either 
in this volume, or in my treatise on his life and actions, I partly took, and 
faithfully copied from what I found written of him by the brethren of the 
Church of Lindisfarne; but at the same time took care to add such things 
 4. “The Resurrection of the Lord,” in Medieval Drama, ed. David Bevington (Boston: 
Houghton Mifflin, 1975), 280–85.
 5. See Sarah Beckwith, Signifying God: Social Relation and Symbolic Act in the York Corpus 
Christi Plays (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001). For a discussion of the intimate rela-
tionship between legal witnesses and medieval drama, see Jody Enders, Rhetoric and the Origins 
of Medieval Drama (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1992).
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as I could myself have knowledge of by the faithful testimony of such as 
knew him. And I humbly entreat the reader, that if he shall in this that we 
have written find anything not delivered according to the truth, he will 
not impute the same to me, who, as the true rule of history requires, have 
laboured sincerely to commit to writing such things as I could gather from 
common report, for the instruction of posterity.6
Here, Bede asserts that “faithful testimony” can be found in a wide range of 
sources, from letters to hearsay to his own personal experience. Indeed, the 
accuracy of his report depends not on an individual author, he says, but on 
“innumerable witnesses,” whether human or documentary.
 However, although Bede implies that different forms of testimony can 
be considered equally accurate in his narrative of the life of a saint, he issues 
a caveat that he ought not be blamed for any mistakes. This caveat turns 
on the “true rule of history” (vera lex historiae) that envisions “common 
report” and “faithful testimony” as fundamental to historical veracity. For 
Bede, testimony asserts its authenticity when it can be gathered into a his-
torical account that seems accurate. In other words, Bede claims here that he 
is reporting the testimony accurately, rather than vouching for the accuracy 
of the testimony itself. Indeed, when Bede imagines “the faithful testimony 
of innumerable witnesses” to signify multiple kinds of testimonies, includ-
ing ecclesiastical letters and eyewitness claims, he implies that testimony is as 
useful for tracking communal memory and belief as for accurately describ-
ing a historical event.7 We see a similar rhetorical move at the beginning of 
Geoffrey of Monmouth’s History of the Kings of Britain, in which he claims 
that the deeds of British kings have been handed down to him through oral 
tradition, “just as if they had been committed to writing, by many peoples 
who had only their memories to rely on.”8 The equation of oral testimony, 
memory, and written document in both Bede and Geoffrey of Monmouth 
suggests that the requirements of accurate reportage did not strenuously 
distinguish between personal experience and documented history, and that 
testimony could confirm the beliefs of a community as well as offer historical 
accounts on its behalf.
 6. Bede, The Ecclesiastical History of the English Nation, ed. J. A. Giles (London: Henry G. 
Bohn, 1849), 3.
 7. Roger Ray, “Bede’s Vera Lex Historiae,” Speculum 55.1 (1980): 14. See also Andrew 
Rabin, “Bede, Dryhthelm, and the Witness to the Other World: Testimony and Conversion in 
the Historia ecclesiastica,” Modern Philology 106.3 (2009): 375–98.
 8. “laudis constarent & a multis populis quasi inscripta iocunde & memoriter predicaren-
tur.” The Historia Regum Britanniae of Geoffrey of Monmouth, ed. Robert Ellis Jones (London: 
Longman, Green, and Co., 1929), 219.
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 Indeed, as Geoffrey of Monmouth shows, the witnessing rhetoric used 
to rehearse Christian unity and history was likewise important in the forma-
tion of geopolitical and legal communities, and a wide range of texts imag-
ine witnessing as an opportunity to examine how one might attest to the 
concatenation of divine and state authority. For example, as Andrew Rabin 
has demonstrated, Wulfstan deployed forms of legal witnessing to envision 
an integrated model of Christian unity and English law. Rabin argues in 
particular that the Sermo Lupi ad Anglos locates the homily’s poetic sub-
ject “at the nexus between the interior moral obligations of the Christian 
self and the public legal responsibilities of the English ðegn,” suggesting 
that the Sermo posits witnessing as the fullest expression of the individual’s 
ordered relationship to the state and, in turn, the state’s ordered relationship 
to the divine.9 Many medieval romances similarly describe witnessing as an 
important way to assert the state’s link to God. Marie de France’s Lanval, for 
example, depicts the power of sworn testimony to determine the outcome 
of the slander case against Lanval. The Queen accuses Lanval of having no 
interest in women after he denies her advances on account of his love of 
another; because he has promised that he will not reveal his love for his lady, 
it looks as if his defense will be severely hampered and the Queen’s slander 
will stand for truth. During the trial, however, he denies under oath that 
he has insulted the king’s honor, and his lady then comes to court to testify 
that Lanval never propositioned the Queen. With the exculpatory evidence 
provided by those two testimonies, the king’s barons quickly free Lanval, 
determining that “Lanval had successfully answered the charge.”10 This text, 
like any number of romances, including Amis and Amiloun, Le chevalier de 
la charrette, Guillaume de Dole’s Roman de la rose, and Tristan, repeatedly 
illustrates the necessity of testimony both to the heuristic work of legal trials 
and to the drama of the story. More pointedly, such trial episodes demon-
strate that witnessing was thought to be a way to restore the king’s authority 
and the unity of the realm.
 Twelfth- and thirteenth-century romances such as Lanval or Guillaume 
de Dole routinely include trial scenes that focus on treason, whether imag-
ined as sexual transgression against a queen, slander, or plots against a king or 
a close kinsman.11 Such trial episodes often represent witnessing as crucial to 
 9. Andrew Rabin, “The Wolf ’s Testimony to the English: Law and the Witness in the Sermo 
Lupi ad Anglos,” JEGP 105.3 (2006): 389.
 10. “N’I a un sul ki n’ai jugié / que Lanval a tut desraisnié.” Lais de Marie de France, trans. 
Laurence Harf-Lancner (Paris: Lettres Gothiques, 1990), 627–28. For an English translation, see 
The Lais of Marie de France, trans. Robert Hanning and Joan Ferrante (Durham, NC: Labyrinth, 
1978).
 11. See Stephen D. White, “The Problem of Treason: The Trial of Daire le Roux,” in Law, Laity, 
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the legal proceedings that rely on ordeal (that is, a trial by battle or bodily test 
of guilt).12 In fact, even after ordeals were officially denounced by the Church 
in 1215 (discussed below), romances depicted ordeal trials as spectacular 
and foolproof ways of rooting out treason, asserting that the witnesses of 
those ordeals ought to be understood as metonymic stand-ins for the com-
munity as a whole. For example, the fourteenth-century romance Athelston 
describes the fate of four kinsmen, one of whom, Athelston, ascends to the 
throne after the king dies without an heir. He appoints his kinsmen to vari-
ous posts: one becomes the earl of Dover, another the earl of Stone, and the 
third the archbishop of Canterbury. Jealous when Athelston becomes close 
with the earl of Stone’s family, the earl of Dover tells Athelston that the earl 
of Stone is plotting against him. Athelston resolves to kill the earl of Stone 
and his family, pursuing his punishment with blind rage until a series of tri-
als by fire establishes their innocence and the earl of Dover’s guilt. Signifi-
cantly, each time the ordeal trial is performed, Athelston repeats the phrase 
“that sawgh the lordes of the land.” (It occurs three times in an 812-line 
romance.) And at the end of the romance, the text asserts, “alle men myghten 
see with yghe” that the real traitor has been revealed and order restored.13 
In Athelston, diegetic and extradiegetic eyewitnesses alike function as mem-
bers of the community who can attest that the threat has been averted, that 
justice has triumphed, and that the unifying authority of the king has been 
affirmed.
 Thus, the diverse forms and practices of witnessing—whether personal 
experience, hearsay, ordeal trial, oral testimony, or written documents—were 
designed to produce a unified devotional or political community. Witnesses 
were called upon to provide accounts of events that revealed divine or royal 
judgment, and those accounts produced narratives that spoke to communal 
obligations, hierarchies, and rules. However, even as witnessing was recog-
nized as fundamental to constructing and protecting legal, ideological, or 
doctrinal communities, literary portrayals of witnessing often constructed it 
as a way to highlight and trouble shifting ethical, legal, and doctrinal bound-
aries. Specifically, this book outlines how vernacular writers used depictions 
and discussions of witnessing to critique the modes of authority designed to 
and Solidarities: Essays in Honor of Susan Reynolds, ed. Pauline Stafford, Janet L. Nelson, and Jane 
Martindale (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2001), 95–115.
 12. For a discussion of the importance of witnesses in understanding cases of injury, wrong, 
and “the king’s peace” in Angevin and early common law, see Paul R. Hyams, Rancor and Recon-
ciliation in Medieval England (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2003), esp. chapters 4 and 5.
 13. Athelston, in Four Romances of England, ed. Ronald B. Herzman, Graham Drake, and 
Eve Salisbury (Kalamazoo, MI: Medieval Institute, 1999); “that sawgh the lordes of the land” re-
peated at lines 589, 613, and 643, and “alle men myghten see with yghe” at line 803.
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produce and protect differences between, for example, orthodox and hetero-
dox doctrinal communities, or between law-abiding subjects and outlaws. 
Indeed, witnessing was an important way fourteenth- and fifteenth-century 
legal thinkers, ecclesiastical officials, and vernacular writers alike sought to 
expose the overlaps and fissures between various kinds of authorities and 
communities: between local justice and royal law, for example, or between 
lay and clerical claims of access to the divine Word.14 
 Indeed, testimony does not operate as a fully “historical” discourse, inso-
far as it cannot provide a perfectly accurate or “factual” account of an event. 
Nor does it operate as a purely inventive or “fictional” discourse, insofar as 
it operates according the assumption of fact or accuracy. Its liminal status 
between the historical and the imagined, or between the factual and the 
fictional, means that witness testimony can be fruitfully taken up by literary 
scholars and particularly, as I discuss below, by medievalists. Derrida’s read-
ing of Maurice Blanchot’s The Instant of My Death, a first-person account of 
a man’s near-death experience at the hand of Nazis, captures the importance 
of the “literary” at the heart of testimony: “In essence a testimony is always 
autobiographical: it tells, in the first person, the shareable and unshareable 
secret of what happened to me, to me, to me alone, the absolute secret of 
what I was in a position to live, see hear, touch, sense, feel.”15 Derrida articu-
lates a central paradox in testimonial discourse: testimony both exposes an 
event and reveals the impossibility of articulating that event fully. A radically 
first-person discourse, witness testimony must nonetheless speak to larger, 
communal truths, whether legal, historical, or ideological. Yet because tes-
timony cannot extract itself from the limits of the individual witness’s per-
spective, it is for Derrida particularly linked to “the possibility of fiction, 
simulacra, dissimulation, lie, and perjury—that is to say, the possibility of 
literature” (29).
 Indeed, the literary possibilities inherent in testimony emerge especially 
when it attests to distinctions between individual recollection and historical 
authenticity. In their work on the testimony of Holocaust survivors, Dori 
Laub and Shoshana Felman focus particularly on the relationship between 
psychoanalytic and historical testimony, recognizing “how issues of biogra-
phy and history are neither simply represented nor simply reflected, but are 
reinscribed, translated, radically rethought and fundamentally worked over 
 14. For a discussion of the relationship between customary “folklaw” and official forms of 
statute and royal law in the fourteenth century, see Richard Firth Green, A Crisis of Truth: Lit-
erature and Law in Ricardian England (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1999).
 15. Jacques Derrida, Demeure: Fiction and Testimony, trans. Elizabeth Rottenberg (Stanford, 
CA: Stanford University Press, 2000), 43.
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by the text.”16 For Laub and Felman, the gaps between individual memory 
and history in the survivors’ testimony point to the friction between indi-
vidual experience and communal truth. Those gaps also suggest the possibil-
ity of resistance against accepted communal knowledge or belief. Recalling 
one witness who testified about an Auschwitz uprising, Laub explains that 
the woman claimed with surety that four chimneys had been blown up, but 
in fact it had been only one. Laub argues that rather than offer factual evi-
dence, the witness testified to the “bursting open of the very frame of Ausch-
witz,” such that she “is breaking the frame of the concentration camp by and 
through her very testimony: she is breaking out of Auschwitz even by her 
very talking. She had come, indeed, to testify, not to the empirical number of 
the chimneys, but to resistance, to the affirmation of survival, to the breakage 
of the frame of death. . . . This was her way of being, of surviving, of resisting” 
(62). Laub points out here that testimony emphasizes the vexed relationship 
between individual experience and historical truth, and more crucially, she 
suggests that by paying attention to this vexed relationship, we allow for the 
possibility of resistance and critique, recognizing the ways testimony might 
operate as a critical response to the rules, obligations, and oppressions that 
can shape a community.
 Taking up Laub’s claim that an individual’s testimony can function as 
critique or resistance of communal truths, Felman reminds us that to testify 
is more than to report a fact or an event: “Memory is conjured here essen-
tially in order to address another, to impress upon a listener, to appeal to a 
community” (204, emphasis in original). Kelly Oliver similarly argues that 
witnessing is always structured as a dialogic relation with another. For Oli-
ver, this means that witnessing foregrounds the ethical obligations required 
of individuals by their communities and that it permits those obligations 
to be reshaped and rearticulated. Because witnessing requires addressing 
another and being addressed, she suggests, it offers the possibility of empa-
thetic, intersubjective engagement with another and thus the possibility of 
a community that coheres around mutual ethical responsibility rather than 
authoritarian systems of duty and punishment.17 Thus, in their different 
ways, Derrida, Laub, Felman, and Oliver all define witnessing as a discourse 
that both attends to and remakes historical events, such that testimony can 
construct as well as critique communal experiences and obligations. They 
 16. Dori Laub and Shoshana Felman, Testimony (New York: Routledge, 1992), xiv. See also 
Dominick LaCapra, History and Memory after Auschwitz (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 
1998).
 17. Kelly Oliver, Witnessing: Beyond Recognition (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota 
Press, 2001).
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also usefully explain that testimony is structured by a tension between two 
sometimes irreconcilable acts: on one hand, testimony can recount an event, 
narrating what a witness has seen with his or her own eyes or heard with his 
or her own ears, but on the other hand, testimony can bear witness to a truth 
that cannot always be verified, such as faith or repressed trauma.18
 Witnessing has thus been understood by contemporary theorists as a 
discourse that must be read with a recognition of its mutual engagement 
with fact and fiction, and this hermeneutic imperative guides this book’s 
investigation of medieval testimony. Indeed, medievalists have long focused 
on the vexed relationship between historical truth and literary invention, 
particularly in terms of authorial voice and what constitutes “evidence” from 
the medieval past. In his classic article on Chaucer’s narratorial persona, for 
example, E. Talbot Donaldson warns readers of the Canterbury Tales not to 
mistake Chaucer-the-pilgrim for Chaucer-the-author, and to mistake neither 
for historian or reporter.19 In response, H. Marshall Leicester argues that 
the Tales’ verisimilitude invites the reader to confuse the voice of a pilgrim 
with a “real” person, and, by extension, to think of the voice of Chaucer-the-
pilgrim as that of a “real” author. As he puts it, “All these views demand that 
the voice in a text be traceable to a person, a subject, behind the language, an 
individual controlling and limiting, and thereby guaranteeing, the meaning 
of what is expressed.”20 Yet, he continues, “Chaucer” does not exist apart from 
his utterances, and the search for an authorial presence is mere fantasy.21 The 
status of the author and/or narrator is a critical topos in medieval literature, 
and any examination of witnessing, including this one, implies an interest 
in the authority of the speaker: that is, it implies an interest in the complex 
interface between historical or biographical evidence and literary expression. 
Indeed, how medieval authors and their texts both offer and obscure access 
to the past, and how the “literary” and the “historical” might be defined and 
seen to interact, are persistent, key issues for scholars of the Middle Ages. 
This book takes up these issues with a particular focus on late medieval tes-
timonial practices, exploring how literary depictions of witnessing present 
us with opportunities to examine complex relationships between historical 
accuracy and literary invention, between evidence and narrative, between 
event and expression.
 18. See Kelly Oliver, “Witnessing and Testimony,” Parallax 10.1 (2004): 79–88.
 19. E. Talbot Donaldson, “Chaucer the Pilgrim,” PMLA 69.4 (1954): 928–36.
 20. H. Marshall Leicester, Jr., “The Art of Impersonation: A General Prologue to the Canter-
bury Tales,” PMLA 95 (1980): 213–24.
 21. George Kane refers to such a search as “the fallaciousness of free biographical inference.” 
Chaucer and Langland: Historical and Textual Approaches (London: Athlone, 1989), 7.
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 In investigating late medieval witnessing, then, this book attends both to 
the historical particularities of fourteenth- and fifteenth-century witnessing 
practices and to the interpretive commitments of critical work on testimony. 
It reveals the importance of witnessing to legal, devotional, and political 
models of community-formation in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, 
paying special attention to how English political and ecclesiastical authorities 
built upon and wrestled with statutory law. Specifically, this book demon-
strates that late medieval vernacular writers took advantage of the complex 
claims to authority available in witnessing practices to explore how legal 
and devotional communities could be constructed, destroyed, and reformu-
lated. In doing so, they drew on witnessing practices to examine increasingly 
blurred boundaries between clerical and lay, Latinate and vernacular, oral 
and written. By reading texts such as the Pistel of Swete Susan, Piers Plow-
man, and the Testimony of William Thorpe with legal and devotional witness-
ing practices in mind, this book offers a picture of late medieval culture that 
actively negotiated the “oral” and the “documentary” rather than describes 
a culture in which oral practices and interactions of old were supplanted by 
written or documentary ones.
 Critics of medieval English culture will be familiar with the claim that 
literate culture can be viewed as an evolutionary step away from the oral cul-
tures that preceded it from Walter Ong’s seminal Orality and Literacy, which, 
despite its important assessment of communicative practices, nonetheless 
offers a somewhat teleological view of the relationship between oral cul-
tures and written literacies. Ong still exerts some pressure on accounts of the 
development of scribal technologies, vernacular literacies, and documentary 
forms, though his assertions have been widely challenged and nuanced.22 
Mark Amodio, for example, has advocated that medieval scholars examine 
the Middle Ages via an “oral–literate nexus,” in which they can recognize 
the performative dynamics of an oral poetics within the literate productions 
of Middle English texts. Doing so, he argues, would demonstrate that oral-
ity and literacy were interdependent rather than competing forces in post- 
Conquest England.23 Similarly, Janet Coleman has shown that listening 
remained critical to medieval reading practices, even in an increasingly doc-
umentary culture.24
 22. For an account of the endurance of Ong’s work in medieval studies, see Janet Coleman, 
“Aurality,” in Middle English, ed. Paul Strohm (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 68–85.
 23. Mark Amodio, Writing the Oral Tradition: Oral Poetics and Literate Culture in Medieval 
England (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2004).
 24. Janet Coleman, Public Reading and the Reading Public in Late Medieval England and 
France (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).
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 In studies of late medieval law and literature specifically, scholars have 
tended to focus on literacy and written documents. This is no doubt due to 
the legacy of legal records from the period, which are, not surprisingly, made 
up of such documents as official depositions, writs of complaint, and last 
wills and testaments. Moreover, following M. T. Clanchy’s groundbreaking 
work on twelfth-century developments in legal apparatus and literacy, much 
of the scholarship on the relationship between medieval law and literature 
concentrates on a burgeoning culture of official documents and texts.25 This 
work sees new kinds of bureaucratic writing emerging out of and nurtur-
ing the growing literacy in legal procedures and languages among lay com-
munities. Scholars such as Steven Justice, Emily Steiner, and Wendy Scase 
have persuasively shown that the upsurge in lay literacy and the efflores-
cence of legal and bureaucratic documents in the later Middle Ages were 
mutually supportive. Moreover, as these scholars have shown, bureaucratic 
language and documentary form infiltrated vernacular texts, which in turn 
deployed these new vocabularies for ideological—and sometimes transgres-
sive—purposes.26 Such criticism has significantly broadened our picture of 
late medieval literacy and culture, depicting a world in which official and 
quasi-official documents softened the distinctions between clerk and layper-
son or between elite and “rustic.”27
 By tracing multiple practices of witnessing in fourteenth- and fifteenth-
century England, this book builds on this scholarship, focusing especially on 
the status of bodily and vocal testimony in a culture increasingly inundated 
with written documents. Indeed, what is striking about the texts consid-
ered here is that they repeatedly depict the literate practices of official cul-
ture in conversation with “archaic” forms of evidence that rely on the body 
or the voice as their probative media. Literary explorations of witnessing 
take as their objects of investigation the testimonial media of juridical and 
religious witnesses: the tortured body of the martyr, the vocal testimony 
of the oath-taker, the documentary formulae of witness depositions. This 
book shows that Middle English writers imagined creative and dynamic 
interactions between bodily evidence, spoken testimony, and written text. 
For the authors this book studies, witness testimony functions as a flexible 
and vibrant discourse through which they can test the limits of witnessing 
 25. M.  T. Clanchy, From Memory to Written Record: England, 1066-1307, 2nd ed. (Cam-
bridge, MA: Blackwell, 1993).
 26. Steven Justice, Writing and Rebellion: England in 1381 (Los Angeles and Berkeley: Uni-
versity of California Press, 1994); Emily Steiner, Documentary Culture and the Making of Medi-
eval English Literature (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003); Wendy Scase, Literature 
and Complaint in England, 1272–1553 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007).
 27. See David Aers, “Vox Populi and the Literature of 1381,” in CHMEL, 432–53.
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to shape legal and doctrinal communities and communal obligations. In 
depicting witnessing as a crucial but flexible mode of community-formation, 
these authors critique the value of written documents as carriers of stable 
and legible authority, even as they rely on the documentary formulae and 
literate technologies of legal and bureaucratic texts.
 Although each chapter focuses on the specifics of witnessing practices 
and formulae, a more general sketch of the history of witness testimony in 
English legal practice here will help contextualize some of the ideas described 
above. Witnesses were necessary for all sorts of legal procedures and transac-
tions throughout the Middle Ages, from corroborating property transfers to 
attesting to the age of a minor at the time of a crime. Before 1215, legal actors 
known as “compurgatory witnesses” were primarily used as oath-helpers 
who could ratify for a judge the truth of the defendant’s oath. In such forms 
of proof, the accused would take an oath of innocence and call upon sev-
eral upstanding members of the community to testify not to the facts of the 
case per se, but to the accused’s reputation and standing in the community. 
As Richard Firth Green has pointed out, this system depended on ethical 
relationships within a local community, in which truth (or “trouthe”) was 
understood as communal agreement, rather than something more akin to 
“fact.”28 The system of compurgatory witnessing took seriously the perlocu-
tionary nature of the oath, which constituted a form of proof that produced 
an inflexible contract between God and the swearer. Accordingly, God (as 
well as the saint upon whose relics the oath-taker swore) also became a wit-
ness, testifying to the truth of the case through the mouth of the oath-taker.29
 If compurgation were unsatisfactory (because a compurgator failed to 
repeat the oath verbatim, for example, or because the compurgator did not 
have sufficiently solid social standing in the community), litigants could turn 
to battle, duel, or ordeal trial. These violent legal procedures were considered 
a last resort, used only when compurgation failed or when “open proof ” (lex 
aperta) was required, as in cases of homicide or treason.30 Trial by battle is 
precisely what it sounds like: two parties physically fought to determine the 
outcome of a case, often to the death but sometimes just to the satisfaction 
of a judge. Duel followed the same format and was used specifically in prop-
erty disputes.31 Ordeal trials proceeded a bit differently. Rather than pit two 
 28. Green, A Crisis of Truth, 100–103.
 29. Paul R. Hyams, “Trial by Ordeal: The Key to Proof in the Early Common Law,” in On 
the Laws and Customs of England: Essays in Honor of Samuel E. Thorne, ed. Morris S. Arnold et 
al. (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1981), 92–93.
 30. Robert Bartlett, Trial by Fire and Water: The Medieval Judicial Ordeal (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1988).
 31. Nicole Clifton, “The Romance Convention of the Disguised Duel and the Climax of 
Piers Plowman,” YLS 7 (1993): 123–28.
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contesting parties against one another, ordeal put the accused through a 
series of physical tests designed to harness and make manifest the judicium 
Dei upon the body of the accused. A trial by hot iron, for example, required 
that the accused hold in his hands a red-hot piece of metal that had been 
blessed by a priest, then proceed through a public marketplace and drop 
the iron at the altar. Three days later, the priest would examine the accused’s 
hands for signs of guilt, registered as blisters, red marks, or scabs.32 Con-
structed as a legal ritual in which the community functions as a witnessing 
audience, ordeal trial relied on two complementary testimonial media. First, 
it relied on the body of the accused as the canvas upon which God could 
testify and offer his divine judgment. Second, it constructed the members 
of the accused’s community as a single-voiced witness that could attest that 
the judicium Dei revealed during the procedure corroborated its beliefs and 
customs.
 In the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, both ecclesiastical and common 
law maintained that testimony was a crucial, even fail-safe, form of proof. 
With the revival of legal study at the University of Bologna in the twelfth cen-
tury, canonists turned to Roman legal models to outline testimonial practice, 
using what legal historians call Roman-canonical procedure, a hybrid juris-
prudential field that reconfigured classical proceduralists such as Justinian 
within the spiritual mandates of Church law. Following Gratian’s Decretum, 
canonists repeatedly claimed that witnesses offering vocal testimony were 
the best mode of proof, better than either written documents or the bodily 
“proof ” offered in ordeal or battle.33 Using both Roman law and Scriptural 
axiom as bases, canonists such as Gratian adopted the principle that two 
witnesses constituted full proof in ecclesiastical courts, and ecclesiastical law 
developed a sophisticated system of admitting and interrogating witnesses 
based on this evidentiary ideal.34 Tancred’s Ordo judicarium, for example, 
explains thoroughly that the two witnesses must take an oath and swear that 
they do not give testimony for money or out of friendship or hate.35 It also 
 32. Rebecca V. Colman notes that there is a disturbing lack of quantitative precision in or-
deal trial records. It is not at all clear what physical criteria would indicate guilt or innocence, so 
it seems that priests had enormous interpretive power to determine the outcome of these cases. 
“Reason and Unreason in Early Medieval Law,” Journal of Interdisciplinary History 4.4 (1974): 
589.
 33. Charles Donohue, Jr., “Proof by Witnesses in the Church Courts: An Imperfect Recep-
tion of the Learned Law,” in On the Laws and Customs of England, 127–58.
 34. R. H. Helmholz, The Oxford History of the Laws of England, vol. 1 (Oxford: Oxford Uni-
versity Press, 2004), 338–41. For a discussion of the use of two witnesses, see Bernard Jackson, 
“Susanna and the Singular History of Singular Witnesses,” Acta Juridica 37 (1977): 37–54.
 35. Pilii, Tancredi, Gratiae, Libri de iudiciorum ordine, ed. Friedrich C. Bergmann (Bot-
tingen, 1842), 3.8. For a discussion of hate and spite in legal disputes, see Hyams, Rancor and 
Reconciliation, 175–83.
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insists that witnesses describe only what they have seen and heard personally. 
Hearsay was to be admitted only in very particular cases.36
 Whereas twelfth-century ecclesiastical law codified the reliance on wit-
ness testimony in Church matters, Angevin legal reforms in common law 
conceptualized witnessing as a way to support the crown’s control over legal 
communities. The twelfth century has long been marked as a critical moment 
in English legal history, when the operations of local courts were centralized 
under the aegis of royal administration.37 In 1166, Henry II sent itinerant 
royal justices to the counties and shires to hear criminal cases, instituting an 
inchoate form of jury trial in which groups of twelve local representatives 
(called “assizes”) would give their assessment of the case to royal judges, who 
would then rule.38 When the Tractatus de legibus et consuetudinibus regni 
Anglie qui Glanvilla vocatur (known simply as “Glanvill”), the earliest com-
mon law treatise, surfaced around 1189 to outline the procedures for the use 
of juries and other legal standards of royal justice, it proposed trial by assize 
as a possible alternative to battle.39 Indeed, when Glanvill specifically offers 
the choice between trial by battle or by assize, it considers the evidentiary 
certainty provided by witnesses used in battle and those who offer narrative 
testimony in assize to be complementary forms of proof. In cases of land 
disputes, for example, Glanvill states that for a battle, the complainant must 
come to court with a “champion” who can corroborate the complainant’s 
claims, and he insists repeatedly that the champion must be “a suitable wit-
ness who heard and saw the facts” (per idoneum testem audientem et uiden-
tem) (II.3). Alternatively, if the defendant chooses a trial by assize, then the 
“neighborhood” is called to testify to what they already know about the case: 
“recourse must be had to the neighborhood, whose verdict shall be conclu-
sive” (ad uisnetum erit recuperandum et eius uerodicto credendum) (II.6).
 Thus, for Glanvill, those who testify in battle and those who testify to 
the assize authenticate their authority in much the same way: they offer their 
eye- and ear-witness knowledge of facts on behalf of their community. Sig-
nificantly, Glanvill saw the community as both a testimonial and judging 
 36. Donohue, “Proof by Witnesses,” 131.
 37. See, for example, F. W. Maitland and Frederick Pollack, The History of English Law Before 
the Time of Edward I, 2 vols. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1899). For an excellent 
summary of historians’ emphasis on Angevin legal reforms and a nuanced reading of them, see 
Hyams, Rancor and Reconciliation, 155–86.
 38. For a discussion of Henry II’s role in constructing a new system of royal justice, see 
Bruce O’Brien, “Forgery and the Literacy of the Early Common Law,” Albion 27.1 (1995): 1–19.
 39. Most scholars agree that this text was likely not written by Ranulph de Glanvill, Henry 
II’s chief justiciar. For a discussion of its authorship, see G. D. G. Hall’s introduction to Tractatus 
de legibus et consuetudinibus regni Anglie qui Glanvilla vocatur, ed. and trans. G. D. G. Hall (Ox-
ford: Oxford University Press, 1993). Hereafter cited parenthetically within the text.
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body, since “in proportion as the testimony of several suitable witnesses in 
judicial proceedings outweigh that of one man, so this constitution relies 
more on equity than does battle; for whereas battle is fought on the testimony 
of one witness, this constitution requires the oaths of at least twelve men” 
(II.7). On one hand, then, witnesses were to testify “objectively,” narrating 
facts and events they had seen with their own eyes and heard with their own 
ears. But on the other hand, witnesses were also to offer testimony on behalf 
of the community and judgment according to their communal beliefs. Used 
for multiple purposes and in multiple forms in both ecclesiastical and com-
mon law, witnessing was fundamental for asserting the customary, legal, and 
ethical contours of community, whether that community was understood as 
a local group of eyewitnesses who could attest to a judicium Dei or a twelve-
person jury that could represent a communal accusation.
 In 1215, the Fourth Lateran Council explicitly articulated the function 
and procedures of witness testimony in the service of shoring up the beliefs 
and customs of Christian community. Scholars have widely acknowledged 
the long-term effects of the Council’s famous Omnis utriusque sexus decree, 
which required annual auricular confession to one’s parish priest. The decree 
invigorated the production of texts that were designed to instruct both the 
laity and lower clergy on basic spiritual knowledge, and it helped develop 
new discourses of confession and instruction that sought to manage a rela-
tionship between the individual penitent and a larger doctrinal and spiritual 
community.40 However, despite scholarly focus on the Council’s decree about 
confession, the Council’s document speaks much more frequently about wit-
ness testimony.41 Indeed, it begins by establishing the unity of the Church 
through a citation from John 5: “Thus we read in the canonical letter of 
John: For there are three that bear witness in heaven, the Father and the Word 
and the holy spirit, and these three are one; and he immediately adds, And 
the three that bear witness on earth are the spirit, water and blood, and the 
three are one, according to some manuscripts.”42 The assertion of witnessing 
as a foundational principle of Christian unity inaugurates the Council’s list 
of decrees, which was itself designed to cement the practices of a doctrinal 
community.
 40. See, for example, Marjorie Curry Woods and Rita Copeland, “Classroom and Confes-
sion,” CHMEL, 376–406; and Katherine C. Little, Confession and Resistance: Defining the Self in 
Late Medieval England (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2006).
 41. John W. Baldwin, “The Intellectual Preparation for the Canon of 1215 Against Ordeals,” 
Speculum 36 (1961): 613–36. For a somewhat different take on the demise of ordeal trial as a 
result of the Fourth Lateran Council, see Hyams, “Trial by Ordeal,” 101–4.
 42. Decrees of the Ecumenical Councils, vol. 1, ed. Norman P. Tanner (Washington, DC: 
Georgetown University Press, 1990) 231.
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 The two decrees from the 1215 Council that focus specifically on witness 
testimony helped articulate important ways of thinking about the relation-
ship between an individual witness and his or her doctrinal community. 
Canon 18, Qualiter et quando, which prohibited priests from blessing the 
instruments used in ordeal trial, sought to detach divine judgment from 
human processes of evidence and inquiry. Its procedural effect on witness 
testimony in English law was to institute inquisition as the most common 
court procedure, shifting away from accusation and denunciation.43 Unlike 
inquisition, accusation required an individual complainant to initiate and 
carry out a prosecution; the complainant had to be of good standing in the 
community, and women, minors, excommunicates, and reputed criminals 
were barred from beginning court proceedings.44 If the accuser failed to 
prove his case, he would suffer the same punishment meted out to convicted 
criminals. Denunciation followed the same process, differing only in that 
it required a Church official first to admonish the accused in an attempt to 
prevent a formal trial. Both accusation and denunciation relied on oaths to 
verify the truth of the complainant’s accusations, and compurgatory wit-
nesses were used by the complainant and by the defendant to support their 
reputations and corroborate their oaths.
 Unlike either accusation or denunciation, inquisition did not require an 
individual complainant. Instead, based on the Qualiter et quando decree, a 
judge could initiate criminal proceedings based on publica fama, in which 
widespread acknowledgment of the crime took the place of individual accu-
sation. Crucially, this shift made it possible to conceptualize an entire com-
munity—rather than an individual—as a complainant. Indeed, as the decree 
makes clear, rumors swirling around the community should not be taken 
lightly: “the superior should carry out the duty of his office not as if he were 
the accuser and the judge but rather with the rumor providing the accusa-
tion and the outcry making the denunciation.”45 Rather than issuing from 
the voice of a single accuser, a complaint emerged from the general public, 
and its truthfulness resided in the perceived unanimity of the community.46 
The recognition of a communal accusatory voice rendered compurgatory 
 43. H. A. Kelly, “Inquisition and the Prosecution of Heresy, Misconceptions and Abuses,” 
in Inquisitions and Other Trial Procedures in the Medieval West (Hampshire: Ashgate Variorum 
Series, 2001), I.439–51.
 44. Helmholz, History, 605–8.
 45. “et si rei poposcerit qualitas, canonica districtio culpam feriat delinquentis: non 
tamquam sit actor et iudex, sed quasi deferente fama vel denunciante clamore, officii sui debi-
tum exequatur.” Decrees, 238.
 46. Hence the phrase ex frequenti et clamosa insinuatione, typically used in defamation re-
cords. See Helmholz, History, 610.
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witnesses obsolete, since it assumed all members of the community spoke 
with one voice against the defendant. Thus, through the Qualiter et quando 
decree, rumor (or, more precisely, public outcry) acquired sufficient legal 
status to initiate proceedings against someone.
 In addition, Canon 38, the Quoniam contra falsam decree, required that 
scribes (as the decree puts it, either a public official or “two suitable men”) 
compile written records of court proceedings. The canon stipulates that the 
judge keep the documentation for himself as well as furnish copies to each 
party upon request, in case disputes should arise about his handling of the 
case. In essence, the Quoniam contra falsam suggests that written documents 
can obviate both judicial misbehavior and misinterpretation. Consequently, 
as Richard Helmholz points out, it called into question the effects of oral 
pleading and testimony by suggesting that a written document could offer 
stable, enduring, and even inarguable evidence of judicial acta.47
 In terms of witnessing, then, the Fourth Lateran Council illustrates two 
crucial issues that resonate both for later medieval jurists and for vernacular 
writers. First, the idea that trial could proceed based on “public outcry” gave 
rumor and gossip legal force, and vernacular writers often probed the legal 
and doctrinal ideal of a unified, evidentiary communal voice. Chaucer, for 
example, illustrates his worry about the power of rumor when he yokes “fals 
and soth” together in the House of Rumor.48 Second, requiring legal docu-
mentation suggested that legal documents could supplant the ethical truths 
to which a community tacitly consented through local, customary practices. 
(Notably, many vernacular writers found work in clerks’ offices or the Office 
of the Privy Seal, and the bureaucratic language of the documents they pro-
duced there often found its way into their poetry.) Yet for writers such as 
William Langland or the anonymous author of the Pistel of Swete Susan, the 
ideal of an accurate and stable written text became a point of contest as they 
tried to negotiate the various ways their own works would be copied, cited, 
and transmitted, even used as “evidence” for a range of unanticipated ideo-
logical purposes.
 Thus, witnessing—construed both as communal belief and as written 
instruments of the court—was crucial to the Fourth Lateran Council’s sense 
of a unified doctrinal community. Witnessing and its written instruments 
 47. Richard Helmholz, “Quoniam contra falsam (X 2.19.11) and the Court Records of the 
English Church,” in Als die Welt in die Akten kam, ed. Susanne Lepsius and Thomas Wetzstein 
(Frankfurt: Vittorio Klostermann, 2008), 31–49.
 48. House of Fame 2108–9, in The Riverside Chaucer. For a discussion of gossip in late me-
dieval vernacular writing, see Susan E. Phillips, Transforming Talk: The Problem with Gossip in 
Late Medieval England (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2007).
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were likewise crucial to statute law’s sense of a unified political community. 
To take one important example, Henry de Bracton’s mid-thirteenth-century 
De legibus et consuetudinibus Angliae imagined a coherent program of stat-
ute law and attempted to collate the complicated system of writs used in 
English criminal and civil procedure. It explained both how “suits and pleas 
are decided according to English laws and customs” as well as instructed the 
reader in “the art of preparing records and enrollments.”49 Bracton claims 
that his compilation will serve both the legal expert and the untrained lay-
person: “The general intention is to treat of law that the unskilled may be 
made expert, the expert more expert, the bad good and the good better, as 
well by the fear of punishment as by the hope of reward” (2.20).
 Like Glanvill, Bracton offers defendants the choice of being tried by bat-
tle or by assize, replicating Glanvill’s argument that a 12-person jury is more 
dependable than individual witnesses, because it relies on multiple oaths that 
promise to adhere to the truth. He also, like Glanvill, explains the mixed role 
of juries as both judging and testimonial entities: while juries are to pres-
ent their veredictum to royal justices, they must also report criminal activity 
going on in their local communities: “And let them be told in private that if 
anyone in their hundred or wapentake is suspected of some crime they are 
to arrest him at once if they can. If they cannot, let them give his name, and 
the names of all those who are under suspicion, privately to the justices in 
a schedule and the sheriff will be ordered to arrest them at once and bring 
them under arrest before the justices, that the latter may do justice upon 
them” (2.329). Yet despite his careful explanation of how assize trials work, 
Bracton is tentative about the way testimony among various authorities 
might differ. He insists that credible witnesses must be able to give specific 
information, carefully outlining the facts to which any complainant must 
attest, such as the year, place, date, day, and hour of the event, as well as what 
he or she knows by “his own sight and hearing.” The complainant must also 
“be consistent in what he says and in all circumstantial details” (2.388).
 However, one notable exception to Bracton’s requirement of consistency 
is the official documents used in court. He states that sometimes, partic-
ularly in cases of homicide, coroners’ rolls and the sheriff ’s records differ 
because an accuser might forget the details of his story out of fear. Or per-
haps, Bracton suggests, the sheriff who recorded the story has died and his 
rolls have gone missing (2.395–96). In these cases, the story with the most 
supporting documentary evidence should prevail in court, and other docu-
 49. Henry de Bracton, De legibus et consuetudinibus Angliae, trans. Samuel E. Thorne (Cam-
bridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1968), 2.20.
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ments ought to be dismissed. Bracton also worries about the possibility that 
the voice of the community could initiate legal proceedings, since “uproar 
and public outcry are at times made of many things which in truth have no 
foundation and thus the idle talk of the people is not to be heeded” (2.404). 
Distinguishing between legal clamor and “idle talk” (vanae voces populi) is 
the task of the judge, who must carefully examine the twelve jurors about the 
source of the suspicion. Defendants have the right to remove anyone from 
the jury they feel is acting out of enmity or revenge. For Bracton, then, wit-
nessing is a necessary but imperfect mode of establishing legal truth and, by 
extension, community unity. He sees the pitfalls of oral testimony as well as 
those of written documents, but he also recognizes how important witness-
ing is to legal procedures and to policing the communities served by those 
procedures.
 This outline of testimonial philosophies and practices is merely a snap-
shot of the range of issues that emerge in an analysis of medieval witnessing. 
Each chapter discusses specific witnessing practices with respect to the texts 
it analyzes, exploring how particular modes of testimony inform the texts’ 
explorations of community-formation and -discipline. Altogether, these 
chapters depict witnessing capaciously, thinking of witnessing as practices 
that register and critique communal obligations and systems of authority. 
However, examining the wide implications of witnessing necessarily means 
this book cannot consider in detail all of the contexts it touches upon. For 
example, this book repeatedly returns to the problem of mediation and pres-
ence: that is, it explores how witnesses often functioned as intermediaries 
between divine truth and a skeptical community. Mediation and presence is 
a critical and complex issue at the heart of fourteenth- and fifteenth-century 
Wycliffism and Lollardy, and chapters 2 and 5 examine how the idea that 
clergy can act as mediators between God and an individual believer is artic-
ulated as a problem of witnessing in vernacular poetry and in fictionalized 
legal documents. But this book cannot treat fully the complicated theological 
and philosophical traditions surrounding mediation and presence. Rather, 
it seeks to show that witnessing is an important part of those traditions. 
Likewise, while this book demonstrates that witnessing was important to 
establishing the authority of the crown to trump local customary practices 
(as examined in chapters 1 and 3), it cannot discuss in detail the complex 
developments of royal law and parliamentary privilege in the fourteenth cen-
tury. This book seeks instead to demonstrate that testimony and witnessing 
are central to a range of debates and controversies ongoing in the fourteenth 
and fifteenth centuries. With the many implications of witnessing in mind, 
this book concentrates on two critical issues at the heart of medieval witness-
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ing: the production of legal and doctrinal communities and the truth-claims 
available in different witnessing media.
 The first three chapters focus on the first of these issues, on how legal 
and doctrinal communities were asserted, disciplined, and reconfigured. All 
three specifically examine false witness, a concern that emerges in a wide 
range of texts, from pastoral manuals to royal statutes to lyric poetry. The 
ubiquitous worry about perjury, muddled oaths, and blasphemy in the four-
teenth and fifteenth centuries points to more generalized anxiety about the 
failure of the mechanisms designed to harness the word of God on behalf of 
ecclesiastical and secular order. Episodes of false witness depicted in vernac-
ular literature expose how the systems of power that depend on a declared 
intimacy with the divine might rest on flimsy claims, and these episodes thus 
explore how legal and ecclesiastical authorities could be resisted.
 Chapter 1, “The Face of a Saint and the Seal of a King,” examines the 
various kinds of witnessing practices used to produce a “nacioun” in Chau-
cer’s Man of Law’s Tale. This chapter argues that, though told by a sergeant 
of law, the Tale dramatizes the failure of legal inquiry, material evidence, 
and bureaucratic documents to construct and protect a unified Christian 
community. Its retelling of the hagiographical story of Constance, a saintly 
woman who endures numerous tortures without ever losing her faith in 
divine justice, depicts at its center Constance’s public trial for a murder she 
did not commit. Chaucer uses a knight’s false oath to elevate divine judgment 
over legal inquiry and to demonstrate how divine intervention into legal 
proceedings can convert a pagan king into a Christian one. Later, when the 
king’s pagan mother forges royal letters to condemn Constance, Chaucer ani-
mates the widespread worry that the king’s word can be easily manipulated. 
In doing so, he upholds the sanctity of the divine Word over and against 
the legal and political systems that work to authenticate the royal word by 
attaching it to the divine. That he does so through a lawyer’s tale illustrates 
his ambivalence about the power of the law to produce and convey the com-
munal beliefs upon which a Christian “nacioun” relies.
 Chapter 2, “Silence, Testimony, and the Case of Susanna,” examines how 
the depiction of false witness in the Scriptural story of Susanna works both to 
shore up and to critique doctrinal assertions of Christian female obedience. 
As told in the Book of Daniel, Susanna is falsely accused of adultery by two 
Church Elders and condemned by a legal trial; at the last second, the prophet 
Daniel saves her after she prays silently to God. After tracking the muffling 
of Susanna’s voice in early patristic commentaries on the Book of Daniel, 
this chapter focuses on the Pistel of Swete Susan, an English alliterative ver-
sion of the tale from the 1390s. It argues that the Pistel actively engages with 
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the strategies of silence deployed by the early Church fathers who sought to 
translate Susanna into an exemplar of female obedience and chastity. The 
Pistel exposes the legacy of silence in the Susanna story and considers how 
her silence might be understood as a kind of testimony under English rape 
and adultery laws. The Pistel, this chapter shows, draws upon the Susanna 
story’s long-term interest in silence, testimony, and doctrinal community to 
focus on contemporary legal procedure in England, probing the complex 
relationship between English statute law and Christian community.
 Together, the first two chapters outline the ways that worries about per-
jury presented literary writers with opportunities to depict how an exem-
plary witness can resist corruptible legal models of authority to authorize 
a Christian community. Chapter 3, “Neighbors, Witnesses, and Outlaws in 
the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Centuries,” focuses on the refusal to testify, a 
form of false witness different from, but no less worrisome than, perjury. 
This chapter explores how religious officials, jurists, and poets exploited the 
multiple registers of the Scriptural requirement to bear witness against one’s 
neighbor. Tracing the term “neighbor” in thirteenth- and fourteenth-century 
pastoral treatises and common law, this chapter shows that the legal neighbor 
poses a challenge to the ideal of Christian unity emphasized in the Scriptural 
precept to “love one’s neighbor.” This challenge is foregrounded in a little-
studied exemplum included in John Waldeby’s collection of Sunday sermons, 
in which Waldeby excoriates a community for failing to testify to a rash of 
murders in the area, accusing them of “turning God into an outlaw.” By con-
textualizing his exemplum with statutory laws on false witness, pastoral calls 
to neighborliness, and late medieval outlaw literature, this chapter argues 
that Waldeby suggests that a community united by its fidelity to the king and 
one united by spiritual responsibility to one another may be at odds.
 These first three chapters all demonstrate how witnessing shapes, defends, 
and breaks community bonds, examining particularly how portrayals of false 
witness illustrate the centrality of witnessing in both formulating and cri-
tiquing doctrinal and legal communities. The final two chapters turn to the 
authoritative rhetoric of witnessing media, investigating the distinctions and 
similarities of claims made by the testifying body, voice, and document. Wil-
liam Langland’s sustained investigation of witnessing is the subject of chapter 
4, “Piers Plowman, Book, and the Testimonial Body.” This chapter examines 
Langland’s scenes of witness testimony throughout his poem, prominently 
displayed in the complaint of Peace against Wrong, in Lady Mede’s trial, and, 
more surprisingly, in his discussion of grace in the third vision as well as in 
the famous pardon scene. In these scenes of witnessing, Langland negoti-
ates the experiential claims of the eyewitness and the iterability of Scriptural 
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citation, conceptualizing personification as a fulcrum between the two. His 
investigation of witnessing, personification, and material texts culminates in 
his peculiar personification, Book. As a vocal text with a body, Book poses 
challenging questions about the authoritative rhetoric of the martyrological 
body, material texts, and the divine Word. The chapter ends by examin-
ing how Langland’s exploration of witnessing and textuality in Piers Plow-
man resurfaces in fifteenth- and sixteenth-century Langlandian texts, which 
deploy witnessing for overtly reformatory ends.
 The fifth and final chapter, “Witnessing, Presence, and Lollard Com-
munities,” examines witnessing practices in the heated debates surrounding 
Scriptural access and vernacular literacy at the turn of the fifteenth cen-
tury. Focusing on the staged interrogation between Archbishop Arundel and 
William Thorpe, this chapter tracks how the particularities of heresy inqui-
sition—inquisitio heretice pravitatis—provide Thorpe a structure and vocab-
ulary by which he can resist Arundel’s attempts to trap him into abjuring his 
heterodox beliefs. For Thorpe, the interplay between his own presence in 
the interrogation room and an absent audience who will “witness” the truth 
of his beliefs offers him strategies to create an extralegal “deposition” that 
exceeds the circumstances of its production and the constraints of its genre.
 Although these five chapters take the literature of fourteenth- and 
fifteenth-century England as their main objects of investigation, they also 
suggest that the multiple portrayals of witnessing in the later Middle Ages 
might help us conceptualize how we understand the differences and overlaps 
between a fictional story and an evidentiary one: that is, how we understand 
literary and historical evidence. This book thus ends with a coda that traces 
the uses of textual and historical “witnesses” in New Philology and New His-
toricism, parsing how this vocabulary conveys a certain access to the Middle 
Ages and a kind of historical accuracy. Analyzing medieval witnessing, this 
book suggests, challenges us to consider critically how we authenticate schol-
arly evidence and determine the truth of the work that we do. 
C h a u C e r ’ s  m a n  o f  L a W  takes seriously his role as a narrator, the medi-
eval Latin term for both someone who enters legal pleas and a teller of sto-
ries. Indeed, the Man of Law insists he is not a poet, but a lawyer, insulting 
Chaucer as a silly rhymer: “‘I kan right now no thrifty tale seyn / That Chau-
cer, thogh he kan but lewedly / On metres and on rymyng craftily, / Hath 
seyd hem in swich Englissh as he kan / Of olde tyme, a knoweth many a 
man.’”1 He then claims that he will “speke in prose,” as is befitting a lawman 
such as himself (II.96).2 However, despite his assertions regarding his own 
authority to tell the kind of story he wants to tell—presumably, a lawyerly 
one, rather than a literary one—the Man of Law finds himself subject to 
the Host’s requirement to tell an entertaining tale. In fact, throughout the 
Canterbury Tales, the Host reminds the pilgrims that the storytelling game 
is structured by his organization and command, not theirs. In the Man of 
Law’s introduction, the Host explicitly reminds the Man of Law that he has 
assented to the Host’s sovereign judgment:
 1. II.46–50. All citations from the Canterbury Tales are from the Riverside Chaucer and will 
be cited parenthetically by fragment and line number.
 2. For a discussion of the possible multiple registers of prose here, particularly given that 
the Man of Law uses rime royal, see A. S. G. Edwards, “‘I Speke in Prose’: Man of Law’s Tale, 96,” 
Neuphilologishe Mitteilungen 92 (1991): 469–70.
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“Ye been submitted, thurgh youre free assent,
To stonden in this cas at my juggement,
Acquiteth yow now of youre biheeste;
Thanne have ye do youre devoir ate leeste.” (35–38)
 The Host’s establishment of his sovereignty over this ad hoc community 
of pilgrims here not only insists on his status as judge; it more broadly inau-
gurates a vision of sovereign law and community-formation that the Man of 
Law himself goes on to parse in his Tale. Indeed, sovereignty and commu-
nity are central preoccupations throughout the Canterbury Tales.3 Written 
at the end of the fourteenth century, when Richard II sought to shore up 
the coercive authority of the crown even as various legal and bureaucratic 
institutions emerged to mediate between its sovereign power and the com-
mons, gentry, barons, and peasants, the Canterbury Tales repeatedly depicts 
and explores how sovereign law might be asserted and protected.4 The Man 
of Law’s story in particular deconstructs the complicated ways sovereign 
authority can both foster and threaten communal sensibilities, focusing on 
the production of an English “nacioun,” which the Man of Law fantasizes to 
be a community united by divine justice and protected by the sovereign rule 
that relies on divine justice.
 Curiously and significantly, the Man of Law depicts the requirements and 
consequences of sovereign law through a well-known hagiographic tale that 
turns on the treachery of false witness. In this story, the obedient and patient 
Constance is sent by her father from Rome to Syria to marry the Muslim 
Sultan there, but his mother ships her off to sea in a rudderless boat. After 
she lands in Northumberland, her steadfast devotion converts the Northum-
brians as well as their pagan king, Alla, who marries her. But after a trial for 
murder (of which she is falsely accused), Constance is again shipped away in 
a rudderless boat. Miraculously, she returns to Rome, where she is reunited 
with her father and with Alla. Repeatedly tested by false accusations, fallible 
systems of evidence, and unjust punishments, Constance remains patient 
 3. For example, the Tale of Melibee, which the Man of Law was perhaps slated to tell in early 
versions of the Tales, depicts at length Melibeus’s deliberations about how to assert his authority 
to punish the thieves who have broken into his house and beaten his wife and daughter. Likewise, 
the Wife of Bath’s Tale overtly depicts women’s desire for soveraynetee, while the Clerk’s Tale illus-
trates Walter’s right to sovereign power over Griselda even as it critiques the severity with which 
it is performed. See Donald C. Green, “The Semantics of Power: Maistrie and Soveraynetee in The 
Canterbury Tales,” Modern Philology 84.1 (1986): 18–23.
 4. Nigel Saul, “The Kingship of Richard II,” in Richard II: The Art of Kingship, ed. Anthony 
Goodman and James Gillespie (Oxford: Clarendon, 1999), 37–57.
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throughout her ordeals, sure of her devotion to God and steadfast in her 
belief that divine justice will prevail.5
 Specifically, the Man of Law uses the repeated scenes of false witness at 
the heart of the Constance story to assert the importance of faith in shaping 
and expressing the sanctity of a community and to explore how a sovereign 
leader must relinquish his earthly legal power to the authority of divine jus-
tice.6 Indeed, though the story provides an exemplary model of womanly 
obedience and Christian faith in Constance, the Man of Law’s focal interest 
in his exploration of nation-building is Alla, the Northumbrian king who 
defies his mother, his culture, and his religion to marry Constance and pro-
duce a Christian heir to his throne. As a sovereign lord, Alla is the “primary 
organizing figure around whom divergent groups build or contest alliance,” 
insofar as he functions as the figure through which the Man of Law can con-
ceptualize how Muslim and pagan communities might be subsumed under 
the aegis of Christian law.7 In other words, the Man of Law produces in Alla 
the image of a Christian sovereign that can turn away from a pagan past and 
transform a “strange nacioun”—the phrase the Man of Law uses to describe 
Syria—into one that adheres to divine law. The Man of Law’s Tale thus 
explores both how sovereign legal authority can shape a doctrinally bound, 
divinely sanctioned “nacioun” and how culturally and ideologically distant 
communities—in this case, Muslim Syria and pagan Northumberland—can 
be transformed into nations that work according to Christian principles of 
obedience.8 The scenes of false witness depicted in the Tale illustrate that wit-
nessing is a critical tool in shaping a community whose sovereign authority 
 5. See Robert M. Correale’s contribution to Sources and Analogues of the “Canterbury 
Tales,” vol. 2, ed. Robert M. Correale and Mary Hamel (Cambridge: D. S. Brewer, 2009), 277–350.
 6. Joseph E. Grennen, “Chaucer’s Man of Law and the Constancy of Justice,” JEGP 84.4 
(1985): 498–514.
 7. Patricia Clare Ingham, Sovereign Fantasies: Arthurian Romance and the Making of Brit-
ain (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2001), 9.
 8. Many scholars have convincingly demonstrated that the Man of Law’s Tale fundamen-
tally, and in multiple ways, explores tensions around cultural difference and proximity: the prox-
imate difference between Islam and Christianity, between England and Rome, and between 
masculine, institutional forms of religious hierarchy and feminine, extrainstitutional modes of 
devotion. These studies illustrate that the Man of Law’s Tale depicts racial, cultural, and religious 
difference in order to stage a series of conversions to reassert what Paul Strohm has called the 
Man of Law’s “complacently pious” set of Christian values. See Susan Schibanoff, “Worlds Apart: 
Orientalism, Antifeminism, and Heresy in Chaucer’s Man of Law’s Tale,” Exemplaria 8.1 (1996): 
60–96; David Wallace, Chaucerian Polity: Absolutist Lineages and Associational Forms in England 
and Italy (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1997), 182–211; Kathy Lavezzo, “Beyond 
Rome: Mapping Gender and Justice in the Man of Law’s Tale,” SAC 24 (2002): 149–80; Elizabeth 
Robertson, “The ‘Elvyssh’ Power of Constance: Christian Feminism in the Man of Law’s Tale,” 
SAC 23 (2001): 143–80; and Paul Strohm, Social Chaucer (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 1989), 167.
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stems from divine justice, one that can claim a Christian heritage and erase 
its non-Christian ancestry.
 The urgency of these scenes draws, in part, upon the many Scriptural 
precepts that describe witnessing as a way to construct and protect Chris-
tian community. Indeed, it would be difficult to overestimate the Scriptural 
preoccupation with giving testimony and bearing witness as a way of formu-
lating doctrinal unity. For example, Hebrews 12:1 describes saints who can 
testify to God’s perseverance as a “cloud of witnesses” (nubem testium), while 
Acts repeatedly calls the apostles Christ’s witnesses (testes). Likewise, Luke 
requires that witnesses confirm the resurrection of Christ, linking together 
preaching and witnessing: “And he said to them, Thus it is written and thus 
it behooved Christ to suffer and rise again from the dead on the third day, 
and that penance and the remission of sins should be preached in his name 
to all people, beginning in Jerusalem, and you are witnesses to these things.”9 
Giving and hearing testimony is fundamental to affirming and repeating 
one’s faith, and one also bears witness to one’s faith by listening to sermons, 
remembering Christ’s suffering, and attending Mass. Moreover, witnessing 
binds members of a community together by offering them opportunities 
to attest to collective beliefs. The Man of Law depicts witnessing as a way 
to draw together a unified “nacioun” that is bound by its subjects’ mutual 
Christian faith and dedication to a sovereign leader. Strikingly, he envisions 
such community unity by critiquing legal models of witnessing as fallible and 
divisive.
 In the Tale’s first scene of false witness, a treacherous knight accuses 
Constance of a murder he himself has committed. Although all the physical 
evidence points to her guilt, Constance’s pale face, a face of innocence and 
steadfast faith, belies the knight’s accusation. The second episode of false wit-
ness occurs after Alla has converted and has married Constance. It depicts 
the king’s pagan mother, Donegild, repeatedly sending counterfeit royal doc-
uments to Alla while he is away at war in Scotland to frame Constance for 
producing a “monstrous” heir to the throne. Taking up the crisis of false 
witness, sovereign power, and divine justice dramatized in the first episode, 
this extended scene conceptualizes false witness not as courtroom perjury, 
but rather as the manipulation of royal documents and official seals, a crime 
that was understood to be treasonous false witness by the second half of the 
fourteenth century. By staging the falsification of royal documents, this epi-
sode plays upon contemporary fears about the fallibility of the royal word 
 9. Luke 26:46–48: “Et dixit eis quoniam sic scriptum est et sic oportebat Christum pati et 
resurgere a mortuis die tertia, et praedicari in nomine eius paenitentiam et remissionem pecca-
torum in omnes gentes incipientibus ab Hierosolyma vos autem estis testes horum.”
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and bureaucratic documents at the hands of forgers. The Man of Law’s Tale 
thus yokes together two distinct forms of false witness—courtroom perjury 
and forged documents—to consider how false witness, in its many forms, is 
a threat to divine justice and Christian sovereignty. Reading these two epi-
sodes together reveals the Man of Law’s overall project to portray multiple 
kinds of false witness as real dangers to the ability of sovereign law to shape 
Christian community and protect its boundaries, and, by extension, to regis-
ter how crucial witnessing is to building a divinely sanctioned “nacioun.”
False oaths, Bloody Knives, and constance’s Pale Face
The Man of Law’s Tale begins in Syria, where a company of merchants tells 
the story of the Roman emperor’s beautiful daughter, whom they encoun-
tered during a trade trip. When they returned to Syria, the story goes, they 
described Constance so vividly to the Sultan “that al his lust and al his bisy 
cure / Was for to love hire while his lyf may endure” (II.188–89). Wanting to 
marry Constance based on her reputation alone, the Sultan consults a “privy 
conseil,” which argues that it cannot imagine that a Christian prince would 
permit his daughter to wed a Muslim, since “ther was swich diversitee / Bit-
wene hir bothe lawes” (II.220–21). Undeterred, the Sultan agrees to convert 
rather than lose Constance, and he convinces his barons to do the same. 
When word of his conversion gets back to the Roman emperor, he agrees to 
send Constance to live in Syria as part of a peace-keeping strategy between 
the two nations. Though she weeps that she will be sent to a “strange nacioun,” 
away from friends and family, Constance nonetheless reluctantly agrees to 
go, telling her father, “‘Allas, unto the Barbre nacioun / I most anoon, syn 
that it is youre wille’” (II.281–82). Syria is thus established as a “nacioun” that 
is alien and barbarous, distant from the Rome she knows. Nonetheless, when 
she arrives, “she peyneth hire to make good contenance” and perform duti-
ful obedience to her father (II.320). Upon Constance’s arrival in Syria, the 
Sultan’s mother, enraged that her son has converted, puts together a welcome 
feast for the new queen only to brutally kill the Sultan and the converted 
Christians and ship Constance out to sea in a rudderless boat.
 The abruptly truncated episode in Syria establishes the tale’s overall con-
cern with the necessity of constructing and articulating an English “nacioun” 
based on Christian belief and, by extension, of contending with a threaten-
ing power whose royal authority and sense of community is not shaped by 
Christian virtue. The Syrians’ “strangeness” and “barbarity” indicate both 
their distance from the Roman world from which Constance hails and the 
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Man of Law’s dismissal of the Syrians as a people truly worth imagining as 
a kindred “nacioun.” Geraldine Heng reads the sudden ending of the Syr-
ian episode as an assertion of the radical difference of Syria from England 
and Rome: “Both Syria and English Northumberland might be heathenish 
foreign lands to a Christian ‘Roman’ princess,” Heng writes, “but Syria—the 
‘Barbre nacioun’—unlike England, presents the prospect of a penultimate 
alienness, an alienation beyond the pale, by virtue of the race and color of 
its constituents, even when the aliens have been Christianized.”10 Indeed, the 
Man of Law focuses his attention on those communities that might be suc-
cessfully absorbed into a Christian “nacioun,” rather than on a truly “alien” 
nation that cannot be made to attest to the righteousness of a Christian com-
munity. Thus, when the next episode mirrors and amplifies the Syrian story 
in an extended episode of false witness, it suggests that pagan Northumber-
land is close enough to Christian sovereign law to merit extended treatment, 
such that the Man of Law can imagine it as a community that might someday 
bear witness to Christian truths and divine justice.
 After the Sultaness ships Constance away from Syria, Constance lands 
under an unnamed castle in Northumberland, where a constable comes 
upon her and takes her in to live with him and his wife, Hermengild. As 
the story details Constance’s transformative effect on the constable and his 
wife, it also offers a short geohistorical narrative of Britain, saying that no 
Christians lived in Northumberland anymore, having fled to Wales and leav-
ing the pagan “olde Britons” in the region. Yet according to the Man of Law, 
Christianity still lurked on the edges of Northumberland: “But yet nere Cris-
tene Britons so exiled / That ther nere somme that in hir privetee / Hon-
oured Crist and hethen folk bigiled / And ny the castel swiche ther dwelten 
three” (II.547–50). The suggestion of Christians living “in hir privetee” in 
pagan Northumberland sets up the central issues that govern the ensuing 
episode of false witness: that is, how witnessing might construct and moni-
tor the boundaries of a properly English, Christian “nacioun.” To imagine 
a narrative in which a nation of Christians can be imagined, sanctioned, 
and protected, the Man of Law stages an elaborate episode of perjury that 
establishes Constance, the faithful Christian and daughter of Roman royalty, 
as Northumberland’s preeminent witness to divine truth. Significantly, this 
episode uses two contradictory forms of witnessing to establish divine jus-
tice as the foundation for Christian nationhood. On one hand, the embod-
ied testimony of the Christian martyr serves as a critical backdrop for this 
 10. Geraldine Heng, Empire of Magic: Medieval Romance and the Politics of Cultural Fantasy 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 2003), 233.
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scene. Specifically, Constance’s “good contenance,” which she had tried to 
assume when she landed in Syria, is registered here as her “pale face,” and 
it functions as a powerful site of Christian conversion.11 On the other hand, 
the Man of Law explores the legal authority of King Alla to testify as both 
inquisitor and judge, ultimately presenting his legal authority as a second-
ary, earthly model of witnessing that must harness divine justice to authorize 
itself.
 When Constance is discovered by the constable, he finds he can under-
stand her, even though she speaks “a maner of Latyn corrupt,” and he takes 
her home to care for her (II.519). After living with her a short while, the 
constable and Hermengild find they are so taken with Constance’s diligence 
that they are filled with a powerful feeling of grace and convert to Chris-
tianity. The Man of Law tells us that Constance’s face is the initial locus of 
her power to convert: “She was so diligent, withouten slouthe, / To serve 
and plesen everich in that place / That alle hir loven that looken in hir face” 
(II.530–32). Likewise taken in by her beautiful face, a young knight finds 
himself overwhelmed with love for her, though Constance rebuffs his per-
sistent advances. Stung by Constance’s rejection, one night the knight kills 
Hermengild and plants the bloody knife in Constance’s bed to frame her for 
the crime. The next day, when the constable finds his wife dead and Con-
stance unable to explain what happened, he goes to King Alla to report the 
murder. The constable then also admits how he found Constance on the 
shore and took her in. Alla immediately recognizes Constance as “so benigne 
a creature,” an innocent defendant who must stand a trial like a lamb being 
led toward its death. Yet as the sovereign legal authority in Northumberland, 
he must initiate legal proceedings, during which the false knight gives seem-
ingly incontrovertible firsthand, eyewitness testimony that Constance com-
mitted the murder.
 The ensuing scene of perjury depicts multiple sites of witnessing and 
truth-telling: the body of the condemned functions as a witness to God’s jus-
tice, for example, and physical evidence, oaths, and the probative claims of a 
communal voice likewise compete for the authority to expose the truth, both 
legal and divine. The contradiction between divine law and human testi-
mony crystallizes in the image of Constance’s face, which the Man of Law has 
already established as a site that can express obedience to sovereign law, stir 
Christian grace, and even inspire conversion. When the trial begins, a crowd 
gathers to watch their beloved Constance be tried for the heinous crime, and 
 11. See Robertson’s discussion of the power of Constance’s face to convert others in “The 
‘Elvyssh’ Power of Constance,” 162–63.
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she moves slowly through the crowd, headed toward what looks like certain 
doom. Significantly, the Man of Law takes a moment here to address his fel-
low pilgrims. “Have ye nat seyn somtyme a pale face,” he asks,
Among a prees, of hym that hath be lad
Toward his deeth, wher as hym gat no grace,
And swich a colour in his face hath had
Men myghte knowe his face that was bistad
Amonges alle the faces in that route?
So stant Custance, and looketh hire aboute. (II.645–51)
This narratorial intrusion is peculiar to Chaucer’s version of the tale: neither 
Nicholas Trevet nor John Gower includes it in his version of the Constance 
story. Examining this momentary departure from the narrative, Carolyn 
Dinshaw notes that Constance’s pale face is one of many Chaucerian pale 
faces that denote despair. For example, Palamon’s face drains of blood when 
he sees Emily for the first time in the Knight’s Tale, and Criseyde pales when 
she learns she will be traded to the Greeks in Troilus and Criseyde.12 Din-
shaw argues that Constance’s paleness not only registers her anguish; it must 
also be understood relative to the cultural and religious differences of the 
once-heathen Northumbrians, so that this particular stanza works to locate 
her Christian innocence in her facial pallor. As Dinshaw asserts, in the Man 
of Law’s Tale, “paleness is marked white Christianity” (22).
 Constance’s face certainly offers an obvious visual of her Christian 
patience and virtue, drawing upon the medieval commonplace that links 
whiteness to Christian innocence. In addition, the Man of Law’s particular 
focus on the face in this stanza—as Dinshaw points out, he uses the word 
“face” four times in these seven lines—suggests his desire to counter the 
false legal testimony that could condemn Constance by asking the pilgrims 
to imagine the face of an innocent, one that can provide a kind of moral tes-
timony that transcends courtroom practices and exposes divine truth rather 
than legal proof. Significantly, in a wide range of medieval texts, faces attest 
both to the possibility of divine revelation and to the way divine wisdom can 
be obscured in human systems of testimony. When a face does offer access to 
 12. Carolyn Dinshaw, “Pale Faces: Race, Religion, and Affect in Chaucer’s Texts and Their 
Readers,” SAC 23 (2001): 19–41. See also Heng, who argues that in the Constance narrative, “the 
recognition of racially marked differences of color and bodies is articulated through the authori-
tative, masterful grammar of religious difference; simultaneously, religious difference itself is 
articulated through the grammar of physiognomy, color, and genealogy, posited on normative 
bodies and the norm of human whiteness.” Empire of Magic, 232.
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divine knowledge, it often embodies the sublime fear and awe encountered 
by the witness who sees the divine face. For example, Langland’s dreamer 
begins his search for “kynde knowyng” with Holy Church, noting that when 
he first saw her, “I was afered of hire face” (I.10). Likewise, for Julian of Nor-
wich, witnessing Christ’s pallid face during the Passion leads to a glimpse of 
divine grace:
I saw His swete face as it was drye and blodeles with pale deyeng, and 
sithen more pale, dede, langoring, and than turnid more dede into blew, 
and sithen more browne blew, as the flesh turnyd more depe dede. For His 
passion shewid to me most propirly in His blissid face, and namly in His 
lippis.13
 For Julian, Christ’s pale face enacts both the violence and the grace of 
his death, and Julian insists elsewhere that seeing his face during the Pas-
sion taught her that “we ought se of Him graciously, than arn we sterid by 
the same grace to sekyn with gret desire to se Him more blisfully” (356–57). 
In contrast to Exodus, in which God tells Moses, “You cannot see my face, 
for no one shall see me and live” (Ex. 33:20), the incarnate Christ offers 
a glimpse of the divine face and thus the possibility of accessing divine 
wisdom in earthly form. By extension, the face of a saint can also attest 
to divine knowledge, as, for example, the Legend of St. Stephen suggests. 
When Jews accuse Stephen of having blasphemed the law of Moses in his 
sermons, they send two false witnesses to “verify” their accusations.14 But 
Christ turns Stephen’s face into the face of an angel to be witnessed by all 
those gathered to judge the case: “And thanne all tho that weren in the 
iugement sawe the visage of hym as the visage of an aungell. And that was 
the victorie of the secounde batayle” (45). Similarly, when the fourteenth-
century preacher’s handbook, the Fasciculus Morum, quotes the Psalms in 
its discussion of false witness (“‘You have thought unjustly that I should be 
like you; I will reprove you and set myself against your face’”), it warns sin-
ners that divine justice will produce the truth before their faces, specifically 
rebuking false witnesses by asserting the divine face as the site of truth-tell-
ing and revelation (167). Faces can even be the site of divine knowledge for 
priests seeking to manage their unruly congregants. One poem included in 
the Vernon manuscript, for example, describes a story about a parish priest 
 13. The Shewings of Julian of Norwich, ed. Georgia Ronan Crampton (Kalamazoo, MI: Me-
dieval Institute, 1993), 589–93.
 14. Jacobus de Voraigne, Gilte Legende, vol. 1, ed. Richard Hamer, EETS 327 (Oxford: Ox-
ford University Press, 2006), 44–55.
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who, suspicious of two rowdy parishioners, prays “that he might know by 
the face” which is worthy to receive the sacrament of the altar. At the next 
Mass, as the priest looks out onto his congregation, he is astonished to see 
that some have red faces (the tyrants), some black (the lechers), some swol-
len (the backbiters) and some “pure and bright,” which signify those who 
are clean of sin.15
 But the medieval face does not always operate as a clear sign of divine 
wisdom; some texts present the face as a hermeneutic crux that must be 
unpacked. In Pearl, for example, the Maiden’s “white face” seems at first to 
be a clear indication of her close relationship with God, and the Dreamer 
claims that her face stirs his desire for grace, much like Julian’s encounter 
with Christ’s face does: “The more I frayste hyr fayre face, / Her fygure fyn 
quen I had fonte, / Suche gladande glory con to me glace / As lyttel byfore 
þerto watz wonte.”16 Later, when the Dreamer is bold enough to ask the 
maiden who formed her “fair figure,” he suggests that the beauty of her pale 
face exceeds human language: “Pymalyon paynted neuer þy vys, / Ne Arys-
totel nawþer by hys lettrure, / Of carped þe kynde þese propertez” (750–52). 
He thus suggests that her face, as an allegorical symbol of God’s love, gestures 
to the possibility of revelation, a revelation that would exceed the confines 
of earthly language. However, as J. A. Jackson has pointed out, the Dreamer 
begins to become infatuated with the earthly beauty of her face, describ-
ing her ivory skin and gray eyes with courtly language. By indulging his 
earthly desire for the maiden and her beauty, the Dreamer disengages the 
Maiden’s face from the possibility of divine revelation, insofar as her face 
“is not the face of the Maiden but the face of the Dreamer’s own construc-
tion, an obstacle, ultimately, that he creates for himself.”17 In other words, as 
the Dreamer becomes increasingly enchanted by the Maiden’s face and her 
beauty, he transforms her face into an object upon which he can map his 
own earthly desire, rather than recognizing it as a symbol that can render 
God’s plan legible. Thus, as Pearl demonstrates, a pale face does not always 
signify Christian virtue or innocence; its signification can shift according to 
the desires of the observer.
 15. “Septem Miracula de Corpore Cristi,” in The Minor Poems of the Vernon Manuscript 
Manuscript, pt. 1, ed. Carl Horstmann, EETS 117 (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner, & Co., 
1892), 206.
 16. Pearl, in The Poems of the Pearl Manuscript, ed. Malcolm Andrew and Ronald Waldron 
(Exeter: University of Exeter Press, 2002), 169–72.
 17. J. A. Jackson, “The Infinite Desire of Pearl,” in Levinas and Medieval Literature: The “Dif-
ficult Reading” of English and Rabbinic Texts, ed. Ann W. Astell and J. A. Jackson (Pittsburgh, PA: 
Duquesne University Press, 2009), 161.
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 Similarly, when the Man of Law asks the Canterbury pilgrims to imagine 
the pale faces of fearful defendants as they head toward legal condemna-
tion, he produces a hermeneutic crux that belies the ostensible simplicity of 
the image. Constance’s pale face ought to convince both the crowd and the 
Canterbury pilgrims that divine truth can be made intelligible on the saintly 
body, particularly as torture and death loom.18 Yet by linking Constance’s 
face to the face of an anonymous, fearful defendant—one who, in the Man of 
Law’s example, could be either innocent or guilty—the Man of Law empha-
sizes that her white face may not offer a transparent sign of innocence. Nota-
bly, such ambivalence about the pale face is reflected in medieval courtroom 
manuals, which suggested that a witness’s pale face could reveal that he or 
she is hiding something. As William Durand warns lawyers in his Speculum 
judiciale: “Often, a face’s paleness, redness, or stuttering made it so that less 
faith might be given, as in: Oh, how difficult it is not to show crime on one’s 
face.”19 For Durand, the face functions as a bodily site of legal truth, but pale-
ness did not necessarily indicate either innocence or honesty; in fact, a white 
face could point to the witness’s guilt or even to perjury as easily as it could 
point to his or her innocence.
 The Man of Law may want Constance’s face to function as a symbol of 
God’s grace as the legal system fails her, but her pale face does not imme-
diately produce any divine intervention into the trial proceedings or into 
the false testimony that has condemned her. However, although Constance’s 
pale face fails to function as the immediately legible signifier of innocence 
and divine revelation the Man of Law imagines, it serves a broader pur-
pose in constructing the Canterbury pilgrims as witnesses to the injustices 
being perpetrated in Alla’s court. By calling attention to Constance’s face and 
departing from the narrative action to address the pilgrims, the Man of Law 
turns the image into an appeal for justice that contradicts the courtroom 
proceedings he is describing. In doing so, he asks the diegetic crowd and the 
pilgrims alike to empathize with Constance’s plight at the hands of the false 
knight. He also encourages empathy for Alla, as both Constance and Alla are 
confined by the earthly systems of evidence and judgment to which they are 
subject, systems that fail to reveal Constance’s innocence and thereby fail to 
enact divine justice.
 18. For a discussion of Constance’s depiction as a saint in the Man of Law’s Tale, see V. A. 
Kolve, Chaucer and the Imagery of Narrative (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1984), 
297–358. For a discussion of the saintly face in medieval imagery, see Michael Edward Moore, 
“Meditations on the Face in the Middle Ages (With Levinas and Pickard),” Literature and Theol-
ogy 24.1 (2010): 19–37.
 19. “Saepe pallor vultus, rubor & titubatio faciunt ut minus fidei alicui habeatur, iuxta illud: 
O quam difficile est crimen non prodere vultu” (I.iv.7).
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 For the Man of Law, then, Constance’s face operates as a call to empathy 
through which the pilgrims can contemplate the way innocents who faith-
fully adhere to Christian ideals can be vulnerable to the fallibility of legal 
practices. Specifically, her face signals how such vulnerability sets the stage 
to transform the pagan Northumbrians who are witnessing the trial into a 
unified community that is drawn together through its common empathy 
for the Christian defendant. Accordingly, Constance’s pale face functions, 
as Emmanuel Levinas would say, as an epiphanal sign that exposes the radi-
cal difference of the Other, wherein the encounter with the face of another 
produces the possibility of divine transcendence. As Levinas puts it, “The 
dimension of the divine opens forth from the human face.”20 For Levinas, 
the encounter with a radically different Other need not result in the violent 
sublimation described by a Hegelian dialectic (against which he explicitly 
argues).21 Rather, an encounter with the face of another arrests that kind of 
violent revulsion, producing instead a charitable response to another human 
being. As James J. Paxson helpfully explains, the face is “the visage of one we 
meet and must not do violence against, the forward sign of the human body 
we must clothe, feed, and whose thirst we must slake.”22 With an empathetic 
and ethical response to the Other, Levinas claims, comes the possibility of 
divine connection:
The dimension of the divine opens forth from the human face. A relation 
with the Transcendent free from all captivation by the Transcendent is a 
social relation. It is here that the Transcendent, infinitely other, solicits us 
and appeals to us. The proximity of the Other, the proximity of the neigh-
bor, is in being an ineluctable moment of the revelation of an absolute 
presence (that is, disengaged from every relation), which expresses itself. 
His very epiphany consists in soliciting us by his destitution in the face of 
the Stranger, the widow, and the orphan. . . . God rises to his supreme and 
ultimate presence as correlative to the justice rendered unto men. (78)
Levinas argues here that the empathetic response to another’s face not only 
opens the possibility of accessing the divine, it also produces a social rela-
tionship that calls for a charitable response to another rather than a violent 
 20. Emmanuel Levinas, Totality and Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority, trans. Alphonso Lingis 
(Pittsburgh, PA: Duquesne University Press, 1969), 78.
 21. Bernard Waldenfels, “Levinas and the Face of the Other,” in The Cambridge Compan-
ion to Levinas, ed. Simon Critchley and Robert Bernasconi (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2002), 63–81.
 22. James J. Paxson, “The Personificational Face: Piers Plowman Rethought through Levinas 
and Bronowski,” in Levinas and Medieval Literature, 144.
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one. Accordingly, the face can produce a sense of community, producing a 
mutually empathetic response among proximate people that unifies them via 
the common recognition of divine presence.
 Read through a Levinasian sense of the empathetic encounter with the 
face of the Other, Constance’s pale face signals two contradictory cruxes 
central to the Man of Law’s Tale. First, as Dinshaw and Heng make clear, it 
clearly reveals the Tale’s racial and cultural politics, in which the white face 
of the innocent Christian transfixes and transforms the Muslims and pagans 
who witness it. In doing so, her face motivates a set of social relationships 
that establish a clear hierarchy between Christian and non-Christian, white 
and nonwhite, and, presumably, English and non-English. At the same time, 
however, it constructs Constance’s pale face as the visage of another to whom 
the audience (both the Northumbrian crowd and the pilgrims) must respond 
with a sense of charity and empathy. These audiences must imagine a com-
munity that reframes the injustices about to take place in the trial with a new 
ideal of divine justice that emerges from the recognition of God’s presence 
in Constance’s face. By asking if they have seen a face like Constance’s, fear-
ful of the legal machinery of condemnation and human systems of evidence, 
the Man of Law positions both the crowd and the Canterbury pilgrims to 
attest to how these earthly legal proceedings fail to account for Constance’s 
beatific innocence and to imagine her face as the locus of divine justice that 
will unify them through mutual empathy and conversion.
 Thus, the Man of Law’s momentary shift away from the narrative to call 
upon the pilgrims to imagine Constance’s pale face turns them into wit-
nesses who can attest to the possibility of Alla’s sovereign power to convert 
and to unite a Christian “nacioun.” Indeed, as Levinas goes on to explain, 
the encounter with another’s face is always a both visual and juridical one, 
in which such an encounter requires one to bear witness to the vulnerabil-
ity of the Other. Bearing witness, he says, “produces the commencement 
of intelligibility, initiality itself, principality, royal sovereignty, which com-
mands unconditionally” (201). Because the face prefigures discursive cat-
egories such as veracity and deceit, it can circumvent the ambiguity of the 
true and the false to which all earthly justice is subject. Thus for Levinas the 
face attests to epiphanal possibilities and ethical requirements, rather than to 
the truth of a particular event. Yet Levinas also claims that bearing witness 
to another’s face expresses the unconditional power of command at the heart 
of royal sovereignty. Its attachment both to empathetic response and to an 
unconditional royal sovereignty makes the face a crucial sign of benevolent 
sovereign power as well as of communal unity. As something that must be 
witnessed, Constance’s face operates in the Man of Law’s Tale as the primary 
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site of both transcendental divine justice and sovereign Christian commu-
nity. Accordingly, Constance functions outside the testimonial discourse of 
courtroom witnesses, which is always subject to varying degrees of truth-
telling and deceit.
 Nonetheless, Constance must stand trial, and the depiction of the trial 
focuses on other forms of testimonial authorization: in particular, the oath. 
When the trial begins, the knight who falsely accused Constance of mur-
der confidently swears on a “Britoun book” and testifies to her guilt. The 
designation of the oath-text as a “Britoun book” is a peculiarly Chaucerian 
detail, and it emphasizes that this episode of false witness tries to expose 
how authentic witnessing can produce a specifically English community that 
coalesces around divine justice. Moreover, the knight’s oath can be contex-
tualized within fourteenth-century preoccupations with how false oaths can 
hasten the moral deterioration of the perjurer, unravel social fabrics, and 
destroy communities. According to Handlyng Synne, for example, taking a 
false oath turns God and the saints against the blasphemer and distances the 
blasphemer from his own internal moral compass:
ȝyf þou by god or our lady
Or ouþer seyntys þat þou sweryst by,
þou dost hym bere fals wytnes
Of þy lesyng þat soþ hyt ys.
How shulde þey þan helpe þe at þy nede
Whan þou hem draghst to þy falshede?
And þyn ynwyt, þyn owne skyle,
Aȝenseyþ þe þan & euermore wyle.23
To swear oaths thoughtlessly, as this wealthy man does, “dismembers” 
Christ.24 Likewise, the Fasciculus Morum argues that perjury implicates God 
as a false witness and that the perjurer “burdens and hurts God by laying sin 
on him even more than that Jews did by killing Christ and laying punish-
ment on him.”25 False oaths relive the trauma of Christ’s torture by calling 
 23. Robert Mannyng of Brunne, Handlyng Synne, ed. Idelle Sullens (Binghamton, NY: Me-
dieval and Renaissance Studies, 1983), 639–46.
 24. The idea that false oaths tear at Christ’s body was commonplace in Middle English 
didactic literature as well as in visual depictions of false swearers in church paintings. See Mir-
iam Gill, “From Urban Myth to Didactic Image: the Warning to Swearers,” in The Hands of the 
Tongue: Essays on Deviant Speech, ed. Edwin D. Craun (Kalamazoo, MI: Medieval Institute, 
2007), 137–60.
 25. “magis gravat Deum et ledit inponendo sibi malum culpe quam Iudei Christum occi-
dendo et inponendo malum pene.” Fasciculus Morum, ed. and trans. Siegfried Wenzel (Univer-
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upon God, Christ, or the saints to act as accomplices in supporting the false 
testimony. Accordingly, for the Fasciculus Morum, false witnesses are worse 
than the devil, who “dares to commit every evil but does not dare to swear” 
(167).
 Notably, in the second half of the fourteenth century, pastoral writing 
on false witness increasingly turned to legal exempla to expose the dam-
aging effects of false oaths and lying, offering detailed taxonomies of the 
ways and reasons why legal actors might turn to perjury. For example, the 
Speculum Vitae, William of Nassington’s versified translation of the Somme 
le Roi from around 1370, devotes some time to discussing false witness in 
its section on “sins of the tongue,” which includes blasphemy, lying, and gos-
sip.26 In this section, Nassington describes perjurers as those who “do Godde 
mare skathe, / For ilk day þai do hym on rode, / And ilka day þay shede his 
blode / With sharp athes in body and hede” (14148–51). Here, false oaths are 
thought to function as violent weapons against the body of Christ, wound-
ing the devotional community that coheres around his suffering body. The 
Speculum also pays considerable attention to perjury and suspicious legal 
practices in its discussion of avarice, listing the specifics of various legal offi-
cers’ potential to bear false witness after listing the kinds of criminals who 
lie and steal for their own gain (such as common robbers and those who aid 
and abet thieves).27 For example, Nassington states, “Fals Executours may bi 
skille / Be called Robbours for þai do ille; / þai suld thurgh Halykirke rede 
/ Mynistre leely þe godes of þe dede / For thurgh athe þai er bunden þarto 
/ And with þa dede godes leelly to do” (6521–26). After condemning false 
beadles, summoners, bailiffs, and sheriffs—all of whom use their legal status 
to bribe defendants and thus operate like common robbers—the Speculum 
turns its attention to those who “falshed vses agayne þe lawe”: that is, false 
pleaders, plaintiffs, defendants, lawyers, and jurors. The false pleader is par-
ticularly insidious both because he does not see the sin in presenting false 
evidence and because he can make others blind to his falsehood. As Nass-
ington puts it, “He charges noght his conscience / To shewe a fals euydence. 
/ His falshed may men noght wele knawe, / For he can couer it with þe lawe. 
/ þarefore in wrange he es mare balde; / A False Auoket he may be talde” 
(6673–78).
sity Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1989), 166–67.
 26. Speculum vitae, ed. Ralph Hanna, EETS 331–32 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2008). For the dating of the poem, see Hanna’s introduction, lx–lxiii.
 27. For a discussion of the Speculum’s critique of legal officials, see Kathleen E. Kennedy, 
Maintenance, Meed, and Marriage in Medieval English Literature (New York: Palgrave, 2009), 
90–92.
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 Like Nassington’s false pleader, the false knight in the Man of Law’s Tale 
uses the law to cover his treacherous perjury, and indeed it seems that his 
formulaic adherence to legal procedure and his confident oath-taking would 
substantiate his claims in the eyes of the court. But the Man of Law describes 
how, just as the false knight swears upon the book and utters his testimony, 
a disembodied hand abruptly surfaces and chops at his neck, causing him to 
fall down and his eyes to burst out of his face. The astonished crowd then 
hears a voice:
A voys was herd in general audience, 
And seyde, “Thou has desclaundred, gilteless,
The doughter of hooly chirche in heigh presence,
Thus hastou doon, and yet hold I my pees!”
Of this mervaille agast was al the prees;
As mazed folk they stoden everichone,
For drede of wreche, save Custance alone. (II.673–79)
The miracle of the disembodied hand convinces the crowd and Alla that 
Constance is a victim of false witness, verifying both her innocence and 
God’s ability to make guilt and innocence visible on the human body. Once 
again, the face is the locus of divine justice, as the knight’s face serves as 
the canvas upon which God enacts his punishment. Indeed, the fact that it 
is specifically his eyes that burst out of his face exposes the fallibility of the 
“eyewitness” testimony he offers the court.
 Notably, Gower’s version of the false knight’s condemnation takes a 
slightly but significantly different path. After the knight swears an oath that 
his accusations are true, the voice of God emerges to articulate the legal truth 
of the matter:
A vois was herd, whan that they felle,
Which seide, “O dampned man to helle,
Lo, thus hath God the sclaundre wroke
That thou agein Constance hast spoke:
Beknow the sothe er that thou dye.”28
Although both Gower and Chaucer imagine God’s voice emerging to explain 
why the legal proceedings cannot account for the “sclaundre” perpetrated by 
 28. John Gower, Confessio Amantis, vol. 2, ed. Russell A. Peck (Kalamazoo, MI: Medieval 
Institute, 2003), II.880–84.
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the false knight, Gower omits the bodily “merveille” that spectacularly con-
cludes Chaucer’s version of the episode. For Gower, divine justice supports 
legal procedure; the voice of God insists that the knight confess his perjury, 
after which he abruptly but unceremoniously dies. Gower’s depiction of the 
end of the scene of false witness thus highlights the way divine intervention 
can reaffirm legal process.
 In contrast, Chaucer’s version turns to the divine truth of the “merveille,” 
a term that indicates wondrous response rather than legal or scientific analy-
sis.29 On one hand, Alla’s use of an oath-text upon which the knight can verify 
his testimony (or expose his perjury) demonstrates Alla’s judicial supremacy 
as both king and judge; indeed, unlike either Trevet’s or Gower’s versions 
of the story, Chaucer portrays Alla as interrogating the knight and decid-
ing the case.30 Yet on the other hand, as Lavezzo has pointed out, this scene 
depicts Alla’s juridical authority as dangerously far from the divine justice 
that ultimately determines Constance’s fate. Despite his careful inquiries of 
the knight, Alla is unable to prove the knight guilty of perjury and murder. 
Crucially, the marvelous intervention of divine justice into his own inad-
equate juridical system of assessment and judgment spurs him and many 
others in the crowd to convert to Christianity. Thus, Chaucer’s version of this 
scene of false witness first establishes the boundaries of Alla’s royal sover-
eignty and legal authority vis-à-vis the divine truth embodied by Constance’s 
pale face. It then rejects the legal work of inquiry, testimony, and physical 
evidence in favor of the “merveille” that indisputably establishes Constance’s 
innocence. The “merveille” of the disembodied hand of God that emerges to 
arrest and transform the legal proceedings taking place establishes the power 
of a Christian God and, by extension, the power of a Christian Constance, 
over and above the legal sovereignty embodied by Alla.
crowds, Clamor, and the Marvel of divine Justice
When the Man of Law turns away from legal analysis to divine marvel, he 
emphasizes that these happenings occur in front of a crowd (“prees”) that 
witnesses the marvelous intervention on Constance’s behalf. For the Man of 
Law, the crowd functions as a potential legal entity, a group of witnesses with 
 29. See Caroline Walker Bynum, Metamorphosis and Identity (New York: Zone, 2001), esp. 
chapter 1, “Wonder,” 37–75; and L. O. Aranye Fradenburg, “Simply Marvelous,” SAC 26 (2004): 
1–27.
 30. In the Chroniques, Alla merely punishes the knight, and in the Confessio Amantis, Alla 
later hears about the divine justice that decides the case. See Lavezzo, “Beyond Rome,” 168.
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the power to attest to the judicium Dei and thus to Constance’s innocence. 
Moreover, the Man of Law envisions the crowd as a crucial synecdoche for 
the Christian “nacioun” he wants to imagine. His depiction of a witnessing 
“prees” draws on contemporary testimonial practice, since crowds had, in 
fact, assumed a new legal status in the second half of the fourteenth century. 
In particular, as Scase has shown, clamor came to imply widespread com-
plaint or the collective probative voice of a community. Clamor surfaced as 
a legal principle at the beginning of the fourteenth century as a feature of 
inquisitional process. It signified a common complaint of the community, 
which could function as an accusatory voice. By the 1340s clamor could be 
used to produce notoriety or publica fama, which would initiate legal pro-
ceedings by claiming general communal knowledge of wrongdoing. Publica 
fama was recorded by the production of several bills or writs of complaint or, 
more informally, by the documentation of widespread complaint signaled by 
the formulaic phrase “the clamor of the people” (clamour de poeple) (Scase 
55–56). In other words, fourteenth-century complaint procedure relied on 
bills that announced common knowledge of criminal activity, or clamor, to 
establish the grounds for having someone stand trial.
 Toward the end of the fourteenth century, parliament mobilized clamor’s 
claims of communal representation to delimit the crown’s juridical and polit-
ical reach. In 1376 the “Good Parliament” impeached several royal coun-
selors and ministers by drawing upon the probative phrases “clamor of the 
commons” or “clamor of the common people,” and ten years later, the “Won-
derful Parliament” impeached Michael de la Pole, the king’s chief counselor, 
based on an “ancient law” that said a king could be deposed if he did not rule 
in accordance with good counsel (Scase 63–65). The following year, however, 
a panel of judges appointed by Richard decreed that parliament could not 
impeach a minister of the crown without the king’s assent, and Michael de 
la Pole was released from prison. In response, the Appellant Lords lodged 
formal complaints of treason on behalf of the people against a number of 
government officials.31
 Clamor was thus a legal linchpin in these complex negotiations between 
crown and commons toward the end of the century. Given its topical imme-
diacy and legal importance, it makes sense that the Man of Law might gesture 
toward the evidentiary power of a crowd as he explores—even diminishes—
Alla’s legal power as king, inquisitor, and judge to determine the case against 
Constance. Chaucer himself was involved in parliamentary politics, as a 
 31. For a discussion of the political buildup to the Wonderful Parliament, see J. J. N. Palmer, 
“The Parliament of 1385 and the Constitutional Crisis of 1386,” Speculum 46.3 (1971): 477–90.
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controller of wool customs between 1374 and 1386, a clerk of the King’s 
works, a deputy forester, and a diplomat to Spain, among other positions.32 
Given his work as a government bureaucrat, Chaucer was very familiar 
with royal and parliamentary systems of representation, and as Matthew 
Giancarlo shows, such bureaucratic and political knowledge undergirds his 
poetic exploration in the Canterbury Tales and elsewhere of how political 
communities formed and articulated themselves.33 Moreover, as a sergeant-
at-law, the Man of Law himself would have been a member of the Order of 
the Coif, whose members were considered the authorities on parliamentary 
law and who often acted as royal counsel.34 He is thus not only in a posi-
tion to recognize the legal role of a clamorous crowd in the Constance case, 
but he might also be inclined to see the voice of the people as an important 
control over the reach of sovereign rule. We might thus be tempted to read 
his emphasis on the “prees” watching Constance’s trial as a counterweight 
to Alla’s legal authority and the courtroom evidentiary procedures that will 
condemn Constance. Perhaps this “prees” attests to her legal innocence and 
moral rectitude, enacting the Christian unity Constance inspires.
 However, despite the legal and literary interest in “common voice” at the 
end of the fourteenth century as well as Chaucer’s particular dedication to 
conceptualizing how communities might collectively “speak,” it is particu-
larly notable that the Man of Law depicts this “prees” as silent. Without a 
clamorous voice of communal complaint, this crowd fails to perform its legal 
role as community of defendants which might try to protect the innocent 
Constance from a trial designed to put her to death for a crime she did not 
commit. We might thus instead read this crowd’s silence as an indication of 
Chaucer’s distrust of crowds as political and legal authorities. As Chaucer 
instructs his readers at the beginning of the Balade de Bon Conseyl,
 32. See Matthew Giancarlo, “‘Oure is the voys’: Chaucer’s Parliaments and the Mediation 
of Community,” in Parliament and Literature in Late Medieval England (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2007), 129–78, esp. 129–31.
 33. At the beginning of his tale, the Man of Law says that the “commune voys of every man” 
spoke of Constance’s goodness and beauty, and he takes this common voice to be so trustworthy 
that he hopes Constance herself will be made queen of all of Europe (II.154–61). Although Chau-
cer perhaps means us to understand that the “commune voys” stands in for God’s, as used by a 
fourteenth-century lawyer such as the Man of Law, the phrase must also gesture to the relatively 
new practice of admitting public opinion and rumor as the probative testimony of a community. 
See David Weisberg, “Telling Stories about Constance: Framing and Narrative Strategy in the 
Canterbury Tales,” Chaucer Review 27.1 (1992): 45–64.
 34. Wallace describes the Man of Law’s professional affiliations; see Chaucerian Polity, 183. 
For a longer explanation of the occupation of medieval sergeants-at-law, see J. H. Baker’s intro-
duction to The Order of Serjeants at Law (London: Selden Society, 1984).
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Flee fro the prees and dwelle with sothfastnesse;
Suffyce unto thy thing, though it be smal,
For hord hath hate, and climbing tikelnesse,
Prees hath envye, and wele blent overal.
Savour no more than thee bihove shal,
Reule wel thyself that other folk canst rede,
And trouthe thee shal delivere, it is no drede. (1–7)
In this poem, Chaucer contrasts “prees” and “sothfastnesse,” ending with an 
exhortation to the reader to pursue a spiritual pilgrimage and look to God 
for “trouthe.” Here, the “prees” is an obstacle to the recognition of truth, 
instead sowing envy and hate within itself and failing to produce the ethical 
“trouthe” that is the foundation of justice and community.
 Yet the Man of Law’s illustration of the “prees” in his Tale does not suffer 
such overt condemnation. Instead, the Man of Law seems to suggest that this 
crowd recognizes that divine justice has taken over for legal process. He thus 
positions it as a collective witness both to the hand of divine justice and to 
the false knight’s perjury rather than registers it specifically as a legal entity 
that must offer courtroom evidence. Its silence specifically suggests that the 
“prees” can recognize God’s law over and above the legal practices and stan-
dards of evidence that cannot save Constance. Instead of offering the kind of 
clamorous complaint that could either provide evidentiary public opinion or 
portend unruly dissent, the silence of this “prees” enacts the medieval com-
monplace vox populi, vox dei, testifying to the miracle that reconceptualizes 
authentic testimony as an attestation to divine justice rather than the kind of 
legal witnessing abused by the false knight in Alla’s courtroom. 
 With the silence of the witnessing crowd in mind, we might also note that 
the Man of Law uses passive voice to describe the false knight’s punishment. 
In doing so, he suggests that the vox dei emerges as the primary legal and 
moral authority in this episode. As the Man of Law puts it, the false knight 
“was slayn for his untrouthe / By juggement of Alla hastifly” (II.687–88). The 
syntax carefully positions Alla’s sovereign power between his legal authority 
and the divine hand of God that has just very publicly killed the knight. The 
specific agent of the knight’s physical punishment is left opaque by the use of 
passive voice (he “was slayn”), but the Man of Law also recognizes the power 
of Alla’s judgment to rule that the knight committed perjury. Indeed, as we 
shall see, the Man of Law repeatedly uses passive structure when describing 
legal judgments and punishments throughout his Tale, always arguing on 
behalf of divine justice while also gingerly affirming the juridical power of 
the sovereign.
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 This scene of false witness densely collates multiple kinds of witnessing 
practices to assert the power of divine justice over and above the apparatuses 
and procedures of human law. Only the divine hand and explanatory voice 
of God can intervene in these perfectly standard legal proceedings to protect 
her against the false testimony that almost condemns her to death. Notably, 
the oath, a method designed to harness the word of God as testimony of legal 
truth, is the only part of the legal process that works in this episode. But it 
works, of course, contrary to the false knight’s desires: rather than solidify 
his story in the eyes of the crowd and Alla, it calls upon God to intervene on 
Constance’s behalf. In depicting the marvelous hand of the divine, this epi-
sode of false witness insists that Alla’s sovereign power draw its legal author-
ity from divine justice, transforming the pagan king into a Christian believer 
and, by extension, producing a new Christian community that emerges from 
and is structured by the beliefs and behavior of its newly converted sover-
eign. To pursue Alla’s transformation from pagan ruler to Christian sover-
eign more fully, the Man of Law goes on to describe a very different kind of 
false witness, one that urgently puts Christian sovereignty and community in 
jeopardy.
Letter-Writing, Forgery, and treasonous Mothers-in-Law
After witnessing his trial overtaken by divine “merveille,” Alla is fully con-
vinced of the power of divine justice, and he marries Constance with a new-
found devotion to Christ. To emphasize Alla’s conversion, when the Man 
of Law tells the pilgrims that Alla and Constance married after the trial, he 
explicitly marks Alla as a Christian subject, rather than a sovereign king: 
“And after this Jhesus, of his mercy, / Made Alla wedden ful solempnely 
/ This hooly mayden, that is so bright and sheene; / And thus hath Crist 
ymaad Custance a queene” (II.690–93). With the matter of Alla’s Christian 
conversion resolved and the authority of divine justice established, the Man 
of Law’s Tale turns its attention to Alla’s need to produce a genealogical line 
that will naturalize and extend his newfound Christian sovereignty. Again, 
false witness becomes the narrative impetus to imagine a unified “nacioun”: 
now, episodes of false witness emphasize the importance of producing a 
Christian genealogy on behalf of Northumberland. Specifically, by threaten-
ing the sanctity of this inchoate Christian “nacioun,” false witness provides 
the Man of Law the opportunity to express the importance of witnessing for 
bolstering the power of Christian sovereignty.
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 Soon after their wedding, while Alla leads his army into Scotland, Con-
stance gives birth to their son, Mauricius, and the constable sends a letter 
that describes “this blisful tidyng” along with “othere tidynges spedeful for to 
seye” (II.726–27). But this message is intercepted by Alla’s mother, Donegild, 
who remains unconverted. She is, not surprisingly, terrifically unhappy with 
her son’s marriage to Constance and with his conversion. Constance’s pagan 
mother-in-law, like the Muslim Sultaness, embodies the non-Christian ori-
gins of Alla’s royal line, an origin that uncomfortably exists in the very recent 
past.35 While Mauricius’s right to the throne should be indisputable since he 
is Alla’s first male child, Donegild strives to erase her grandson’s existence 
from the realm along with Constance’s and to restore Northumberland to 
its pre-Christian state of pagan sovereignty. She does so by manipulating the 
royal seal used to authenticate bureaucratic documents, a crime that in the 
fourteenth century was thought be a severe form of false witness, akin to 
treason.
 When the Man of Law depicts Donegild’s attempt to destroy Mauri-
cius’s claim to Alla’s throne, he needles a particularly sore subject for Chau-
cer’s audience. Succession to the throne was a major source of worry in the 
fourteenth century, particularly when the inheritance of the French throne 
came under dispute during the Hundred Years’ War. In 1337, Edward III 
laid claim to the French throne through his mother, Isabelle, Phillip IV’s 
daughter. In response, the French insisted that a woman could neither claim 
the throne for herself nor transmit the throne to her offspring.36 The French 
response to Edward’s claim to the throne inaugurated debates regarding 
whether women could transmit the royal patriline, and the English, encour-
aged by the possibility that they could take the French throne, emphasized 
the English rule that women could inherit and transmit royal bloodlines 
(Florschuetz 32). Yet the acceptance of female genealogical privilege in Eng-
land was disputed later in the century, when Edward had to determine his 
own heir to the English throne. In a letter patent issued by Edward in 1376, 
 35. Sue Niebrzydowski, “Monstrous (M)othering: The Representation of the Sowdanesse in 
Chaucer’s Man of Law’s Tale,” in Consuming Narratives: Gender and Monstrous Appetite in the 
Middle Ages and the Renaissance, ed. Liz Herbert McAvoy and Teresa Walters (Cardiff: University 
of Wales Press, 2002), 196–207.
 36. For an outline of how these political developments influenced Chaucer’s Man of Law’s 
Tale, see Angela Florschuetz, “‘A Mooder He Hath, but Fader Hath He Noon’: Constructions of 
Genealogy in the Clerk’s Tale and the Man of Law’s Tale,” Chaucer Review 44.1 (2009): 25–60. 
For a discussion of the territorial disputes that drove the Hundred Years’ War, see Christopher 
Allmand, The Hundred Years War: England and France at War c. 1300–1450 (Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press, 1988).
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in which he addressed concerns about his advancing age and the death of 
the Prince of Wales, the rightful heir to the throne, he reluctantly noted that 
the throne must go to the Prince’s only surviving son, Richard, who was then 
only nine years old.37 Richard’s inheritance of the throne would pass over 
Roger Mortimer, the son of Phillippa of Clarence, Edward’s granddaugh-
ter. Edward prioritized the nine-year-old Richard’s inheritance because 
of his more direct—and specifically male—lineage through the Prince of 
Wales, and he thus suggested that royal patrilines ought to be authenticated 
through male genealogies.38 Notably, however, in 1399 Henry of Boling-
broke claimed to be the true heir of the throne by tracing his genealogy to 
the elder brother of Edward I through his mother.
 The complicated dynastic politics of the late fourteenth century turned 
on the problem of whether to accept women’s participation in royal patriline. 
In the extended depiction of Donegild’s attempts to thwart Constance’s sta-
tus as a new queen, Chaucer presents an extreme illustration of the ongoing 
crisis about the genealogical status of women, and he imagines Constance’s 
mother-in-law as a monstrous example of the threats to community sanctity 
that can arise when women are considered royal genealogical agents. To off-
set the threat of a mother-in-law taking charge of the throne’s inheritance, 
the Man of Law pronounces Constance’s royal status as divinely sanctioned, 
baldly stating that “Crist ymaad Custance a queene” (II.693). Constance thus 
not only displaces Donegild as the reigning woman in the realm, she also 
draws her sovereign status from Christ. Indeed, the Man of Law explains 
Donegild’s response to her son’s marriage as her devastation that her son 
should marry “so strange a creature” (II.700), recapitulating the language 
Constance had used to describe Syria. As Angela Florschuetz succinctly puts 
it, Donegild’s “hostility arises from a specifically dynastic concern, the poten-
tial for her son’s mysterious wife to hijack his lineage by producing a child 
marked by her own strangeness” (49).
 Donegild’s strategy to disrupt Constance’s genealogical privilege and 
Mauricius’s inheritance is to falsify the bureaucratic devices designed to 
attest to the will of the sovereign in his absence. Her acts of false witness 
deliberately seek to dismantle the sovereign Christian community taking 
 37. Michael Bennett, “Edward III’s Entail and the Succession to the Crown, 1376–1471,” 
English Historical Review 113 (1998): 584.
 38. As Bennett points out, the principle that a woman could pass a royal title to a son was 
well established in England, and Edward III himself had endorsed this principle when he laid 
claim to the French throne. With respect to Edward’s transfer of power to Richard, Bennett states, 
“Given his advocacy, for over forty years, of the claims of the heir general against the claims of 
the heir male, the settlement of 1376 would appear a volte-face of some magnitude” (592).
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shape through Alla’s marriage to Constance and their production of a Chris-
tian heir. When the messenger encounters Donegild, he offers to include any 
letter she might want to send to her son in the packet of letters he is deliver-
ing; he takes care to show her that he holds official letters, marked with the 
royal seal: “‘Lo, heere the lettres seled of this thyng, / That I moot bere with al 
the haste I may’” (II.736–37). The emphasis on the seal here alerts Donegild 
(and Chaucer’s audience) that these letters are diplomatic missives from the 
queen to the king rather than personal communications between a wife and 
husband. Such an emphasis, in turn, frames Donegild’s subsequent treachery 
as interference with the operations of the state, forecasted when the Man of 
Law describes her as “ful of tirannye” (II.696). Donegild tells the messenger 
she does not have any message to send her son at the moment, but later, she 
plies the messenger with ale. When he falls asleep, she steals his letters and 
writes another: “And countrefeted was ful subtilly / Another lettre, wroght 
ful synfully, / Unto the kyng direct of this mateere / Fro his constable, as ye 
shal after heere” (II.746–49). Alfred Hiatt has demonstrated that Chaucer’s 
use of the term “countrefeten” here is one of the earliest instances in which 
the verb was applied to textual falsification, and it carries with it the specific 
negative connotations of the production of an imitation with the intent to 
deceive.39 Chaucer further takes care to note Donegild’s careful machinations 
by describing the forged letter as “wroght,” a term he pejoratively attaches to 
magicians in the Franklin’s Tale.
 Counterfeiting royal letters in late medieval England was considered a 
serious crime, one that was, significantly, understood as a form of false wit-
ness. Glanvill includes forgery of documents under the rubric crimen falsi, 
which includes forging charters, royal seals, measurements, and coins.40 
A century later, Bracton specifically argues that the forgery of a lord’s seal 
should be considered treason, a position upheld by the 1352 Statute, which 
lists forgery as one of seven kinds of treasonous false witness, including plot-
ting the death of a king, aiding his enemies, or violating his wife or daughter.41 
Seals were critical authenticating apparatuses in England, either impressed in 
wax on the document itself or hung from a ribbon or strip of parchment. 
Clanchy has even described seals, particularly royal seals and those convey-
ing the transfer of property, as “relics,” arguing that they could be “seen and 
 39. Alfred Hiatt, The Making of Medieval Forgeries: False Documents in Fifteenth-Century 
England (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2004), 28.
 40. Glanvill 176–77.
 41. Bracton considers forgery of the royal seal a crime of lese-majesty, “a crime which sur-
passes all others” (2.334). His discussion of forgery occurs at 2.337.
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touched in order to obtain from it that authentic view and feel of a donor’s 
wishes which no writing could adequately convey.”42
 Indeed, royal seals could sometimes be understood as metonyms for the 
royal body, thought to be material signs of authenticity through which divine 
justice could emerge. For example, in one striking twelfth-century commen-
tary on Psalm 4, which asks, “Let the light of your face shine on us, Lord,” 
the German theologian Gerhoh of Reichersberg writes, “The Lord impressed 
his face like a royal seal on our faces, mirrored in our spirits, a true mirror 
when it is pure.”43 In fourteenth-century English law, the body and the seal 
were likewise understood as reflections of one another. To take one example, 
a case from 1328, which describes a man named John Le Gode being brought 
before the King’s Bench on charges of forging the royal seal, includes the 
sheriff ’s assurances that he has both the body of the criminal and the coun-
terfeit seal. As the sheriff claims, “I have attached his body and the counter-
feit seal found on him.”44 Furthermore, the sheriff asks the king to allow him 
to pass “the body” onto the Oxford sheriff because he does not know the 
extent of John’s criminal network:
Therefore, more honourable lord, please allow me to bring the body 
through my bailiwick and through Berkshire as far as Oxford, for as far as 
there I dare undertake to bring the body safely so long as I am in my own 
district, and then let the sheriff of Oxford accept the body by your warrant 
and safely bring it to the next county, and so from one county to another 
until the body has come to you and, if it please you, my lord, send one of 
your serjeants to whom I can safely hand over the body at your order. (33)
John’s body is paramount here, as the sheriff seems particularly worried that 
this counterfeiter will be able to slip away easily en route to trial. More strik-
ing, however, is the sheriff ’s abrupt turn from focusing on the criminal’s 
body to authenticating the material evidence he has at hand: “My lord, I have 
in my possession the seal, sealed with the seal of the prior of Bradenstoke, 
and that seal I send you in a pouch, sealed with the seal of the prior and 
with my own seal, by Simond de Asshe, my chaplain, the bearer of this let-
ter” (32). The almost absurd multiplication of seals illustrates both the need 
 42. Clanchy, From Memory to Written Record, 247.
 43. “Sicut enim regale sigillum plumbo vel auro impressum format in eo vultum seu faciam 
regis ita tibi omnipotenti est possibile per impressionem tuae formae faciem meam faciei tuae 
conformare.” Gerhoh of Reichersberg, Commentarius Aureus in Psalmos et Cantica Ferialia, PL 
193: 1199D–1200A. Cited in Moore, “Meditations on the Face,” 21.
 44. “ieo ai attache son cors et le seal conterfait troue sur ly,” in Select Cases in the Court of 
King’s Bench under Edward III, vol. 5, ed. G. O. Sayles (London: Selden Society, 1958), 32.
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to authenticate legal transactions with bureaucratic seals and the profound 
worry about distinguishing a counterfeit seal from a real one. In fact, forg-
ing the seal was seen as an attack on the king, as violent and treasonous as 
an attempt to injure him bodily. In the second half of the fourteenth century, 
claims of counterfeiting became more and more common, and these claims 
increasingly worry about forging the king’s seal. For example, a few cases 
from 1367 describe a counterfeiting ring that had not only forged the great 
and privy seals of the king, the pope, archbishops, and bishops, but had cre-
ated machines capable of reproducing these forgeries.45 Fears arose about the 
easy reproducibility of the king’s seal and the concomitant diminishment of 
the seal’s power, so in 1371 a petition was put in front of parliament to make 
the forgery of private seals punishable by life imprisonment.46
 For the Man of Law, the ongoing anxiety about documentary forgery and 
the authenticity of the royal word provides him the context through which he 
can argue that true sovereign authority must come from divine power rather 
than bureaucratic apparatus. Donegild’s particular forgery tries to destroy 
Constance’s royal authority as queen by turning Constance into a genealogi-
cal disruption and community threat. Donegild’s forged letter tells Alla that 
Constance has given birth to a monster and even implies that Constance 
herself is not of this world:
The letter spak the queene delivered was
Of so horrible a feendly creature
That in the castel noon so hardy was
That any while dorste ther endure.
The mooder was an elf, by aventure
Ycomen, by charmes or by sorcerie,
And every wight hateth hir compaignye. (II.750–56)
Alla responds undaunted, giving a letter to the messenger that welcomes 
Mauricius as a “sonde of Crist,” and he implores Christ to keep both his child 
and wife safe until he can return home. The Man of Law again emphasizes 
the authenticating, metonymic work of the king’s seal, not only emphasiz-
ing that it was written “of his owene hand” but also describing the moment 
Alla seals his letter and hands it over to the messenger (II.759, 768). Yet once 
again, Donegild intercepts the messenger, plies him with ale, and takes the 
 45. Calendar of Patent Rolls, Edward III, vol. 14 (London, 1913) mem. 23d, p. 51.
 46. Nigel Ramsay, “Forgery and the Rise of the London Scriveners’ Company,” in Fakes and 
Frauds: Varieties of Deception in Print and Manuscript, ed. Robin Myers and Michael Harris 
(Winchester: St. Paul’s Bibliographies, 1989), 100.
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letter. The Man of Law condemns the messenger with an apostrophic aside 
that suggests he has become, unwittingly, a false witness of the king’s will:
O messager, fulfild of dronkenesse,
Strong is thy breeth, thy lymes faltren ay,
And thou biwreyest alle secreenesse.
Thy mynde is lorn, thou janglest as a jay,
Thy face is turned in a newe array. (II.771–75)
His claim that the messenger’s face is “turned in a newe array” recalls the 
image of Constance’s pale face from the earlier trial. Here, we can read in the 
messenger’s face his inability to protect the king’s words and deliver them 
unaltered. Once again, the face exposes the moral truth of the witness, and 
here that truth is contrasted with the bureaucratic documents the messenger 
carries. The Man of Law follows up this condemnation with a harsher exco-
riation of Donegild’s actions: “O Donegild, I ne have noon Englissh digne / 
Unto thy malice and thy tirannye! / And therefore to the feend I thee resigne; 
/ Lat hym enditen of thy traitorie!” (II.778–81). Demonstrating his familiar-
ity with the statutory laws that consider counterfeiting royal seals a form of 
treasonous false witness, the Man of Law links the messenger’s and Done-
gild’s crimes against the state through his apostrophic condemnations.
 Donegild’s counterfeit letter purports to be a message from Alla to his 
constable, commanding him to ship Constance and Mauricius off in the 
same rudderless ship that brought her to the Northumbrian shores. Sor-
rowfully, the constable complies, with the entire community coming out to 
weep at the injustice. The restaging of Constance’s cold ejection from Syria 
presents the non-Christian mothers-in-law, Donegild and the Sultaness, as 
doubly disruptive to the new “nacioun” shaped by Christian patrilineage. Not 
only do they exile Constance from their lands and away from their besot-
ted sons, they attempt to shun Christian rule on behalf of their Muslim or 
pagan communities. Revisiting the critical image from the earlier scene of 
false witness, Constance here emerges from the crowd with a “deedly pale 
face,” accepting her fate as Christ’s will and reassuring the crowd by recalling 
the divine justice that had intervened earlier: “‘He that me kept fro the false 
blame / While I was on the lond amonges yow, / He kan me kepe from harm 
and eek fro shame / In salte see, althogh I se noght how’” (II.827–30). She 
also amplifies her trust in divine justice by calling upon Mary as a witness 
to Christ’s suffering, and by extension, to her own. “‘Thy blisful eyen sawe 
al his torment; / Thanne is ther no comparison bitwene / Thy wo and any 
wo man may sustene. / Thow sawe thy child yslayn bifore thyne yen, / And 
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yet now lyveth my litel child, parfay!’” (II.845–49). Constance links her own 
“sight”—she cannot “se” how Christ will keep her and Mauricius safe in the 
ocean—with Mary’s eyewitnessing of her own child’s torture.
 Constance’s response to finding herself shipped away in a rudderless 
boat for the second time, this time with an infant, is to return to her own 
body as the site of divine justice, which always triumphs over royal law and 
the bureaucratic devices that support it. Recalling that God had intervened 
before, Constance reminds herself (and the pilgrims) that her innocence and 
faith will protect her from the exile, torture, and death Donegild has in store 
for her. Likewise, when she recalls Mary’s eyewitnessing of Christ’s suffering, 
she reframes the earlier scene of false testimony as an opportunity to reha-
bilitate the truth-claims of the eyewitness. When the false knight’s eyes burst 
from his face in a spectacular punishment for perjury, we were to understand 
that eyewitness accounts cannot always testify to the truth. In contrast, Mary 
operates as the ultimate eyewitness, and as such she rehabilitates the eviden-
tiary claims of a courtroom eyewitness on behalf of the kind of divine justice 
that transcends the royal authority Donegild manipulates.
 The third part of the Man of Law’s Tale opens with Alla’s return to Nor-
thumberland, where he discovers that his wife and child are missing. He asks 
the constable where they are, and in response, the constable “sheweth the 
kyng his seel and eek his lettre,” explaining that he followed what he assumed 
were Alla’s orders. The messenger is then tortured (“tormented”) until he 
reveals that he had spent nights unaware that the letters were being stolen, 
forged, and replaced. “And thus,” the Man of Law states, “by wit and sotil 
enquerynge, / Ymagined was by whom this harm gan sprynge” (II.888–89). 
James Landman notes that Alla’s use of torture is unique to Chaucer’s ver-
sion of the story and argues that for the Man of Law, “it is a reminder of the 
fragility of the common-law institutions he represents, and of torture’s allur-
ing promise of certainty.”47 Indeed, by torturing the constable, the Man of 
Law seems consider the body as an infallible site of truth. But we must note 
the carefully passive syntax the Man of Law again deploys here: while Alla is 
posited as a legal authority who can inquire and torture in the service of gar-
nering legal fact, the syntax suggests that the revelation of truth here emerges 
as much from a judicium Dei as it does from Alla’s sovereign power to inquire 
and to torture. Significantly, now, as a Christian sovereign, Alla successfully 
used inquiry and legal procedure to expose the truth, whereas his attempts 
had failed when he was a pagan leader.
 47. James H. Landman, “Proving Constant: Torture and the Man of Law’s Tale,” SAC 20 
(1998): 2. Gower omits the depiction of torture, merely saying that the messenger was “sodeinli-
che opposed” (II.1257).
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 The third part of the Tale tracks a series of revelations, and through those 
revelations, the restoration of Christian sovereign authority and community. 
Alla recognizes the counterfeit letter’s handwriting (“The hand was knowe 
that the lettre wroot”), and kills his mother. The Man of Law takes care to 
assert that Alla commits this act of violence as a king, rather than as an angry 
son: “His mooder slow—that may men pleynly rede— / For that she traitour 
was to hire ligeance, / Thus endeth olde Donegile, with meschance!” (II.894–
96). Alla’s recognition of his mother’s treachery establishes royal legitimacy 
outside the documentary apparatus designed to support it. In other words, 
the tortured body of the messenger and Donegild’s death anatomize Alla’s 
sovereign power, and they trump the power of the royal seal to substitute for 
and protect Alla’s status, given the ease with which the seal was counterfeited 
to serve treasonous purposes. Alla’s return to Northumberland, the torture of 
his messenger, and the punishment of his mother collectively suggest that in 
the Man of Law’s Tale, documents obscure sovereign power, while the body 
testifies to it.
 With the threat of treason contained and Alla’s sovereign power restored 
through his acts of authorized violence, the tale turns back to Constance, 
who has landed on the shores of “an hethen castel” (II.904). There, a thief 
threatens to rape Constance, but her struggles against him send him over-
board and she and Mauricius sail safely on through the strait of Gibraltar. She 
meets a ship manned by a Roman senator whom her father has sent to Syria 
to enact revenge on those who killed the converted Syrians. Though he does 
not recognize her, the senator brings her home to Rome, where the senator 
and his wife, Constance’s aunt, take her and Mauricius in. Meanwhile, Alla 
comes to Rome to receive penance for the death of his mother, whereupon 
Constance’s father welcomes him with a feast, which Mauricius attends.
 This extraordinary confluence of events emphasizes both the inevita-
bility of Constance’s return to Rome and the tight link between Rome and 
the newly Christian nation of Northumberland. Significantly, the Man of 
Law describes Alla’s first encounter with Mauricius as a face-to-face meeting 
between sovereigns: “But sooth is this, that at his moodres heeste / Biforn 
Alla, durynge the metes space, / The child stood, lookynge in the kynges 
face” (II.1013–15). As Mauricius takes in Alla’s face, Alla stands in wonder at 
the child’s likeness to his mother:
Now was this child as lyk unto Custance
As possible is a creature to be.
This Alla hath the face in remembrance
Of dame Custance, and ther on mused he
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If that the childes mooder were aught she
That is his wyf, and pryvely he sighte,
And spedde hym fro the table that he myghte.
“Parfay,” thoghte he, “fantome is in myn heed!
I oghte deme, of skilful juggement,
That in the salte see my wyf is deed.”
And afterward he made his argument:
“What woot I if that Crist have hyder ysent
My wyf by see, as well as he hire sente
To my contree fro thennes that she wente?” (II.1030–43)
Mauricius’s face leads Alla to return to Constance’s face in his memory, which 
in turn shifts the terms of Alla’s powers of judgment. He claims that his 
knowledge of what happened in his realm (“juggement”) should bring him to 
the conclusion (“deme”) that his wife has died in the ocean, but Mauricius’s 
face triggers the possibility of Christ’s power to save Constance. Moreover, 
Mauricius’s face inspires Alla’s repentance. He weeps with joy when he sees 
Constance; Constance faints twice and then, with her characteristic saintli-
ness, “hym excuseth pitously.” In response, Alla announces his innocence 
and the return of his heir: “‘Now God,’ quod he, ‘and his halwes brighte / So 
wisly on my soule as have mercy, / That of youre harm as giltelees am I / As 
is Maurice my sone, so lyk youre face; / Elles the feend me fecche out of this 
place!’” (II.1060–64).
 The face thus reemerges at the end of the Man of Law’s Tale as the site 
of truth and Christian sovereignty, as Mauricius’s likeness to his mother 
solidifies the genealogical link between Northumberland and Rome and 
rehabilitates Alla as a righteous king of a Christian “nacioun.” Accordingly, 
the end of the tale restores Christian belief as the foundation of Alla’s sov-
ereignty, and after Constance reunites with her father, the family returns to 
Northumberland. By this point in the Tale, “Northumberland” has turned 
into “Engelond,” and Constance and Alla return the “righte way,” suggesting 
that their conversion is complete, the promise of a Christian patriline is rein-
stated, and the sanctity of England’s Christian unity is preserved (II.1130). 
Only a year later, the Man of Law tells us, Alla passed away and Constance 
returned to Rome, leaving Mauricius as the heir to the Roman throne and 
thus further ensuring the deep connection between Christian Northumber-
land/England and Rome.
 For the Man of Law, false witness functions as a crucial backdrop against 
which claims of legal authority can be tested in the service of conceptualiz-
ing a coherent “Engelond” that expresses a harmonious Christian “nacioun.” 
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The episodes of false witness at the center of the Constance story—and the 
Man of Law’s particular versions of those episodes—present a central con-
flict between divine justice and human law as well as between Christian and 
non-Christian communities. The resolutions offered in these episodes dem-
onstrate that witnessing is fundamental to shaping and protecting Christian 
community and sovereign law. Specifically, the multiple forms of witnessing 
the Man of Law features in his Tale demonstrate the importance of the body 
as a testimonial medium, one that can transcend the claims of bureaucratic 
documents and royal seals to affirm that divine justice will always triumph 
over earthly legal procedures. Likewise, as we shall see again and again the 
ensuing chapters, the episodes of false witness that surface repeatedly in 
fourteenth- and fifteenth-century pastoral, literary, and legal texts often pit 
the body and the document against one another as testimonial media that 
offer different kinds of testimony with different levels of authenticity. Yet the 
body does not always function as a reliable conduit of the divine Word. For 
some vernacular texts, such as the Pistel of Swete Susan, the body—particu-
larly the mouth—can be the site of deceptive testimony, just as documents 
can be manipulated, as the Man of Law cautions. 
C h a u C e r  takes the Constance story as an opportunity to imagine a uni-
fied Christian “nacioun” which triumphs over the heathen communities that 
threaten it. In particular, the multiple scenes of false witness in the Man of 
Law’s Tale demonstrate the necessity of witnessing to construct and affirm 
the cultural and ethical requirements of a community. Like the story of the 
saintly Constance, the story of saintly Susanna, a Scriptural tale that was 
enormously popular in England in the late fourteenth and fifteenth cen-
turies, features scenes of false witness to test and affirm the integrity of a 
Christian community, one that coheres around the doctrinal prescription 
for female silence, chastity, and obedience. At the center of the story is a tale 
of false testimony, in which Susanna’s steadfast faith directly contrasts with 
the legal corruption propagated by Church Elders in their own self-interests. 
It thus offers a lesson similar to the one illustrated in the Man of Law’s Tale 
about the sanctity of divine justice and the corruptibility of earthly legal 
mechanisms. But unlike the story of Constance, the Susanna story also inter-
rogates how true “witnessing” might be understood as a range of practices, 
including prayer and prophecy. In doing so, it expands the definition of wit-
nessing to accommodate distinctly female modes of testimony.
 The story of Susanna was familiar to medieval readers and congregants 
from the thirteenth chapter of the Book of Daniel, which describes an inci-
dent in which two Church Elders spy Susanna, the beatific wife of Joachim, 
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as she bathes in a garden. They find themselves overwhelmed with desire: 
“ravished,” as English versions of the text claim, by her beauty. They decide 
to approach and sexually proposition her. When she refuses their advances, 
the Elders take advantage of their juridical and moral authority, telling her 
that she must either submit or be accused of adultery, a charge she would be 
unable to deny credibly. After crying out with sorrow and outrage, Susanna 
silently stands trial for sexual transgressions she did not commit, unable to 
stand up against the social and legal standing of the Elders who falsely tes-
tify against her. Based on the testimony of the Elders, Susanna is convicted 
of adultery, only to be saved by Daniel, who uses legal inquiry to expose the 
Elders’ falsehood and condemn them to death. The story was long read as a 
warning against false witness, an example of divine justice, and an exemplary 
tale of womanly chastity. Medieval commentators on the Book of Daniel 
persistently imagined Susanna as a saintly, silent victim in the face of almost 
certain social and legal condemnation, saved only by the last-minute inter-
vention of divine justice, embodied by the child prophet Daniel. These com-
mentators interpret Susanna’s suffering silence as a sign of her steadfast faith. 
Like Constance, she is a woman at the mercy of legal officials but always 
protected by divine justice.
 Significantly, however, Susanna’s courtroom silence emerges as a site of 
protest in late fourteenth- and fifteenth-century English versions of the story, 
which seek to rehabilitate her silence as a kind of testimony itself, outside 
of Daniel’s prophetic involvement in the case. As Lynn Staley has pointed 
out, “Susanna occupies a subtly different range of meanings in English texts, 
possibly because of the challenge to patriarchal control offered by hetero-
doxy and of the different English attitude toward law itself.”1 In particular, 
texts such as the Pistel of Swete Susan and the Lollard treatise “Of Prelates,” 
a polemic against ecclesiastical corruption, carefully depict both how the 
silence of a condemned woman can be understood as testimony and how 
that silence might be “translated” into writing for a community of readers. 
Thus, rather than merely portray a silent woman performing her faith, these 
texts use Susanna’s silence to expand what might be considered efficacious 
“witnessing,” including private prayer, public testimony, and even, as this 
chapter argues, vernacular poetry. Moreover, as these English texts highlight 
the contrast between the false testimony offered by the communal protectors 
of the law and Susanna’s silence, they suggest that at stake in this story of false 
witness is how different kinds of testimony, oral and written, signal their own 
 1. Lynn Staley, “Susanna’s Voice,” in Sacred and Profane in Chaucer and Late Medieval Lit-
erature, ed. Robert Epstein and William Robins (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2010), 48.
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peculiar authenticity and shape multiple, even widely differing, Christian 
communities and authorities.
 In fourteenth-century England, the story’s investment in female silence 
and documentation emerged specifically as an exploration of the complex 
relationship among sexual transgression, female testimony, and silence. 
Traditionally, the medieval Church understood female silence as a sign of 
womanly obedience in marriage: as stated in the first letter to Timothy: “Let 
the woman learn in silence, with all subjection. But I suffer not a woman 
to teach, nor to use authority over the man: but to be in silence” (I Tim. 
2:12–13). Likewise, Tertullian upbraids women for being both verbally and 
sexually promiscuous, while Jerome warns Eustochium not to “engage in 
adultery of the tongue.”2 Such anxieties and warnings were commonplace 
throughout the Middle Ages, and the long-term worry about female loquac-
ity specifically dovetails with worries about sexual transgressions. Medieval 
commentators’ strenuous attempts to link Susanna’s chastity to silence—and 
to muffle the story’s interest in testimony in favor of its assertion of female 
obedience—are thus based in hefty Scriptural and patristic precedent.
 But at the end of the fourteenth century, the English Pistel of Swete Susan 
recuperates the story’s emphasis on false witness rather than on female obe-
dience, specifically concentrating on how Susanna’s silence might speak to 
contemporary worries about the role of testimony in cases concerning sexual 
transgression. In doing so, the Pistel reformulates the patristic tradition it 
inherits by portraying silence as an efficacious model of female testimony. 
Such a portrayal poses complicated questions about various ways female 
testimony might be heard, recorded, and rendered vital to the coherence of 
Christian community. Indeed, unlike its patristic precursors, the Pistel envi-
sions Susanna’s silence not merely as the sign of an obedient wife but as an 
opportunity to experiment with the authoritative claims of oral testimony 
and documentary form. These experiments were, in turn, taken up in the 
fifteenth century by Lollard writers, who routinely cited the Susanna story 
in support of their own resistances against ecclesiastical control over written 
testimony.
 By examining the longue durée of the Susanna story and focusing par-
ticularly on the late fourteenth-century Pistel of Swete Susan and fifteenth-
century Lollard citations of Susanna, this chapter accounts both for the way 
female testimony emerges in various forms—prayer, legal document, vernac-
ular poetry, even citation—and for the way late medieval English ideas about 
 2. Letter to Eustochium, in The Principal Works of St. Jerome, trans. W. H. Fremantle (Grand 
Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans, 1913), 22.29.
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witness testimony and legal documentation reframe the stakes of this endur-
ing story of false witness. Susanna’s silence functions as a complex legal, 
doctrinal, and ideological touchstone for understanding multiple models of 
bearing witness in the later Middle Ages and for exploring how those models 
were used to formulate, challenge, and reshape the bonds of Christian com-
munity and authority.
silence, documents, and susanna’s voice in 
Early Patristic commentaries
The earliest extant form of the story of Susanna is in Greek (ca. 100 b.c.e.), 
and the story has been featured in stone carvings in third-century Roman 
catacombs, in patristic writing from the third and fourth centuries, and in 
Latin poetry from the twelfth and thirteenth centuries.3 In England, the 
Susanna story was particularly popular in the fifteenth century, appearing 
in five miscellanies. The earliest English versions, in the Vernon manuscript 
and British Library Additional 22283, both date from around 1400, while 
the latest, Cotton Caligula A.ii, dates from around 1500.4 The Pistel of Swete 
Susan circulated as a stand-alone text in the fifteenth-century manuscript 
owned by a nun named Matilde Hoyle.5 In addition, medieval congregants 
heard the story of Susanna on the Saturday before the third Sunday in Lent, 
and a short citation of it is included in the Lollard tract The Lantern of Light. 
Beyond the Middle Ages, Susanna was written for the stage in Thomas Gar-
ter’s 1578 Commody of the moste virtuous and godlye Susanna, in Lope de 
Vega’s Comedia de Santa Susana (ca. 1600), and in Carlisle Floyd’s 1947 
opera, Susanna. In all of these versions, Susanna is depicted as a silent vic-
tim of false witness, a saintly figure who, like Constance, suffers at the hands 
of a corrupt legal system, only to be saved by divine intervention. In fact, 
the only point at which Susanna voices her protest is when the two Elders 
 3. For discussions of Susanna’s appearance in antiquity, see Piero Boitani, “Susanna in Ex-
celsis,” and Betsy Halpern-Amaru, “The Journey of Susanna Among the Church Fathers,” both in 
The Judgment of Susanna: Authority and Witness, ed. Ellen Spolsky (Atlanta, GA: Scholars Press, 
1996). For an overview of the various patristic and medieval versions of Susanna, see Lynn Staley, 
“Susanna and English Communities,” Traditio 62 (2007): 25–58. For the medieval Latin verse 
versions by Peter Riga, Alan of Melsa, and an anonymous author, see J. H. Mozley, “Susanna and 
the Elders: Three Medieval Poems,” Studi Medievali n.s. 3 (1930): 27–52.
 4. See the notes and commentary in Susannah: An Alliterative Poem of the Fourteenth Cen-
tury, ed. Alice Miskimin (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1969).
 5. For a discussion of BL MS Additional 10596, which contains the stand-alone Pistel, see 
Mary C. Erler, Women, Reading, and Piety in Late Medieval England (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2002), 4.
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approach her in the garden, when she emits a cry, either aloud to signal to 
her handmaidens that she needs help or, as some versions have it, muted, to 
register her innocence only to God.
 Indeed, Susanna’s outcry is where various adaptations of and commen-
taries on the Susanna narrative take the opportunity to “silence” her. Such 
texts seek to emphasize her as the epitome of the chaste, obedient woman, 
rather than as a victim of false witness, and her voice is thus the central 
ideological pivot upon which commentators and translators shape the story 
to reflect their specific aims. The Vulgate Bible’s Daniel 13 provides a “great 
voice” for Susanna, heard well beyond the garden walls: “Susanna cried out 
with a great voice, and the elders cried out against her, and one ran to the 
door of the orchard and opened it, and when the servants heard the clamor 
in the orchard they rushed through the back door to see what was going on.”6 
Here, Susanna’s voice extracts her from the seclusion of the garden, render-
ing her outrage (and the Elders’ iniquity) public. This great shout comes after 
she carefully explains to the Elders that she feels stuck (angustiae) between 
two impossible choices: death or adultery. The Vulgate posits her cry against 
the cry of the Elders, a sound of truth versus one of treachery.
 Likewise, Hippolytus’s third-century commentary on the Book of Dan-
iel juxtaposes Susanna’s voice with that of the Elders, and it offers specific 
interpretive cues for understanding what her voice signifies. Hippolytus 
insists that Susanna shouted when the Elders approached her, emphasizing 
that despite the “large and spacious” size of the garden, her voice was heard 
and “understood.”7 Indeed, her shout renders the Elders’ accusations “unbe-
lievable”: “See the proof in Susanna, whose education in God’s Law since 
childhood and whose pure and prudent life, made the words spoken against 
her by the Elders seem unbelievable” (I.xxiv). Hippolytus emphasizes that 
the Elders’ use of language must be read in contradistinction to Susanna’s 
voice; the words that are specifically “pronounced” against Susanna cannot 
be believed because her cry signifies truth beyond the claims of their speech. 
Hippolytus thus understands Susanna’s cry against the Elders’ accusations as 
being a sound that registers as true because it emerges more directly from her 
body, unaltered by the machinations of discourse.
 6. Daniel 13:24–26: “et exclamavit voce magna Susanna, exclamaverunt autem et senes 
adversus eam, et cucurrit unus et aperuit ostia pomarii, cum ergo audissent clamorem famuli 
domus in pomario inruerunt per posticum ut viderent quidnam esset.”
 7. “Voyez-en la preuve dans Suzanne qui, pour avoir été instruite des l’enfance dans la Loi 
de Dieu, et avoir vécu pure et sage, a rendu incroyable la parole que les vieillards avaient pronon-
cée contre elle.” Commentaire sur Daniel, trans. Maurice Lefévre, Sources Chrétiennes 14 (Paris 
1947), I.xxiii. My translation of Lefévre’s French. Hereafter cited parenthetically by book and 
chapter.
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 Hippolytus’s explanation and elevation of Susanna’s vocal cry, however, 
is transformed when commentators begin to gloss the story to construct 
Susanna as an emblem of chastity. In his fifth-century Commentary on Dan-
iel, Jerome silences Susanna’s cry to portray her as an obedient woman who 
maintains her chastity in the face of an ostensibly insurmountable obstacle. 
“Her voice was great,” he writes, “not because of the intense vibrations it 
sent through the air nor because of outcry that came from her lips, but 
because of the greatness of the chastity with which she called out to the 
Lord. And so for this reason Scripture did not attribute a great voice to the 
outcry of the elders, for the following statement is merely, ‘The elders also 
cried out against her.’”8
Jerome reconstitutes the sound and audience of Susanna’s outburst, trans-
lating her cry from a public, legal call for help into a silent prayer to God. 
In doing so, he reconstructs the Susanna narrative into an exemplary story 
about female virtue, signaled by womanly silence. Augustine takes up Jerome’s 
muffling of Susanna’s voice, citing her as a paragon of steadfast chastity and 
claiming, “Though her prayer was inaudible to human beings, it was heard 
by God.”9 He further claims that there are three kinds of life in the Church 
for a woman: married, widowed, and virginal, exemplified by Mary, Anna, 
and Susanna, respectively.10 He takes care to note that each of these women 
“gives testimony” by living a chaste life. Thus, female testimony, understood 
as silent prayer and exemplary behavior, functions for these commentators 
as a way to express the Christian requirements of chastity and obedience.
 Jerome and Augustine are the most influential commentators for the 
Middle Ages’ reception of a silent Susanna, yet what it means for them to 
“silence” Susanna—and to what extent that is possible—is not always clear. 
For example, Augustine is careful to note that while Susanna’s explanation 
and cry were not widely heard, they were documented: “Her words are 
recorded, which she spoke in the paradise (Dn. 13:7), that is her shrubbery; 
words no human being heard, apart from the two who were lying in wait to 
 8. Commentary on Daniel, trans. Gleason L. Archer (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker, 1958), 582. 
For the Latin text, see Commentarii on Danielem, ed. F. Glorie, CCSL 75 (Turnhout: Brepols, 
1968). 
 9. Exposition of Psalm 34, Exposition of the Psalms, 33–50, vol. 10, trans. Maria Boulding 
(New York: New City, 2000), 5.
 10. Notably, Constance seems to have internalized this triad. When she goes to trial for mur-
der, she drops to her knees and prays: “‘Immortal god, that savedest Susanne / Fro false blame, 
and thou, merciful Mayde, / Marie I meene, doghter to Seynte Anne, / Bifore whos child angeles 
synge Osanne, / If I be giltlees of this felonye, / My socour be, for ellis shal I dye!’” (II.639–44).
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ensnare the modesty of another man’s wife, and planning to give false evi-
dence against her if she proved unwilling.” He repeats again that only the 
two Elders heard that she feels compelled to choose death, lest she commit 
adultery for God to see. This claim is followed by a full citation of Susanna’s 
complaint: “They were the only ones who heard what she said: ‘I am trapped 
on every side. For if I do this thing, it means death for me, but if I do not do it, I 
shall not escape your hands. But it is better for me not to slip out of your hands 
than to sin in the sight of God.’”11 Although her complaint and her choice to 
rebuff the Elders, whatever the consequences, are meant only for the Elders’ 
ears, Augustine ensures to “document” both, and accordingly, Susanna’s 
words become evidence in support of her innocence. Moreover, in record-
ing her complaint, Augustine assumes the authority to translate her muffled 
voice into a public document and thus into doctrinal instruction for a wide 
community of readers. The passive construction—“her words are recorded” 
(conscripta sunt verba ejus)—suggests that this translation from voice to text 
occurs organically, without authorial perspective or scribal intervention.
 For Augustine, documenting her silent prayer can render it an illustra-
tion of female doctrinal obedience. By recording her words, words meant 
only for the Elders, Augustine extracts her from an isolating and damning 
silence and makes that silence efficacious for God and, crucially, for a com-
munity of Christian readers. Elsewhere, notably, Augustine argues in more 
general terms what he has enacted in his sermon about Susanna: that silence 
redresses the ephemerality of sound, making it so that voiced statements can 
be remembered. “Suppose that we hear a noise emitted by some material 
body,” he suggests in his Confessions. “The sound begins and we continue 
to hear it. It goes on until finally it ceases. Then there is silence. The sound 
has passed and is no longer sound. Before it began it was future and could 
not be measured, because it did not yet exist. Now that it has ceased it can-
not be measured, because it no longer exists.”12 Yet, he argues, “even when 
both the voice and the tongue are still, we review—in thought—poems and 
verses, and discourse of various kinds or various measures of motions, and 
 11. Sermons 343:1. Trans. Edmund Hill, in The Works of St. Augustine: Sermons, ed. John E. 
Rotelle (New York: New City, 1995). Italicized portions are Scriptural citations. For the Latin, see 
PL 39:1505. “Conscripta sunt verba ejus, quae habuit in paradiso, hoc est in viridario suo: quae 
verba nullus hominum audivit, nisi soli duo, qui pudori uxoris alienae insidiabantur, et reluctanti 
falsum testimonium meditabantur. Illi soli audierunt quod dictum est: Angustiae mihi undique. 
Si enim hoc fecero, mors mihi est; si autem non fecero, non effugiam manus vestras. Melius est 
autem mihi manus vestras non evadere, quam in conspectu Deo peccare” (Dan. XIII, 22).
 12. Confessions 11.27. For a discussion of the relationship between sonority and embodi-
ment in Augustine, see Bruce W. Holsinger, Music, Body, and Desire in Medieval Culture: Hilde-
gard of Bingen to Chaucer (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2001), 296.
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we specify their time spans—how long this is in relation to that—just as if we 
were speaking them aloud” (11.27). Augustine’s formulations in the Confes-
sions fuse silence and speaking, memory and voice: silence enables memory, 
and memory functions as if sound were emitted. With these formulations 
in mind, we can understand how Augustine’s “documentation” of Susanna’s 
unheard prayer provides him the opportunity to transform her ordeal and 
anguish into a text, imagining her silence as something that can be under-
stood as if sound were emitted for others to hear. In doing so, he provides her 
a public voice and ensures that she becomes an enduring exemplar, chaste in 
the face of almost certain death, rather than merely a silent woman falsely 
accused.
 After translating Susanna’s outcry into a public text, Augustine praises 
Susanna for speaking her mind to the Elders: “Susanna too gave them some-
thing, and didn’t send them away empty-handed, if they had been willing 
to take her advice about chastity. Not only, you see, did she not consent to 
them, but she did not, either, keep quiet about why she didn’t consent.”13 Fur-
thermore, in Augustine’s version of the story, Susanna follows her muffled 
prayer and private statement to the Elders with a cry which was publicly 
heard and which inaugurated legal process: “The cry was raised, people came 
running, proceedings began.”14 Again, the passive construction here (“the 
cry was raised”) omits a vocal agent, suggesting that the remaining story of 
Susanna’s resolute chastity, as well as her participation in legal process, oper-
ates communally rather than through her individual complaint. In other 
words, Augustine focuses on the community responding to a cry and the 
legal process, rather than Susanna’s personal outrage. Susanna’s individual 
voice is thus a necessary condition for the possibility of other, legal enuncia-
tions on her behalf, which can turn her private prayer and immediate outcry 
into an opportunity for the community to witness divine intervention into a 
case of courtroom perjury.
 In contrast, for Ambrose Susanna is completely silent, and her prayer 
is undocumented and left between Susanna and God. Indeed, her silence 
exemplifies God’s precepts against idle talk. “If we must give an account for 
every idle word,” he writes in his De officiis, 
we need to make sure that we do not find ourselves having to account for 
idle silence as well. For there is another kind of silence as well, one that is 
 13. Sermons 359:3.
 14. Sermons 343:1.
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characterized by activity. The silence of Susanna was an example of it. She 
achieved more by keeping silent than she would have done if she had spo-
ken. In keeping silence before men, she spoke to God, and she devised no 
greater proof of her chastity than this silence. Her conscience spoke when 
her voice was not heard; she sought no judgment at the hands of men, for 
she had the Lord himself as her witness.15
Silence permits Susanna to converse solely with God, who trumps human 
judges in being able to hear true testimony even when the legal system can-
not detect it. In this formulation, her silence offers the only possibility of 
transcending the probative claims of the two Elders’ testimony in the court-
room, and it marks Susanna’s turn away from courtroom practices to divine 
justice. Ambrose carefully notes various kinds of silences and testimonial 
voices: here, though Susanna remains quiet externally, she speaks in her 
conscience.
 Similarly, the late fourth-century De lapsu Susannae (sometimes attrib-
uted to Ambrose) omits the words of Susanna’s testimony altogether, instead 
taking Susanna’s silence as a metaphor for the suffering of those who must 
witness the sinful actions of the lecherous and promiscuous go unpunished:
Why are you so silent, my soul? Why are you troubled in your thoughts? 
Why don’t you let your voice break forth and lay bare the ardent desire of 
your mind so that you might have some relief? This surely, this will be like 
a remedy for your trouble, if you would open up your mouth and set out to 
explain what the crime is. Similarly, lancing and draining a boil, however 
swollen it has been, offers relief from the festering.16
 15. De officiis, vol. 1, ed. and trans. Ivor J. Davidson (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2001), 123. For the Latin see Sancti Ambrosii Mediolanensis, De officiis, ed. Mauritius Testard, 
CCSL 15 (Turnhout: Brepols, 2000): “Deinde si pro verbo otioso reddimus rationem, videamus 
ne reddamus et pro otioso silentio. Est enim et negotiosum silentium ut erat Susannae quae plus 
egit tacendo quam si esset locuta. Tacendo enim apud homines, locuta est Deo; nec ullum maius 
indicium suae castitatis invenit quam silentium. Conscientia loquebatur ubi vox non audieba-
tur; nec quaerebat pro se hominum iudicium, quae habebat Domini testimonium” (I.III.9.2–9).
 16. Maureen Tilley, “An Anonymous Letter to a Woman Named Susanna,” in Religions of 
Late Antiquity in Practice, ed. Richard Valantasis (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 
2000), 218. Hereafter cited parenthetically in the text. For the Latin, see De lapsu Susannae, ed. 
Ignatius Cazzaniga (Turin: G. B. Paraviae, 1948): “Quid taces, anima? Quid cogitationibus aes-
tuas? Quid non erumpis in vocem et mentis tuae exponis ardorem ut aliquod solatium capias? 
Hoc plane, hoc erit quasi remedium aegritudinis tuae, si aperto ore conceptum digeras scelus. 
Nam et ulcus quamvis tumidum, cum fuerit apertum, evaporans praestat refrigerium passionis” 
(I.1).
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The text navigates the various types of silences at the heart of the Susanna 
story. Here, the voice is imagined simultaneously as something heard and as 
an internal voice of conscience. Moreover, the speaker addresses his com-
plaints to virgins near and far, imploring everyone to listen to his complaint: 
“Hear me now, you who are near, you who are far away,” explaining that he 
wants to speak directly to lapsed virgins and adulterers (I.2, II.5). He thus 
imagines his objections both to be immediate and to endure beyond the 
moment of his speaking. Significantly, when he turns to Susanna as an exam-
ple of chastity in the face of temptation, he takes up Susanna’s voice as direct 
quotation: “But you say, ‘I did not will this evil; I suffered violence.’ That 
most brave Susanna, whose name you falsely wear, will answer you, ‘Placed 
between two elders, there between two judges of the people, set there alone 
between the trees of the garden, I could not be conquered; because I did not 
will to be’” (III.12). For the author of De lapsu Susannae, then, the Susanna 
story is decidedly not about the injustices of evidentiary process or even 
about false witness. Instead, it functions as an exemplar for lapsed virgins to 
return to their prescribed chaste behavior. False witness is merely the narra-
tive conceit by which this exemplary aim can be presented. Significantly, this 
version of the story permits the author to revoice Susanna, insofar as he uses 
Susanna’s silence as an opportunity to put words in her mouth rather than 
simply quoting the Book of Daniel. Unlike the Susanna of De officiis, this 
Susanna speaks, but she addresses an audience far beyond the garden walls 
with a complaint about the behavior of virgins, not about the false accusa-
tion she suffers.
 These various depictions of Susanna’s voice illustrate patristic writers’ 
ongoing struggles to shape the Susanna story to be about female chastity and 
silent obedience. Indeed, numerous versions of the story in the high Middle 
Ages obviously strain to explain away Susanna’s magna vox. The Glossa ordi-
naria, for example, takes great care to muffle Susanna’s voice, transforming 
her magna vox into “pure testimony,” heard only by God.17 Nicholas of Lyra 
makes a similar claim in his commentary on Daniel: “Her voice was great, 
not because of the beating of the air and cry from the throat, but because of 
the magnitude of its beauty, through which she called out to God.”18 He goes 
on to emphasize that her voice was heard not by men, but by God, because 
 17. Indeed, the Glossa ordinaria persistently suggests that voices require glosses. Biblia La-
tina cum Glossa ordinaria, vol. 3 (Turnhout: Brepols, 1992), 351.
 18. Supra Danielem XIII, in Commentariorum in Danielem, Libri III, S. Hieronymi Presby-
teri Opera, CCSL 75A (Brepols: Turnhout, 1964), 947. “Magna vox erat, non aeris percussione et 
clamore faucium sed pudicitiae magnitudine per quam clamabat ad Dominium.” Hereafter cited 
parenthetically by page number.
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of her purity of heart and mind.19 Thus, the long hermeneutic history of 
Susanna’s voice reveals that there are different kinds of silences that can be 
registered as “testimony,” each with various social and doctrinal functions. 
Moreover, throughout the Middle Ages, Susanna’s silence is described as a 
kind of “testimony” that reaches outside the problematic systems of human 
judgment and evidence to call upon divine justice.
 The claim that her silence can be read as testimony is put to the test in 
the late fourteenth-century English alliterative version of the story, the Pistel 
of Swete Susan, which straddles the line between a vocal and a silent Susanna 
by describing her response to the Elders’ accusations as a “careful cri.”20 The 
Pistel’s depiction of Susanna’s cry challenges the patristic link between female 
silence and exemplary chastity. Specifically, it foregrounds Susanna’s testi-
monial silence within the particular context of fourteenth-century changes 
in English common law that focused on how allegations of rape and sexual 
transgression could be made, which were required to conform to particular 
documentary forms of legal complaint. As it explores how Susanna’s testi-
mony might operate under these legal conditions, the Pistel suggests that 
the Elders’ false testimony can be mitigated by Susanna’s testimonial silence 
because her muffled voice can be witnessed, documented, and disseminated 
in vernacular poetry.
Accusation, False testimony, and the Power of silence 
in the Pistel of Swete Susan
The Pistel begins, like the Vulgate Book of Daniel, by emphasizing Susanna’s 
literacy, particularly in “the maundement of Moises.” Yet while the Vulgate 
merely states that her parents had dutifully instructed her in matters of faith, 
 19. “Cordis affectus et mentis pura confessio et bonum conscientiae, vocem eius fecerant 
clariorem; unde magna erat exclamatio eius Deo, quae ab hominibus non audiebatur.” Supra 
Danielem 947.
 20. Written after the Pistel, Christine de Pizan’s Book of the City of Ladies notably restores 
Susanna’s “magna vox”: “Hearing their threats and knowing that women in such a case were cus-
tomarily stoned, she said, ‘I am completely overwhelmed with anguish, for if I do not do what 
these men require of me, I risk the death of my body, and if I do it, I will sin before my Creator. 
However, it is far better for me, in my innocence, to die than incur the wrath of my God because 
of my sin.’ So Susanna cried out, and the servants came out of the house.” Christine’s ideal of 
Susanna imagines her as legally savvy, aware of the violent punishment of adulterers, and it gives 
her a voice that speaks with a certain kind of exemplary authority, distinct from the exemplary, 
silent obedience that Jerome, Augustine, and Ambrose attribute to Susanna. See The Book of the 
City of Ladies (New York: Norton, 1988), 156.
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the Pistel insists that they “lerned hire lettrure of that langage.”21 This spe-
cific emphasis on her legal literacy sets up the law-focused expectations for 
the remainder of the text, which is saturated with legal references. These 
references both offer implicit instructions to read the Pistel as an illustration 
of the triumphant exoneration of a chaste and dutiful woman and remind 
us that this story can be understood as an exploration of multiple forms of 
witnessing, from silent prayer to legal documents and even, as the Pistel ulti-
mately suggests, vernacular poetry.
 As the Pistel describes the Elders’ encounter with Susanna in the garden, 
their lecherous gazes are repeatedly articulated through legal vocabulary: 
“And whon thei seigh Susan, semelich of hewe, / Thei weor so set uppon hire, 
might they not sese” (44–45). The Middle English word “sese” (“cease”) sig-
nals their inability to tear their eyes away, but it also gestures to two specific 
legal definitions, one meaning “to arrest and bind over to a session of court,” 
the other signifying the term for land transfer.22 The term “sese” thus empha-
sizes that the Elders’ legal and social standing is at odds with their lustful 
gazes. In addition, as they watch Susanna play in the garden and devise an 
elaborate plan to “bewile that worly,” the text describes their plotting as a 
legal test of her purity: “Every day bi day / In the pomeri thei play. / Whiles 
thei mihte Susan assay / To worchen hire wo” (62–65). By the middle of the 
fourteenth century, the verb “assaien” had accumulated a constellation of 
definitions. The verb often surfaced in romances and meant “to test”: that is, 
to demonstrate one’s knightly strength in combat. But it could also mean “to 
investigate” or “to inquire” by means of legal interrogation, as well as to have 
sexual intercourse.23 Used here, the verb “assay” emphasizes the overlapping 
bodily, legal, and moral transgressions of rape, adultery, and false witness the 
Pistel will depict.
 The Elders themselves make these overlaps clear when they approach 
Susanna and present her with the choice of having sex with them or being 
publicly accused of adultery. “‘Wolt thu, ladi, for love on ure lay lerne,’” they 
ask lasciviously, “‘And under this lorere ben ur lemmone?’” (135–36). To 
“learn their law” clearly means to submit to their advances, and the Elders 
suggest that she relinquish her body for her “love” of learning the law. 
Susanna responds with despair:
 21. Pistel of Swete Susan, ed. Russell A. Peck, in Heroic Women from the Old Testament in 
Middle English Verse (Kalamazoo, MI: Medieval Institute, 1991), 18. All citations of the Pistel will 
be taken from Peck’s text unless otherwise noted. Hereafter cited parenthetically by line number.
 22. “sessen,” Middle English Dictionary s.v. 1d.
 23. “assaien,” Middle English Dictionary s.v. 3, 4, 5.
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Then Susan was serwful and seide in hire thought:
“I am with serwe biset on everiche syde.
Yif I assent to this sin that this segges have sought,
I be bretenet and brent in baret to byde;
And yif I nikke hem with nai hit helpeth me nought—
Such toret and teone taketh me this tyde!
Are I that worthlich wrech, that al this world wrought,
Betere is wemles weende of this world wyde.” (144–51)
Her internal monologue is followed by noise: she emits a “careful cri,” bring-
ing her servants and valiant men into the garden. Susanna here follows the 
legal protocol for a complaint of rape, which required that a woman raise the 
“hue and cry,” a procedure in which a victim of or witness to a crime was 
to shout in order to gather people from the community to help pursue the 
criminal. Specifically in cases of rape, an “open cry” must be made to register 
a claim of unwanted sexual activity.24 Susanna’s legal literacy suggests that she 
knows these procedures, and here she uses them appropriately.
 However, Susanna’s cry is more than a mere enactment of proper legal 
process. Rather, it illustrates and explores the complicated ways the female 
voice was deployed in fourteenth-century rape prosecutions. For most of the 
Middle Ages, rape complaints had to be registered orally with a cry. Only 
late in the fourteenth century did rape law catch up with the documentary 
procedures (including writs of complaint, petitions, and bills) already well in 
place for other legal accusations.25 Specifically, in 1382 a new statute on rape 
and ravishment required that charges of sexual transgression be tried specifi-
cally “by inquisition of the country”; the statute did not offer the option to 
try the charge by battle, unlike in other kinds of criminal allegations.26 Before 
 24. The requirement of the “open cry” (nutesium levantum) surfaces in the 1276 Office of 
the Coroner, assigned to 4 Edward I. See H. A. Kelly, “Statutes of Rapes and Alleged Ravishers 
of Wives,” in Inquisitions and Other Trial Procedures in the Medieval West (Aldershot: Ashgate 
Variorum Series, 2001), IX.367.
 25. Formal legal complaints, documented in writs or petitions, were used to pursue personal 
and communal accusations, and “plaints” were an important form of expressing grievances. For 
a discussion of the commonplace use of documentary complaints in the fourteenth century, see 
Sheila Lindenbaum, “London Texts and Literate Practice,” CHMEL 284–309; and Wendy Scase, 
Literature and Complaint in England, 1272–1553 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007).
 26. 6 Richard II, Statutes of the Realm, vol. 2, ed. A. Luders (London: Dawsons, 1810–28). 
There are numerous discussions of this statute, many of which focus on the term raptus, which 
likely signified kidnapping; stuprum often signifies rape in the modern sense of the word. Con-
sent is at stake in both of these legal terms. See Kelly, “Statutes,” and Christopher Cannon, “Rap-
tus in the Chaumpaigne Release and a Newly Discovered Document Concerning the Life of 
Geoffrey Chaucer,” Speculum 68 (1993): 74–94.
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then, rape cases required material evidence to support, and sometimes even 
substitute for, the claim of the victim. In the twelfth century, for example, 
Glanvill claimed that a woman pursuing a plea of rape case should, “soon 
after the deed is done” (mox dum recens fuerit maleficium), go to the nearest 
vill to “show to trustworthy men the injury done to her, and any effusion of 
blood there may be and any tearing of her clothes.”27 She must then complain 
publicly to generate the publica fama necessary to begin legal proceedings.28 
For Glanvill, physical evidence and vocal complaint work in conjunction in 
the difficult process of proving a rape took place.
 But by the fourteenth century, the requirement to provide immediate 
material evidence had dropped away: women were no longer required to 
expose a bloodied body or torn clothes to their community leaders. In addi-
tion, a woman could take up to 40 days to register a complaint of rape, and 
rape claims were to conform strictly to the documentary formulae of the 
writ.29 The expectation of documentary iterability was paramount, insofar 
as the language used and details given in the original (oral) complaint to a 
family member, community authority, or sheriff had to match exactly with 
the claims made in the writ of complaint; any deviation, even of the most 
minor detail, could result in rendering the complaint legally null. Thus, the 
relationship between sexual transgression, vocal complaint, and documen-
tary form was tightly controlled, such that legal procedure required a linear 
trajectory from bodily violation to vocal cry to oral testimony to legal text. 
Sexual violation must be “translated” into an “open cry” that would draw 
members of the community as judges and witnesses, and it should then be 
“translated” into a formal accusation and finally into a formulaic document 
in which the details of the event could be ossified and repeated. Adultery 
was even more difficult to track and prosecute than rape, since it was a 
transgression usually done in secret, without witnesses, and thus it could be 
difficult to generate the necessary publica fama to start proceedings. None-
theless, it was subject to “multiple networks of informing, gossip, rumor, 
talebearing, and, on occasion, lies about neighbors’ sex lives among com-
munity inhabitants, which brought such cases to the attention of officials 
and courts.”30 Like charges of rape, charges of adultery had to follow strict 
 27. Glanvill XLV.6.
 28. For a discussion of inquisition and publica fama, see the introduction.
 29. For a discussion of the documentary formulae and the requirement that details of the 
rape be repeated in all documents, see Barbara A. Hanawalt, “Whose Story Was This? Rape 
Narratives in Medieval English Courts,” in Of Good and Ill Repute: Gender and Social Control in 
Medieval England (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 124–41.
 30. L. R. Poos, “Sex, Lies, and the Church Courts of Pre-Reformation England,” Journal of 
Interdisciplinary History 25.4 (1995): 585.
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documentary formulae to move from gossip to formal complaint. For late 
medieval English writers, the systems designed to register allegations of rape 
and adultery were sufficiently new to the documentary practices of petition-
ary complaint that they offered them an opportunity to experiment with the 
relative probative efficacy of material evidence, oral testimony, and docu-
mentary form. The Pistel, as discussed below, conceptualizes the Susanna 
story as such an experiment. Specifically, Susanna’s “careful cri” in the face 
of sexual and social transgression navigates the Pistel’s understanding of the 
relationship between body, voice, and document, particularly in terms of a 
woman’s ability to announce her own chastity and pursue false charges of 
sexual transgression.
 The Pistel’s interest in whether and how the written word can recuperate 
the testimonial voice of a silenced woman emerges early in the poem. Unlike 
either the Vulgate or the various commentaries on the Book of Daniel, the 
Pistel spends some time setting up the Elders’ approach of Susanna. Predict-
ably, when the two Elders are “ravished” by Susanna’s beauty, they at first try 
to hide their lust from God and from one another:
Heore wittes wel waiwordes thei wrethen awai
And turned fro His teching that teeld is in trone;
For siht of here soverayn, sothli to say,
Heore hor hevedes fro hevene thei hid apon one.
Thei caught for heor covetyse the cursyng of Kai,
For rightwys jugement recordet thei none,
They two. (55–61)
The description of their lust is commonplace in its depiction of “wayward 
wits” and self-oblivion, familiar from romance narratives in which a beau-
tiful love-object transfixes the lover. But their desire to conceal their lust, 
formulated here as a refusal to “record” it, suggests that we ought to under-
stand the Elders’ ravishment in documentary terms. They seek to suppress, 
even erase, their lust by controlling whether it gets “written.” For the Elders, 
recording their ravishment would potentially transform their inner feelings 
into external and visible testimony. By the time we hear Susanna’s careful cry, 
then, we are primed to read it as a crystallization of the Pistel’s exploration of 
how a voice can be represented in text. Her careful cry stages the possibilities 
and limitations of oral and documentary testimony in terms of their ability 
to legibly register either female chastity or sexual transgression.
 When Susanna’s “careful cri” brings her servants to the garden, the Elders 
make good on their threat to accuse Susanna of adultery. In disbelief but 
70 •  chapter two
unable to contradict the Elders’ claims, the townspeople shackle Susanna and 
put her into a dungeon to await trial, while Joachim, “with al his affinité,” 
rushes to the court.31 To present their “playnt” to the judges, the Elders seal 
their accusation with an oath:
Be this cause that we say,
Heo wyled hir wenches away;
This word we witnesse for ay,
With tonge and with toth. (218–21)
The Elders’ oath locates their authority and their truth-claims specifically 
in the mouth (“tonge and toth”), and in doing so, places special emphasis 
on their collective voice as public, legal, and evidentiary. Specifically, the 
Elders’ oath sets up the terms by which we must read the Pistel’s description 
of Susanna’s condemnation and eventual salvation: that is, as an investigation 
of the community-forming power of testimony within and beyond the court-
room, rather than a celebration of her innocence. Significantly, as the Pistel 
turns to Susanna’s trial and Daniel’s prophetic intervention, it repeatedly 
focuses on the mouths of both the Elders and Susanna, from which different 
kinds of testimony emerge to address different communities.
 In a scene reminiscent of Constance’s public trial, the crowd gathered 
to witness Susanna’s trial reluctantly believes the Elders, given their social 
standing and solemn oath. As the Vulgate makes clear, “The multitude 
believed them as elders and judges of the people; and they condemned her to 
death.”32 The Pistel explains it slightly less overtly than the Vulgate: “Nou heo 
is dampned on deis; with deol thaugh hir deve, / And hir domesmen unduwe 
do hir be withdrawen” (235–36).33 Notably, in one of the manuscripts of the 
Pistel, the multitude is particularly aural: in the version found in Cotton Cal-
igula A.ii, the line reads, “with dyn they hyr deiue” (“they deafened her with 
din”). But in other versions of the Pistel, we are to understand that Susanna 
is deafened with grief (“deol”), rather than with the voice of the crowd. Alice 
Miskimin has tried to account for this discrepancy by suggesting that the 
Pistel-poet may have confused the Vulgate’s creditit (“believed”) with crepi-
 31. Staley argues that the gesture to Joachim’s “affinité” suggests the Pistel’s specific engage-
ment with English models of justice. “Susanna and English Communities,” 50.
 32. “Creditit eis multitudo quasi senibus populi et iudicibus; et condemnaverunt eam ad 
mortem” (Dan. 13:41).
 33. As both Miskimin and Peck note, these lines are particularly difficult to interpret. I fol-
low Peck’s translation: “Now she is damned on a dais; they deafened her with grief / And the 
unjust judges order her to be withdrawn.”
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tit (“roared”).34 But whether the translation is deliberate or accidental, the 
shift from the condemnatory rumble of the crowd to its grief (or, perhaps, 
Susanna’s grief) suggests a link between the crowd’s testimony and its emo-
tional response to Susanna, rather than necessarily signaling their judgment 
of Susanna in the face of ostensibly incontrovertible legal evidence. Here, the 
crowd’s noise signals both their inability to deny the Elders’ testimony and 
their deep surprise and sadness that Susanna could be capable of such trans-
gressions. Thus, unlike the “prees” that silently witnesses the “merveille” of 
the divine hand of justice in the Man of Law’s Tale, this crowd functions as 
a legal and social entity that outwardly expresses its dismay at the legal trap 
in which Susanna finds herself. Yet significantly, the crowd cannot read her 
silence as testimony of her innocence; it can only hear the perjured testimony 
offered by the Elders.
 Whereas the public din of the throng signals either its judgment of 
Susanna or, perhaps, its dismay at the condemnation of a woman it hopes 
is innocent, Susanna’s voice of protest only comes when she withdraws from 
the crowd to await her fate alone in the dungeon. There,
Heo asked merci with mouth in this mischeve;
“I am sakeles of syn,” heo seide in hir sawen,
“Grete God of His grace yor gultus forgive
That doth me derfliche be ded and don out of dawen
With dere.” (239–43)
Again, the Pistel emphasizes the mouth, suggesting that we are to read Susan-
na’s prayer here against the false oath and testimony that had issued from 
the Elders’ mouths. Certainly, the distinction between the Elders’ mouths 
and Susanna’s emphasizes the Elders’ iniquity against Susanna’s steadfast 
innocence, at least for readers of the Pistel, if not for the diegetic crowd. It 
also juxtaposes the Elders’ public, authoritative (and false) testimony, offered 
in the courtroom, with the private (and true) testimony of a condemned 
woman. Thus, when Joachim visits Susanna in jail, she falls to the floor 
and kisses his hand, explaining, “‘For I am dampned, I ne dar disparage thi 
mouth’” (253). She seeks to keep the perception of defilement away from 
Joachim, and to “disparage his mouth” would be to damage the power of his 
(male and public) word.
 34. Miskimin 157. The manuscripts that contain the line “with deol they hyr deiue” are the 
Vernon manuscript, Huntington Library HM 114, and BM MS Additional 22283.
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 Given Susanna’s courtroom silence, it might seem as though the Pistel 
corroborates a long-standing interpretation of the Susanna story that under-
stands Susanna’s testimony to be private, directed only toward God, while the 
Elders’ voices are directed to the court and community. But there may be a 
different way to understand how the Pistel conceptualizes the different kinds 
of testimonies that emerge from Susanna and from the Elders, particularly 
if we read the Pistel’s repeated use of mouth imagery alongside another tale 
centrally about a silenced woman and the production of a public, eviden-
tiary text: the story of Philomela.35 Like Susanna, Philomela is ubiquitous 
throughout antiquity and the Middle Ages, taken up by Ovid, the Ovide 
moralisé author, Gower, Chaucer, and Christine de Pizan, to name just a 
few. The story describes Tereus’s violent mutilation of Philomela, in which 
he rapes her and then, to keep her from accusing him of the crime, cuts out 
her tongue. Unable to speak, Philomela instead weaves her story into a tex-
tile for her sister, Procne. Chaucer’s particular version of the Philomela story 
(roughly contemporaneous with the Pistel) strikingly suggests that the cen-
tral issue is the role of a male author in a tale that details the textual expres-
sion of silenced women. When Tereus cuts out Philomela’s tongue, Chaucer 
writes, “O sely Philomene, wo is thyn herte! / God wreke thee, and send the 
thy bone! / Now is it tyme I make an ende sone.”36 Leaving out the gruesome 
ending of the story in which Procne and Philomela kill Tereus’s son and feed 
the child to him, Chaucer instead foregrounds his own sense of guilt for 
retelling a story that portrays the violent rape and silencing of an innocent 
woman. Indeed, he begins the tale with a self-conscious assertion of his own 
response to Philomela: “And, as to me, so grisely was his deed / That whan 
that I his foule storye rede, / Myne eyen wexe foule and sore also” (2238–40). 
Chaucer seems especially anxious to distance himself from the violence per-
formed against Philomela, positioning himself as a sorrowful witness to the 
events. The ending reframes the story to ensure that Philomela be under-
stood as a wholly innocent victim. More generally, the story depicts the pos-
sibility that silenced women can find alternative modes of public testimony, 
whether in a textile or in the vernacular poetry penned by a male author.
 Like Chaucer’s Legend of Philomela, the Pistel recognizes itself as a docu-
ment that works to emphasize the legal and moral innocence of its protago-
nist. But rather than merely express sympathy as Chaucer does, the author 
classifies the Pistel as a kind of testifying document and the final word on 
 35. In addition, as Staley notes, the fact that the Elders’ transgression occurs specifically 
under a laurel tree—a unique feature of the Pistel’s version of the story—contextualizes the Pistel 
with Daphne. “Susanna and English Communities,” 47.
 36. The Legend of Good Women, in The Riverside Chaucer, lines 2339–41.
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the case of Susanna: “This ferlys bifel / In the days of Danyel, / the pistel wit-
nesseth wel / Of that profete” (361–64). The particular form Susanna’s text 
takes here is an epistle, which typically refers to a written letter, specifically 
one that takes its content from the apostolic letters of the New Testament, 
often read as part of the Mass. Indeed, the story of Susanna was read aloud 
during Lent, so the “pistel” here likely gestures toward its use in sermons 
and other doctrinal texts. But in the fourteenth century, “pistel” could also 
refer to an oral complaint or message, as when the old woman in Chaucer’s 
Wife of Bath’s Tale whispers a “pistel” in the ear of the knight, telling him 
what women really want.37 Similarly, Hoccleve’s Jonathas features a meet-
ing between Jonathas and an anonymous prostitute on the street, in which 
“Shee thidir cam / and bothe foorth they wente, / And he a pistle rowned in 
hire ere: / Nat woot y what / for y ne cam nat there.”38 Both the Wife of Bath’s 
Tale and Jonathas understand a “pistel” to be a whispered comment or com-
plaint, specifically when female chastity is at stake. In these cases, the “pistel” 
remains unarticulated for the reader, heard only by the immediate recipient.
 Given this range of meanings, its appearance at the end of the Pistel of 
Swete Susan signals the poem’s interest in multiple testimonial forms and 
their gendered modes of authority and access. On one hand, the Pistel estab-
lishes itself as a documentary witness that can be accessed by readers who 
want to hear about the triumph of chastity and womanly obedience. On the 
other hand, however, this epistle could signify an oral witness that cannot 
immediately be heard, one that could potentially offer instruction in female 
sexual expression. As noted above, though official complaint petitions were 
open to women, forms of complaint about sexual transgression remained 
vexed even into the late fourteenth century, particularly in terms of encod-
ing a woman’s oral accusation into the iterable, written formulae acceptable 
in court. The Pistel’s final claim that such a “pistel” can “witnesseth wel” 
implicitly points out the complicated relationship between oral and written 
complaints made by and on behalf of women. By using the term “pistel,” the 
poem asks whether “witnessing” is an oral activity or a documentary one, 
foregrounding the limitations and payoffs of voiced testimony and written 
witnesses. Oral testimony, it seems, can control its audience and determine 
who will hear it, while written testimony can claim iterability and legal force.
 Of course, the relationship between speech and writing, and particularly 
their comparative claims to authenticity and truth, were debated long before 
the Pistel, and the poem’s particular interest in oral and written testimony 
 37. Middle English Dictionary, “epistel,” s.v. 5. The Wife of Bath’s Tale, line 1021.
 38. Hoccleve’s Works I: The Minor Poems, ed. Frederick J. Furnivall, EETS e.s. 61 (London 
1892), lines 166–68.
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engages unexpectedly in this enduring philosophical discussion. Plato’s Pha-
edrus, to take one foundational example, argues that writing encourages 
laziness and forgetfulness, while Isidore of Seville recognizes writing as a 
supplement to speech, in which letters are symbols of words that speak on 
behalf of the absent. Honing Isidore’s formulation, John of Salisbury famously 
argued, “Fundamentally letters are shapes that indicate voices. Hence they 
represent things which they bring to mind through the windows of the eyes. 
Frequently they speak voicelessly the utterances of the absent.”39 In these 
formulations, writing is inextricably linked to voice, the originary site of 
cognition and articulation. More crucially, writing is a way for the silent (the 
“voiceless” or “absent”) to speak, mimicking utterance.
 Like Isidore, Hugh of St. Victor also imagines speech and writing to be 
intimate partners. For Hugh, the link between voice and writing enables the 
kind of authoritative commentary that muffles Susanna’s voice:
The word “gloss” is Greek, and it means tongue (lingua), because, in a 
way, it bespeaks (loquitur) the meaning of the word under it. Philosophers 
call this an ad-verbum (upon the word) because, with one single word, it 
explains that word concerning the meaning of which there is question, as, 
for example, when consticescere (to become silent) is explained by the word 
tacere (to be still).40
Hugh here follows William of Conches’s commentary on the Timaeus, in 
which William asserts that a gloss must be as clear as if it were “the tongue of 
a doctor speaking.”41 Such emphasis on the clarity of commentators’ glossing 
“tongues” surfaces in the Pistel’s recurring interest in men’s mouths, particu-
larly the “tonge and toth” that describes the Elders’ false testimony against 
Susanna. The tongue is where theologians such as Hugh and William situate 
commentators’ authority to gloss Scriptural texts, and the Pistel’s investment 
in male mouths reprises the link between doctors’ tongues and Scriptural 
hermeneutics. But of course, the Elders’ mouths are the site of false testimony, 
spoken under the auspices of ecclesiastical authority. The Pistel thus revises 
the link between authoritative glossing and tongues, experimenting with the 
metaphors that authorize male patristic authority—that is, the authority of 
 39. “Littere autem, id est figure, primo vocum indices sunt; deinde rerum, quas anime per 
oculorum fenestras opponunt, et frequenter absentium dicta sine voce loquuntur,” I.13, Metal-
ogicon, ed. C. C. J. Webb (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1929).
 40. The “Didascalicon” of Hugh of Saint Victor, trans. Jerome Taylor (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1991), 119.
 41. For William’s commentary on the Timaeus, see PL 172: 250.
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those who tell and retell Susanna’s story—by disengaging the tongue from 
the page. Indeed, Hugh’s description of silence to exemplify what he means 
by glossing uncannily anticipates the Pistel’s focus on Susanna’s silence in 
the face of false accusations. For Hugh, silence can be rendered articulate 
by authoritative lingua, but the Elders take immoral, self-interested advan-
tage of their ability to gloss Susanna’s silence in the courtroom. However, 
although the Elders attempt to speak for Susanna, translating her silence 
into a story that transforms her into an adulteress and maintains their legal, 
doctrinal, and social status, their ultimate failure to testify convincingly via 
“tonge and toth” suggests the Pistel’s rejection of the authoritative-gloss-as-
patristic-tongue metaphor.
 Furthermore, the idea that silence is an enabling condition of writ-
ing—and voice a distraction from it—surfaces repeatedly in a wide range 
of fourteenth- and fifteenth-century vernacular poetry, when bureaucratic 
documentary production became increasingly central to the literary proj-
ects of several writers. To take one prominent example, Thomas Hoccleve 
elevates the bureaucratic work of a Privy Seal clerk to poetic production in 
the prologue to his early fifteenth-century Regiment of Princes. For Hoc-
cleve, writing is linked to the ailing body but not to the voice: “A wryter 
moot thre thynges to him knytte, / And in tho may be no disseverance: / 
Mynde, ye, and hand—noon may from othir flitte, / But in hem moot be 
joynt continuance.”42 Claiming that writing tires the stomach, eyes, and back, 
Hoccleve goes on to argue that Privy Seal clerks must execute their jobs in 
silence, lest they be distracted by the talking and singing going on around 
them. Indeed, the need for silence distinguishes writers from manual work-
ers, whom he calls “artificers”:
Thise artificers, see I day by day,
In the hootteste of al hir bysynesse,
Talken and synge and make game and play,
And foorth hir labour passith with gladnesse;
But we laboure in travaillous stilnesse;
We stowpe and stare upon the sheepes skyn,
And keepe moot our song and wordes yn. (1009–15)
Sarah Tolmie points out that Hoccleve actually fails to distinguish between 
the intellectual work of a writer and the physical work of a laborer, interested 
 42. The Regiment of Princes, ed. Charles R. Blyth (Kalamazoo, MI: Medieval Institute, 1999), 
lines 995–98.
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as he is here and throughout the Regiment in his own bodily afflictions.43 
Moreover, Tolmie reminds us that the job of Privy Seal clerks was mimetic 
rather than inventive, and that they spent their time “directing their discrete 
wills to follow or co-produce the royal will embodied in the warrants issued 
by their office” (287). Thus, Hoccleve’s call for silence might be read not 
so much as a writer’s need for silence to concentrate but as a gesture to the 
radical absence of the author-scribe at the heart of the kind of bureaucratic 
production in which he was involved. Transcribing the utterances of oth-
ers, Hoccleve-the-bureaucrat reconceptualizes Isidore’s intimate relation-
ship between voice and letter to imagine writing as representative of the 
authorial absence that renders bureaucratic production almost monastic in 
its focus and in its intense devotion to the state.44
 Hoccleve exemplifies what might be seen as an increasing disengagement 
between voice and document in the later Middle Ages, a disengagement at 
the heart of the Pistel’s revision of the long-established philosophical and 
patristic link between tongue and text in the face of new kinds of legal and 
bureaucratic textual productions. For Hoccleve, silence can be deadening, a 
morose vision of John of Salisbury’s voice-as-text under the tedious condi-
tions of scribal labor. But if we examine another fifteenth-century Chauce-
rian, Robert Henryson, we might see yet another version of the relationship 
between voice and documentation, as he considers silence central to doc-
umentary production. Like the author of the Pistel, Henryson specifically 
explores the relationship between bureaucratic silence and female voice in 
his Testament of Cresseid, which revisits Cresseid after her affair with Dio-
mede is over. She is condemned to a diseased life in a leper colony and given 
over to a parliament of gods to be judged. The Testament ends with a com-
plaint and Cresseid’s last will, which leaves most of her worldly possessions 
to her fellow lepers and cautions the “ladyis fair of Troy and Grece” to beware 
the vagaries of Fortune.45 Significantly, what Cresseid laments most is the 
loss of her voice: “‘My cleir voice and courtlie carrolling, / Quhair I was 
wont with ladyis for to sing, / Is rawk as ruik, full hiddeous, hoir and hace” 
(443–45). Nonetheless, she seems to imagine her writing as a way to ensure 
her testimony will endure, since, after concluding her complaint she begins 
 43. Sarah Tolmie, “The Prive Scilence of Thomas Hoccleve,” SAC 22 (2000): 281–309.
 44. For a discussion of late medieval bureaucratic and literary culture with particular em-
phasis on Hoccleve, see Ethan Knapp, The Bureaucratic Muse: Thomas Hoccleve and the Literature 
of Late Medieval England (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2001).
 45. The Testament of Cresseid, in The Poems of Robert Henryson, ed. Robert L. Kindrick 
(Kalamazoo, MI: Medieval Institute, 1997), lines 452–55. Hereafter cited parenthetically by line 
number.
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her last will and testament: “with paper scho sat doun / And on this maneir 
maid hir testament” (575–76).
 The emphasis here on both the material paper and the “making” of her 
testament illustrates Cresseid’s sense that for her testimony to be effective, 
it must be documentary, rather than oral; this written testament clearly 
substitutes for her absent raw voice.46 In her document, Cresseid implores 
her readers to take heed of her experiences: “‘Exempill mak of me in your 
memour,’” she writes. “‘Quhilk of sic thingis wofull witnes beiris’” (465–66). 
Cresseid defines witnessing here as the documented accounts of her life, 
both the complaint she pens as well as Henryson’s Testament. Thus, for Cres-
seid, “bearing witness” is fundamentally documentary, and as such, funda-
mentally iterable, accessible to a community of readers rather than listeners. 
Moreover, Cresseid conceptualizes her testament as a supplement to her 
deteriorating body and the loss of her “cleir voice,” a way to mitigate the 
silence brought upon by her death.
 But Henryson takes a more ambivalent stance with respect to the possi-
bility that a written document produced by a male author can offer the kind 
of authentic testimony Cresseid might provide with her own voice and body. 
Indeed, like Chaucer, he seems to worry about taking over Cresseid’s testi-
mony once her voice is gone:
Now, worthie wemen, in this ballet schort,
Maid for your worschip and instructioun,
Of cheritie, I monische and exhort,
Ming not your lufe with fals deceptioun:
Beir in your mynd this schort conclusioun
Of fair Cresseid, as I have said befoir.
Sen scho is deid I speik of hir no moir. (610–16)
The effect of Cresseid’s death, he suggests, is to silence the author, though 
he carefully puts this silence in oral terms: “I speik of hir no moir.” His overt 
refusal to “speak” on behalf of the dead Cresseid is supplanted by his tex-
tual production that claims to document Cresseid’s voice. For both Cresseid 
and Henryson, then, the voice must be destroyed in order for the text to be 
efficacious; the absence of oral testimony provides the conditions by which 
a documentary witness can be written and, by extension, the conditions by 
 46. For a discussion about how literary complaints were invigorated and structured by legal 
forms of complaint (that is, a written bill that formalized a grievance for which legal remedy was 
sought), see Scase, Literature and Complaint.
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which that document can imagine a community of present and future read-
ers taking heed of its exemplary testimony.
 Henryson’s Testament, like Chaucer’s Legend of Philomela, sets up a gen-
dered system of witnessing: the loss of the female voice is the male author’s 
opportunity to write (albeit with some anxiety). The end of the Pistel seems 
to participate in a similar system, since this witnessing “pistel” testifies on 
behalf of Daniel the prophet, not Susanna. To make a broad claim from these 
observations, we might suggest that testifying documents in the later Middle 
Ages tend to signal male authorship, or at least masculine authority. If this 
is the case, the Elders’ legal downfall would not celebrate Susanna so much 
as it would elevate Daniel, and the Pistel of Swete Susan would attest to the 
transfer of religious authority from the perjurous Elders to a young prophet. 
But the use of the term “pistel,” rather than “compleinte,” suggests perhaps 
that the Pistel wants to posit an alternative. Even if we are to recognize that 
this poem documents the divinely sanctioned, authoritative power of Dan-
iel’s prophetic voice, we must also consider the possibility that there is an oral 
testimony, a “pistel” whispered so that it cannot be immediately accessed by 
readers. Perhaps this “pistel” is Susanna’s testimony, a female voice that sub-
tends the documentation of Daniel’s judgment.
citation, notaries, and documentary Presence in the 
case of susanna
Thus far, this chapter has tracked various patristic interventions into the 
Susanna story, demonstrating that Susanna’s silenced voice was key to the 
influential and enduring transformation of the story from a warning against 
false witness into an exemplary tale of female obedience. The previous sec-
tion argued that the late fourteenth-century Pistel of Swete Susan rehabilitated 
the story’s interest in false witness, restaging the evidentiary possibilities in 
female silence and written documents, particularly when examined both 
through fourteenth-century complaint procedures regarding sexual trans-
gressions and through other fourteenth- and fifteenth-century vernacular 
texts that explore the complicated relationship between female silence, offi-
cial document, and male-authored vernacular poetry. This section turns to 
late medieval citations of the Susanna story (rather than adaptations of or 
commentaries on it) to examine how fourteenth- and fifteenth-century writ-
ers used the story’s complex negotiations between vocal and documentary 
witnessing to reconsider the communal unity promised by the exemplary 
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Susanna.47 For some vernacular writers at the turn of the fifteenth century, 
Susanna’s stoic silence offered a model of resistance against corrupt ecclesi-
astical or legal hierarchies, rather than a tale of false witness that could reaf-
firm orthodox doctrine. These texts envisioned the Susanna story as a way 
to challenge the authority of the Church to assert an alternative heterodox 
Christian community.
 Significantly, many of the texts that cite the story of Susanna understand 
it in legal terms, emphasizing its investment in how legal testimony might be 
registered. For example, when Chaucer’s Parson cites Susanna, he insists the 
Susanna story is of particular importance for jurors and notaries: “Ware yow, 
questemongeres and notaries! Certes, for fals witnessyng was Susanna in ful 
gret sorwe and peyne, and many another mo” (X.796). Notaries, discussed 
more fully in chapter 4, were the legal scribes charged with documenting the 
oral testimonies of courtroom witnesses, and they represented a fairly new 
scribal occupation in the fourteenth century, one that was already flourish-
ing in Italy but only beginning to emerge on the English legal scene. Nota-
ries were not required to write down testimony word for word, but rather to 
construct testimony as a coherent narrative. Because they were afforded a 
significant amount of inventional leeway but also considered arbiters of legal 
truths, they were often the subject of suspicion and satire in the late four-
teenth and fifteenth centuries. The Parson not only understands the Susanna 
story as fundamentally about false witness rather than about female obedi-
ence and chastity, he imagines bureaucratic scribes as the pertinent audi-
ence for it, rather than wives or virgins. Accordingly, he inserts the Susanna 
narrative into a contemporary legal context, worrying particularly that what 
the narrative exposes—that is, the potential fallibility inherent in transcrib-
ing oral testimony into a legal document, particularly when that testimony 
is silent—might happen under the relatively new conditions of notarial 
practice.
 Similarly, the Wycliffite treatise “Of Prelates” views the Susanna story as 
a warning for notaries to watch out for false witnesses and as a caution for 
them to pay attention to how they document testimony. The treatise particu-
larly worries about the negotiation between voice, silence, and document. It 
claims that when corrupt ecclesiastical officials want to condemn an inno-
cent man, they
 47. Here, I draw on another meaning of “witness”: that is, “to cite.” “witnessen,” Middle 
English Dictionary s.v. 5 a–d.
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brynge many false witnesses & notaries in his absence, & in presence speke 
no word, & þei feynen þis false lawe, ȝif þre or four false witnesses hirid bi 
money seye sich a þing aȝenst a trewe man, þan he schal not be herd, þouȝ 
he wolde proue þe contrarie bi two hundrid or þre; & þes false men seye in 
here doynge þat crist was lafully don to þe deþ, & susanne also, for bi sich 
witnessis þei weren dampnyd, but cristene men bileue techiþ þe contrarie.48
The treatise’s vocabulary takes up the dense connotations of “witness”: that 
is, to provide oral testimony to an event, as the Elders (falsely) do, and to 
document that testimony, as notaries were supposed to do. “Of Prelates” is 
particularly anxious about the work legal documentation is designed to per-
form, insofar as it worries that while prelates might be silent in the face of the 
“trewe man,” a false accusation might nonetheless enter into the legal record. 
In such a scenario, notarial writing might supplement silence in order to sup-
port and ossify the claims of a false witness, particularly since, as the Susanna 
story shows, silence offers corrupt Church authorities the opportunity to 
falsify the legal record. Moreover, the treatise presents such documentary 
manipulation as an exploitation of the principles of presence and absence: 
the testimonial silence that occurs in the presence of the “trewe man” results 
in lies and slander written in his absence.
 Indeed, Wycliffite texts repeatedly worry about false witnesses’ exploita-
tion of official modes of documenting testimony, citing Susanna as an exam-
ple of ecclesiastical authority gone wrong. For example, William Thorpe uses 
Susanna as a way to authorize his refusal to submit to Archbishop Arundel’s 
demand that he abjure his Lollard practice of preaching without Church 
permission:
And I heerynge þese wordis þouȝte in myn herte þat þis was an vnlee-
ful askynge, and I demed mysilf cursid of God if I consented herto; and 
I þouȝte how Susanne seide “Angwysschis ben to me on euery side,” and 
forþi þat I stoode stille musynge and spak not.49
Throughout his Testimony, as discussed in chapter 5, Thorpe maintains 
his silence to the frustration of Arundel and his henchmen. That he draws 
upon Susanna as a foundational text in support of this strategy suggests 
that he understands the Susanna story to be about managing the relation-
 48. The English Works of John Wyclif, ed. F.  D. Matthew, EETS 74 (London: Kegan Paul, 
Trench and Trubner, 1880; repr. 1902), 74–55.
 49. The Examination of William Thorpe, in Two Wycliffite Texts, ed. Anne Hudson, EETS 301 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), lines 365–68.
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ship between testimonial silence and textual production, particularly when 
the legal and doctrinal record is at stake.50 The layers of citation here are 
multiple and complicated: Thorpe documents—but does not utter—some-
thing Susanna purportedly said, either to the Elders, to herself, to God, or 
to her readers. Thus, rather than merely use Susanna as a model for faithful 
silence—that is, silence that, as prayer, can result in divine intervention—
Thorpe puts pressure on the story’s complex negotiations between voice and 
document and, by extension, between presence and absence. Thorpe’s silence 
frustrates Arundel’s attempts to turn his testimony into a self-accusing docu-
ment, but Thorpe can also imagine his own silence turning into text that 
will reach beyond Arundel to a sympathetic audience. By using Susanna to 
negotiate his own silence with various kinds of documentation (the legal 
transcript Arundel seeks to produce as well as the extralegal autobiogra-
phy Thorpe wants to provide a Lollard audience), Thorpe transforms the 
Susanna story into an iterable text that supports his resistance against eccle-
siastical and legal corruption.51
 The Wycliffite championing of Susanna centers on larger questions about 
divine mediation and presence, discussed more fully in chapter 5. In the case 
of “Of Prelates,” the treatise worries in particular about the work of a notary, 
who operates as a kind of intermediary between the defendant and the court 
and, as Thorpe points out, between oral testimony and documented tran-
script. In “Of Prelates,” Susanna represents an exemplar of truth unadulter-
ated by corrupt clergy or legal officials.52 Likewise, Thorpe sees Susanna as 
a way to argue on behalf of his own righteousness without the interference 
of the legal officials who want to shape him into a legal and moral heretic. 
We might fruitfully understand these complex citations of Susanna in terms 
of Derrida’s discussion of spectrality, which operates according to the same 
 50. Another Lollard tract, the fifteenth-century Lanterne of Liȝt, also cites Susanna as a 
warning against false witness, but it emphasizes God’s intervention into a seemingly intractable 
situation. Lanterne of Liȝt, ed. Lilian M. Swinburn, EETS 151 (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trub-
ner & Co., 1917), XII.10–19.
 51. For an argument that the Pistel itself has Lollard leanings, see David Lyle Jeffrey, “Vic-
timization and Legal Abuse: The Wycliffite Retelling of the Story of Susannah,” in Retelling Tales: 
Essays in Honor of Russell Peck, ed. Thomas Hahn and Alan Lupack (Cambridge: D. S. Brewer, 
1997), 161–78.
 52. Debates about clerical mediation between individual and God are, of course, an enor-
mous and complex issue for Wycliffism and Lollardy. Although I discuss these debates more 
in chapter 5, I cannot pursue their details fully in this book. For a more in-depth discussion 
of mediation and presence in Wycliffite studies, see J. Patrick Hornbeck II, What Is a Lollard?: 
Dissent and Belief in Late Medieval England (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), and Anne 
Hudson, The Premature Reformation: Wycliffite Texts and Lollard History (Oxford: Oxford Uni-
versity Press, 1988) as well as studies by Hudson, Fiona Somerset, and Andrew Cole cited in 
chapter 5.
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logic as iterability: the spectral word, like the iterable word, can be detached 
from its immediate context, bubbling up in unexpected places and with 
unintended results.53 Derrida defines spectrality as the inevitable return, 
what he calls the “frequenting,” of a dead or absent authority, such that even 
the excoriation or rejection of that authority retains its residual presence. 
Spectrality thus operates via citational logic, which works according to a 
principle of reflection, “reproducing in a mirror the logic of the adversary 
at the moment of the retort, piling it on there where one accuses the other 
of abusing language” (157). In other words, spectrality denotes not merely a 
ghostly haunting in which something dead or absent unexpectedly returns, 
but a persistent, dialectical reproduction, in which the rhetorical techniques 
of an adversary are learned and mimicked so as to destroy the adversary.54 
Thorpe’s citation of Susanna reflects and assumes Archbishop Arundel’s 
ecclesiastical power to quote Scripture, and in doing so, Thorpe asserts the 
power to produce his own legal document, beyond the ecclesiastical arm of 
the Archbishop. That he does so with a citation of Susanna suggests that he 
envisions her silence as a particularly powerful model of spectrality, from 
which he can counter Arundel’s efforts to indict him as a heretic.
 Moreover, when Derrida explains that spectrality connotes repetition and 
frequency, insofar as the specter returns to haunt the present, he uncannily 
returns us to the Pistel. As Derrida explains, the specter haunts repeatedly:
Visit upon visit, since it returns to see us and since visitare, the frequenta-
tive of visere (to see, examine, contemplate) translates well the recurrence 
or returning, the frequency of a visitation. The latter does not always mark 
the moment of a generous apparition or a friendly vision; it can signify 
strict inspection or violent search, consequent persecution, implacable 
concatenation. The social mode of haunting, its original style could also be 
called, taking into account this repetition, frequentation. (126)
Strikingly, when the Pistel describes the Elders lurking around the garden 
walls, gazing upon Susanna, it describes them as specters:
Iwis, ther haunted til her hous, hende, ye may here,
Two domes of that lawe that dredde were that day,
 53. Jacques Derrida, Specters of Marx: The State of Debt, the Work of Mourning, and the New 
International, trans. Peggy Kamuf (New York: Routledge, 1994).
 54. For a discussion of spectrality, medieval rhetoric, and intellectual practice, see Rita Co-
peland, “Sophistic, Spectrality, Iconoclasm,” in Images, Idolatry, and Iconoclasm in Late Medieval 
England, ed. Jeremy Dimmick, James Simpson, and Nicolette Zeeman (Oxford: Oxford Univer-
sity Press, 2002), 112–30.
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Preostes and presidens preised als peere;
Of whom ur soverein Lord sawes gan say,
And tolde
How heor wikkednes comes
Of the wrongwys domes
That thei have gyve to gomes,
This juges of olde. (31–39)
The Pistel follows the Wycliffite Bible’s use of the Middle English verb 
“hauntiden” as a translation of the Vulgate’s frequentabunt.55 Though the 
Elders do not repeatedly visit the garden, they “haunt” the text insofar as 
they signal the return to a moment of transgression, to the violation of 
Susanna. In other words, when the Elders “haunt” the garden, they do not 
merely lurk and gaze upon Susanna; they perform the historical and textual 
work of the specter, loitering in the space between presence and absence, 
between the transitory quality of the utterance and the iterability of the writ-
ten word. Read with Derridean spectrality in mind, the Pistel’s use of the 
word “hauntiden” here indicates that the Elders’ moral transgression can be 
understood as something that returns again and again, first as their propo-
sition to Susanna and then as false witness. In other words, their lascivious 
gazes and their perjury mirror one another, violating Susanna in the eyes of 
her husband, the community, and the court.
 In explaining the frequenting quality of the specter, Derrida also recog-
nizes the intimate relationship between seeing and spectrality. This “visor 
effect,” as he calls it, describes the feeling of being seen without being able to 
gaze back, of being haunted without knowing from where or by whom. How, 
he asks, do we respond to something we cannot see but somehow know is 
there? For Derrida, the only way to respond is to hear the specter: “Since we 
do not see the one who sees us,” he writes, “we must fall back on its voice” 
(7). Notably, the Pistel specifically depicts the Elders’ lecherous gazes—gazes 
the unwitting Susanna cannot return—as an aural moment for the reader, 
injecting “hende, ye may here” to direct the reader to listen to this moment 
in the story. This narratorial intrusion is unique to the Pistel’s version of 
the Susanna story. Reading it through Derrida, we might conceptualize this 
directive as a suggestion that the readers of the Pistel pay attention to the 
multiple ways voice can surface in a text. Accordingly, Susanna’s “careful cri” 
exists between utterance and documentation, a silence that can be “heard” by 
readers despite the Elders’ attempts to muffle it.
 55. Daniel 13:4–6. See Peck’s notes to this stanza.
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 By considering spectrality as a framework for thinking about how the 
Pistel understands Susanna’s cry in the garden and, more broadly, about how 
late medieval texts take up the Susanna story as a call to resist ecclesiastical 
manipulation of the written record, we can recognize that fourteenth- and fif-
teenth-century adaptations and citations of the Susanna story foreground the 
complexities of textual iterability and authority, particularly when it comes to 
female testimony. Moreover, the long history of the Susanna story illustrates 
the way vocal and written testimony can be used to construct the require-
ments of Christian obedience, particularly for women. However, whereas 
early commentators translate Susanna’s silence into a model for women to 
bear witness to their steadfast faith in Christian doctrine and divine justice, 
later English versions reconceptualize female silence as a model of resistance. 
By extension, these English versions of the story use Susanna’s silence to 
imagine communities of Christian believers that could bear witness to the 
iniquities of some Church authorities and assert obedience to “true” Church 
doctrine that operated outside ecclesiastical hierarchy. 
 Thus, like the Man of Law’s Tale, the story of Susanna provides oppor-
tunities to imagine a unified Christian community; the threat of false testi-
mony is the impetus to articulate and shore up the Scriptural requirement 
to bear witness to one’s faith, even in the face of legal manipulation. But 
whereas the Man of Law’s Tale depicts a “nacioun” that emerges unified and 
triumphant out of false witnesses’ threats against Alla’s Christian authority, 
the Susanna story depicts the authorities themselves as the threats to Chris-
tian community. Moreover, as late medieval adaptations of the Susanna 
story reveal, the tensions at the heart of this story of false witness occur 
between the multiple forms of witnessing. The various kinds of testimony 
featured in this story—from private prayer to public testimony, from whis-
pered epistles to vernacular poetry—lay claim to different models of legal 
and moral authority. The portrayal of different witnessing forms is most 
fulfilled in the Pistel of Swete Susan, and later citations of the Susanna story 
take up the Pistel’s exploration of different kinds of witnessing to critique 
ecclesiastical authority and to imagine alternative Christian communities.
 These explorations of various forms of witnessing demonstrate the com-
plex ways witnessing can produce different, even competing, devotional 
communities, in which Church authorities might be the target of critique. 
Indeed, even though the Susanna story functioned for patristic writers as a 
foundational example of female obedience and chastity, it comes to operate 
as a challenge to orthodox forms of community-unification and -discipline. 
The next chapter shows how witnessing was fundamental to a particularly 
important and vexed discourse of community-formation in the later Middle 
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Ages: neighborliness. The witness and the neighbor were unexpected but 
crucial reflections of one another in a wide range of late medieval discourses 
about community, from pastoral treatises to legal statutes to outlaw poetry. 
Those texts, like the Pistel, depict witnessing as a fundamental but flexible 
mode of constructing a community and show that determining who is one’s 
neighbor is a more complicated task than it first seems. In addition, as we 
shall see in the final two chapters of this book, the competing authoritative 
claims that could be made by oral and documentary testimony were crucial 
to late medieval writers who sought to stretch the boundaries of Christian 
community to include those marginalized by ecclesiastical restrictions and 
discipline. The medium of witnessing—whether the body, the voice, or the 
document—was an important consideration for writers exploring how testi-
mony is defined and how the requirement to bear witness could be used to 
reconfigure Christian obedience, community, and authority.
I n  a  s e r m o n  preached to a Norfolk community sometime around 1365, 
John Waldeby, an Augustinian friar and Yorkshire preacher, condemned a 
congregation for failing to testify about a murder in the area. Waldeby argues 
that the congregation’s reticence unfortunately placed the burden of guilt on 
God, with disastrous effects for the community:
People today are like those who live in a certain region of England, who, 
because of a particular murder that had been committed, were unwilling 
to pass sentence on any one of their neighbors, but instead claimed that 
God had killed the man. And after they had conducted legal proceedings, 
they outlawed God. And from this arose an opinion that neither God, nor 
any of his saints, either lived, or wanted to live, in that part of the country.1
 This exemplum is part of Waldeby’s Novum opus dominicale, a collection 
of Sunday sermons he compiled as a guide for preachers wanting to instruct 
 1. “Similes sunt homines iam hominibus cuiudam patrie in Anglia qui, propter homi-
cidium quoddam perpetratum, noluerunt aliquem vicinum suum iudicare, sed dixerunt quod 
Deus ipsum occidit, et, facto processu, vtlagauerunt Deum. Et inde surrexit opinio / quod in ista 
patria existit nec morari voluit Deus nec aliquis sanctus.” MS Laud misc. 77, fol. 37r–v. Cited 
and translated by H. Leith Spencer, in English Preaching in the Late Middle Ages (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1993), 96, 403 note 70.
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congregants in the divine commandments. In it, Waldeby takes a commu-
nity’s failure to report a crime and refusal to testify about it as an opportunity 
to preach about the consequences of false witness and silence for the sanctity 
of Christian community. The congregation’s refusal to provide witnesses to 
this crime, he suggests, profoundly misunderstands the neighborly loyalty 
it seeks to protect, and he pushes the point further by asserting that their 
silence has “outlawed” God from their community. Like Chaucer and the 
author of the Pistel, Waldeby here demonstrates that witnessing is crucial to 
shaping and protecting the integrity of devotional and legal communities. 
Indeed, Waldeby’s exemplum suggests that this community’s reticence func-
tions much like the episodes of false witness featured in the Man of Law’s Tale 
and the Pistel of Swete Susan, insofar as its refusal to bear witness threatens 
the bonds of Christian community as much as perjury and counterfeiting 
can.
 For Waldeby, the most important form Christian community takes—and 
what is most threatened by false witness—is neighborliness. Significantly, 
in a wide range of late medieval texts, from pastoral manuals to legal stat-
utes to outlaw literature, ideals of neighborliness were often imagined and 
tested in scenes of false witness. These scenes depict the Scriptural and legal 
requirements of bearing witness being violated, show divine justice being 
meted out, and demonstrate that the integrity of Christian communities is 
ultimately protected by God. Accordingly, what constituted true neighborly 
conduct was assessed and expressed in such episodes. Yet the depictions of 
what constituted neighborly behavior in these texts are remarkably varied: 
some suggest that neighborliness requires demonstrating one’s loyalty to a 
local community, even if that means resisting testifying about a crime, while 
others suggest that neighborly conduct means testifying against others in 
the service of legal order and royal authority. In parsing Waldeby’s claim 
that failing to bear witness may weaken the neighborly bonds of this com-
munity and even “outlaw” God, this chapter examines the multiple registers 
of neighborliness Waldeby draws upon in this exemplum, tracking how this 
term variously emerges in pastoral, legal, and literary discussions about wit-
nessing and justice in the thirteenth, fourteenth, and fifteenth centuries. In 
particular, it argues that Waldeby’s exemplum unexpectedly draws on thir-
teenth- and fourteenth-century statute law as much as on Scriptural ideals of 
neighborliness and witnessing, and in doing so, the exemplum opens itself to 
various readings, both in support of ecclesiastical and royal authorities and 
resistant to them.
 More broadly, then, analyzing this exemplum offers insight into the later 
Middle Ages’ ubiquitous worry about multiple and sometimes competing 
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definitions of neighborliness, a worry that surfaces particularly as English 
law sought to streamline its practices under the centralized authority of 
the crown in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. The medieval neigh-
bor was at the center of debates regarding the vexed relationship between 
local customary practices and royal legal and bureaucratic operations. As 
scholars such as Robert Palmer, Susan Reynolds, Richard Firth Green, and 
Anthony Musson have shown, the expansion of royal jurisdiction in the 
thirteenth and fourteenth centuries produced new relationships within and 
between local communities, such that “neighbors” could be understood as 
mutual crown subjects or, at times, as partners in resistance to the king’s 
law.2 Indeed, L. O. Aranye Fradenburg has suggested that in the later Middle 
Ages, we can see what she calls an “apotheosis of the neighbor,” when mul-
tiple allegiances—to God, to country, to lord—were entangled to varying 
degrees of success.3 She shows that new horizontal affiliations and loyal-
ties (among, for example, guild members) both accommodated and resisted 
older hierarchical relationships (between, for example, laborer and lord, 
or subject and king). These competing zones of fidelity produced multiple 
definitions of neighborly behavior that did not necessarily complement one 
another. Neighborly fidelity to local members of the same community—
whether understood as a vill, a parish, or even class—sometimes worked 
against the kind of “neighborly” fidelity the crown expected subjects to 
express on its behalf.
 The conflicting arenas in which neighborly witnessing was debated can 
be demonstrated in some early ecclesiastical attempts to define and disci-
pline false witness as a crime. At the Council of Oxford in 1222, Archbishop 
Stephen Langton declared excommunication for anyone maliciously imput-
 2. Robert Palmer, English Law in the Age of the Black Death, 1328–1381: A Transformation 
of Governance and Law (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1993); Susan Reynolds, 
Kingdoms and Communities in Western Europe, 900–1300 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1997); Green, Crisis of Truth; and Anthony Musson, Medieval Law in Context: The Growth of Le-
gal Consciousness from Magna Carta to the Peasants’ Revolt (Manchester: Manchester University 
Press, 2001).
 3. L.  O. Aranye Fradenburg, “Pro Patria Mori,” in Imagining a Medieval English Nation, 
ed. Kathy Lavezzo (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2003), 30. The idea and func-
tion of the neighbor (and neighbor-love) is perhaps most familiar from Freudian and Lacanian 
psychoanalysis, in which the neighbor (nebenmensch) symbolizes the double pull between desire 
and sacrifice that structures subject-formation. This psychoanalytic framework has been central 
to investigations of neighborliness in the Middle Ages and is best exemplified by Fradenburg’s 
Sacrifice Your Love: Psychoanalysis, Historicism, Chaucer (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota 
Press, 2002). For discussions of the relationship between psychoanalytic and political construc-
tions of neighborliness, see the essays by Slavoj Žižek, Eric L. Santner, and Kenneth Reinhard in 
The Neighbor: Three Inquiries in Political Theology (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005).
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ing a crime to someone “who is not of ill fame.”4 This is the beginning of 
an English law of defamation, but it is not clear from the records whether 
slander, perjury, and other kinds of false witness were considered spiritual 
crimes, to be adjudicated by canon law, or secular ones, left to the state. It 
seems that private defamation between individuals, including slander, was 
to be considered under secular jurisdiction: in fact, in the local court sys-
tems operating in the shires, defamation could be considered a form of tres-
pass, akin to stealing property. But blasphemy, including false oaths, was to 
be handled by Church courts, since it violated the sanctified relationship 
between God and person. Likewise, perjury was thought to be a spiritual 
crime, even when committed in a secular court. Oddly enough, despite the 
new legal designation of defamation as a crime, royal courts seemed largely 
unconcerned with it; it was treated as a local infraction, whether secular or 
spiritual. These negotiations about defamation prosecution illustrate that 
while it could be considered a local, secular problem—as a crime that dam-
ages the relationships between individuals—it was also sometimes more 
broadly considered a spiritual threat to a Christian community, particularly 
when bad oaths were involved. Defamation laws were one way to manage 
the relationships between neighbors, but even in these legal discussions it is 
not always immediately apparent whether a neighbor signified someone who 
lived in one’s local community or whether it indicated someone who partici-
pated in a larger Christian community.5
 For the later Middle Ages, “neighbor” was an analytic category deployed 
by an astonishing range of texts and communities, from local sheriffs to 
crown representatives to the Church. This chapter follows the logic of Wal-
deby’s exemplum to trace the intimate but complicated relationship between 
witnessing and neighborliness. The first section examines how pastoral trea-
tises and didactic literature understand how witnessing can construct neigh-
borly communities (and, by extension, how false witnessing and refusing to 
bear witness can weaken neighborly bonds). The next section demonstrates 
the centrality of neighborliness in the development of English common law, 
particularly in its attempts to centralize legal authority around the crown, 
rather than around the customary practices of local legal communities. 
 4. “Excommunicamus omnes illos qui gratia odii, lucri, vel favoris, vel alia quacunque 
de causa malitiose crimen imponunt alicui, cum infamatus non sit apud bonos et graves, ut sic 
saltem ei purgatio indicatur vel alio modo gravetur.” Councils and Synods with Other Documents 
relating to the English Church II: 1205–1313, ed. F. M. Powicke and C. R. Cheney (Oxford: Clar-
endon, 1964), 107.
 5. For a discussion of the status of defamation in Church courts, local courts, and royal 
courts, see Richard Helmholz’s introduction to Select Cases of Defamation to 1600, ed. R.  H. 
Helmholz (London: Selden Society, 1985).
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Together, these two sections show that Waldeby works within these didactic 
and legal contexts to formulate his insistence that neighborliness requires 
people to come forward when witnesses are needed.
 Moreover, when Waldeby warns that this community has turned God 
into an outlaw, he suggests that outlaws, like false witnesses, threaten the 
bonds of neighborly, Christian community. Although Waldeby’s suggestion 
that God can be imagined as an outlaw may seem startling, depictions of 
outlawry in the later Middle Ages—particularly depictions featured in popu-
lar literature such as Robin Hood ballads—built upon the legal and didac-
tic thinking about witnessing and neighborliness. But those depictions do 
not cohere into a single, unified picture of how neighborliness ought to be 
defined. Some outlaw texts resist the legal ideal of neighbors bearing witness 
against one another by conceptualizing communities of outlaws as neigh-
bors working on behalf of a kind of extralegal ethical justice. Other texts 
imagine outlaws as “neighbors” to the king who act in support of the royal 
jurisdiction of the crown to construct and manage legal authority. The range 
of portrayals of neighborliness in the poems and ballads that feature outlaws 
reveals that distinctions between legal official and criminal (and the com-
munities they represent) can be difficult to discern. Accordingly, these texts 
remind us that what it means to be truly “neighborly” may require resisting 
the institutions and systems that claim to shape and produce neighborly rela-
tionships and communities. Thus, the final section of this chapter shows that 
outlaw literature provides a surprising but important context for Waldeby’s 
exemplum, since it illustrates that the neighbor and the outlaw can (and per-
haps should) be considered extensions of one another. Reading Waldeby’s 
exemplum through these diverse contexts suggests that Waldeby’s sense of 
Christian neighborliness may be more capacious or resistant than it first 
appears, and it demonstrates just how complex it was to be a good neighbor 
in the Middle Ages.
False Witnesses, Good neighbors, and corrupt Lawyers in 
Late Medieval Pastoralia
Despite his oblique reference to a local murder, Waldeby addresses his exem-
plum to a general audience (homines), so his call to bear witness might be 
read as a general warning to all Christians about the requirements of build-
ing unity among neighbors.6 As Waldeby’s exemplum makes clear, medieval 
 6. MS Laud 77 includes a marginal note, “Nortifelchia,” next to this exemplum, perhaps 
indicating that Waldeby or one of his readers thought the exemplum might have particular 
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ideals of neighborliness and neighborly behavior are inextricably linked to 
the act of witnessing, insofar as bearing witness unites communities through 
common belief and neighborly trust. As Zechariah formulates it, “Speak the 
truth, everyone to his neighbor” (8:16). Indeed, the idealized relationship 
between neighborliness and witnessing emerges most profoundly out of the 
many Scriptural warnings that bearing false witness will destroy neighborly 
relationships. For example, Exodus cautions, “You shall not bear false wit-
ness against your neighbor” (20:16), while Proverbs claims, “A man who 
bears false witness against his neighbor is like a dart and a sword and a sharp 
arrow” (25:18).7 Furthermore, failing or refusing to bear witness is consid-
ered equivalent to bearing false witness, as Leviticus asserts: “If anyone sins 
and hears the voice of one swearing and is a witness either because he himself 
has seen or because he is conscious of it: if he does not utter it, he will bear 
his iniquity” (5:1).8 Following these Scriptural injunctions, the Somme le Roi 
lists keeping quiet as the last of the twenty-four sins of the tongue. Waldeby 
follows these Scriptural and pastoral injunctions against testimonial reti-
cence, and he likewise argues that failing to bear witness destroys the neigh-
borly bonds that are crucial to Christian unity.
 Notably, pastoral and didactic discussions of witnessing often center on 
assessing the potential damage to neighborly bonds, suggesting that neigh-
borliness was becoming a central category through which to articulate the 
importance of bearing witness. As outlined in the first chapter, didactic trea-
tises of the period often focus on false oaths and perjury as particularly dan-
gerous to Christian fidelity and doctrinal knowledge. Such treatises tend to 
identify these forms of false witness as insidious expressions of envy that 
destroy neighborly relationships by rejecting Christian caritas in favor of 
base or material desires.9 The Fasciculus Morum, for example, discusses a 
resonance in Norfolk. Notably, Norfolk was a growing center for criminal activity in the thir-
teenth and fourteenth centuries, especially homicide. In the thirteenth century, Norfolk boasted 
higher-than-average murder rates, and in the fourteenth century, cases from Norfolk were often 
used to illustrate legal principles in statute collections detailing coroners’ duties. For example, in 
one collection from the second half of the fourteenth century, the guidelines for coroners’ duties 
regarding pleas of the crown are accompanied by three case examples, all of which happened 
“apud C. in Norffolk.” See Huntington Library, HM 906, folios 83r–v. James Buchanan Given 
calculates Norfolk’s overall homicide rate (based on eyre rolls between 1250 and 1269) as around 
15/100,000 per annum, with Bedford topping the list with 18.9/100,000 per annum in 1276 and 
Kent boasting the lowest rate with 6.8/100,000. See Society and Homicide in Thirteenth-Century 
England (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1977), 36–37.
 7. For other warnings specifically about bearing false witness against one’s neighbors, see 
Deuteronomy 5:20, 19:16–21, and Proverbs 24:28.
 8. See also Proverbs 29:24.
 9. For a list of preachers’ handbooks that include extended discussions of false swearing, 
see G. W. Owst, Literature and Pulpit in Medieval England (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1933), 414–24.
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parable of a simple man (simplex) whose property is coveted by a more pow-
erful neighbor:
If the lower-class citizen does not want to sell or make over his property, 
what I pray will his more powerful neighbor do? Will he not go to the bai-
liffs or the hundred-court and accuse him of being a thief or murderer or 
traitor to his town or the realm? This way he will come injustly to the land 
or have that lower-class citizen hanged, just as such a tyrant once said to 
the peasant for the sake of the latter’s land: “I swear to God,” he said, “you 
will either give, sell, or swap that land with me, or else ‘grin at the moon,’” 
that is to say, you will at once be hung by your neck. (153)
Here, class distinctions and the legal influence that accompanies them are 
exploited, supported with a false oath that works to satisfy the envious 
desires of the powerful, wealthy neighbor. The abuse of status position, this 
example suggests, leads to violence and tyranny, and the envy supported by 
a false oath destroys the charitable relations that should structure any Chris-
tian community. Indeed, false oaths not only permit the wealthier citizen 
to take property from his neighbor; they provide the opportunity for the 
helpless neighbor to be treated like a traitor to his community. Thus, false 
oath-taking problematically allows the wealthier neighbor to determine who 
belongs within his circle of neighbors and who does not. Similarly, Robert 
Mannyng’s worries about taking false oaths (described in the first chapter) 
divides communities of people into distinct classes rather than unites them 
around Christian caritas. Mannyng particularly chastises “gentyl men” who 
think of oath-taking merely as an act of courtesy rather than an assertion 
of truth-telling (669–70). For Mannyng, communities based around per-
formances of empty courtesy fail to nurture the doctrinal unity that should 
supersede class consciousness and fidelity. As he puts it, “þys gentylmen, 
þys gettours, / þey beyn but goddys turmentours,” further explaining that 
“So euery man vnto oþer / þe pore to þe ryche ys broper / Yn oþys and yn 
wykkydhede” (761–62; 771–73). The author of Ayenbite of Inwit (ca. 1340) 
similarly argues that perjury leads to chiding, strife, slander, reproach, and 
threats, linguistic and social crimes the author specifically likens to “war with 
neighbors and those close to us.”10
 Repeatedly throughout the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, didactic 
texts incorporate demonstrative episodes of legal strife to portray how any 
 10. Dan Michel’s Ayenbite of Inwit, ed. Richard Morris, EETS 23 (London: Trubner & Co., 
1866), 64.
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friction between Christian neighbors could be amplified by abuse of legal 
process. These episodes often specifically depict common law as supportive 
of a general culture of false witness that damages Christian neighborliness 
and unity. Langland’s Clergie, for example, complains that Religion (which 
Langland associates particularly with the monastic life) has become too 
closely affiliated with legal administration, and in doing so, he has left “the 
commune” behind while he wanders aimlessly: “‘Ac now is Religion a rydere, 
a romere by stretes, / A ledere of lovedayes and a lond buggere, / A prikere 
[up]on a palfrey fro manere to manere, / An heep of houndes at his ers as 
he a lord were.’”11 Similarly, in Jack Upland, a fifteenth-century complaint 
against corrupt friars and other ecclesiastical officials, the narrator criticizes 
the widespread unraveling of neighborliness among the “comoun peple” as 
a result of the troublesome affiliations between ecclesiastical authorities and 
secular administrators:
To þe comoun peple haþ Anticrist ȝouun leue to leue her trewe laboure and 
bicome idil men ful of disceitis to bigile eche oþere, as summe bicome men 
of crafte & marchauntis proffessid to falsnes, and summe men of lawe to 
distroye Goddis lawe & loue amonge neiȝboris.12
Here, lawyers are accused of destroying both God’s law and neighborly love, 
due in part to the rampant backbiting that has grown among the “comoun 
peple.” Jack Upland worries specifically about the detachment of legal offi-
cials from those they are supposed to serve, imagining a gap between the 
“commons” and the law as it is administered on earth. Together, Piers Plow-
man and Jack Upland illustrate that the worry about the ways false witness 
might dissolve neighborly relationships extends to various kinds of didactic 
texts that depicted a range of Christian communities. For Langland’s Clergie, 
an advocate for Latin learning and Church hierarchy, as for Jack Upland, an 
iconoclastic critic of ecclesiastical officials, neighborliness is the backbone of 
doctrinal community, and it suffers when legal authorities forget to serve the 
community they have been charged with protecting.
 Like Piers Plowman and Jack Upland, Dives and Pauper argues that abuses 
of the law can disrupt neighborly trust, and it articulates the eighth com-
mandment, against bearing false witness, in specifically legal terms. Pauper 
 11. All citations from Piers, unless otherwise noted, will be from the B-text from The Vision 
of Piers Plowman, 2nd ed., ed. A. V. C. Schmidt (London: Everyman, 1995), X.305–8. Hereafter 
cited parenthetically by passus and line number.
 12. “Jack Upland,” in Jack Upland, Friar Daw’s Reply, and Upland’s Rejoinder, ed. P. L. Hey-
worth (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1968), 40–44.
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first takes the time to explain in detail the way courtroom testimony ought 
to proceed and the necessity of ensuring that testimony be true and objective. 
Despite his turn to legal example, however, Pauper insists that bearing wit-
ness is a function of neighborly justice in the service of a truth that exceeds 
the legal requirements of the courtroom:
And ȝif a man see þat hys neyebore schulde fallyn in hys trewþe & lesyn 
his ryȝt for defaute of witnesse, ȝif he knowe þe trewþe & mon beryn wit-
nesse in þe cause, but he bere witnesse & seye þe trewþe for sauacioun of 
his neyebore ellys hy synnyth greuously þou he be nout brout to beryn 
witnese. (VIII.x.10–14)
Pauper argues that if any neighbor knows the truth and hears another neigh-
bor falsifying a story, he must come forward “for the salvation of his neigh-
bor,” whether or not he is summoned to court. Notably, however, Pauper’s 
emphasis on the relationship between true testimony and neighborly com-
munity makes exceptions for ecclesiastical officials. Claims against priests or 
bishops require extra witnesses, he says,
For þer schulde no man ben in dignete neyþer spirituel ne temporel but 
trewe folc to wose trewþe men schuldyn ȝeuyn mor credence þan to þe 
speche of simple folc whyche knowyn nout wel what is trewþe ne what is 
fals, what is profytable to þe comounte ne what is noyous to þe comounte, 
and oftyn wol lytil dredyn God. (VIII.x.38–43)
This formulation is different from the example of the wealthy, devious false 
witness offered in the Fasciculus Morum. In the Fasciculus Morum the privi-
leged few could manipulate the law in the service of their own material gain 
and at the expense of those who live more simply. Here, priests are figured 
as “trewe folc” whose reputations may be damaged as a result of the speech 
of “simple folc,” who cannot tell the difference between what is true and 
what is false. Their inability to distinguish between true and false, moreover, 
is linked to an inability (or indifference) to act on behalf of the communal 
good. Thus, for Pauper, the neighborly fidelity that characterizes Christian 
community must be monitored by ecclesiastical officials, who must always 
maintain truth and communal integrity.
 These few examples show that pastoral and didactic treatments of neigh-
borliness in the later Middle Ages reveal a number of fissures in the ideal 
of community sanctity that “neighborliness” ostensibly performs. Repeat-
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edly, pastoral and didactic texts depict suspicion of the legal authorities that 
attempt to determine the truth or falsity of a witness’s claims, instead claim-
ing that true neighborliness can only be expressed by attesting to the moral 
and ethical ties of a community. Similarly, Waldeby’s exemplum insists that 
Christian neighborliness must be articulated and strengthened by bearing 
witness against any threat to the community. Indeed, his exemplum sounds 
much like the one included in Dives and Pauper, which advocates for the 
morality of the requirement to bear witness for the salvation of one’s neigh-
bor. But unlike many of the treatises discussed above, Waldeby’s exemplum 
does not seem to register any suspicion of the law or legal administrators. In 
fact, it seems to argue that the community he addresses has failed to adhere 
to the legal requirement to testify about a crime as much as to the moral 
obligation to bear witness. The exemplum thus suggests that the legal and 
the moral ought not to be distinguished so easily. Indeed, the next section 
argues that Waldeby is as invested in legal definitions and models of neigh-
borly behavior as he is in pastoral definitions and models. Crucially, this legal 
context opens up new and unexpected possibilities for understanding what 
kind of neighbor Waldeby might have imagined in his exemplum as well as 
the multiple ways one might enact the ideal of neighborliness.
neighbors, Vicini, and Witnesses of the Realm in 
English common Law
As discussed in the previous section, Waldeby’s exemplum illustrates a con-
cern with neighborly behavior, a concern shared by several fourteenth- and 
fifteenth-century pastoral and didactic texts. But the peculiar vocabulary 
Waldeby uses in his exemplum suggests that it ought to be contextualized 
within the discussions about legal neighborliness ongoing in the thirteenth 
and fourteenth centuries. In particular, it must be understood through what 
jurists called “vicinage”: that is, the requirement that jurors be drawn from 
the local village or town because of their knowledge of the case and the 
accused. As if signaling this exemplum’s investment in the common law’s 
definition of neighborly witnessing, Waldeby uses the legalistic term vici-
num, rather than proximum, which is much more common in sermons, ser-
mon collections, and ars praedicandi manuals. Proximum is also the term 
used in the Vulgate and Rheims-Douai versions of the Good Samaritan 
parable and in other Scriptural discussions of neighborliness, such as Mat-
thew. By using vicinum rather than proximum, Waldeby calls attention to his 
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awareness of and interest in legal models of neighborliness, and his use of 
this term complicates any simple understanding of what he might be preach-
ing to his congregation about witnessing and neighborliness.
 Vicinage requirements stretch back to early Anglo-Saxon and Anglo-
Norman legal codes, in which groups of vicini, or neighbors, were asked to 
give testimony on local facts and crimes. Vicinage was based on the idea that 
neighborly knowledge of the accused’s reputation and of community custom 
was evidentiary and that neighbors were the best source of judgment, since 
they could accurately attest to community beliefs and suspicions as well as 
to the facts in dispute.13 The principles of vicinage engineered much of early 
English legal process, when local custom structured legal and ethical stan-
dards and when juridical administrators were drawn directly from the local 
community. Systems of frankpledge, for example, relied on local knowledge 
as the foundation of justice and discipline. Used in the counties and mano-
rial courts, frankpledge operated through units of ten men, called tithings, 
and each member of the tithing vowed to serve the tithing faithfully and 
to suppress crime and disorder within the community.14 To do so, the tith-
ing primarily relied on the hue and cry, in which a shout, a horn blow, or a 
ringing bell alerted community members to suspicious activity and sum-
moned the neighbors within earshot to pursue the criminal.15 The hue and 
cry meant that the jurisdiction of the tithing and the neighbors within that 
jurisdiction were understood as those within earshot. Under such a system, 
the term “neighbor” signaled spatial proximity, and neighbors functioned as 
disciplinary watchdogs for the community.
 The operations of frankpledge endured in manorial courts into the thir-
teenth century and even beyond in some areas, but beginning in the twelfth 
century, English law slowly began to transfer its procedures away from local 
customary justice to centralized royal legal systems. Significantly, such shifts 
in operations produced new conceptualizations of the neighborly witness, 
particularly in terms of local legal knowledge and loyalty to the community. 
In 1166, Henry II declared in the Assize of Clarendon that 12 of every 100 
men must report suspicious behavior in their neighborhood royal sheriffs. 
 13. Mike MacNair, “Vicinage and the Antecedents of the Jury,” Law and History Review 17.3 
(1999): 537–90. See also responses in the same volume by Charles Donohue, Jr., “Biology and 
the Origins of the Jury” (591–96) and Patrick Wormald, “Neighbors, Courts, and Kings: Reflec-
tions on Michael MacNair’s Vicini” (597–602), as well as MacNair’s response to Donohue and 
Wormald (603–8). Much of my explanation of the development of neighbor-witnesses is drawn 
from this discussion.
 14. William A. Morris, The Frankpledge System (London: Longman, Green, & Co., 1910).
 15. Musson, Medieval Law, 90–91.
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These 12 men, called vicini, were the kind of neighbor-witnesses familiar 
from frankpledge, who could attest to the accused’s reputation or commu-
nity standing. They also, significantly, took on an accusatory function on 
behalf of the realm. Accordingly, these 12 men operated as early forms of 
juries, insofar as the group was asked to tender a verdict on a case to a judge, 
who would then take the jury verdict as one piece of evidence as he made 
his decision.16 To explain and defend the dual function of the vicini, Glanvill 
states that jurors must be neighbors in order to judge both the facts and the 
circumstances of the case. Indeed, Glanvill considers groups of neighbors to 
be particularly foolproof in meting out justice, given their familiarity with 
the events at hand and their dedication to communal discipline.
 Vicini were thought to be especially useful in land transfer and inheri-
tance cases. For example, Glanvill insists that family members must be the 
primary witnesses to testify to the terms of an inheritance, but he adds that 
if there is insufficient or inconsistent testimony among the family, “recourse 
must be had to the neighborhood (ad visnetum) whose testimony, if it con-
firms that of blood relatives, shall be conclusive” (II.6). Glanvill thus treats 
the neighborhood as a legal supplement for or extension of the family, 
important if the bonds of kinship were to break down in the face of legal 
dispute. Notably, Glanvill argues these neighbor-jurors might be familiar 
with the case in a range of ways: “The knowledge required from jurors is 
that they shall know about the matter from what they have personally seen 
and heard, or from statements which their fathers made to them in such 
circumstances that they are bound to believe them as if they had seen or 
heard for themselves” (II.6). Such a claim—that to be an eyewitness could be 
considered equivalent to hearing something from “their fathers”—is striking 
in its elision of distinctions between types of probative knowledge, insofar 
as firsthand knowledge and hearsay are thought to be the same. This elision 
also expresses the ways both familial and neighborly ties were thought to be 
bonds that can be trusted, both within a community and in a courtroom.
 This is not to say, however, that neighbor-witnesses were always fully 
trusted, nor that they always offered honest testimony and sound judgments. 
For example, one case from around 1155 laments that the system of vici-
nage allows neighbors to take advantage of their legal authority. The case 
 16. Wormald argues that the accusatory function of the vicini was “emphatically a feature of 
Henry’s inheritance,” rather than a sea change ushered in by the Assize of Clarendon. Likewise, 
Hyams argues that “the Assize of Clarendon sought to institutionalize in twelve-man juries that 
concept of neighborhood reputation used in England since at least the eleventh century.” Rancor 
and Reconcilation, 159. See 158–60 for an explanation of how early English juries worked.
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describes how the Abbot Robert of St. Albans lost the rights to his land to a 
lay brother of the Order of the Hospitallers based on the manipulated testi-
mony of neighbors:
It was finally decided by judgment of the king’s court to have the problem 
settled by the oath of the men of the town of Luton. Some people, swayed 
by the gifts of the aforesaid man H. and corrupted by numerous promises, 
produced mendacious witnesses who were ready to prove by oath that the 
said land belonged in no way to the said church of Luton, and although 
their wickedness was patent to all, their testimony, because such was the 
custom of the land, was admitted and confirmed by oath. And thus that 
land henceforward was possessed by the aforesaid H., but he did not get 
away with it unpunished, for he was immediately seized by a horrible and 
sudden indisposition and died miserably.17
The “custom of the land” is here recognized as the acceptance of the testi-
mony offered by its own community members, even when it is clear that the 
witnesses are not truthful. Furthermore, it illustrates the way such corrupt 
legal operations were perceived to be subject to divine justice. The custom of 
relying on neighbors as witnesses, particularly about property rights, falls flat 
as these neighbors’ fidelity to the lay brother trumps the courtroom expec-
tation that they give truthful testimony. But the intervention of God in the 
form of a terrible disease reassuringly submits all human witnessing to the 
ultimate testimony and judgment of divine justice. Accordingly, this docu-
ment suggests that the legal call to neighborly witnessing is always subject to 
divine law, especially when the sense of neighborly community that coheres 
in bearing witness fails in the face of greed or corruption.
 In the thirteenth century, the vicinage requirements of testifying wit-
nesses and courtroom judges were replaced by the rule of venue, which 
required that a trial take place at the site from which the alleged facts issue. 
The rule of venue assembled juries from the injured region, rather than gath-
ered accusatory and judging people who knew the accused, his family, and 
his circumstances. Under the rule of venue, a trial could take place at West-
minster as well as anywhere else, since jurors needed only to be informed 
of the facts and did not need to be familiar with the life of the accused. The 
status of the legal neighbor-witness (and the neighbor-juror) thus stretched 
and changed as English common law sought to construct a system of justice 
 17. English Lawsuits from William I to Richard I, vol. 2, ed. R. C. Van Caenegem (London: 
Selden Society, 1990–91), 468.
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under the authority of the king, a system that would come to contend with, 
if not fully supplant, the customary laws governing the counties and shires.
 Yet royal documents from the thirteenth century do not always reveal 
a hard distinction between the king’s justice on one hand and neighborly, 
localized justice on the other, attempting instead to conceptualize a kind of 
neighborly justice that could accommodate both local customary practice 
and royal law. For example, “The Proclamation of 1258,” issued in Latin, 
French, and English, explains the newly centralized system of juridical 
administration to suggest a certain amount of involvement on the part of 
local communities. The text claims that royal administrators
beoþ ichosen þurȝ us and þurȝ þaet loandes folk on vre kuneriche, habbeþ 
idon and shullen don in þe worþnesse of Gode and on vre treowþe, for þe 
freme of pe loande þurȝ þȝ besiȝte of þan tofrensiseide redesmen.18
The proclamation links the royal administration (“us”) to the people of a par-
ticular community (“that land’s folk”), using vocabulary that suggests the law’s 
dedication to neighborly unity and local culture. Ralph Hanna has shown 
that the demands of this Proclamation are rooted in an Oxford committee’s 
insistence that the king follow their counsel, as commanded in Magna Carta; 
after three drafts, the Proclamation was “grudgingly” adopted as royal pol-
icy in 1263.19 The production and dissemination of the text itself, as Hanna 
shows, emerges out of debates regarding the reach of royal jurisdiction, the 
role of customary justice, and the need for voices of representatives from the 
shires and elsewhere. The vocabulary of the Proclamation carefully works to 
subsume the shires beneath the king’s jurisdiction, stressing in particular the 
neighborly commitment that might structure the shires’ relationship to the 
king.20 That these juridical officials will work on behalf of “vre treowþe,” for 
example, suggests a desire to emphasize their ethical motivations on behalf of 
a local community. As Green has outlined, the term “trouthe” often signaled 
binding integrity and community fidelity. By deploying the term “treowþe,” 
this Proclamation tries to depict a working relationship between royal offi-
cials and the local communities they police, taking up the rhetoric of local 
community and neighborly fidelity to construct royal administrators work-
 18. English Historical Documents, 1189-1327, ed. Harry Rothwell (London: Eyre and Spot-
tiswode, 1975), 367. Hereafter abbreviated as EHD.
 19. Ralph Hanna, London Literature, 1300–1380 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2005), 45.
 20. Hanna notes that government pronouncements such as the Proclamation of 1258 “were 
routinely promulgated and archived in the shires” (52). See also George E. Woodbine, “The Lan-
guage of English Law,” Speculum 18.4 (1943): 395–436.
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ing in the outer counties as members of those communities. Yet the Procla-
mation also carefully insists that the administrators are agents of the crown, 
not of the counties.
 Indeed, in the second half of the thirteenth century, statute law and royal 
documents redefine legal neighbors as crown subjects, rather than as those 
linked through their knowledge of and adherence to local custom. The 1267 
Statute of Marlborough, for example, chastises the residents of the town for 
failing to adhere to proper royal procedure in prosecuting crimes. In this 
statute, neighborly relations are explicitly managed by royal courts. In fact, 
these “neighbors” are treated almost as children having a spat that requires 
intervention by a calm, disinterested authority:
Whereas at the time of a Commotion late stirred up within this Realm, and 
also sithence, many great Men, and divers other, (refusing to be justified) 
by the King and his Court, like as they ought and were wont in Time of 
the King’s noble Progenitors, and also in his Time; but took great Revenges 
and Distresses of their Neighbours, and of other, until they had Amends 
and Fines at their own Pleasure; and further, some of them (would not be 
justified) by the King’s Officers, nor (would) suffer them to make Delivery 
of such Distresses as they had taken of their own Authority; It is Provided, 
agreed, and granted, that all Persons, as well of high as of low estate, shall 
receive Justice in the King’s Court; and none from henceforth shall take 
any such Revenge or Distress of his own Authority, without Award of (our) 
Court, though he have Damage or Injury, whereby he would have amends 
of his Neighbour either higher or lower.21
The statute not only excoriates the justice meted out by neighbors of the 
community; it repeatedly insists that everyone in the community, whether 
of high or low estate, must submit to royal systems of justice. In this statute, 
then, the term “neighbors” signifies those working in contradistinction to 
royal precept, and the way it is used here flattens out any class differences 
that might exist within the community itself, class differences that could 
critically structure internal neighbor-relations, as illustrated in some of the 
didactic treatises discussed in the previous section.
 One consequence of this shift in neighborly relations and juridical author-
ity is that legal infractions were measured as injury to the crown, rather than 
as local injuries between people who knew each other. In fact, the 1275 Stat-
ute of Westminster explicitly defines false witness as treason:
 21. 52 Hen. III. Statutum de Marleberge, in Statutes of the Realm, vol. 1, page 19.
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Forasmuch as there have been oftentimes found in the Country (Devisors) 
of Tales, whereby discord (or occasion) of discord, hath many time arisen 
between the King and his People, or Great Men of this Realm; for the Dam-
age that hath and may thereof ensue; It is commanded, That from hence-
forth none be so hardy to tell or publish any false News or Tales, whereby 
discord, or (occasion) of discord or slander may grow between the King 
and his People, or the Great Men of the Realm; and he that doth so, shall 
be taken and kept in Prison, until he hath brought him into the Court.22
Not surprisingly, this statute imagines bearing false witness in administrative 
and legal terms, rather than (or at least as much as) in moral terms. Cru-
cially, the statute attempts to envision the act of bearing witness as support-
ive of royal authority, suggesting that false witness destabilizes not so much 
the peer relationships between neighbors as the hierarchical bonds between 
people and king (or people and magnate). According to this statute, then, 
the king must be understood as everyone’s neighbor, who both inspires and 
polices the witnessing practices of a community structured by its fidelity to 
the crown. Indeed, the Westminster Statute seems very worried about the 
possibility that some people might refuse to recognize royal authority and 
instead believe false witnesses:
Forasmuch as certain People of this Realm doubt very little to make a false 
Oath (which they ought not to do,) whereby much People are disherited, 
and lose their Right; It is Provided, That the King, of his Office, shall from 
henceforth grant Attaints upon Enquests in Plea of Land, or of Freehold, 
or of any thing touching Freehold, when it shall seem to him necessary.23
The Statute suggests that because false oaths are standard practice among 
“certain People of this Realm,” the king must step in to supervise inheri-
tance and land transfer rather than rely on the testimony of neighbors, as 
was the custom a century back. The Statute thus establishes the king as an 
authority who can root out and deflate the power of false witnesses to ensure 
the integrity of the legal community he is meant to structure. However, we 
must nonetheless note that despite the turn toward centralized, royal legal 
administration in the latter half of the thirteenth century, the conceptual 
importance of neighborliness in attesting to local community beliefs and 
customs remains important. For example, William Durand’s 1271 Speculum 
 22. 3. Edw I. c. 34. The Statutes of the Realm, vol. 1, page 35.
 23. 3. Edw I. c. 38, page 36.
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juris insists, “We are presumed to know the deeds of our neighbors,”24 and as 
mentioned above, frankpledge still operated as an important mode of juridi-
cal administration in the counties throughout the thirteenth century. On 
one hand, then, the thirteenth-century neighbor could testify on behalf of a 
local community, and his or her fidelity was anchored in the neighbor-bonds 
produced by local custom, reputation, and belief. But on the other hand, a 
neighbor could be understood as someone bound to royal law, rather than—
or at least as much as—to local community custom.
 In the fourteenth century, England saw significant administrative and 
legal upheavals regarding definitions and procedures that were centered on 
neighborly justice. Public disorder was a major social and political issue from 
the turn of the century into the 1330s, and the crown repeatedly tried to 
shore up its influence over local juridical administrators by experimenting 
with several kinds of administrative agencies, to varying degrees of success. 
In 1305, for example, Edward I instituted the commission of trailbaston, an 
itinerant group of royal justices who were to patrol the counties and shires 
and report any suspicious activity to the king’s court. Widely upbraided for 
corruption and ineffectiveness, trailbaston officials were seen as strangers 
who infiltrated local communities to upstage local administrators. Yet at the 
same time, the number of tithing groups dwindled in the fourteenth century, 
suggesting that royal justice was overtaking the localized mechanisms of 
manorial courts.25
 Three particular parliamentary moments help illustrate the tug of war 
between local and royal jurisdictional power in the fourteenth century. In 
1341, several counties issued petitionary requests that parliament withdraw 
itinerant justice commissions and instead appoint men with knowledge of 
local conditions to police the counties. Apparently dissatisfied with parlia-
ment’s response, other petitioners asked for the same thing in 1348, declaring 
firmly that the best method of keeping the peace throughout the counties 
would be to elect six men to hear and determine cases, since “residents are 
best suited to deal with local needs.”26 Yet in 1361, just a few years before 
Waldeby recorded his exemplum, parliament felt the need to enact a statute 
 24. “vicinorum facta praesumimur scire,” Decretum Gratiani Universi Iuris Canonici (Ven-
ice, 1567), C. 23, q. 1, page 84. Discussed by MacNair, “Vicinage.”
 25. Phillip R. Schofield, “The Late Medieval View of Frankpledge and the Tithing System: 
An Essex Case Study,” in Medieval Society and the Manor Court, ed. Zvi Razi and Richard Smith 
(Oxford: Clarendon, 1996), 408–49.
 26. Rotuli parliamentorum; ut et petitiones, et placita in parliamento, vol. 2, ed. J. Strachey 
(London, 1767–77), 161. See Bertha Haven Putnam, “The Transformation of Keepers of the 
Peace into the Justices of the Peace, 1327–1380,” Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, 4th 
ser., vol. 12 (1929): 19–48.
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that specifically condemned bribing jurors and allowing members of judi-
cial commissions to be nominated by interested parties. That statute sug-
gests that the local residents charged with keeping the peace were working 
for material gain. It also officially acknowledges the (widely ignored) sense 
that local keepers of the peace were attentive only to the needs of the mag-
nates and gentry class, rather than to the overall needs of everyone who lived 
within their jurisdiction, regardless of status.27
 In addition, the complex relationships between royal and local jurists 
and administrators were drastically affected by the Black Death, which rav-
aged up to a third of the population in the first outbreak between 1348 and 
1350. As has been widely discussed, the loss of so many people restructured 
relationships between worker and lord, particularly as workers moved from 
place to place in search of good wages.28 The demographic devastation also 
produced profound changes in English legal practices, particularly in terms 
of centralizing legal control around the king and taking it away from local 
courts. As Robert C. Palmer puts it, “Governance after the Black Death was 
qualitatively different, exhibiting a government intent on using the law to 
control society, to preserve as far as possible the status quo” (5). Indicative 
of such royal control was the 1349 Ordinance of Laborers (reinforced two 
years later by the Statute of Laborers), which required all able-bodied people 
under the age of 60 to work at pre-plague rates. The enforcement of the 
statute exacerbated the friction between royal and local juridical admin-
istrators: local keepers of the peace were required to search out violators 
of the statute, and king’s justices were charged with ensuring that the local 
officials remained uncorrupted by their loyalty to their neighbors.29 But 
between 1352 and 1359, local keepers of the peace were no longer charged 
with enforcing the labor statute, a task that was left solely to royal bureau-
crats.30 These rapid changes in legal administration in the second half of the 
fourteenth century profoundly affected neighbor-relations and the witness-
ing procedures designed to uphold them. In part, the problem centered on 
determining whom to consider a “neighbor” in the eyes of both local and 
 27. W. M. Ormrod, The Reign of Edward III: Crown and Political Society in England (New 
Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1991).
 28. See, for example, Palmer, English Law, 3–4. See also John Hatcher, “England in the Af-
termath of the Black Death,” Past and Present 144.1 (1994): 3–35.
 29. Bertha Haven Putnam, The Enforcement of the Statute of Laborers during the First Decade 
after the Black Death, 1439–1359 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1908). See also Palmer, 
English Law, 21.
 30. Musson and Ormrod point out that justices of laborers and keepers of the peace were 
often the same persons, so even if the law theoretically distinguished between royal and local ad-
ministrators, it rarely did so in practice. The Evolution of English Justice: Law, Politics, and Society 
in the Fourteenth Century (Hampshire: Macmillan, 1999), 52–53.
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royal jurisdictions. James H. Landman summarizes the dual fidelities of the 
neighbor-jurist succinctly: “Called upon to bring their local knowledge to 
bear on the case and yet to remain above the influence of local, partial inter-
ests, the jurors occupy an ambiguous space, of the locality yet sworn to apply 
their understanding of the facts to the fulfillment of the king’s law; suppos-
edly impartial yet feared subject to subornation.”31
 As this outline of English law’s understanding of the neighbor-witness 
suggests, neighborliness was a crucial but elastic concept in the production 
of royal juridical authority and the administrative offices that supported it. 
As both a Scriptural and legal figure, the witnessing neighbor operated as a 
sign of community unity, but it is difficult to tell whether that community 
was construed via geography, class, royal fidelity, or Church doctrine. Wal-
deby’s exemplum marshals the overlapping jurisdictions of the late medieval 
neighbor and its elasticity to present his reticent congregation as stuck in 
the crossfire between, on one hand, the requirement to witness in the ser-
vice of Christian caritas and the increasingly coercive demands to bear wit-
ness on behalf of the state on the other. Indeed, once we take into account 
the complicated legal underpinnings of Waldeby’s directive to this group of 
vicini, it becomes less easy to read the exemplum as simply asserting that 
these neighbors ought to come forward about a local murder. In addition, 
as we shall see in the next section, Waldeby’s surprising admonition that this 
community has “outlawed” God initially registers as the dire consequences 
of its inability to choose between local neighbors and “neighborly” fidelity 
to the crown. But read within late medieval literary depictions of outlaws, 
this outrageous condemnation might be transformed into a rehabilitative 
gesture toward this community. It is possible, given the multiple models 
of neighborliness Waldeby draws upon, that his claim that these neighbors 
have turned God into an outlaw may actually salvage their silence as an act 
of doctrinal fidelity rather than condemn it as a rejection of spiritual and 
legal neighborliness.
neighbors, criminals, and Royal sovereignty in 
Late Medieval outlaw Literature
What does it mean to imagine God as an outlaw? Outlawry was the secular 
equivalent of excommunication, and it was typically used as the punishment 
 31. James H. Landman, “‘The Doom of Resoun’: Accommodating Lay Interpretation in Late 
Medieval England,” in Medieval Crime and Social Control, ed. Barbara A. Hanawalt and David 
Wallace (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999), 98.
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for failure to appear in court to respond to a summons. The community 
Waldeby addresses could certainly be outlawed for failing to testify, but such 
punishment was rarely meted out and was not taken seriously.32 Rather, the 
consequences of an outlawed God would register in rhetorical and imagina-
tive, rather than strictly legal or social, terms. Indeed, in the fourteenth and 
fifteenth centuries, the outlaw was as much a powerful literary and imagina-
tive figure as a legal one, and it often functioned as a counter to the neigh-
bor. To take one important example, in his idiosyncratic version of the Good 
Samaritan parable—in which Jesus responds to the lawyer’s question “Who 
is my neighbor?”—Langland inserts an outlaw, suggesting that for him, the 
outlaw was critical to exploring how Christian community could be united 
by ethical calls to charitable neighborliness. As the Good Samaritan explains 
to Langland’s dreamer, Faith and Hope must find the blood of a child born 
from a virgin to heal the wounded man they have encountered on the road. 
The Christ child will also, presumably, heal the social wounds that have rav-
aged Christian communities, wounds that have been propagated by Outlawe:
“For Outlawe is in the wode and under bank lotieth,
And may ech man see and good mark take
Who is bihynde and who before and who ben on horse—
For he halt hym hardier on horse than he that is a foote.” (XVII.104–7)
For Langland, the outlaw is Luciferian, lurking in the woods and awaiting 
unsuspecting travelers, and he disrupts Christian communal bonds by all but 
destroying Faith and Hope. The idea of the lurking outlaw who disturbs the 
sanctity of law-abiding Christian communities was common in late medieval 
literature. Yet the outlaw, like the neighbor, is not so easily defined. Some 
medieval texts envision the outlaw working on behalf of neighborly justice 
in heroic defiance of corrupt royal rule, while others imagine the outlaw to 
be easily reabsorbed into the social systems that outlaws only temporarily 
disrupt. Indeed, the medieval outlaw exemplifies what Jeffrey Jerome Cohen 
has called a “difficult middle”: one who defies easy categorization, since the 
outlaw is suspended between criminal and moral savior, between lawless 
transgressor and royal bureaucrat.33
 Strikingly, the exploration of the principles of outlaw justice is often ver-
balized as “neighborliness,” and, moreover, such explorations concern them-
 32. Edward Powell, Kingship, Law, and Society: Criminal Justice in the Reign of Henry V (Ox-
ford: Clarendon, 1989), 74–76.
 33. Jeffrey Jerome Cohen, Medieval Identity Machines: Hybridity, Identity, and Monstrosity in 
Medieval England (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2003).
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selves specifically with false witness as test cases for outlaw ethical principles. 
For example, in The Outlaw’s Song of Trailbaston, an Anglo-Norman poem 
written soon after Edward I’s 1305 institution of trailbaston commissions, 
the narrator curses a commission’s intrusion into what he feels are personal 
matters, such as disciplining one’s children. He also sneers at its willingness 
to accept bribes and complains that he has been unfairly accused of theft and 
“other misdeeds.” In response, the narrator takes to the woods, where “there 
is no deceit nor any bad law” (“La n’y a fauceté ne nulle male lay”).34 Green 
reads the poem as a general critique of royal law and the operating systems 
that support it, and it is true that trailbaston was a particularly sore subject 
for communities in the shires, because it focused exclusively on “trespass 
against the king’s peace.”35 Indeed, complaints of “trespass against the king’s 
peace” were lobbied at an astonishing rate in the fourteenth century, osten-
sibly either by the gentry trying to align itself with the monarchy or even by 
the king himself against unpopular officials, so much so that those living on 
the outskirts of London and Westminster protested that such focus on tres-
pass took resources away from local justices charged with rooting out and 
disciplining real crime.36
 As an administrative body, trailbaston emphasized the gap between those 
who asserted fidelity to the sovereign and those who remained locally loyal. 
In the Outlaw’s Song, the narrator is particularly outraged at his perceived 
mistreatment, since, he claims, he has spent much of his life serving the king. 
His retreat into the woods offers an alternative to the “common law,” which 
he claims is “too uncertain” (“trop est doteuse,” 56). Beyond an indictment 
of the new commission of trailbaston, this poem explores the conceptual 
role of the legal neighbor, using it to imagine alternative communities on 
the margins of official operations of law. The narrator blames “ill-favored 
people” (“le male desynes”) for turning him in to the commissioners, such 
that he must shun his “friends” (“mes amis”) lest they be assumed guilty by 
association. As his frustration with both his community and the commis-
sioners grows, he begins to provide hypothetical questions to express his 
doubts about the new system:
If I am a good guy and can draw a bow
My neighbor will say, “He is of that company
 34. The poem is included in Isabel Aspin, Anglo-Norman Political Songs (Oxford: Anglo-
Norman Text Society, 1953), 67–78; this citation on 69, line 18. Hereafter cited by line number.
 35. Green, Crisis of Truth, 171. Green’s translation.
 36. Alan Harding, The Law Courts of Medieval England (London: Allen & Unwin, 1973), 86.
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That goes poaching in the woods and does other mischief.
If he wants to live, he will live like swine.”37
The narrator’s designation of himself as a “compagnoun” is positioned in 
contradistinction to his neighbor, “mon veisyn.” When he calls himself a 
“compagnoun,” he signals his membership in a compagnie, a loaded term in 
both Anglo-Norman and Middle English. As David Wallace has explained, 
in fourteenth-century England, the term compagnie signaled a community 
based on a kind of consensus model, “where the right to exist as a group is 
simply assumed from within rather than conferred from without.”38 For the 
Outlaw Song’s narrator, a compagnie offers a safe community that exists in 
the forest, just outside the community that seeks to criminalize him for a 
life he feels neither corrupts royal law nor hinders others’ ability to live as 
they please. His neighbor, on the other hand, is not a part of that loyal band, 
operating under the distasteful sense of fidelity to the commission and, by 
extension, the king. The neighbor in this poem exemplifies a rigid bound-
ary between those who live within the confines of royal law and those who 
retreat to the forests to exist outside of them.
 Yet in other texts that depict outlaw culture, the “neighbor” and the “out-
law” can be difficult to tell apart, and outlaw communities are not necessarily 
totally divorced from the operations of the crown. The intimate—or, perhaps 
more accurately, extimate39—relationship between royal sovereignty and 
outlaw justice emerges particularly in Fouke le Fitz Waryn, an outlaw text 
written in Old French prose and dated around 1330.40 Fouke, the son of the 
Norman king, is absorbed into King Henry’s household when his father dies, 
becoming an almost-brother to Henry’s four sons. He moves to the royal 
forests after an inheritance dispute with Henry’s son John, who was crowned 
King of England after the death of his brother, Richard. The royal forest is a 
crucial setting for many late medieval outlaw texts, and it was envisioned as 
 37. Si je sei compagnoun e sache de archerye / Mon veisyn irra disaunt: “Cesti est de com-
pagnie / De aler bercer a bois e fere autre folie. / Que ore vueille vivre come pork merra sa vye.” 
Aspin, Anglo-Norman Political Songs, lines 85–88.
 38. Wallace, Chaucerian Polity, 66–104.
 39. Here, I draw on Cohen’s definition of extimacy, which he draws from Lacan’s extimité. 
The idea of “intimate alterity” suggests the inextricability of another from the identity of oneself, 
indicating “an abjected realm outside but entwined within, the ‘normal,’ the unambiguous, the 
culturally central.” Of Giants: Sex, Monsters, and the Middle Ages (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 1999), xiii–xvi.
 40. For a discussion of the poem’s date, see the introduction to Fouke le Fitz Waryn , in 
Robin Hood and Other Outlaw Tales, ed. Stephen Knight and Thomas H. Ohlgren (Kalamazoo, 
MI: Medieval Institute, 1997).
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a site in which such outlaw systems of justice might flourish. Indeed, forests 
are often discussed as the site of adventure precisely because of their prox-
imity to, but crucial distance from, the court. However, if we broaden our 
view of the literary forest to include legal discussions of land ownership and 
use, we can contextualize the forest as a space in which royal officials and 
local residents jockeyed for juridical authority.41 In the thirteenth and four-
teenth centuries, forests were legally liminal, at once the jurisdictional space 
of the king and of local communities, and they were often under dispute in 
terms of ownership and use. Under Henry III, the 1217 Charter of the Forest 
established an official system of patrolling forests, noting that while forests 
were royal land, commoners were allowed to use them (EHD 337). In 1225 
the Charter was specifically addressed to “all bailiffs and faithful subjects 
who shall look at the present charter,” suggesting that Henry was success-
ful in developing a system to adjudicate forest lands on behalf of both the 
crown and local residents (EHD 337). Indeed, thirteenth- and fourteenth-
century forest law records show a fairly symbiotic relationship between king 
and those living near his forest. The king often permitted locals to water 
their animals or even cultivate small parcels of land under the legal rubric of 
ancient demesne, which afforded the tenants of lands particular rights of use, 
even though the land belonged to the royal household. These tenants could 
not be treated as villeins or serfs, and so they enjoyed certain legal privileges 
with respect to the land.
 But forests were also where strangers could loiter and commit unex-
pected violence against the communities around them. For example, in 1255, 
when Richard of Grafham, a canon of Huntingdon, was found wandering 
through the forest, he was suspected of being a vagabond (venit per patriam 
quasi vagus, suspectus), and he was required to testify that he was not an “evil 
doer in the forest” (malefactor in foresta) before the forest justices.42 And in 
the late thirteenth century, the crown widened highways so that “there may 
be no ditch, underwood or bushes where one could hide with evil intent 
within two hundred feet of the road on one side or the other.”43 Despite this 
statutory precaution, however, local communities and royal foresters had 
 41. Though many of the extant Robin Hood and outlaw tales are from the late fourteenth 
and fifteenth centuries, Maurice Keen dates the circulation of Robin stories to around 1265, so 
the early thirteenth-century forestry laws could provide some important context for consider-
ing how these tales regard the forest as a space to experiment with the interaction between royal 
sovereign authority and outlaw justice. The Outlaws of Medieval Legend (New York: Routledge, 
1961), 128–207.
 42. Select Pleas of the Forest, ed. G. J. Turner. Selden Society 13 (London: Bernard Quaritch, 
1901), 11.
 43. Statute of Winchester, in English Historical Documents, 461.
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to remain vigilant. A case from Oxfordshire in 1338 details the testimony 
of a jury (“twelve good and free men dwelling within the aforesaid forest 
& adjoining the same”) that accuses a few members of their community of 
entering the forest of Stowood with “seven unknown men” who attacked the 
foresters with great force. The roll emphasizes that the foresters raised the 
hue and cry and caught the strangers, who “took nothing of the Lord King’s 
deer.”44 In this case, a great number of foresters and other judicial officials 
worked with the free tenants of the surrounding areas to monitor the entry 
and egress of unknown strangers in the forest. Forests may have had the 
romantic allure of courtly adventure, but they were also troubled spaces in 
which jurisdictions—royal and outlaw, legal and ethical—could be confused.
 Given the jurisdictional liminality of the forest, fourteenth- and fifteenth-
century outlaw texts such as Fouke le Fitz Waryn often used it as a setting in 
which to imagine the formation of communities with juridical and ethical 
structures that are just out of reach of the king’s law. Once banished from 
any genealogical claim on Henry’s royal household, Fouke quickly estab-
lishes himself as the leader of a forest-dwelling company of outlaws. Indeed, 
Fouke’s status as a member of the royal household yet not a blood relation 
to the king establishes him as the perfect outlaw: proximate to but not of the 
royal patriline, a member of the gentry class who has been let down by royal 
systems of ownership and inheritance. But Fouke does not construct a totally 
alternative society, completely apart from the aristocratic organization that 
has marginalized him. Instead, he heads a community that maintains similar 
hierarchical social and governmental structures. For example, while hid-
ing in the forests adjacent to the king’s lands, Fouke and his company come 
across a group of merchants carrying expensive goods for the king:
Fouke took them in to the forest, where they told him that they were the 
King’s merchants. When Fouke heard this he was delighted, and said, “Sir 
merchants, if you lose this property, on whom will the loss fall? Tell me the 
truth.” “Sir,” they said, “if we lost it through our cowardice, or by our own 
carelessness, we ourselves are responsible; but if we lost it otherwise, by 
danger of the sea, or by force, the loss will fall upon the King.”45
Fouke responds by taking the merchants’ cloth and furs, cutting them with 
his lance, and dividing them among his retinue “according to his degree.” 
 44. Oxfordshire Forests, 1246–1609, ed. Beryl Schumer (Oxfordshire: Oxfordshire Record 
Company, 2004), 139.
 45. Fouke le Fitz Waryn, trans. Thomas E. Kelly, in Robin Hood and Other Outlaw Tales, 
696–97.
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Here, even as these outlaws deliberately take the property to injure the crown, 
they are invested in ranking systems (“degree”), belying the fantasy of a hori-
zontally affiliated, purely egalitarian society that challenges the entrenched 
hierarchies of royal systems of power.46
 The Tale of Gamelyn, a rhyming Middle English poem from around the 
mid-fourteenth century, features a strikingly similar premise, focusing on 
the neighbor and the witness to explore how outlaw justice both resists and 
reflects orthodox forms of legal community. Like Fouke le Fitz Waryn, the 
Tale of Gamelyn opens with a dispute over inheritance. Gamelyn, the young-
est son of a powerful lord, receives no property from a trusted knight, who is 
charged with distributing the ailing lord’s land and goods. The lord, upset at 
this transgression, addresses his executors:
Than saide the knight, “By Saint Martin,
For all that ye have y-doon, yit is the lond min.
For Goddes love, neihebours, stondeth alle stille,
And I will dele my lond after my wille.”47
The oath “by Saint Martin” is significant, as Martin of Tours is the Roman 
soldier who cut his own cloak to share with a beggar. The lord’s citation of 
Martin gestures toward the kind of charitable neighbor-love he chastises 
his knights for lacking, as does the plea “for Goddes love.” Gamelyn’s older 
brother, however, is not happy with his father’s desire to bequeath Gamelyn 
some property, so he plots to leave Gamelyn with nothing while dissembling 
with a false oath: “That shalt you have, Gamelyn,” he promises, “I swere by 
Christes ore! / All that thy fader thee biquath, though thou woldest have 
more” (159–60). Gamelyn thus juxtaposes the lord’s call to neighborly unity 
and righteous inheritance supported with a genuine oath on one hand and 
his son’s false vow on the other. This juxtaposition asserts both neighborli-
ness and witnessing as fundamental to determining the workings of royal 
households and the transmission of aristocratic power and goods; here, a 
false oath can destroy the neighborly unity required for the proper genea-
logical transfer of power.
 46. Green notes that outlaws deployed fraternal language to articulate their sense of egali-
tarian loyalty to one another, rather than hierarchical loyalty to the king: terms such as societas, 
compagnie, fellowship, and even frers were used to claim outlaw confederacy. While it is clear that 
outlaw writing deployed such vocabulary of affiliation, here I want to nuance Green’s claim by 
showing that outlaws were just as often depicted as deploying hierarchical vocabulary to describe 
outlaw communities. See Crisis of Truth 189–90.
 47. Gamelyn, in Middle English Verse Romances, ed. Donald B. Sands (New York: Holt, Rine-
hart and Winston, 1966), lines 53–56.
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 When the text turns to depicting outlawry, it illustrates how the manip-
ulation of witnessing practices might actually authorize the outlaw com-
munities royal households were supposed to suppress. Gamelyn discovers 
his brother’s falsity and finds he has, in fact, been left with nothing, so he 
flees to the forest to live as an outlaw. There, Gamelyn assumes the status of 
quasi-sovereign, referred to both as a “maister outlawe” and as “her king” as 
he commits theft and trespass to support his forest community (688). The 
dramatic confrontation between royal officials and outlaws takes place in 
a courtroom, where Gamelyn and his gang are put on trial for treasonous 
activity. Based on the false testimony of several jurors, the judge finds them 
guilty of treason. But just before the judge sentences the outlaws, Gamelyn 
announces to the judge, “‘Now is thy power y-don; thou most nedes arise; 
/ Thou hast yeven domes that been ivel dight; / I will sitten in thy sete and 
dressen hem aright’” (846–48). The substitution of Gamelyn for the judge—
“I will sitten in thy sete”—is accomplished first by violence, when Gamelyn 
and his company beat the judge, sheriff, and corrupt jurors, and then by sov-
ereign decree, when the king makes Gamelyn the chief justice of the forest. 
His status as “king of the outlaws” is thus rendered official, and Gamelyn is 
reabsorbed into the juridical community ruled by royal law. Likewise, “Adam 
Bell,” a fifteenth-century rhyming ballad, depicts a band of outlaws’ rescue 
of William Cloudesley, who had been arrested and jailed for trespass and 
for stealing deer from royal forests. At the end of the tale, though the king is 
outraged that William has been liberated from prison by other outlaws, he 
recognizes William’s prowess in archery, telling him, “‘And over all the north 
countre / I make the chyfe rydere.’”48
 Like the Tale of Gamelyn and “Adam Bell,” “Robin Hood and the Monk,” 
a fifteenth-century ballad, illustrates the entrenched hierarchical structure of 
outlaw societies and their proximity to the royal communities they ostensibly 
oppose. When Robin Hood is jailed for treason, Little John finds a way to 
engineer his escape. In gratitude for Little John’s loyalty and in recognition of 
his bravery, Robin Hood tells Little John that he is now his master. But Little 
John shuns his new status: “‘Nay, be my trouth,’ seid Litull John, / ‘So shalle 
hit never be; / But lat me be a felow,’ seid Litull John, ‘No noder kepe I be.’”49 
Little John’s response carefully navigates the pair’s outlaw bond and their 
difference in rank. Robin Hood’s suggestion that Little John could become 
his master offers an egalitarian ethos that imagines a society that dissolves 
the distinction between sovereign and subject, a society that constructs one 
 48. “Adam Bell, Clim of the Clough, and William of Cloudesly,” in Rymes of Robyn Hood, ed. 
R. B. Dobson and J. Taylor (Pittsburgh, PA: Sutton, 1976), 272, verse 163.
 49. “Robin Hood and the Monk,” in Rymes, 121, verse 80.
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another as “fellows.” But Little John’s refusal to assume the master role pow-
erfully reinforces Robin’s status as capitalis de societate, a kingly role that is 
reflected in the writing produced by actual bands of outlaws. As both E. L. G. 
Stones and Barbara A. Hanawalt have pointed out, threatening letters from 
outlaws to kings or parsons often adopted a royal style of address, as though 
one authority were writing to another.50 Such letters show that outlaws them-
selves sometimes envisioned and articulated themselves via available, royal 
modes of justice and authority, resistant but close to the systems of sover-
eignty they sought to disrupt.51
 Given the plasticity of the figure of the outlaw as a representative of local 
ethics, a royal bureaucrat-in-training, or a marauder who unravels the fab-
ric of society, Waldeby’s claim that his reticent community has “outlawed” 
God might be read in any number of ways. We can certainly understand 
the image conservatively: false witness (and particularly false oath-taking) 
was considered a crime against God, and the community’s perpetration of 
this crime goes against not only doctrinal precept but also the legal require-
ment to accuse one another’s neighbors on behalf of royal justice. As such, 
we might understand Waldeby as tying together the requirements to bear 
witness found in Church doctrine and in common law, thereby supporting 
the divine power of the king. On the other hand, however, we might read 
the exemplum more experimentally: that is, as a suggestion that this com-
munity envisions God, rather than the king, as their juridical and ethical 
authority. In this interpretation, God would operate as a kind of capitalis de 
societate, an authority that envisions outlaw ethics as a corrective to royal 
corruption. Perhaps, for Waldeby, to be a good neighbor is to consider the 
margins of royal, ecclesiastical, or doctrinal law as necessary to the opera-
tions of that law. In this reading, the final line of Waldeby’s exemplum—“And 
from this arose an opinion that neither God, nor any of his saints, either 
lived, or wanted to live, in that part of the country”—could be understood as 
a reproach of those who misunderstand or misrepresent the refusal to bear 
witness as merely a rejection of the king’s authority. It might, in other words, 
seek to protect this community as a group of loyal neighbors who refuse to 
 50. E. L. G. Stones, “The Folvilles of Ashby-Folville, Leicestershire, and Their Associates in 
Crime, 1326–1347,” Transactions of the Royal Historical Society 5th ser., no. 7 (1957): 134–35; and 
Barbara A. Hanawalt, “Ballads and Bandits: Fourteenth-Century Outlaws and the Robin Hood 
Poems,” in Chaucer’s England: Literature in Historical Context, ed. Barbara A. Hanawalt (Min-
neapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1992), 161.
 51. For an argument that fifteenth-century Robin Hood ballads confront the way socio-
juridical authority was exercised in both local and national arenas, see Christine Chism, “Robin 
Hood: Thinking Globally, Acting Locally,” in The Letter of the Law, ed. Emily Steiner and Can-
dace Barrington (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2002), 12–39.
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participate in the witnessing strategies that support the king’s law over local 
custom.
 This chapter has sought to contextualize Waldeby’s exemplum within 
a capacious cultural framework, arguing that its worry about neighborly 
unity and false witness emerges out of several overlapping (and sometimes 
competing) institutional attempts to shape and express the requirements of 
doctrinal and legal communities. Indeed, doctrinal and legal communities 
in late medieval England relied on complicated triangulations of neighbor, 
witness, and outlaw that circulated in a wide range of texts, from pastoral 
treatises to statute records to vernacular ballads. The neighbor, the witness, 
and the outlaw were deployed in support of Scriptural precept and royal 
jurisdictional control alike, and yet they were also mobilized by communities 
determined to recreate a kind of localized, customary sense of justice, one 
we might think of as “ethical” rather than purely “juridical.” Attending to the 
range of contexts for and possible readings of Waldeby’s exemplum makes it 
clear that while witnessing is a crucial mode of expressing neighborly com-
munity, what it means to attest to one’s neighborliness was a point of serious 
contention for late medieval preachers, jurists, and vernacular writers.
 In addition, given its flexibility to shape and articulate a wide range of 
ideologies and communities, neighborliness might be a useful conceptual 
device to respond to the persistent challenge that faces scholars of the Middle 
Ages: that is, to think through our own relationship to a distant past. Per-
haps we can envision the various overlaps and fissures between “neighbor” 
and “outlaw” as a potential theoretical model for thinking about the Middle 
Ages themselves as both our temporal neighbor (something to which we, as 
scholars, offer our empathetic loyalty) and as a kind of outlaw (a tantalizing 
but suspicious Other).52 Indeed, recognizing the cultural centrality of neigh-
borliness in the later Middle Ages might help us construct a relationship to 
the past that refuses either complete assimilation or differentiation. If we can 
conceive of the Middle Ages as a neighbor to the present, then, like Waldeby’s 
congregation, we are asked to bear witness to it, to act, perhaps, with both a 
charitable love of the past and a neighborly suspicion of it.
 These first three chapters have demonstrated that narratives of false wit-
ness were crucial for late medieval jurists and writers to explore how the 
 52. Cohen has urged us to study the Middle Ages by acknowledging “the impossibility of 
choosing alterity or continuity.” See “Midcolonial,” in The Postcolonial Middle Ages, ed. Jeffrey 
Jerome Cohen (New York: Palgrave, 2001), 5–6. Maura Nolan has similarly warned against 
“controlling literary meaning by building an edifice of historical causation or theoretical analysis 
designed to erase difference.” See “Historicism after Historicism,” in The Post-Historical Middle 
Ages, ed. Elizabeth Scala and Sylvia Federico (New York: Palgrave, 2009), 84.
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boundaries of community were formed, transgressed, and reshaped. Ver-
nacular texts such as Chaucer’s Man of Law’s Tale and the Pistel of Swete 
Susan animate the legal and Scriptural precepts against false witness, and 
in doing so, they expose how witnessing mediated between divine justice, 
earthly law, and the ethical ties that solidified communal relationships. At 
the same time, we see in Waldeby’s exemplum how even those texts charged 
with defining and emphasizing the importance of witnessing to Christian 
community-formation could potentially speak to multiple, even competing, 
communities that were defining their boundaries by distinguishing them-
selves from certain kinds of legal authorities. The next two chapters focus on 
how various witnessing media—that is, the body, the voice, and the docu-
ment—were used to assert the integrity of different authorities and com-
munities. As we saw with the Pistel of Swete Susan, the medium through 
which one expresses testimony can make all the difference in asserting the 
authority to act as a witness on behalf of a Christian community. The final 
two chapters argue specifically that William Langland and William Thorpe 
exploit the authoritative rhetoric of different witnessing media to critique 
and challenge the ecclesiastical hierarchies that attempt to construct sharp 
divisions between those who can access divine knowledge directly and those 
who should require an official intermediary. These chapters demonstrate 
that while devotional and legal witnessing practices are central to construct-
ing and articulating doctrinal and legal communities, they are also practices 
that could be used to critique those communities and the authorities that 
police them. Accordingly, witnessing practices could be used to construct 
alternative devotional or legal communities that operated beyond the reach 
of ecclesiastical or royal officials.
C h a u C e r ’ s  Wife of Bath begins her prologue by asserting that she can 
easily expound upon the trials and woes of marriage, since she has had five 
husbands and is in search of a sixth. She establishes the foundation of her 
expertise immediately: “‘Experience, though noon auctoritee / Were in this 
world, is right ynogh for me / To speke of wo that is in mariage’” (III.1–3). 
According to the Wife, her experience in her many marriages has taught her 
as well as any book could, giving her license to argue against the misogynist 
claims of such patristic authorities as Jerome and Valerian. For the Wife, 
experience provides a counterdiscourse to any masculine (and misogynist) 
“auctoritee,” and the Prologue constructs a critical gap between what one 
knows personally and what can be read in books.
 The complex relationship between personal experience and book-knowl-
edge animated in the Wife’s prologue nourished much of the thinking about 
lay piety and devotional knowledge in the second half of the fourteenth cen-
tury. The most sustained exploration of the relationship between lay piety 
and devotional knowledge is William Langland’s magisterial Piers Plowman, 
which portrays the dreamer’s search for spiritual understanding through 
repeated negotiations of “experience” and “auctoritee.” When the dreamer 
first meets Holy Church, for example, he falls to his knees, crying out for 
grace: “Thanne I courbed on my knees and cried hire of grace, / And preide 
hire pitously to preye for my synnes, / And also kenne me kyndely on Crist 
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to bileve / That I myghte werchen His wille that wroghte me to manne” 
(I.79–82). The dreamer desperately searches for what Langland repeatedly 
calls “kynde knowyng”—that is, wisdom derived from grace and love, rather 
than theory or books1—but in his search for such knowledge, he encounters 
an incredible range of texts that could fall under the rubric of “auctoritee”: 
Scriptural citations, canon law axioms, charter formulae, snippets of patris-
tic commentary. Indeed, the entire poem could be described as the dream-
er’s search for “kynde knowyng” through a labyrinth of texts, and Langland 
most forcefully foregrounds the relationship between the dreamer’s visionary 
experiences and textual knowledge in passus 18, when the poem accelerates 
toward the Harrowing of Hell and Judgment Day. As James Simpson has 
argued, passus 18 overtly juxtaposes two kinds of narration that are through-
out the poem understood as distinct and exclusive: one that “authenticates 
itself by reference to the narrator’s experience,” and the other that derives its 
authority from texts.2
 Significantly, passus 18 is also when Langland inserts his peculiar wit-
nessing personification, Book, who surfaces briefly to testify to Christ’s birth 
and Passion and to promise his certain resurrection. As an eyewitness to 
Christ’s birth and death as well as an—even the—authoritative text around 
which Christian devotion can cohere, Langland offers Book as an example 
of how “experience” and textual “auctoritee” might work together in the 
service of Christian eschatology. In some ways, Book is the perfect figure 
through which Langland can imagine the grace of “kynde knowyng” and 
the clerkly knowledge of many of the dreamer’s interlocutors as mutually 
supportive, since Book is “a unifying figure who introduces a kind of tran-
scendent harmony” into the poem.3 Certainly, Book personifies the incar-
national hypostasis of the divine Word; he is at once a Bible with a body, 
an authoritative text, and an eyewitness to the Passion. But as a personified 
text with a body and a voice, Book poses challenging questions about the 
testimonial possibilities of the body, material texts, and the divine Word. 
What does it mean to treat the Bible as a personification? Specifically, why 
does Langland depict Book as a witness who can testify, like the apostles, to 
Christ’s birth and death? This chapter uses Book’s speech as a touchstone 
to track Langland’s use of testifying witnesses throughout Piers Plowman, 
 1. Mary Clemente Davlin, “Kynde Knowyng as a Major Theme in Piers Plowman B,” Re-
view of English Studies n.s. 22 (1971): 1–19.
 2. James Simpson, “Desire and the Scriptural Text: Will as Reader in Piers Plowman,” in 
Criticism and Dissent in the Middle Ages, ed. Rita Copeland (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1996), 216.
 3. George Shuffleton, “Piers Plowman and the Case of the Missing Book,” YLS 18 (2004): 
70.
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arguing that Langland imagines an intimate relationship between salvific 
knowledge and personification through depictions of witnessing. 
 Langland’s fullest investigations into this relationship are his repeated 
discussions of the oath, which permit him to conceptualize the way contrac-
tual language can harness the power of the divine Word to verify a prom-
ise, whether legal or eschatological. Significantly, however, Langland inserts 
oaths into the mouths of personifications that most stretch the connection 
between their bodily signifiers and the abstractions they signify.4 By insert-
ing oaths into personifications in which the links between material body 
and abstract signification are contested and fragmented, Langland exploits 
the perlocutionary power of an oath. Langland’s oath-takers disengage the 
certainty of the link between a witness’s speech and the events to which he or 
she testifies, and this disengagement has enormous consequences for oaths 
such as Book’s, which promises an eschatological future. Langland thus uses 
oaths to consider how language and the body might both access and obscure 
the divine Word. 
 Moreover, Langland’s complicated experiments in personification and 
witnessing surface in the fifteenth- and sixteenth-century texts that envision 
Piers Plowman as a call to doctrinal and political reform. The chapter closes 
by exploring how the post-Langlandian witness provided the resources for 
diverse audiences to claim doctrinal and political authority. Mum and the 
Sothsegger offers a case study in the legacy of the Langlandian witness in 
the fifteenth century, when Langland’s experiments in testimony informed 
vernacular poetry’s engagement with turbulent Henrician politics. In the 
sixteenth century, “Piers Plowman” shows up as a witness who can testify on 
behalf of Reformation polemics in a number of texts, including vernacular 
pamphlets and the editorial prologues appended to the earliest printed edi-
tions of Langland’s poem. In these texts, witnessing functions as the autho-
 4. For a discussion of Langland’s peculiar personification poetics with respect to Gluttony 
and Anima, see Helen Cooper, “Gender and Personification in Piers Plowman,” YLS 5 (1991): 
31–48; James J. Paxson, “Gender Personified, Personification Gendered, and the Body Figural-
ized in Piers Plowman,” YLS 12 (1998): 65–96; Larry Scanlon, “Personification and Penance,” 
YLS 22 (2008): 1–29; and Masha Raskolnikov, “Promising the Female, Delivering the Male: 
Transformations of Gender in Piers Plowman,” in Body Against Soul: Gender and “Sowlehele” in 
Middle English Allegory (Columbus: The Ohio State University Press, 2009), 168–96. For discus-
sions of Langland’s personification poetics more generally, see Lawrence M. Clopper, “Langland 
and Allegory: A Proposition,” YLS 15 (2001): 32–45; Ann W. Astell, “Response to ‘Langland and 
Allegory: A Proposition,’” YLS 15 (2001): 43–46; James J. Paxson, The Poetics of Personification 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994); Mary Carruthers, “Allegory without the Teeth: 
Reflections on Figural Language in Piers Plowman,” YLS 19 (2005): 27–44; and Elizabeth Fowler, 
Literary Character: The Human Figure in Early English Writing (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University 
Press, 2003). 
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rizing principle for the reformist projects that envision Piers Plowman at 
the center of vexed doctrinal and ideological debates about the status of lay 
spiritual authority and ecclesiastical hierarchy.
Lady Mede, Gluttony, Anima, and Empty oaths
Langland establishes his interest in oaths and promissory language promi-
nently in the first vision, during the marriage negotiations for Lady Mede. In 
this scene, Langland posits oath-taking as a kind of speech-act used by sin-
ful personifications such as Liar, Guile, and Gluttony, and he imagines oaths 
in conjunction with other kinds of untrustworthy speech, including false 
witnessing and backbiting. When the marriage ceremony of Mede to False is 
first pronounced by Liar, he produces a charter for Simony and Civil Law to 
read “‘Lo! here a chartre / That Gile with his grete othes gaf hem togidere,’ 
/ And preide Cyvylle to see and Symonye to rede it” (2.69–71). The charter 
begins formulaically, calling everyone present to “witeth and witnesseth” 
that Mede’s marriage will be based merely on material gain. It goes on to 
claim that “Favel with his fikel speche feffeth by this chartre / To be princes 
in Pride, and poverte to despise / To bakbite and to bosten and bere fals 
witnesse, / To scorne and to scolde and sclaundre to make, / Unbuxome and 
bolde to breke the ten hestes” (2.79–83). Cataloguing all of Mede’s “property” 
(that is, the deadly sins), the charter distributes the “erldom of Envy and 
Wrathe” as well as the “countee of Coveitise” and the “lordshipe of Leccerie” 
to the marital parties. In this catalogue, Gluttony is notably described as a 
tavern-goer with a drinking buddy, Great Oaths, a pair Langland reunites in 
the next vision: “Glotonye he gaf hem ek and grete othes togidere, / And al 
day to drynken at diverse tavernes, / And there to jangle and jape and jugge 
hir evencristen” (2.93–95). After Theology objects to the marriage, Mede and 
her retinue (made up of a number of legal administrators, including assizers, 
bailiffs, and sheriffs) go to Westminster, where the King offers Conscience as 
an appropriate husband, one who might finally translate Mede’s promiscuous 
gift-giving into acts of spiritual support and exchange.
 Oaths were used for multiple purposes in medieval England. In the 
county court system, for example, oaths were taken when a male turned 
twelve and was officially inducted into the tithing, the legal unit in charge 
of keeping the peace, and oaths of fealty were made to English kings up 
to and beyond Richard’s reign.5 Oaths could register and solidify a public 
 5. See Green, Crisis of Truth, 231–32.
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reputation, particularly when compurgatory oath-helpers were called upon; 
oaths could also verify the truth of a legal document, such as when witnesses 
took an oath that a last will and testament accurately reflected the deceased’s 
wishes. Langland’s depiction of oaths here—as language used by devious, 
sinful people—spurs his investigation of the status of “meed” as an indefinite 
term that signifies both God’s gifts and the corrupting monies that keep jus-
tice tied to earthly gain rather than to spiritual truth. Lady Mede floats flir-
tatiously and dangerously among justices and government administrators, 
and repeated attempts to marry her off signal repeated attempts to affix her 
meaning to a moral code. As Simpson explains, “At the heart of the action 
of these passus, then, is an ambiguity, a word which refuses to be tied down 
in any fixed way, and which can provoke exclusive and opposed definitions 
from two figures of apparently unimpeachable authority, Holy Church and 
Theology.”6 Even when spoken correctly, Langland suggests, oaths might not 
always have the kind of perlocutionary power they ought to have, depending 
from whose mouth an oath is issued.
 Conscience refuses the position as Mede’s husband, insulting her at 
length and predicting that when Reason reigns again and unites the world 
through “love and lowenesse and leautee,” Mede will lose her status. When 
he cites Scripture to prove his point, Mede counters with a quotation from 
Proverbs that supports her gift-giving practices as spiritually and socially 
sound, and she proudly cites it in Latin. Conscience acknowledges that her 
Latin is correct, but admonishes her for failing to turn the page of her book 
to find the “true” text:
“Ac thow art lik a lady that radde a lesson ones,
Was omnia probate and that plesed hire herte—
For that lyne was no lenger at the leves ende.
Hadde she loked that other half and the leef torned,
She shold have founde fel[l]e wordes folwynge therafter:
Quod bonum est tenete—Truthe that texte made.” (3.338–43)
After the King puts an end to their squabbling, he turns his attention to a 
petition Peace has issued against Wrong for a number of crimes, including 
trespass and theft. Mede offers Peace gifts to make amends for Wrong, which 
Peace accepts. Yet the King refuses to release Wrong from jail, upbraiding 
Mede for corrupting the law and disrupting rational government: “‘Mede 
 6. James Simpson, Piers Plowman: An Introduction (Exeter: University of Exeter Press, 
2007), 44.
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shal noght maynprise yow, by the Marie of hevene!’” he proclaims. “‘I wole 
have leaute in lawe, and lete be al youre janglyng, / And as moost folk wit-
nesseth wel, Wrong shal be demed’” (4.179–81).
 Here, the king effectively fixes the meaning of “meed” as unlawful bribes 
and gift-giving (“maynprise”).7 He also verifies this definition and solidifies 
his authority to condemn Wrong by calling upon the testimony of “moost 
folk.” In doing so, the king points out a critical paradox at the heart of the 
trial of Peace and Wrong, a paradox that emerges throughout the Mede pas-
sus and that typifies Langland’s investigation of witnessing as a mode of 
establishing legal, ethical, and moral truths. As Andrew Galloway points 
out, Peace acts both as an individual complainant—that is, as a private indi-
vidual—and as an embodiment of the “king’s peace”—that is, as a represen-
tative of the public good.8 When Mede offers Peace gifts, she treats him as 
an individual complainant against an individual defendant. When the king 
rejects the amends, he treats Wrong as a transgressor against the communal 
good. His call upon “moost folk” to attest that Wrong will be judged by the 
standard of the king’s requirement to have “leaute in law” registers witness-
ing as a communal act on behalf of the king’s peace and treats Peace as a rep-
resentative of the communal good. Thus, the king argues that these testifying 
“folk” act as witnesses on behalf of royal law as well as on behalf of justice, 
understood as a kind of ethical obedience to royal law. Whereas the first 
vision began with all sorts of suspect contractual language and documents, 
including oaths and charters, it ends with the promise of a social contract 
that will enact a government run by “leaute” rather than bribes, and one that 
elevates the community over the individual. It does so by rejecting the indi-
viduated testimony of Wrong in favor of the communal testimony of Peace 
and “moost folk.”
 The Mede passus are crucial pretext for understanding Langland’s inter-
est in witnessing and oath-taking throughout Piers Plowman. Progressing 
from Guile’s charter to Conscience’s codicological argument to the testifying 
role of “moost folk,” the vision’s attempts to affix Mede’s significatory elastic-
ity to legal and moral justice dramatize Langland’s skepticism that contrac-
tual language, whether oath, charter, or royal decree, can reveal God’s will. 
Instead, communal testimony can unite “moost folk” through ethical loyalty 
to the king’s law. In the second vision, Langland moves inward to examine 
how oaths work in the context of penitential discourse. Waking up after the 
 7. For an explanation of the systems of mainprise and maintenance in these passus, see 
Kathleen E. Kennedy, “Retaining a Court of Chancery,” YLS 17 (2003): 175–89.
 8. Andrew Galloway, The Penn Commentary on “Piers Plowman,” vol. 1 (Philadelphia: Uni-
versity of Pennsylvania Press, 2006), 374–86.
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King’s excoriation of Mede and Wrong at the end of passus 4, the dreamer 
falls asleep again and sees the seven deadly sins dawdling as they make their 
way to church. Here, we get an extended portrait of Gluttony. Lured into a 
tavern on his way to church, Gluttony proceeds to befriend his fellow tavern-
goers and consume over a gallon’s worth of ale. The description of Gluttony 
is particularly dedicated to “sins of the tongue,” which include body-based 
sins such as overeating and -drinking and language-based sins such as lying, 
rumormongering, blaspheming, and, as described in chapters 1 and 2, bear-
ing false witness.9 In addition, as Larry Scanlon points out, the mouth, Glut-
tony’s site of transgression, “crosses the fundamental divide between sins of 
the spirit, like pride and envy, and sins of the body” (20). More than any of 
the other seven deadly sins, Gluttony sits at the intersection of the material 
and the discursive, and his bodily excesses and his words are tightly knit 
together. While his most obvious sins and misbehaviors include drinking 
too much and urinating in public, Gluttony is also, notably, prone to swear-
ing false oaths. In fact, when Gluttony chooses to enter the tavern rather 
than go to church, he is followed by a shadow figure, Great Oaths: “Thanne 
goth Gloton in, and grete othes after” (5.307). Later, after his bender, Glut-
tony promises to mend his ways and go to church, confessing a litany of bad 
behavior—including repeatedly taking false oaths—to Repentance.
 Gluttony’s oath-bound confession offers a fantasy of certainty, a promise 
that he can and will mend his ways and find repentance. But Gluttony’s con-
fession enacts a paradox: if Gluttony were to confess his sins to Repentance, 
he would erase those gluttonous sins, and in the process, he himself would 
disappear.10 The confession could thus potentially redeem Gluttony out of 
existence, though the implication, of course, is that it may save his soul. In 
addition, Gluttony’s confession is strikingly recursive: he takes an oath in 
order to verify the truth of his confession, then confesses that he has repeat-
edly taken false oaths: “‘I, Gloton,’” quod the gome, ‘gilty me yelde— / Of that 
I have trespased with my tonge, I kan noght telle how ofte / Sworen Goddes 
soule and his sydes! and So helpe me God and halidome!’” (5.368–70)11 The 
 9. Scanlon discusses the enduring link between gluttony and other “sins of the tongue,” 
beginning with Peter Cantor’s twelfth-century Verbum abbreviatum and turning to William Per-
aldus’s Summae virtutum ac vitiorum and Laurent de Bois’s Somme le roi. See “Personification 
and Penance.”
 10. See Scanlon’s argument about Langland’s portraits of confessing sins, “Personification 
and Penance,” 26. For a discussion of the paradox of confessing sins, see Lee Patterson, “Chau-
cerian Confession: Penitential Literature and the Pardoner,” Medievalia et humanistica n.s. 7 
(1976): 153–73.
 11. For a discussion of Langland’s peculiar portrayals of auricular confession, see Katherine 
C. Little, Confession and Resistance (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2006), 
25–29.
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logic of Gluttony’s confession is decidedly circular: to take an oath to verify 
that he has repeatedly taken false oaths leaves no anchor of certainty, noth-
ing to prove that this particular confessional oath is genuine and that it will 
effectively perform the sacrament that is necessary for salvation.
 Thus, Gluttony’s oaths are both the agents of his demise (as they might 
verify his confession and redemption) and examples of the kind of language 
that enables his existence as Gluttony, an abuser of words and food. In both 
the first and second visions, then, the figures who use oaths are personifica-
tions whose significatory existence is shaky—either because they animate an 
ambiguous term, as in the case of Mede, or because they exist on the brink of 
self-effacement, as in the case of Gluttony. The next time Langland turns his 
focus to oath-taking is in the fifth vision, when the dreamer wakes to won-
der whether he would ever “kyndely knowe what was Dowel,” then promptly 
falls asleep again (15.2). In his dream, the dreamer encounters Anima, who 
chastises him for searching in the first place, since “‘it were ayeins kynde’” 
to know everything that God does (15.52). Predictably, the dreamer wants to 
know who this creature is, and asks her name. Described as someone “with-
outen tonge and teeth,” Anima cites Isidore to offer a long list of Latin and 
vernacular signifiers: while “quykke the corps,” she is Anima, but the faculty 
that wishes and wills is called Animus; she might also go by Mens, Memoria, 
Ratio, Resoun, Sensus, Amor, lele Love, or Spiritus. Significantly and surpris-
ingly, she is called “Conscience” when acting as “Goddis clerke and his nota-
rie” (15.32).
 In claiming that she can “notarize” God’s authority as Conscience, Anima 
internalizes and transforms the bureaucratic office that was charged with, 
among other tasks, transcribing the oral testimony of witnesses into the doc-
umentary formulae of public record.12 Widely used in Italian juridical and 
bureaucratic circles, medieval notaries were a much smaller part of English 
legal operations. Nonetheless, they were part of a growing population of 
trained bureaucratic clerks in fourteenth-century England, primarily serv-
ing the ecclesiastical and Chancery Courts, and their functions expanded in 
the later Middle Ages to include paralegal work such as authenticating wills 
and offering legal advice.13 When notaries transcribed the oral testimony 
 12. For a discussion of notaries as transcribers of witness testimony, see chapter 2.
 13. Common law courts did sometimes use notaries, but they had a separate documentary 
system of writs and petitionary complaints. See C. R. Cheney, Notaries Public in England in the 
Thirteenth and Fourteenth Centuries (Oxford: Clarendon, 1972); Nigel Ramsay, “Scriveners and 
Notaries as Legal Intermediaries in Later Medieval England,” in Enterprise and Individuals in 
Fifteenth-Century England, ed. Jennifer Kermode (Gloucester: Alan Sutton, 1991), 118–31; and 
Medieval Notaries and Their Acts: The 1327–1328 Register of Jean Holanie, ed. and trans. Kathryn 
Reyerson and Debra A. Salata (Kalamazoo, MI: Medieval Institute, 2004).
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and authenticated it with their seal (an act performed in front of several 
witnesses), they produced documents that rendered courtroom testimony 
dispositive. Judges could use these documents to determine cases or award 
damages. So when Anima (as Conscience) assumes the office of “notarie,” 
she takes the clerkly, specialized labor of the notary out of legal and ecclesi-
astical circles and instead reclaims the notarial procedures of authentication 
to offer extrajudicial authority to anyone with a conscience, particularly the 
“lewed.”
 In addition, Anima’s mutilated mouth emphasizes that her work as God’s 
notary relies on a different economy of authority than those operating within 
the clerkly world of the law. As described in the second chapter, in the Pis-
tel of Swete Susan, the Elders promise the veracity of their false accusation 
against Susanna by witnessing “with tonge and toth,” evoking an endur-
ing patristic tradition that locates commentators’ authority in their mouths 
and tongues. Anima’s lack of a tongue and teeth challenges this tradition in 
pointedly bodily terms. She cannot take such an oath as the Elders do: that 
is, she cannot guarantee her speech “with tonge and toth.” Her open face 
thus not only indicates the speechlessness of the soul—that is, as something 
beyond the human constraints of language—but also positions Anima out-
side the clerkly auctoritas of a patristic hermeneutic tradition.14 The portrait 
of Anima thus suggests that she works to open spiritual authority to those 
not specifically schooled in clergie, and more specifically, that she does so by 
appropriating and reimagining the bureaucratic office that translated witness 
testimony into official documents.
 When Anima takes her oath, she does so specifically to condemn “freres 
and fele othere maistres” who preach to “lewed men.” Her oath establishes 
the truth of her condemnation, and it locates her authority both in authorita-
tive texts and in her own body:
“Gooth to the glose of the vers, ye grete clerkes;
If I lye on yow to my lewed wit, ledeth me to brennyng!
For as it semeth ye forsaketh no mannes almesse—
Of usurers, of hoores, of avarouse chapmen—
And louten to thise lordes that mowen lene yow nobles
Ayein youre rule and religion. I take record at Jesus,
That seide to hise disciples, ‘Ne sitis acceptores personarum.’
Of this matere I myghte make a muche bible;
 14. For discussions of what Anima’s disfigured face might signify, see Paxson, “The Personi-
ficational Face,” 154; and Raskolnikov, “Promising the Female, Delivering the Male,” 98.
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Ac of curatours over Cristen peple, as clerkes bereth witnesse,
I shal tellen it for truthe sake—take hede whoso liketh!” (15.82–91)
Anima promises to burn herself should her accusations prove false, and in 
doing so, she follows both customary and canon law, which require that 
accusers be punished if they cannot prove their cases. She also offers her own 
body in exchange for a false gloss and then translates her bodily guarantee 
into a citational promise by “taking record at Jesus.” Her oath constructs an 
intimate relationship between body and document, conceptualizing both as 
witnessing media through which she can voice her critiques of ecclesiasti-
cal officials who let their spiritual obligations to the laity fall by the wayside.
 Repeatedly in Piers Plowman, oaths emerge from the mouths of personi-
fications who foreground the complex relationship between their body and 
the word they represent. The link between oath-taking and such vexed per-
sonifications suggests that Langland wants to explore the way witnessing dis-
course relies upon a perlocutionary certainty that might not be so available 
when it comes to salvation and the search for divine wisdom. His exploration 
of witnessing discourse centers on how the “lewed” might be able to attest 
to divine knowledge, even perhaps without the aid of an ecclesiastical offi-
cial. Indeed, as he focuses on how the “lewed” might construct themselves 
as authoritative witnesses to divine truth, he turns to thinking about experi-
ence as a path to knowledge that might be as viable as that found in books. 
Surprisingly, he does so most forcefully through his personified Book.
Langland’s Book and the Experience of salvation
Like Lady Mede, Gluttony, and Anima, Langland’s personified Book depicts 
a complicated but crucial intimacy between body and document as witness-
ing media that can testify on behalf of various communities, both “lewed” 
and clerical, and thereby offer divine knowledge. Book appears in passus 
18 (C.20), just before the dreamer envisions the harrowing of hell. Awake 
after having listened to the Good Samaritan preach mercy and forgiveness 
to “alle manere men,” the dreamer falls asleep once again. In his dream, he 
sees both the Samaritan and Piers Plowman riding into a town, which is 
preparing to watch a joust between Jesus and the devil to decide who should 
take possession of mankind. The dreamer then witnesses the crucifixion 
of Christ and the subsequent debate between the Four Daughters of God 
regarding the fate of mankind: whether all should remain condemned or be 
granted forgiveness and released from hell. The descriptions of Jesus’ entry 
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into Jerusalem, his trial and crucifixion, and his descent into hell to release 
the devil’s prisoners make passus 18 arguably the most action-filled of B-text, 
and it has been read both as one of Langland’s most dramatic and as one 
of his most saturated with legal imagery and language.15 In particular, the 
Four Daughters’ debate models various ways of culling evidence in support 
of an argument. While Truth and Righteousness use Scriptural citations to 
back up their argument that mankind should be left in hell to suffer for its 
sins, Mercy draws on “experience”: “‘Thorugh experience,’ quod he[o], ‘I 
hope thei shul be saved, / For venym fordooth venym—and that I preve by 
reson.’” (18.151–52). Agreeing with Mercy, Peace offers a royal document, a 
“patente” that proves God has forgiven mankind and has authorized Peace 
and Mercy to bail everyone out of hell.
 Peace and Mercy construct a mutually supportive relationship between 
experience and official documents, imagining a “patente” as evidentiary cor-
roboration of their argument to release mankind. Once Peace finishes her 
impassioned speech, Langland introduces Book, who collates the various 
kinds of probative materials marshaled in the debate—experience, legal doc-
uments, and Scriptural citation—as testifying witnesses to the divine Word. 
Although a witnessing Book is a striking personification even for a poem 
filled with odd personifications, neither Book nor his testimony is Lang-
land’s invention. For example, earthly elements appear in Matthew to testify 
to Christ’s birth and passion, and they reappear in Augustine’s exegetical 
treatise on John, in the pseudo-Augustinian sermon De symbolo, and Greg-
ory’s tenth homily on the Gospels.16 A sermon included in the fourteenth- 
century Northern Homily Cycle is perhaps Langland’s closest source for 
Book’s speech, in that it explicitly translates “cognare” (the verb used by Greg-
ory) as “witnessen,” and it gestures toward a speaking book (“And sithen, for 
al that boc moht sai”). The sermon continues:
Hefen and erthe, and sun and se,
Bar witnes that cumen was he,
 15. For discussions of the passus’s legal imagery, see, for example, William J. Birnes, “Christ 
as Advocate: The Legal Metaphor of Piers Plowman,” Annuale Mediaevale 16 (1975): 71–93. For 
a discussion of the passus’s dramatic elements, see David C. Fowler, Piers the Plowman: Literary 
Relations of the A and B Texts (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1961), 129–46. See also 
Stephen A. Barney, who notes of Jesus’ sermon to the devils during the Harrowing of Hell that 
“for Jesus to speak at length extrabiblically has precedent in the French drama.” The Penn Com-
mentary on “Piers Plowman,” vol. 5 (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2006), 73.
 16. R. E. Kaske, “The Speech of ‘Boke’ in Piers Plowman,” Anglia 77 (1959): 117–44. For an 
amplified list of possible sources for Langland’s witnessing elements, see Barney, Commentary, 
55–58.
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That suld mannes state amend,
For heuin and sterne in witnes send,
That he was cumen that broht us liht
Into this warld, and makid briht
The trowthe, that ar was mirk als niht,
For thoru Crist, trow we now riht.17
In addition, in a formulation similar to the one in Book’s speech, the four-
teenth-century Short Charter of Christ lists a variety of witnesses to the 
Passion: “his testibus: / Witnesse the Earth that then did quake / And sto-
nys great that in sunder brake / Witnesse my moder and St. Ihon, / And 
bystnders many a one.”18
 Book’s speech (or the elements therein) is thus fairly commonplace in a 
range of doctrinal texts, Latin and vernacular. Langland tinkers with it most 
obviously by personifying Book as a testifying witness, which he emphasizes 
right from the beginning:
Thanne was ther a wight with two brode eighen;
Book highte that beaupeere, a bold man of speche.
“By Goddes body!” quod this Book, “I wol bere witnesse
That tho this barn was ybore, ther blased a sterre
That alle the wise of this world in o wit acordeden—
That swich a barn was ybore in Bethleem the citee
That mannes soule sholde save and synne destroye.” (18.229–35)
Langland specifically marks Book’s body as a witnessing one, his two “brode 
eighen” denoting Book as an eyewitness to Christ’s divine birth. Moreover, 
the designation of Book as a “beaupeere” establishes him as a ranking mem-
ber of society, a figure of sufficient community status to provide credible 
testimony.19 Perhaps drawing on the homiletic qualities of the speech, Lang-
 17. English Metrical Homilies from Manuscripts of the Fourteenth Century, ed. John Small 
(Edinburgh: W. Patterson, 1862), page 98.
 18. The Middle English Charters of Christ, ed. M.  C. Spalding (Bryn Mawr: Bryn Mawr 
College, 1914), lines 21–28. Emily Steiner has discussed the formal and conceptual relationship 
between the Charters of Christ and Piers Plowman in Documentary Culture and the Making of 
Medieval English Literature (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 64–75.
 19. “Beaupeere” is a somewhat vague Middle English term. Barney follows the Middle En-
glish Dictionary’s definition of “father-confessor,” though as I discuss here, it can have more gen-
eral connotations, including someone of good standing in a given community (which is one im-
portant requirement of being a witness in a court of law). Barney, Commentary, 55. As for Book’s 
eyes, Kaske argues that they “can appropriately allegorize the relationship of the New Testament 
to both past and future.” See “Speech,” 126.
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land emphasizes Book’s voice by inserting “quod the Book” twice and adding 
some oral flourishes. For example, when describing the Passion, Book twice 
repeats “Lo!” as though calling out to a congregation:
“And lo! how the sonne gan louke hire light in hirselve
Whan she seigh hym suffer, that sonne and see made.
The erthe for hevynesse that he wold suffre
Quaked as quyk thyng and al biquasshe the roche.
Lo! helle myghte nat holde, but opnede tho God tholede,
And leet out Symondes sones to seen hym hange on roode.” (18.245–50)
Langland’s transformation of this text into the speech of a personified book 
sets up the specific stakes of Langland’s inclusion of Book in his poem. Rather 
than merely offer a summary of Christ’s life and death before the Harrow-
ing of Hell, Langland uses Book to foreground his concern with the abil-
ity of personifications to express and teach Christian devotion, particularly 
the incarnational ideal of the divine Word. That he does so with a witness-
ing book suggests that he is particularly interested in how testimony might 
provide a way to think about the dreamer’s access to the salvific knowledge 
contained within Book.
 Beyond Book’s immediate source-texts, we can locate Book’s speech 
within a long history of books as mediators of the divine Word. The book 
surfaces as a penitential image in the Book of Revelation 5.1, in which the 
dreamer John sees that God holds a book written within and without (librum 
scriptum intus et foris signatum). Sealed with seven seals, the book cannot 
be opened until a wounded lamb takes it from God and opens it, revealing 
Christ’s divinity. These episodes in Revelation set up two crucial features 
of the penitential book. First, the penitential book fundamentally controls 
access to God’s Word. Only Christ can open the text, and those unable to 
open it never actually read or hear read the words within. Instead, John sees 
and hears the voices of many angels (et vidi et audivi vocem angelorum mul-
torum), who mediate between the divine Word and John’s understanding 
of it. Second, Revelation depicts God’s book as an object to be witnessed, a 
symbol of God’s Word rather than a legible text. This image of the peniten-
tial book thus carefully establishes both a gap and a link between the divine 
and the earthly: while John cannot read God’s book nor even open it him-
self, he can witness the object that contains the Word and thus testify to its 
power. Indeed, the symbolic potential of the codex, what Jesse Gellrich calls 
the “myth of the book,” imagines that divine ordo could be gathered into a 
kind of urtext, such that “the bond between image and referent, signifier 
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and signified is highly motivated or natural.”20 In other words, because some 
books could fuse signifier and signified under the unity of the Word, they 
were crucial symbols of the link between divine wisdom and earthly signs. 
Accordingly, Langland’s Clergie imagines books as the appropriate accou-
trements of a utopian, heavenly society: “‘For in cloistre cometh no man to 
[querele] ne to fighte,’” she says, “‘But al is buxomnesse there and bokes, to 
rede and to lerne’” (10.301–2).21
 Whereas John’s testimony demonstrates that mythographic books can 
link the divine Word to earthly witnesses, personified, speaking books sur-
face in the fourteenth century to complain about the laity who have found 
ways to access texts they have no business reading. In his Philobiblon, for 
example, Richard de Bury imagines books as the keepers of divine wisdom, 
which anyone can access: “There everyone who asks receives you, and every-
one who seeks finds you, and to everyone that knocks boldly it is speedily 
opened.”22 But when Richard’s books speak for themselves, they complain 
about all sorts of things, including misuse by “degenerate clerks” (clerici 
degeneres). In particular, because books have been expelled from the homes 
of the clergy and sold to laypeople, they protest, “We suffer from various dis-
eases, enduring pains in our backs and sides; we lie with our limbs unstrung 
by palsy, and there is no man who lays it to heart, and no man who provides a 
mollifying plaster” (45). These personified books beg to be restored to clerks’ 
cloistered studies, safe from rough laymen and the wives who are jealous of 
their husbands’ love of books.
 Richard’s speaking books materialize one of his central points: that books 
harbor divine wisdom and thus can only be cared for properly by clerks 
trained to read sacred texts. His personified books, like Langland’s Book, 
emphasize their own materiality, posing as diseased bodies decaying at the 
hands of ignorant laypeople. Moreover, as Richard’s books worry about their 
material disintegration at the hands of ignorant or jealous abusers, they also 
 20. Jesse M. Gellrich, The Idea of the Book in the Middle Ages: Language Theory, Mythology, 
and Fiction (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1985).
 21. Shuffleton argues that throughout Piers Plowman, books are treated as the private prop-
erty of clerks, who “know books kindly because of their institutional position.” See “Missing 
Book,” 59.
 22. “Ibi te omis qui petit accipit, et qui quaerit invenit, et pulsantibus improbe citius aperi-
tur.” The “Philobiblon” of Richard de Bury, ed. Michael Maclagan and trans. E. C. Thomas (Oxford: 
Basil Blackwell, 1960), 16–17. For a discussion of Richard’s “fetishistic” relationship between 
codicology and corporeality, see Michael Camille, “The Book as Flesh and Fetish in Richard de 
Bury’s Philobiblon,” in The Book and the Body, ed. Dolores Warwick Frese and Katherine O’Brien 
O’Keeffe (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1997), 34–77. For a discussion of 
Richard’s specific interest in the codex rather than other material texts, see Steiner, Documentary 
Culture, 18–19.
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complain about a “pestilent multitude of creatures” among the laity, people 
who consider themselves able to preach and cite from sacred books without 
really understanding them (65). Richard’s books moan, “As the silly parrot 
imitates the words that he has heard, so such men are mere reciters of all, 
but authors of nothing, imitating Balaam’s ass, which, though senseless of 
itself, yet became eloquent of speech and the teacher of its master though a 
prophet” (67).
 We can thus note two traditions that treat the relationship between books 
and witnesses available to Langland. On one hand, the Book of Revelation 
establishes mutually supportive links between God’s Word, the symbolic 
codex, and earthly witnesses, and Scripture operates as the hinge between 
the divine Word and John’s testimony of it. On the other hand, some four-
teenth-century personified books argue that the Johannine experience of 
witnessing the Word should be confined to clerks to protect the Word from 
misuse. Langland’s Book balances witnessing access and clerkly protection 
by bringing together the witnesses that might be understood to represent a 
“kynde” or experiential mode of knowing—natural, earthly eyewitnesses—
and clerkly, textual ones, signaled by Peter’s citation of Matthew. Indeed, 
Book focuses less on the miracle than on the testimony of those who can 
provide evidence of it:
“And alle the elements,” quod the Book, “herof beren witnesse
That he was God and al wroghte the wolkne first shewed:
Tho that weren in hevene token stella comata
And tendeden hire as a torche to reverencen his burthe;
The light folwede the Lord into the lowe erthe.
The water witnesseth that he was God, for he wente on it;
Peter the Apostel parceyved his gate,
And as he wente on the water wel hym knew, and seide,
Iube me venire ad te super aquas.” (18.236–44)
He goes on to claim that the sun, the earth, and the sea quaked with grief 
as they witnessed Christ’s brutal hanging. Book’s formulation lists witnesses 
horizontally, not ranking the claims of the witnessing water below Peter the 
Apostle’s Latin quotation. Book thus brings together “experience” and clerkly 
learning. 
 Langland’s personified Book is particularly invested in summarizing the 
miracle of the nativity and the Passion to prepare the dreamer for the Har-
rowing of Hell and Judgment Day. In offering a sermonlike speech, Book 
participates in the dramatic operations of the final passus, in which Christ 
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enacts the gospels in front of a crowd, including the dreamer. For George 
Shuffleton, the end of Piers Plowman brings the immediate, communal expe-
rience offered by dramatic reenactments of Christ’s life and death together 
with the textual citations scattered throughout the poem. As he puts it, in 
passus 18, “the poem still features textual learning, replete with documents 
and biblical quotations in an even greater density than in preceding passus, 
but now they are all on public display” (67). Indeed, Shuffleton extracts Book 
from the passus’s supposed emphasis on “textual learning,” arguing that Book 
ought not to be considered a kind of document or even a representation of 
clergie, but a kind of pure allegory that momentarily fuses the Book of Nature 
and God’s Word, different from any documentary or textual materials that 
surface throughout Piers Plowman. Book’s speech is to be encountered not 
as a citation, he claims, but as the divine Word emerging directly from the 
mouth of Scripture. But we ought not to dismiss so easily Book’s textuality. 
Book is still a book, even if an especially transcendent one, and his mate-
riality is crucial to his ability to express the eschatology passus 18 seeks to 
instruct. Book both participates in the dramatic enactment of the Harrowing 
of Hell and maintains the clerkly status of a commentary on it. As a witness 
to Christ’s life and death whose testimony reveals the multiple kinds of wit-
nesses working together in the service of verifying Christian eschatology, 
Book suggests that the Johannine understanding of the divine Word can be 
accessed and enacted in a number of ways and by a variety of readers, listen-
ers, and observers, clerical and lay.
 Yet Langland does not always offer such a mutually supportive relation-
ship between eyewitness experience and bookish literacy, and he spends 
much of the poem struggling between the authoritative claims of experi-
ence and texts. He does so especially in the difficult third vision, where the 
dreamer turns to the question of grace: that is, whether humans are saved 
by grace alone or whether good works (“dowel”) can offer the possibility of 
salvation. At the beginning of the vision, after asking many people where 
he might find “Dowel,” the dreamer falls asleep. In this dream, he retreats 
to his interior consciousness, meeting Thought, who explains the work-
ing of Dowel, Dobet, and Dobest. But the dreamer shrugs off the lessons of 
Thought, telling him, “For more kynde knowynge I coveite to lerne” (8.110). 
He thus articulates the basic terms of the inner dream: what is the differ-
ence between what “bokes” and “kynde knowynge” can offer in the search 
for grace? The question leads the dreamer to personified figures that rep-
resent the human soul, including Thought and Wit, as well as those who 
represent “external” modes of accessing divine knowledge, including Dame 
Studie, Clergie, and Scripture. Not surprisingly, as these personifications try 
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to define Dowel, Dobet, and Dobest for the dreamer, they emphasize tight 
links between moral development and formal models of education, includ-
ing Scriptural exegesis. Clergy argues that Dowel means to know the articles 
of faith and “to bileve lelly, bothe lered and lewed”; he goes on to complain 
about incompetent priests and prophesizes that a king will soon come to 
reform the Church. The prophecy prompts the dreamer to ask if Dowel and 
Dobet are knights who will serve such a king, but before Clergy can answer, 
Scripture shows up.
 When Scripture arrives, he answers the dreamer’s question with a caveat 
about the reliability of material texts: “‘I nel noght scorne,’” he says, “‘but if 
scryveynes lye, / Kynghod ne knyghthod, by noght I kan awayte, / Helpeth 
noght to heveneward oone heeris ende, / Ne richesse right noght, ne reautee 
of lordes’” (10.331–34).23 Scripture’s admission that texts are susceptible to 
the fallibility of copyists reminds us that Scripture operates in material form, 
even as it expresses the immaterial Word. This reminder initiates Scripture’s 
measured answer to the dreamer’s questions about grace. At first, Scripture 
explains that only a few will be chosen to enter heaven, and the dreamer 
trembles with fear that he will not be among them. In response, the dreamer 
argues that only belief is required for redemption, and moreover, that even 
non-Christians might be redeemed: “For Crist cleped us alle, come if we 
wolde— / Sarsens and scismatikes, and so he dide the Jewes: / O vos omnes 
sicientes, venite &c” (11.119–20). Scripture, seemingly impressed with the 
dreamer’s ability to cite from Isaiah, concedes that contrition and meekness 
could lead anyone to redemption: “‘That is sooth,’ seide Scripture; ‘may no 
synne lette / Mercy, may al amende, and mekenesse hir folwe; / For thei beth, 
as oure bokes telleth, above Goddes werkes: / Misericordia eius super omnia 
opera eius’” (11.137–39). For Scripture, “oure bokes” provide the substance 
for this debate as well as the site of agreement between Scripture and the 
frustrated dreamer.24
 The dreamer continues to argue until an irritated Scripture tells the 
dreamer that he simply does not understand himself well enough for such 
a complicated discussion. Insulted and exhausted, the dreamer falls asleep 
within his ongoing dream, and during this dream-within-a-dream he contin-
ues his conversation with Scripture, who cites from Matthew to preach that 
 23. For a discussion of this passage, see Simpson, Introduction, 96.
 24. Shuffleton points out that Clergy offers to bring Conscience a bible to serve as a lesson 
about patience. As Shuffleton argues, “For Clergy, an intellectual yearning can best be satisfied 
by a material object. But again, the aim of this covetousness is kind knowing, the same type of 
intimate connection that exists between a clerk and his books, between owner and property.” 
“Missing Book,” 66.
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God is both merciful and exacting in his justice. Outraged by the suggestion 
that clerical learning might be crucial for salvation, Trajan abruptly surfaces 
to interrupt the conversation. “‘Ye, baw for bokes!’” he exclaims, going on 
to describe his own conversion as one that proves the futility of the kind of 
clerical authority Scripture advocates:
“I, Troianus, a trewe knight, take witnesse at a pope
How I was ded and dampned to dwellen in pyne
For an uncristene creature; clerkes wite the sothe—
That al the clergie under Crist ne myghte me cracche fro helle
But oonliche love and leautee and my laweful domes.” (11.141–45) 25
Trajan was well known in the later Middle Ages as the pagan emperor who 
was saved by the sixth-century pope Gregory as a result of Trajan’s sense of 
justice.26 Langland’s particular use of Trajan here illustrates his interest in 
the ways experiential testimony might operate as a fundamental discourse of 
justice and salvation, particularly as such testimony can dispute the authority 
of book learning. For Trajan, “taking witness” of his own conversion chal-
lenges the citational authority of Scripture and his “bokes.” Indeed, as Frank 
Grady points out, one notable feature of Langland’s version of Trajan is that 
“Trajan speaks—speaks of his own salvation, in his own voice, in the pres-
ent moment” (24–25). In doing so, Trajan links his speech with the testimo-
nial structures available in law rather than in theological discourse, acting 
as a witness of his own experiences rather than as a narrator of a dream or 
prophecy. Indeed, Trajan’s self-referential manner of introducing himself as 
a testimonial subject (“‘I, Troianus, a trewe knight, take witnesse’”) posits 
witnessing as a critical intersection between legal and devotional models of 
grace, linking “love,” “leautee,” and “laweful domes.”
 The third vision goes on to offer a series of alternatives to “bokes” as 
pathways to salvation, including love, faith, and self-understanding. In fact, 
 25. This quotation is cited from Schmidt’s first edition of Piers Plowman. In the second 
edition, the quotation from Trajan is in indirect discourse: “‘Ye, baw for bokes!’ quod oon was 
broken out of helle / Highte Troianus, a trewe knyght, took witnesse at a pope / How he was ded 
and dampned to dwellen in pyne / For an uncristen creature” (11.140–44).
 26. For a description of the figure of Trajan from the lives of Gregory through twelfth-cen-
tury theologians and Dante and Langland, see Gordon Whatley, “The Uses of Hagiography: The 
Legend of Pope Gregory and the Emperor Trajan in the Middle Ages,” Viator 15 (1984): 25–63. 
For a concise summary of twentieth-century criticism on the legend of Trajan and Piers Plow-
man, see Frank Grady, Representing Righteous Heathens in Late Medieval England (New York: 
Palgrave, 2005), 20–22.
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Trajan presents Paradise as a place where Scripture’s “bokes” can be redefined 
to be more inclusive: “‘Ther no clergie ne kouthe, ne konnyng of lawes!’” he 
states. “‘Love and leautee is a leel science, / For that is the book blissed of 
blisse and of joye’” (11.165–67). Though he claims love and “leautee” ought 
themselves to be considered authoritative “books,” his speech is littered with 
Scriptural axioms, illustrating, as Langland so often does, that the distinction 
between “lewed” and “clergie” is not easy to mark. More specifically, Lang-
land shows that “taking witness” as Trajan means it and citing Scripture are 
not entirely distinct activities. But when Will awakens from his inner dream, 
he encounters Ymaginatif, who tries (unsuccessfully) to defend the authority 
of “clergie” over “lewed” models of devotion. Ymaginatif argues that while 
someone such as Trajan can be saved, his ignorance of clerical knowledge 
and eleventh-hour conversion will secure him a lower place in heaven than 
is reserved for those who are baptized. Significantly, to make this argument, 
Ymaginatif draws on multiple registers of witnessing:
“Clergie and kynde wit cometh of sighte and techyng,
As the Book bereth witnesse to burnes that kan rede:
Quod scimus loquimur, quod vidimus testamur.
Of quod scimus cometh clergie, a konnynge of hevene,
And of quod vidimus cometh kynde wit, of sighte of diverse peple.
Ac grace is a gifte of God, and of greet love spryngeth;
Knew nevere clerk how it cometh forth, ne kynde wit the weyes:
Nescit aliquis unde venit aut quo vadit.” (12.64–69)
In this passage, witnessing signifies “kynde wit,” which is achieved through 
the “sighte of diverse peple.” It also signifies Scriptural citation for a Latinate 
audience, as the “Book bereth witnesse to burnes that kan rede.” Here, Ymag-
inatif takes up Trajan’s opposition between Scriptural citation and witnessing 
by emphasizing an interactive relationship between “clergie” and “kynde wit,” 
neither of which is wholly sufficient for redemption.
 Trajan’s testimony and Ymaginatif ’s sermon are both interested in the 
overlap between experiential and citational models of devotion and paths 
to redemption, and both figures broadly illustrate Langland’s ambivalence 
about both clerical and extraclerical modes of demonstrating salvific knowl-
edge. That the discussion about these paths to salvation coheres around Tra-
jan and Ymaginatif is important, since Trajan is a quasi-historical figure, the 
only “real” figure to appear in Piers Plowman, as Grady points out. Ymagi-
natif, of course, is a personification, an embodiment of the psychological 
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faculty that can construct and distinguish between images in the service of 
memory.27 But Ymaginatif is depicted merely as a name, his body only once 
gestured to when he claims, “I sitte by myself in siknesse ne in helthe” (12.2). 
By imagining these characters conversing about the various definitions and 
salvific claims of “bokes,” Langland posits “bokes” as the linchpin not only 
between personal experience and citational knowledge, but also between 
historical actor and personified abstraction.
 In the third vision, then, “bokes” engineer theological discussions about 
the relationship between attested experience and Scriptural citation. At the 
end of the poem, Langland’s Book collects the various threads of these dis-
cussions into a single personification that can exemplify both experience 
and book learning as witnessing evidence that supports the eschatological 
future he seeks to articulate. However, as we shall see, when Book takes an 
oath to burn himself to verify his promise of redemption, he troubles the 
unified ideal of experiential and bookish witnessing he presents in the first 
part of his speech. Indeed, Book’s oath exposes that Langland’s purpose in 
inserting a speaking Book into his poem is not merely to assert that the wit-
ness can blend the authoritative claims of “experience” and “auctoritee,” but 
more specifically to think about how personification might mediate between 
earthly language and the divine Word. Book’s oath recalls the problematic 
personifications of Gluttony and Anima, and we are asked to consider Book 
likewise as a personification in which the link between the body and what it 
represents is not so clear.
 After listing the impressive variety of witnesses that either saw or reported 
on Christ’s miraculous birth and violent death, Book confirms his testimony 
of the Passion with an oath to burn himself should Jesus fail to rise again:
“And I, Book, wole be brent, but Jesus rise to lyve
In alle myghtes of man, and his moder gladie,
And conforte al his kyn and out of care brynge,
And al the Jewene joye unjoynen and unlouken;
And but thei reverencen his roode and his resurexion,
And bileve on a newe lawe, be lost lif and soule!” (18.254–59)
Book’s offer of his own body as a guarantee of Christ’s certain resurrec-
tion enacts the martyrological structures of bodily effacement that testify to 
divine justice, typically over and above corrupt earthly judges.28 In addition, 
 27. A. J. Minnis, “Langland’s Ymaginatif and Late Medieval Theories of Imagination,” Com-
parative Criticism 3 (1981): 71–103.
 28. Critical work on Book’s oath focuses on its half-line “but Jesus rise to lyve.” Kaske under-
stands “but” as indicating the future indicative, thus rendering the line “I, Book, will be burned, 
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if we recall Trajan’s testimony when we read Book’s introduction (“‘I, Troia-
nus, a trewe knight’”), we can also take into account the juridical underpin-
nings of Book’s oath. An oath like this, where the burned body is offered 
as the conduit for divine justice, gestures to the oaths used in ordeal trial, 
particularly trial by fire. In such a trial, the accused would hold a hot iron in 
his hands and walk slowly through a marketplace and into a church, where 
he would drop the iron at the altar. Three days later, an ecclesiastical official 
would examine the accused’s hand for blisters and wounds, thought to be 
unmistakable signs of guilt.29 In this system, the oath and the ordeal were 
mutually exclusive. If one could prove his case with an oath or with oath-
helpers (that is, people in good standing in the community who would attest 
to the accused’s character or to his versions of events), he would not have to 
undergo an ordeal. Ordeal happened only when one needed what was called 
lex aperta, or “open,” manifest proof. Ordeal trial thus assumes that the body 
is a more reliable source of divine evidence than words. Book’s oath seems to 
rely on this standard: so sure is he of Christ’s resurrection that he offers his 
own body as open proof.30
 Book’s testimony offers multiple forms of proof that Christ will return, 
and his oath crystallizes the various evidentiary media he brings together: his 
body will ensure Christ’s return, his own vocal testimony and the testimony 
of others will corroborate that promise, and his written text will provide 
access to God’s wisdom. Yet by putting an oath of self-destruction in the 
mouth of a speaking book, Langland emphasizes a paradox central to his 
testimonial speech. On one hand, Book is the sort of witness that can offer 
his body as a conduit for God’s Word, but on the other hand, as a Bible or 
but Jesus will rise” (“The Speech of Boke,” 134–38). Richard L. Hoffman and E. Talbot Donaldson 
each convincingly refute Kaske’s reading and translate “but” as “unless,” and in doing so, render 
“lyve” as an infinite verb, not a future conditional. Joseph Wittig has settled the debate, reading 
the lines “And I, Book, will be burned, unless Jesus rises to live.” Hoffman, “The Burning of ‘Boke’ 
in Piers Plowman,” MLQ 25 (1964): 57–65; Donaldson, “The Grammar of Book’s Speech in Piers 
Plowman,” in Studies in Language and Literature in Honor of Margaret Schlauch, ed. Mieczyslaw 
Brahmer, Stanislaw Helsztynski, and Julian Krzyzanowski (Warsaw: Polish Scientific, 196), 103–
9; Wittig, “The Middle English ‘Absolute Infinitive’ and ‘The Speech of Book,” in Magister Regis: 
Studies in Honor of Robert Earl Kaske, ed. Arthur Groos et al. (New York: Fordham University 
Press, 1986), 217–40.
 29. Robert Bartlett, Trial by Fire and Water (Oxford: Clarendon, 1988).
 30. By the fourteenth century, ordeal trial had been denounced in English courts for over 
a century. Canon 18 of the Fourth Lateran Council prohibited priests from blessing the instru-
ments used in the ordeal, effectively preventing the use of ordeal trial as a viable legal option. 
This is not to say, of course, that ordeal trial did not go on in fourteenth-century England, and 
ordeals are particularly central to the imaginative world of late medieval English romance, as in 
a text such as Athelston. For a discussion of oaths and ordeal trial in fourteenth-century English 
romance, see Nancy Mason Bradbury, “The Erosion of Oath-Based Relationships: A Cultural 
Context for Athelston,” Medium Aevum 73 (2004): 189–204.
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other salvific text, his contents exceed his material form. Thus, Book’s oath 
emphasizes the central question that emerges when we are confronted with a 
material, witnessing text: how are we to understand the competing modes of 
authority embedded in various testimonial media (bodily, vocal, and docu-
mentary)? Book’s oath stages a complicated relationship between personi-
fication poetics, oral testimony, and documentary practice, a relationship 
Langland begins to explore in Lady Mede’s trial and in his portraits of Glut-
tony and Anima.
 Indeed, though they are perhaps a surprising group, Gluttony, Anima, 
and Book have much in common. All three take oaths that point out their 
existence at the seam between the immaterial and the material. As Elaine 
Scarry usefully explains, oaths function by “laying edge to edge of the 
extremes of the material and the immaterial,” insofar as
the body tends to be brought forward in its most extreme and absolute 
form only on behalf of a cultural artifact or symbolic fragment or made 
thing (a sentence) that is without any other basis in material reality: that 
is, it is only brought forward when there is a crisis of substantiation. As a 
result of this unanchored quality, the disembodied cultural fragment has a 
fluidity not shared by its physical counterpart.31
Gluttony and Anima both clearly suffer “a crisis of substantiation,” as their 
bodies threaten to dissolve under the pressure to confess or give voice to the 
soul. It is more difficult to make the same claim about Book, who provides 
the dreamer the closest access to the transcendent Word and shows no sign 
of physical annihilation. But by reading Langland’s oath-taking personifica-
tions together, we can see that Book, like Gluttony and Anima, exposes the 
friction between the transcendent Word and the material media that offer 
incomplete access to it. Thus, rather than understand Book only as personi-
fied Scripture or simply assign another signifier to him (such as the Book of 
Nature), we can read Book as simultaneously material and allegorical. As a 
personified, textual witness, he embodies both experience and “auctoritee.”
documentary Witnessing in truth’s Pardon
Recognizing the centrality of oath-taking and witnessing at the heart of 
Langland’s explorations of personification, signification, and modes of sal-
 31. Elaine Scarry, The Body in Pain: The Making and Unmaking of the World (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1985), 127.
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vific understanding permits a new reading of one of the most notoriously 
knotty passages in Piers Plowman. The tearing of the pardon scene (B.7) has 
generated more critical inquiry than any other episode in Piers Plowman, yet 
scholars have not entirely succeeded in clarifying the mysterious destruc-
tion of the ersatz pardon.32 This is in part because critics have overlooked 
the fact that this pardon functions specifically “in witnesse of truthe,” with 
the dreamer peeking over Piers’s shoulder to read the text and subsequently 
watch its destruction. The passus begins just after Piers has finished plow-
ing and before he embarks on a pilgrimage to find Truth. Worried about 
the possibility that Piers’s fields will lie fallow while he goes on pilgrimage, 
Truth purchases a pardon for Piers and his heirs, telling Piers to return home 
to plow his fields. The pardon dictates who will receive salvation via Truth’s 
pardon: kings and knights will be saved, as will patriarchs, prophets, bishops, 
and lawyers. Merchants, however, may not be:
Marchaunts in the margyne hadde manye yeres,
Ac noon a pena et a culpa the Pope nolde hem graunte,
For thei holde noght hir haliday as Holy Chirche techeth,
And for thei swere “by hir soule” and “so God moste hem helpe”
Ayein clene Conscience, hir catel to selle. (7.18–22)
Merchants have been excluded from salvation because they abuse oaths, 
using them to sell their goods rather than demonstrate their fidelity to divine 
truth.33 Their careless oath-taking puts them dangerously close to the edge 
of condemnation. But Truth intervenes, telling the merchants that he has a 
papal bull which states that if they amend their ways and perform acts of 
charity, they will be saved. In gratitude, merchants everywhere praise Piers, 
who purchased the bull on their behalf.
 When Piers receives Truth’s pardon for himself and his heirs, a priest 
offers to read and explain it: “‘For I shal construe ech clause and kenne it 
thee on Englissh’” (7.106). As Piers unfolds the pardon and reads it aloud 
(demonstrating at least some knowledge of Latin), he is surprised to find two 
lines of the Athanasian Creed:
 32. For a small sampling of critical examinations of the pardon scene, see Nevill K. Coghill, 
“The Pardon of Piers Plowman,” in Style and Symbolism in “Piers Plowman,” ed. Robert J. Blanch 
(Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1969), 40–86; Rosemary Woolf, “Tearing the Pardon,” 
in “Piers Plowman”: Critical Approaches, ed. S. S. Hussey (London: Methuen, 1969), 50–75; David 
Lawton, “On Tearing—and Not Tearing—the Pardon,” Philological Quarterly 60 (1981): 414–22; 
Denise Baker, “The Pardons of Piers Plowman,” Neuphilologische Mitteilungen 85 (1984): 462–72; 
and Steiner, Documentary Culture, 121–42.
 33. D. Vance Smith, Arts of Possession: The Medieval Household Imaginary (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 2003), 136–50.
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And Piers at his preiere the pardon unfoldeth—
And I bihynde hem bothe biheld al the bulle.
In two lynes it lay, and noght a le[ttre] moore,
And was ywriten right thus in witnesse of Truthe:
Et qui bona egerunt ibunt in vitam eternam;
Qui vero mala, in ignem eternum. (7.107–10)
Enraged that he has been duped into buying a pardon that isn’t a pardon at 
all, Piers angrily tears the document in two, vowing to leave his life of plow-
ing to pursue prayer and penance. The pardon scene pits the material form 
of the document against the potentially redemptive citation of the Creed.
 To navigate the relationship between a document that fails to fulfill its 
contractual promise and the Creed’s simple model of penance, Langland 
inserts a third term, the witness. In doing so, he suggests that the pardon 
negotiates the probative claims of an individual text against the iterable force 
of documentary formulae and citation. Langland thus puts the pardon in 
the same paradox he puts Gluttony, Anima, and Book: material self-destruc-
tion may lead to salvation. Indeed, what Book merely promises, the pardon 
fulfills, when Piers rips it apart and chooses a life of prayer. This is not to 
argue that the pardon scene clearly promotes good works over clerical learn-
ing or ecclesiastical documents. Rather, recognizing the pardon as a witness 
expands what kinds of objects can be considered part of Langland’s experi-
ment in testimony and personification. Like Gluttony, Anima, or Book, the 
pardon uneasily occupies the space between the allegorical and the material.
 If much of the pardon scene’s tension is between the materiality of this 
individual pardon and the endurance of the truth of its contents outside any 
material form, the complicated relationship between the Latin Creed and 
the priest’s English translation adds to these tensions. Simpson argues that 
throughout Piers Plowman, Langland attaches Latin and English to different, 
and contested, narrative modes: “If the vernacular lays claim to the experi-
ential, the new, the contingent (the seen), it does so only in the shadow of a 
different kind of narrative, the sonorous, immutable, impersonal discourse 
of the Latin Creed—a text which is read.”34 For Simpson, the hierarchical 
relationship between Latin and English relies on a gap between seeing and 
reading, between the kind of experiential Christian redemption in which 
someone such as Trajan can engage and the clerical authority asserted by 
those trained in Latin and Christian theology. Yet Langland’s portrayal of the 
pardon as Truth’s witness suggests that he resists understanding experiential 
 34. Simpson, “Desire and the Scriptural Text,” 216.
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witnessing and reading as different activities, even in the tension-filled par-
don scene.35
 Significantly, a similar negotiation between eyewitnessing and reading 
also emerges in the C-text apologia, which famously replaces the pardon 
scene with Langland’s most extensive, and most self-reflexive, discussion of 
authorship.36 Staged as an interrogation between Will and Reason, the apolo-
gia defends the dreamer’s ostensibly idle life against Reason’s argument that 
he ought to perform manual labor in order to fulfill his material and spiri-
tual duties. Asserting himself as a clerk, the dreamer explains that his “tools” 
consist of liturgical texts and his primer, then claims that his contemplative 
work sets him apart from the kind of labor executed by less educated men:
And also moreover me thynketh, syre Resoun,
Me sholde constrayne no clerc to no knaves werkes,
For by the lawe of Levyticy that oure lord ordeynede,
Clerkes ycrouned, or kynde understondynge,
Shold nother swynke ne swete ne swerien at enquestes
Ne fyhte in no faumewarde ne his foe greve. (C.5.53–58)
The dreamer contrasts all sorts of manual activities with the contemplative, 
clerkly work of a poet, but his insertion of oath-taking is striking. Why might 
Langland want to disengage oath-taking from writing here? The citation of 
the “law of Leviticus” offers some insight. Beyond dictating how clerks were 
to dress and conduct themselves, Leviticus 5:4–5 states, “The person that 
swears and utters with his lips that he would do either evil or good and binds 
it with an oath and his word, and having forgotten it afterward, understands 
his offence, let him do penance for his sin.”37 Leviticus puts quite a bit of 
pressure on the oath, making it stand in for the intentions of its speaker even 
when what was promised has been forgotten or the intentions have changed. 
For a writer like Langland, whose work was likely appropriated by the rebel 
leader John Ball in 1381, this kind of contract is particularly dangerous.38 By 
 35. By the end of the poem, according to Simpson, Langland has produced a picture of ac-
tive reading, in which “experience” and “auctoritee” are not necessarily at odds.
 36. See Kathryn Kerby-Fulton, “Langland and the Bibliographic Ego,” in Written Work: 
Langland, Labor, and Authorship, ed. Steven Justice and Kathryn Kerby-Fulton (Philadelphia: 
University of Pennsylvania Press, 1997), 67–143; and David C. Fowler, “Piers Plowman: Will’s 
‘Apologia pro vita sua,’” YLS 13 (1999): 35–47.
 37. “Anima quae iuraverit et protulerit labiis suis ut vel male quid faceret vel bene et id ip-
sum iuramento et sermone firmaverit oblitaque postea intellexerit delictum suum agat paeniten-
tiam pro peccato.”
 38. Steven Justice, Writing and Rebellion: England in 1381 (Berkeley and Los Angeles: Uni-
versity of California Press, 1994).
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disentangling oath-taking from the kind of work a clerk or a poet might per-
form, the narrator renounces the possibility that his writing might be used 
as a kind of “evidence” in support of an ideological or political position he 
might never have intended.
 Thus, we can understand the dreamer’s dismissal of swearing as anxiety 
about the potentially close relationship between an author and a witness 
who, under the authority of an oath, attests to the incontrovertible truths of 
his works. Perhaps, under the politically pressured conditions of the 1380s, 
Langland wanted to disengage witness from author, perhaps even retreating 
to the individuated authenticity of the dream-vision as a way of mitigating 
the possibility that Piers Plowman could be read as a testifying document 
by those using it in the service of dissident ideological claims.39 Yet, as we 
shall see in the next section, fifteenth-century Langlandian poetry brings 
the witnessing document and the vernacular author back together. Texts in 
the Piers Plowman tradition construct their political critiques by effacing the 
individual dreamer and vernacular author and replacing them with docu-
mentary anonymity.
Langlandian Witnessing in the Piers Plowman Tradition
Thus far, this chapter has argued that Langland uses episodes of witnessing 
to negotiate the overlaps and frictions between “experience” and “auctoritee” 
as modes of spiritual expertise. Langland’s fullest expression of testimony 
as a multifaceted model of spiritual knowledge emerges in Book’s speech, 
when he collapses the differences between eyewitness experience and textual 
authority by imagining a testifying, salvific book with a body and a voice. 
But throughout Piers Plowman, Langland draws on witnessing speech-acts, 
particularly the oath, to experiment with whether and how personification 
might offer access to spiritual, moral, and ethical truths. This section turns 
to fifteenth-century Langlandian texts to see how Langland’s thinking about 
the relationship between the experiential eyewitness and the clerical text was 
deployed with increasingly ideological urgency and specificity.
 The fifteenth-century texts that deliberately imitate and expand upon 
Piers Plowman depict witnessing as a mode of political engagement. At the 
turn of the fifteenth century, as Grady argues, English poetry began to shift 
 39. There are numerous discussions of the role of Piers Plowman in the Rising of 1381. 
For extended accounts, see Anne Middleton, “Acts of Vagrancy: The C-Version ‘Autobiography’ 
(C.5.1–108) and the Statute of 1388,” in Written Work: Langland, Labor and Authorship, 208–317; 
and Justice, Writing and Rebellion.
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away from the visionary authority of the individual dreamer toward the 
authorizing conceits of bureaucratic reportage and legal discourse. In partic-
ular, these authorizing conceits were used to discuss and satirize topical poli-
tics regarding Richard’s deposition. “The two motifs are certainly related,” 
Grady writes. “It is logical to assume that a crisis of political authority—the 
deposition and its aftermath—would present a problem for political poetry 
trying to speak authoritatively about that crisis. Trading dreams for docu-
ments turns out to offer some potential solutions.”40 The turn to documents 
perhaps protected the poet from the confessional pitfalls of dream-visions 
and permitted him to speak with a social voice. Still, dream-vision remains 
an important genre in the fifteenth century, and much of the Piers Plowman 
tradition is, in fact, dream-vision.41 The witness brings together the vision-
ary authority of the dreamer and the legal or bureaucratic authority of tes-
timony, so the witness provides a powerful voice with which to critique the 
king. Specifically, poems included in the Piers Plowman tradition deploy the 
witness as an outside observer of royal systems of power that can respond 
to political upheaval. In “Richard the Redeless,” for example, the narrator 
laments that he is troubled over the bitter criticism of Richard’s reign: “for 
it passid my parceit and my preifis also, / How so wondirffull werkis wolde 
haue an ende.”42 Locating his narratorial fallibility in his inability to “perceive 
and prove” the end to Richard’s story, this speaker translates the uncertainty 
of Langland’s dreamer into an imperfect witness.
 Mum and the Sothsegger offers an extended meditation on Langlandian 
witnessing. Written between 1402 and 1409, Mum centers on the reign of 
Henry IV, and it worries about the false flatterers who surround the king and 
argues for the need for royal “truth-tellers.” Structurally, it calls upon Piers 
Plowman by featuring a dream-vision as well as the narrator’s pilgrimage in 
search of a “sothe-segger.” The dreamer’s quest to find a truth-teller provides 
the narrative conceit for a satirical look at what constitutes “truth” in con-
temporary politics and law. More specifically, it considers how keeping mum 
undercuts the need for royal justice that works according to ethics and truth 
rather than a political system that supports those who merely agree with the 
king in order to curry favor.
 40. Frank Grady, “The Generation of 1399,” in Steiner and Barrington, The Letter of the Law, 
206.
 41. The term “Piers Plowman tradition” is Helen Barr’s, and it denotes a series of four texts 
produced between 1399 and 1415: Pierce the Plowman’s Crede, Richard the Redeless, The Crowned 
King, and Mum and the Sothsegger.
 42. “Richard the Redeless,” in The Piers Plowman Tradition, ed. Helen Barr (London: J. M. 
Dent, 1993), 17–18. Quotations from Mum will also be cited parenthetically from this edition, 
by line number.
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 In Langlandian fashion, Mum turns to testimony to conceptualize the 
vexed status of a royal counselor, particularly in delicate bureaucratic mat-
ters. Mum begins with a striking definition of what it means to witness well: 
first, it says, attend to the gospel, where you will see for yourself the sins of 
your king. Armed with this knowledge, you must then interrogate him to 
draw out a confession. Such interrogation should be pursued until the king 
sees the wisdom of drawing out the truth. When you “haue wittenes the with 
that thou wel knowes,” you will be able to convince your king of the wisdom 
of keeping a truth-teller in his retinue:
For whenne thy tente and thy tale been temprid in oone,
And menys no malice to man that thou spekys,
But forto mende hym mukely of his misse-deedes,
Sory for his synne and his shrewed taicches,
And the burne be y-blessid and balys cunne eschewe
And thrifty and towarde, thou shal thanke gete. (90–95)
Pushing the king into testimonial dialogue—that is, interrogating him and 
getting him to confess—not only keeps the king honest, it also unites the 
truth-teller’s intention (“tente”) with his words (“tale”). The truth-teller thus 
operates as a double agent: he draws the king into confessional honesty that 
will protect the crown from the duplicitous desires of flatterers and power-
hungry lords, and he offers his own testimony of the king’s foibles, bearing 
witness to the king’s misdeeds as a kind of thermometer for the health of the 
realm.
 Later, when Mum emerges to extol the virtues of staying silent rather 
than draw confessions out of the king, he introduces himself to the narrator 
as “Mum thy maister.” Mum goes on to explain that he remains close to sov-
ereigns by refusing to contradict them and by flattering them. Frustrated, the 
narrator accuses Mum of serving only himself, at the expense of the realm: 
“‘Thou wol not putte the in prees but profit be the more, / To thy propre 
persone, thou passes not the bondes / Forto gete any grucche for glaunsyng 
of boltes’” (267–69). Nonetheless, the narrator finds himself intrigued with 
Mum’s counseling strategies, and he goes on a quest to search for a truth-
teller and to investigate what he repeatedly calls “my matiere of Mum” (326, 
396). Mum is thus established, in Langlandian fashion, both as a personified 
interlocutor for the narrator and his object of study. The “matiere of Mum” 
can be defined as the exploration of how silence can function in a system of 
counsel that, as the beginning of the poem asserts, requires a counselor to 
testify to his knowledge of the crown’s crimes and sins.
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 Mum argues throughout the poem that such truthful testimony would 
negate the material benefits garnered by being a flattering yes-man. But 
when he specifically addresses the problem of remaining mum as a court-
room witness, he oddly belies his own arguments. Citing a legal axiom, “qui 
tacet consentire videtur,” he warns that those who remain silent in the face of 
“silde-couthe thingz” will be considered legally liable for those deeds (745–
50). Mum continues,
And eeke in lond-is lawe I lernyd by anothir:
Yf a freeke for felonye is frayned atte barre
For traison or for trespas and he a tunge haue
And wil not answere to the deede he is of indited,
But stont stille as a stoone and no worde stire,
But he be deef or dum to deeth shal he wende,
As atteynt for the trespas, and is a trewe lawe. (751–57)
Here, Mum states that silence in the courtroom is akin to self-destruction, 
since refusing to testify to the truth in cases of treason or trespass will lead 
to the same death reserved for those who commit these crimes. It is a strange 
speech for Mum, particularly given his impassioned defense of flattery, 
praise, and silence in the face of a sovereign’s misdeeds. But it becomes less 
strange in the wider context of Langlandian testimonial discourse. Mum sug-
gests that he can exist as the personified representation of flattering silence 
only in certain contexts: here, within the intimacy of royal counsel and main-
tenance. When called upon to testify in a court of law, his very existence—as 
the embodiment of flattery and silence, of keeping mum—is put in jeopardy. 
Like Langland’s Gluttony, Mum’s status as personification finds its limits in 
testimony: if called upon to testify in a court of law, he cannot continue to 
perform the silence and flattery that is his essence as Mum.
 The narrator, pleased with Mum’s admission that silence can some-
times be self-destructive, compares courtroom truth-telling to exposing the 
wounds on a sick plant. The link between wounds and social sins is ubiqui-
tous throughout the Middle Ages, particularly in confessional manuals and 
penitential treatises, and surely this is where the narrator takes the imagery 
of telling the truth as lancing a physical wound. But the imagery assumes 
new meaning when read as a reprisal of Langland’s investigation of the inter-
face between personification, testimony, and text. “‘For thou has rubbid on 
the rote of the rede galle,’” the narrator tells Mum, “‘And eeke y-serchid the 
sore and sought alle the woundz’” (770–71). The narrator reads Mum’s con-
fession as saying that legal testimony would destroy him as a path to heal-
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ing, but such “healing” would erase Mum: like Gluttony, if Mum suddenly 
“healed” the social wounds created by flatterers such as himself by speaking 
truth to crown, he would be redeemed out of existence. After Mum warns 
those who refuse to provide truthful legal testimony, the narrator goes on 
a dream-vision quest to learn where he can find a bona fide truth-teller. In 
his dream, he encounters a wise beekeeper, who explains a hive as an ideal 
model of governance, imagining himself as the sovereign. He is, the narra-
tor discovers, the truth-teller he has been searching for, and the beekeeper 
implores the narrator to write down his words to give to the king: “‘And furst 
feoffe thou therewith the freyst of the royaulme, / For yf thy lord liege alone 
hit begynne, / Care thou not though knyghtz copie hit echone, / And do 
write eche word and wirche there-after’” (1284–87).
 When the narrator wakes up, he discovers a bag full of “pryue poyse,” 
which details the vices and virtues of bishops and lords of the realm. This 
bag of books powerfully extends Langland’s experiments in the relationship 
between witnessing and personification. It includes “real” documents, such 
as a quire that lists bequeathed goods and a collection of visitation papers for 
bishops and priests, and fictional documents, such as a “rolle of religion” that 
details monks’ misuse of their endowments. Emily Steiner argues that the 
bag represents a satirical investigation of how public poetry and bureaucratic 
documents allow “society to disclose itself to public view, and, in doing so, 
to translate disclosure into incrimination and reparation” (182). Accordingly, 
she claims, the kind of counsel poetry that is authorized by the truth-teller 
can operate like a public document, one that reveals social ills and thus helps 
them to be disclosed, punished, and healed. Likewise, Helen Barr reads the 
bag of books as a strategic image that divests the poet of the political liability 
of criticizing the realm.43 She argues that by featuring a sack full of bureau-
cratic documents, the Mum-author suggests that political criticism is embed-
ded in legal and documentary formulae, rather than in the personal gripes 
of an individual author or the words of a single poem. Both Steiner and Barr 
recognize that the power of the bag of books is its disengagement from any 
particular author, so that truth-telling becomes a collective rather than an 
individual pursuit.
 When we focus on the description of one specific document embed-
ded in the long list of legal and bureaucratic texts, the “raggeman rolle,” we 
can also understand the bag of books as an extension of the poem’s argu-
ments about witnessing. When the narrator mentions a “raggeman rolle that 
Ragenelle hymself / Hath made of mayntennance and motyng of the peuple” 
 43. Barr, Piers Plowman Tradition, xiii–xiv.
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(1565–66), he cites the legal text that documents the accusations made in 
both criminal and civil courts. Those who transported these rolls from the 
complainants to the courtrooms were known as “ragmen,” and so the term 
comes to signify both the document and the bureaucratic official in charge of 
that document.44 In Mum, “Ragenelle” also signifies the devil, who has pro-
duced a text that proclaims the abuses imposed on the public by the practices 
of maintenance that Mum espouses. By naming “Ragenelle” as the author and 
as the carrier of the “raggeman rolle,” the Mum-poet momentarily reminds 
us of the complicated link between material document and personification. 
The name functions like Book, in that it refers both to an embodied per-
sonification and to the material form that conveys testimony. Like Langland, 
then, the Mum-poet suggests that personification can navigate between the 
communal claims of anonymous bureaucratic and legal documents and the 
individual testimony lobbied by a dreamer or vernacular poet.
 Mum and the Sothsegger offers a rich example of how Langland’s exper-
iments in witnessing and personification offer the fifteenth-century Piers 
Plowman tradition an opportunity to conceptualize testimony as a political 
and ethical imperative. In Mum, witnessing documents are a source of dis-
embodied authority, in which testimony can be detached from any individual 
source and thus derive its power from the collective voice it assumes. Thus 
legal documents take on the power to attest to political critiques on behalf of 
the community as a whole. But in the sixteenth century, as we shall see, the 
individual voice of the witness—named Piers the Plowman—reemerges as an 
important source of political critique. Significantly, it does so via the implicit 
authoritative claims of print technology, thus expanding upon Langland’s 
experiments in the relative efficacies of body, voice, and document.
Langlandian Witnesses in Print
The author of Mum and the Sothsegger takes Langlandian explorations of 
testimony and personification into the political sphere of the court, inves-
tigating the complicated relationship between individuals offering spoken 
testimony and the material texts that can serve in their stead. The bag of 
books offers not simply a catalogue of the kinds of bureaucratic documents 
circulating at the turn of the fifteenth century, but an exploration of the way 
 44. See John Alford, Piers Plowman: A Glossary of Legal Diction (Cambridge: D. S. Brewer, 
1988), 125. In her discussion of the “raggeman rolle,” Steiner argues that it, like the rest of these 
documents, inserts vernacular alliterative poetry into the bureaucratic and legal poetics of public 
discourse. Documentary Culture, 183.
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personification might inform even the most official or formulaic bureau-
cratic document. In the sixteenth century, the relationship between testi-
mony and personification is taken up in the service of Reformation politics, 
as “Piers Plowman” and his brethren, the “simple plowmen,” surface as stock 
figures in the service of arguments against the rhetorical bombast and finan-
cial bloat of the Church.45 More specifically, the texts that feature a witness-
ing Piers center on print technology as an ideological medium. What this 
suggests is that the Reformation Piers, a witness in the case for political and 
doctrinal reform, may help articulate some of the political stakes of early 
modern print culture.
 Jesse M. Lander has shown that Protestant reformers often imagined an 
alliance between anti-Catholic polemic and the printing press, in which print 
technology could be formulated as a system dedicated to spreading doctrinal 
truth.46 At the same time, plowmen (and “Piers Plowman”) emerge as repre-
sentatives of reformist ideology, even revising Langland’s medieval Catholi-
cism to suit the needs of Protestant polemic. These two developments are not 
unrelated. Sixteenth-century “Plowman texts” focus on granting power to 
laborers and others outside institutional systems of authority by closing the 
gap between the simple (that is, illiterate) laborer and the sophisticated (that 
is, literate) clerk.47 Notably, to close the gap, they turn to reportage as a form 
of authority that unites manuscript and print and brings together the “voice” 
of the testifying plowman and the print technologies that disseminate that 
voice among a wide audience. “Reportage” thus puts in play multiple kinds 
of testimonial media, drawing on both the voice and the document alike to 
authorize the ideological principles to which “Piers the Plowman” can attest.
 Robert Crowley was the first to print Piers Plowman, producing three 
editions of the poem in 1550. These versions include a preface from “the 
printer to the reader” as well as a program of marginal notes that tends to be 
anti-Catholic, even if mildly so. The preface is most overt in its insertion of 
Langland into a radical agenda, locating the poem’s philosophical and theo-
logical imperatives alongside those of Wyclif:
In whose tyme it pleased God to open the eyes of many to se hys truth, 
giving them boldenes of herte, to open their mouthes and crye oute agynst 
 45. See, for example, John N. King, English Reformation Literature: The Tudor Origins of the 
Protestant Tradition (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1982).
 46. Jesse M. Lander, Inventing Polemic: Religion, Print, and Literary Culture in Early Modern 
England (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006).
 47. The phrase “Plowman texts” is from Sarah A. Kelen, Langland’s Early Modern Identities 
(New York: Palgrave, 2007).
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the workes of darckenes, as dyd John Wicklyfe, who also in the those dayes 
translated the holye Byble into the Englishe tonge, and this writer who in 
reportynge certayne visions and dreames, that he fayned hym selfe to have 
dreamed, doth most christianlie enstructe the weake, and sharplye rebuke 
the obstynate blynde.48
One of Crowley’s main purposes in his preface is to detach Langland from 
prophecy, which he says misconstrues Langland’s intent: “And that which 
foloweth and geveth it the face of a prophecy,” he writes, “is lyke to be added 
by some other man than the first autour” (f. iir).49 Crowley rejects reading 
Langland prophetically by constructing a complicated series of authorial and 
editorial claims to authenticity, and these claims turn on the kind of wit-
nessing reportage that surfaces in fifteenth-century Langlandian texts. “This 
writer,” as Crowley puts it, “who in reportynge certayne visions and dreames, 
that he fayned hym selfe to have dreamed, doth most christianlie enstructe 
the weake.” In turn, the reader is to “loke not upon this boke therefore to 
talke of wonders past or to com but to emend thyne owne misse, which thou 
shalt fynd here most charitably rebuked” (f. iir). For Crowley, “reportynge” 
is the operative verb. Like the poems in the Piers Plowman Tradition, Crow-
ley’s Piers substitutes the individual authority of the dreamer with the iter-
ability of the witnessing text. Here, eyewitness reports triumph over other, 
particularly medieval, ways of accessing redemptive knowledge, including 
dream-vision and prophecy. Reporting also shores up his own printing proj-
ect more broadly. Crowley begins his preface by locating the poem’s author-
ship (attributed to “Roberte Langlande, a Shropshire man”) and its year of 
first publication, which he strains to authorize via his own eyewitness and 
scholarly expertise:
For the tyme when it was written, it chaunced me to se an auncient copye, 
in the later ende whereof was noted, that the same copye was written in 
the yere of oure Lorde. M.iii.C and nyne, which was before thys present 
 48. The Vision of Pierce Plowman, Now Fyrste Imprynted. STC 11906, ed. A. W. Pollard et al. 
(London, 1926), folio iir.
 49. In offering this caveat, he may be positioning his editions against other sixteenth-cen-
tury constructions of Piers Plowman as a prophetic voice in the service of royal politics. British 
Library MS Sloane 2578, for example, includes in its varied collection of political prophecies a 
fragment of the B-text. See Sharon L. Jansen, “Politics, Protest, and a New Piers Plowman Frag-
ment: The Voice of the Past in Tudor England,” Review of English Studies n.s. 40.157 (1989): 
93–99. For a description of MS Sloane 2578’s contents, see Jansen, “British Library MS Sloane 
2578 and Popular Unrest in England,” Manuscripta 29 (1985): 30–41.
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yere, an hundred & xli yeres. And in the seconde side of the lxviii leafe 
of thys printed copye, I finde mention of a dere yere, that was in the yere 
of oure Lord. Miii.hundred and .L. John Chichester than being mayre of 
London. So that this I may be bold to report, that it was fyrste made and 
written after yeare of our lord. M.iii.C.L. and before the yere M.iiii.C. and 
.ix, which meane space was lix yeres.50 (f. iir)
Crowley’s “bold report” that Piers Plowman was first made between 1350 and 
1409 is based both on his chance encounter with an “auncient copye” and 
on his careful codicological investigation into “thys printed copye.”51 Locat-
ing his editorial authority in both manuscript and print editions, Crowley 
pays close attention to the hermeneutic pitfalls of having multiple printed 
copies of Piers Plowman in circulation. For example, he admits that while 
some editions of the poem might support prophetic readings, his does not: 
whereas “diuerse copies” might depart from the (nonprophetic) intentions 
of the author, the copy he has followed closely follows the original—presum-
ably the “auncient copye” he was able to witness. By insisting that he has been 
able to see for himself an “auncient copye” of Piers Plowman, Crowley draws 
on the commonplace use of the term “ancient” to describe medieval texts, a 
method that transformed the Catholic Middle Ages into a distant past that 
could be appropriated and assimilated by early modern writers. Moreover, 
Crowley imagines a mutually supportive relationship between the “ancient” 
manuscript and this printed copy in his pursuit of a “true” version of Lang-
land’s poem.
 Reportage is also the primary method of authorization in a text that 
imagines Piers the Plowman to testify directly to parliament on behalf of 
the “poore comens.” In the mid-sixteenth-century Pyers Plowmans Exhorta-
tion, Piers begins his catalogue of complaints (which include problematic 
property distribution in the wake of the widespread closure of religious 
houses) by suggesting that parliament focus on the plight of the poor so 
that “in all regions wher as it shalbe reported how that we of thys realm 
haue expelled all vayne tradicions of men / and receyued the true religion 
 50. Kelen points out that Chichester was mayor of London from 1369 to 1370, not in 1350. 
Crowley likely calculated 1350 from Activa Vita’s speech discussing the effects of a famine; in 
some manuscripts, Activa Vita says Chichester was mayor in 1350. See Langland’s Early Modern 
Identities, 28.
 51. The tag of “auncient” applied to medieval texts was a common rhetorical practice in ear-
ly modern texts that sought to absorb medieval writers within a new Protestant culture. Spenser’s 
Shepheardes Calendar is one example.
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of Christ.”52 Piers uses the term “reported” to extend the reach of his for-
mal complaint beyond parliament, claiming its power to produce reports 
throughout the realm not merely of parliament’s good will toward the poor, 
but of England’s reception of true (that is, anti-Catholic) doctrine. Nota-
bly, Piers’s mode of reform is to ask members of parliament to trust their 
own witnessing experience in contradistinction to the clerical and educated 
claims of “fatte priestes” and “fatte marchauntes”: “But he that wyll be conu-
ersaunt with the comen sorte of the poore comens, shal (if he not stop his 
eares, nor hyde not his eyes) both heare se & perceyue the case to be farre 
otherwise” (f. 1v).
 Sixteenth-century reformers may have seen in Langland the possibility of 
appropriating clerical models of authority on behalf of a new ideology that 
positioned an “unlearned” laity as the proper representatives of theological 
and doctrinal ideals for a religious community. For Langland, however, wit-
nessing offered a conceptual model for linking together experiential and tex-
tual modes of doctrinal knowledge. Examining closely how Langland depicts 
oath-taking reveals his investment in the way legal language can help express 
spiritual exploration. Witnessing provides Langland the opportunity to play 
with the relative probative and contractual authorities of the body and the 
document, and his Book depicts his most powerful and urgent investigation 
of testimonial media with respect to the divine Word. Moreover, the Lang-
landian witness endures into the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, when it is 
taken up for a range of purposes: to critique royal systems of maintenance 
and flattery and to contend with the incorporation of a Catholic medieval 
past into a reformist present. For sixteenth-century reformers, the voice of 
“Piers Plowman” could be disseminated through the medium of print, and 
“reporting” became a crucial vocabulary term in the rhetorical service of 
transforming the medieval voice of the individual Piers into the ideological 
claims of a reformist collective.
 Indeed, the idea that a witness might provide a position from which 
reform can be argued and preached is crucial to the Wycliffite criticism of 
the Church bubbling up toward the end of the fourteenth century. The next 
chapter examines how one early fifteenth-century Lollard tract deploys the 
negotiation between testimonial vox and witnessing text to address the very 
real possibility of self-destruction under the 1401 De heretico comburendo 
statute, which authorized capital punishment for relapsed heretics. As that 
 52. Pyers plowmans exhortation unto the lordes, knightes and burgoysses of the parlyament-
house, STC 19905 (London: Imprinted by Anthony Scoloker dwelling in the Sauoy tentes without 
Templebarre, 1550).
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chapter shows, witnessing remains a central but vexed mode of political and 
doctrinal engagement throughout the fifteenth century, deployed by conser-
vative ecclesiastical officials and radical Lollard resistors alike to negotiate 
their respective claims to the “true” Church and to articulate the bonds of 
their respective theological communities.
t h e  t r I a L  r e C o r d s  of accused Lollards produced in the fifteenth cen-
tury, coupled with the printed compilations of Lollard “martyrs” in the six-
teenth century, are critical to thinking about the procedural and conceptual 
legacy of witnessing in the later Middle Ages. As Andrew Cole has shown, 
the persecution of heresy in late medieval England, which began with the 
Blackfriars Council in 1382 and gathered steam with the institution of the De 
heretico comburendo statute in 1401 and Archbishop Arundel’s “Cruel Con-
stitutions” in 1409, depends on the mutual support of ecclesiastical and secu-
lar justice.1 Accused Lollards trapped by this massive campaign were subject 
to both canon and common law, a procedural fact that significantly changed 
how defendants could be interrogated. More broadly, witness accounts of 
Lollard interrogations help us think about the relationship between histo-
ricity—that is, biographical or historical truth, verified by documentary 
evidence—and the individual testimony that animates that historicity. As 
Christina von Nolcken has argued, Wycliffite and Lollard texts are an “obvi-
ous test case” regarding our ability to capture and interpret the past because 
they exhibit little individual inventiveness or authorial flair, instead illustrat-
 1. Andrew Cole, Literature and Heresy in the Age of Chaucer (Cambridge: Cambridge Uni-
versity Press, 2008), 3–22.
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ing a kind of dogmatic repetition of the same phrases and structures in the 
service of producing a dangerous heterodox culture.2
 Nowhere is such dogmatic repetition more obvious than in the legal 
records of Lollard interrogations. Despite the leeway given scribes and nota-
ries to transform the sometimes tedious narrative of witness testimony into 
a concise text,3 accused Lollards were asked to respond to a stock set of ques-
tions designed to draw out a consistent picture of their heretical beliefs and 
practices.4 The basic tenets of what was considered heresy at the turn of 
the fifteenth century were drawn from Wyclif ’s writings; interrogators typi-
cally focused on his arguments against the miracle of Eucharistic transub-
stantiation and those in favor of disendowment of the clergy, as well as on 
his complicated arguments about Scriptural truth and the literal sense, first 
articulated in his Trialogus and spectacularly enacted in his English transla-
tion of the Bible.5
 The resulting legal documents work to suppress the individual voice or 
specific beliefs of the defendant. Thus, rather than offering access to the 
life and beliefs of any particular individual, these documents illustrate how 
inquisitional process and witness testimony were used to produce a uniform 
picture of heterodox thinking and to authorize draconian tactics of persecu-
tion. By providing a consistent illustration of the heresies that were attack-
ing the moral sanctity of Church doctrine, ecclesiastical and royal officials 
could assemble the testimonies of individual defendants into a collective 
and dangerous counterculture. Yet, as this chapter shows, witnessing rhet-
oric was also used by Lollard thinkers to counteract ecclesiastical control 
over the depiction of heterodox communities. For example, the writer of 
the Wycliffite tract Apology for Lollard Doctrine deploys witnessing to insist 
that his challenges to Church doctrine do not attack faith itself. In doing so, 
he establishes his testimony as a verification of his adherence to the “true” 
Church:
First, I witnes bifor God Almiȝty, and alle trewe cristunmen and women, 
and ȝowe, þat I haue not ben, nor is, nor neuer schal, of myn entent ne 
 2. Christina Von Nolcken, “A ‘Certain Sameness’ and Our Response to It in English 
Wycliffite Texts,” in Literature and Religion in the Later Middle Ages, ed. Richard G. Newhauser 
and John A. Alford (Binghamton, NY: Medieval and Renaissance Texts and Studies, 1995), 191–
208.
 3. For a discussion of the editorial latitude given notaries, see chapters 2 and 4.
 4. See Anne Hudson, “The Examination of Lollards,” Bulletin of the Institute of Historical 
Research 46 (1973): 145–59.
 5. For a discussion of the production of the Wycliffite Bible out of Wyclif ’s arguments on 
translation and Scriptural truth, see Mary Dove, The First English Bible: The Text and Context of 
the Wycliffite Versions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007).
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purpos, to sei any þing aȝen the general feiþ; neiþer entent to bigile, or 
deseyue, ani man or woman, in ani vnprofitable to perpetual ȝel of soule; 
ne agein seying to þe wordis, ne sentence, of ani seint, seying feithfulli.6 
The flexibility of witness testimony to define and persecute Wycliffite heresy 
on one hand and to defend against such persecution on the other drives the 
Examination of William Thorpe (also known as the Testimony of William 
Thorpe), a peculiar document that shrewdly transforms Thorpe’s official 
deposition into his own autobiographical, testimonial text. The Testimony 
presents itself as a first-person account of Archbishop Arundel’s interroga-
tion into Thorpe’s unauthorized preaching. Purportedly written in 1407, a 
year after Thorpe’s arrest in Shrewsbury, it details his production of a text 
on behalf of “dyuerse freendis” who have requested that he document his 
“aposynge and answeringe.”7 Though there is some historical evidence to 
corroborate that this interrogation actually occurred, including a notebook 
of the diocesan official John Lydford that contains articles drawn up against 
a “William Thorpe,”8 the historicity of Thorpe’s testimony remains shadowy. 
We do not know, for example, whether this particular interrogation ever took 
place, nor do we know what happened to William Thorpe afterward. As Rita 
Copeland has put it, “As a life, Thorpe barely exists beyond the page.”9
 Thorpe’s existence at the edge of historical verification provides a criti-
cal view of how late medieval witness testimony, particularly the testimony 
produced under the ecclesiastical persecution of heretics, negotiates the rela-
tionship between historical and testimonial truths. With this in mind, this 
final chapter examines what it means to construct a Lollard testimony at the 
beginning of the fifteenth century, when efforts to eradicate heretics and 
their writings were ramped up with an unprecedented urgency. In 1401 the 
parliamentary statute De heretico comburendo officially sanctioned burn-
ing relapsed heretics to death, and ecclesiastical and secular officials proved 
 6. An Apology for Lollard Doctrines, ed. James Henthorn Todd, Camden Society vol. 20 
(London: John Bower Nichols and Son, 1842), 1.
 7. Lines 20, 26. All citations for the Examination are by line number as given in Two 
Wycliffite Texts, ed. Hudson. Hereafter cited parenthetically. For a discussion of the arrest of Wil-
liam Thorpe in 1406, see Maureen Jurkowski, “The Arrest of William Thorpe in Shrewsbury and 
the Anti-Lollard Statute of 1406,” Historical Research 75 (2002): 273–95.
 8. See Hudson’s introduction to Two Wycliffite Texts, xlvii–1.
 9. Rita Copeland, “William Thorpe and his Lollard Community,” in Bodies and Disciplines: 
Intersections of Literature and History in Fifteenth-Century England, ed. David Wallace and Bar-
bara A. Hanawalt (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1996), 201. For a response to 
Copeland’s claims about Thorpe’s shadowy existence in extant documents, see Fiona Somerset’s 
review of Pedagogy, Intellectuals and Dissent in the Later Middle Ages in Medium Aevum 72 
(2003): 140–41.
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their willingness to follow through on this threat when they burned William 
Sautre that same year. In 1410 John Badby became the first layperson to be 
killed under the statute. Thorpe’s Testimony depicts his keen awareness of the 
material consequences of his responses to Arundel, as well as his sense that 
the document that will emerge from the interrogation might be used to sup-
port efforts to imagine Lollardy as a united assault on the sanctity of Church 
practices and systems.
 Specifically, this chapter examines Thorpe’s strategies of producing a tes-
timony of resistance, one that redefines the role of a witness in a heresy 
inquisition. Rather than acquiesce to Arundel’s attempts to get him to abjure, 
Thorpe documents his Lollard beliefs and practices for a receptive audi-
ence, whom he calls witnesses, outside the interrogation room. The debate 
between Arundel and Thorpe largely centers on how testimony and docu-
ments can sharpen the distinctions between orthodox and heretical com-
munities, with Arundel insisting that his official list of complaints against 
Thorpe testifies to Thorpe’s heresy. Rather than merely deny the complaints, 
however, Thorpe reframes Arundel’s documents to accommodate a differ-
ent ideal of testimony, one that calls upon presence as its central term and 
key strategy. In doing so, Thorpe stretches the definition of witnessing to 
imagine a document that both deploys and exceeds the conditions of its 
production. As both a speaking witness and a self-aware “notary” of his own 
interrogation, Thorpe offers a sophisticated staging of his own testimony, 
writing it as a dramatic debate with serious consequences for himself and for 
his audience of witnesses.10 Thorpe thus transforms what should be a nego-
tiation for his own self-preservation into an example of how Lollard wit-
nesses could use the very tactics of their inquisitors to authorize the beliefs 
and practices of heterodox textual communities.11
documents, Witnesses, and the struggle for Authority
In 1382 Archbishop William Courtenay and the Blackfriars’ Council 
described and condemned a series of constitutions drawn from Wyclif ’s 
works because they were worried that the academic arguments of a uni-
versity man had somehow escaped the ivory tower and “infected” the laity. 
 10. For an argument that Thorpe’s Testimony draws on the rhetorical principles of drama, 
see Ritchie D. Kendall, The Drama of Dissent (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 
1986).
 11. The phrase “textual community” is Brian Stock’s. He uses it to describe communities that 
cohere around a set of core texts. See Listening for the Text (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University 
Press, 1990).
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Accusing a group of Oxford theologians of being runaway preachers, the 
Council blamed these teachers for contaminating lay communities outside 
the university. Much of the fear-inducing rhetoric formulates Wycliffite 
doctrine as a “pestilence” that might infiltrate even the healthiest of com-
munities. For example, Roger Dymmock begins his 1395 condemnatory 
response to the Lollard Twelve Conclusions by accusing Lollards of hiding 
poison (uenenum pestiferum heretice pravitatis) behind fancy language and 
the pretense of sanctified truth (uariis coloribus ueritatis et diuersis ymag-
inibus sanctitatis).12 Similarly, according to the chronicler Henry Knighton, 
England required an “antidote” for the poison Lollards spread through the 
realm. He attests that the pestilence of Lollardy must be treated so the body 
politic might be healed:
And unless God soon shorten the days of their asperity, and provide some 
antidote to their evil, I testify that this realm of England will be unable to 
sustain their deceits and their malice. Hence the verses:
If all the world were parchment, and the trees one reed,
The seas a pool of ink, and all mankind a mighty scribe,
They would not serve to tell the wicked tale.13
Knighton amplifies the ubiquitous metaphor of pestilence by turning from 
the infected body of the realm to the world-as-text; for Knighton, the dis-
eased body politic will wither before it is able to record the Lollards’ ram-
page. Indeed, his “testimony” of the realm’s demise suggests that writing itself 
suffers under the pervasive disease of heresy.
 In response to the toxicity of Lollard preaching, ecclesiastical officials took 
up the Lollard body as its object of inquiry and punitive canvas, claiming that 
the “pestilence” of Lollardy could be eradicated only with the destruction of 
the bodies from which it issued forth. In 1401 Thomas Arundel, Archbishop 
of Canterbury and Thorpe’s adversary, convened a clerical council to sen-
tence the accused Lollard William Sautre to death by fire. Parliament was 
in session during his burning at Smithfield, and they sent representatives to 
Arundel’s council to offer lay support of its aims to address what was seen 
as “widespread” errors and heresies throughout the realm.14 That support 
 12. Rogeri Dymmok Liber Contra XII Errores et Hereses Lollardorum, ed. H. S. Cronin (Lon-
don: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co., 1922), 14.
 13. Knighton’s Chronicle, ed. and trans. G. H. Martin (Oxford: Clarendon, 1995), 305–6.
 14. For a discussion of the events leading up to the De heretico comburendo statute, see Paul 
Strohm, England’s Empty Throne (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1998), esp. 32–62.
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came in drastic form: parliament approved the De heretico comburendo stat-
ute to burn any heretics who refused to abjure their beliefs publicly, specifi-
cally so that such punishment might “inspire fear in the minds of others.”15 
Notably, the language of the statute shifts the martyrological terms taken 
up by Langland’s Book. If Book’s contents exceed his material form—such 
that his narrative of salvation history can survive the possibility of his fiery 
self-destruction—this statute supports the fantasy that the fiery destruction 
of Lollard bodies could effectively erase Lollard doctrine. Indeed, Henry’s 
addendum to the statute asserts the need for violent measures “so that this 
wicked sect, preachings, doctrine, and opinions should cease from now on, 
and should completely be destroyed.”16
 Six years after parliament authorized the De heretico comburendo statute, 
Arundel drafted what are known as the “Cruel Constitutions,” a series of arti-
cles that prescribed methods for dealing with unauthorized preachers such 
as Thorpe. The most extreme articles closely regulate how theology was to 
be taught and accessed, forbidding the study of Wyclif ’s works and warning 
of the dangers of translating Scripture from one language to another. Other 
articles detail how officials were to find and punish suspected heretics.17 The 
Constitutions’ explanation of due process for searching out and interrogating 
heretics shows the attempt to discipline Lollards through the proliferation 
of official documents, building upon and transforming the standard inqui-
sitional procedure that was formalized by Innocent III in the Fourth Lat-
eran Council. As described in the introduction to this book, inquisitio differs 
from accusatio or denunciatio—the trial procedures used in English criminal 
courts—primarily in its use of a judge to present charges against a defendant, 
rather than an individual accuser. In inquisitio, the judge acts on behalf of the 
public, who makes the defendant’s infamia (public fame of criminal activ-
ity) known. As in all trial procedures in England, the defendant has a right 
to know the witnesses testifying against him and to hear their testimony (or 
hear it read).18
 15. “easdem coram populo in eminenti loco comburi faciant, ut huiusmodi Punitio metum 
incutiat mentibus aliorum.” Rotuli Parliamentorum, vol. 3 (London, 1767–77), 467.
 16. Statutes of the Realm, vol. 2 (London: Dawsons, 1816), 126. Cited and discussed by 
Strohm, England’s Empty Throne, 67–69.
 17. Concilia Magnae Britanniae, ed. David Wilkins (London: Gosling, Gyles, Woodward, 
and Davis, 1737). Nicholas Watson has shown the wide-ranging effects of these Constitutions 
on the production and circulation of theological writing in English: see “Censorship and Cul-
tural Change in Late-Medieval England: Vernacular Theology, the Oxford Translation Debate, 
and Arundel’s Constitutions of 1409,” Speculum 70.4 (1995): 822–64.
 18. For a summary of inquisitio procedures (as well as the argument that inquisition was not 
a system specifically designed to prosecute heresy), see Kelly, “Inquisition and the Prosecution of 
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 In the second half of the thirteenth century, the jurisprudential subfield 
of inquisitio heretice pravitatis (“inquisition of heretical depravity”) devel-
oped specifically to address the peculiar challenges of prosecuting heresy, 
which was considered a crime of belief as much as one of “action.”19 Inquisi-
tio heretice pravitatis loosened the evidentiary requirements of inquisitio in 
several ways, mostly having to do with what testimony could be admitted 
and how it should be publicized. For example, the names of witnesses could 
be suppressed if the judge felt that providing them would put the witnesses 
in danger, and criminals and other “infamous” witnesses were permitted to 
testify.20 Moreover, witness testimony could be self-incriminatory, because 
a judge could demand that a witness testify “about themselves and about 
others” (de se et de aliis). Thus, in regular inquisitional procedure, witness 
testimony was sought to determine whether a defendant was sufficiently 
infamous to merit a trial. In contrast, in the inquisitional procedure used for 
heresy, the testimony given during a trial could produce the infamy neces-
sary to begin trial proceedings against the witness who had given testimony 
against the defendant.
 In addition, given the (perceived or actual) slipperiness of accused her-
etics, procedures of inquisitio heretice pravitatis permitted heretics to be 
prosecuted and punished in absentia. To do so, a judge, working on the 
knowledge of the accused’s infamy, would issue a citation at the accused’s 
parish church. After a reasonable wait for the accused to respond to the 
summons and appear in court, the trial could proceed. The thirteenth arti-
cle of Arundel’s Constitutions builds upon this procedure by proliferating 
the number of citations that could be produced and the places they could 
be posted. Not content with merely posting a single citation in the parish 
church, Arundel authorizes multiple documents to be posted where a heretic 
was born and where he was thought to have preached. This article exhibits 
how ecclesiastical officials produced infamy under the auspices of merely 
Heresy,” in Inquisitions I.439–51. For a discussion of accusatio, denunciatio, and inquisitio in the 
Fourth Lateran Council, see the introduction to this book.
 19. Innocent III determined that heretics were those who believed, received, or defended 
heretical ideas, and Gregory IX confirmed this definition in 1231. See Kelly, “Inquisitorial Due 
Process and the Status of Secret Crimes,” in Inquisitions II.414.
 20. H.  C. Lea claims there was another shift: in standard inquisitio process, if a witness 
changed his or her testimony, the second version would not be admitted into evidence, but in 
heresy cases, witnesses were allowed to change their testimony so long as the changed testimony 
incriminated the accused. Notably, however, he does not offer specific evidence of this claim. His-
tory of the Inquisition of the Middle Ages (New York: Russell & Russell, 1955), 434. Kelly points 
out that “infamous” witnesses could be used in cases of treason and simony as well, and so this 
shift was not specific to heresy trials. Inquisitions I.446.
158 •  chapter Five
seeking it, since these documents, posted in multiple parishes, would publi-
cize the accusations against an individual to activate the infamia necessary to 
begin trial proceedings. In addition, the article dismisses the need for witness 
testimony should the accused fail to present himself at court:
We do ordain, will, and declare, for the easier punishment of the offenders 
in the premises, and for the better reformation of the church divided and 
hurt, that all such as are defamed, openly known, or vehemently suspected, 
in any of the cases aforesaid, or, in article of the catholic faith, sounding 
contrary to good manners, by the authority of the ordinary of the place 
or other superior, be cited personally to appear, either by letters, public 
messenger being sworn, or by edict openly set at that place where the said 
offender commonly remains, or in his parish church, if he have any certain 
dwelling house; otherwise, in the cathedral church of the place where he 
was born, and in the parish church of the same place where he so preached 
and taught: and afterwards, certificate being given that the citation was 
formerly executed against the party cited being absent and neglecting his 
appearance, it shall be proceeded against him fully and plainly, without 
sound or show of judgment, and without admitting proof by witnesses 
and other canonical probations. And also, after lawful information had, 
the said ordinary (all delays set apart) shall signify, declare, and punish the 
said offender, according to the quality of his offence, and inform aforesaid; 
and further, shall do according to justice, the absence of the offender not-
withstanding.21
The mere verification that the citation was properly executed could miti-
gate the need for witness testimony during the trial. Thus the absence of the 
heretic was a procedural inconvenience, but it did not affect the ability to 
 21. “Volumus, ordinamus, et declaramus, ob faciliorem punitionem delinquentium in prae-
missis, et reformationem scissurae ecclesiae ex hoc laesae, quod diffamati, detecti, sive denun-
ciati, sive vehementer suspecti in aliquo casuum praedictorum, sive alio articulo quocunque in 
fide catholica aut bonis moribus male sonante, auctoritate loci ordinarii, alteriusve superioris 
citentur personaliter, si apprehendi poterunt, per literas sive per nuncium publicum juratum; sin 
autem per edictum, ad locum habitationis ipsius delinquentis, ubi morari communiter consue-
vit, et in ecclesia sua parochiali, si certum habuerit domicilium, publice propositum; alioquin in 
ecclesia cathedrali loci originis suae, et in ecclesia parochiali ipsius loci, in quo sic praedicavit, 
et docuit; ac recepto certificatorio legitimo de citatione huiusmodi executa, contra sic citatum 
etiam absentem et comparere negligentem, in poenam contumaciae suae huiusmodi summarie 
et de plano, absque strepitu et figura judicii, ac lite non contestata, ad testium receiptionem, et 
alias probationes canonicas procedatur; habita quoque informatione legitima, idem ordinarius, 
omni dilatione semota, sententiet et declaret, puniatque secundum qualitatem delicti, modo et 
forma superius expressatis, ulteriusque faciat quod est justum, ipsius contumacis absentia non 
obstante.” Concilia Magnae Britanniae 3:319.
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excommunicate him. Indeed, Wyclif himself was condemned as a heretic in 
1413, nearly 30 years after his death.22
 The De heretico comburendo statute and Arundel’s Constitutions dem-
onstrate two related issues at the heart of fifteenth-century prosecution of 
heretics in England. First, they depict the Lollard body as a site of heretical 
belief, insofar as they imagine Lollardy as an infection that has made its way 
from Oxford into the body politic. To root out this infection, they seek the 
actual bodies of Lollards to be “healed” through confession and abjuration 
or to be burned and eradicated. Second, they construct a tight link between 
the Lollard body and the documents used to search out and transform it. The 
Constitutions in particular replace the absent Lollard with a series of official 
citations and documents, mitigating the need for testimony (either by the 
defendant or by corroborating witnesses). These two pieces of legislation 
triangulate the body of the Lollard, accusatory documents, and witness testi-
mony in an effort to ensure that Lollardy could be constructed as a frighten-
ing attack on the health of the church and realm, one that could be controlled 
only by verifying the narrative of heretical infection with an impressive paper 
trail. 
 In the service of controlling and destroying the bodies from which Lol-
lard pestilence emanates, the depositions of Lollard trials end with the fusion 
of the Lollard body and the official documents designed to record the her-
etic’s abjuration. The defendant was required to sign the documents explic-
itly “with myn owen hand a cross,” and one copy of the deposition was to 
be enrolled in the official register while the other was to remain with the 
accused “unto my lyves ende.”23 It is not entirely clear how this was sup-
posed to happen, as Rebecca Krug points out. Perhaps the document was 
supposed to be displayed, or kept in a drawer, or even kept on one’s person 
until death.24 But it is clear that legal officials sought to rein in the body of 
the heretic with its hefty documentary apparatus.25
 However, whereas fifteenth-century legislation tried to make the Lollard 
body the central linchpin in its campaign against heresy, the testimonies of 
 22. Joseph H. Dahmus, The Prosecution of John Wyclyf (New Haven, CT: Yale University 
Press, 1952).
 23. See the documents collected in The Heresy Trials in the Diocese of Norwich, 1428–31, ed. 
Norman P. Tanner, Camden 4th Series, vol. 20 (London: Royal Historical Society, 1977).
 24. Rebecca Krug, Reading Families: Women’s Literate Practice in Late Medieval England 
(Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2002), 143–44.
 25. Significantly, Thorpe’s 1406 arrest document ends by insisting on the delivery of his body 
to prison: “Quorum corpora vobis mittimus in cancellaria vostrum virtute brevis predicti.” See 
“Appendix: Public Record Office C 250/4, no. 23,” in Jurkowski, “The Arrest of William Thorpe,” 
294–95.
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accused Lollards envision the Lollard body as a site of resistance and theo-
logical privilege. For example, in a letter detailing his 1403 interrogations for 
unauthorized preaching, the convicted Lollard Richard Wyche explains that 
on the way to the first interrogation, he fell off a horse and hurt his leg. He 
then goes on to describe in detail the gastrointestinal distress he suffered in 
prison:
And our good Lord, out of his grace, has afflicted me through a great con-
striction of the stomach, on account of which I now have and have been 
having great pain at times purging my stomach, so that for nine days I have 
not had so much as one purgation, and hemorrhoids have twice gripped 
me and have bled rather profusely, such that it is shameful to mention it. 
However, I must do so or not survive, and my purgation is as difficult as the 
purging of it. These are my secrets.26
By emphasizing the material conditions of his time in prison, Wyche retrieves 
his own body from the symbolic economy constructed by his accusers, turn-
ing that economy upside down. His inability—or, perhaps, his refusal—
to “purge” his stomach draws on commonplace language in late medieval 
confessional manuals, which imagine confession as a kind of “vomit” that 
cleanses the body and the soul of its sins. Here, his constipation enacts his 
resistance against his accusers’ desire for a full confession and abjuration, 
“enclosing” Lollard secrets in his body.
 Likewise, Margery Baxter, accused of sometimes housing the known Lol-
lard William White and storing his books, makes her own body a central 
feature of her arguments against the orthodox claims against her. Accord-
ing to her household servant, Joanna Clyfland, Margery once told her that 
crosses were merely objects produced by “lewed wrights,” and that if Joanna 
wanted to see a cross she could just look at Margery holding her arms out-
stretched.27 Margery then goes on to state that she harbors a “charter of sal-
 26. “In quo continuo, etc. habens cibum et potum competenter, gracias agens Deo. Et bonus 
Deus noster ex sua gracia visitavit me per magnam strictitudinem in ventre, per quam habeo et 
habui magnam penam aliquando pergare ventrem meum, quia aliquando per novem dies non 
habui quantitatem unius purgacionis et emeraudes tenuerunt me bis et sanguinarunt quodam-
modo fortiter, et sic quod pudor est dicere. Tamen oportet me ita facere vel non vivere et purga-
cio mea est dura sicut purgacio eius. Ista sunt secreta mea.” F. D. Matthew, “The Trial of Richard 
Wyche,” The English Historical Review 5.19 (1890): 541. For a discussion of Wyche’s letter, see 
Copeland, Pedagogy, 161–63.
 27. “Et ista iurata asseruit se libenter videre velle veram crucem Christi. Et prefata Margeria 
dixit, ‘vide,’ et tunc extendebat brachia sua in longum, dicens isti iurate, ‘hec est vera crux Christi, 
et istam crucem tu debes et potes(t) videre et adorare omni die hic in domo tua propria, et adeo 
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vation” in her womb.28 Calling upon Marian imagery to suggest an organic 
(and distinctly female) connection to God’s Word, Baxter imagines her body 
to contain legal documents ecclesiastical authorities cannot access.29 In doing 
so, she constructs her own body as a sacred enclosure that holds secret, sal-
vific knowledge that can survive bodily and textual persecution. Though 
Baxter’s claim is a startling one, reading it alongside Wyche’s letter suggests 
a wider picture of resistant Lollard rhetoric that imagined the body as a kind 
of reliquary that held “secrets” or documents beyond the access of ecclesias-
tical officials.30
 Like Wyche and Baxter, Thorpe writes his Testimony in the shadow of 
the De heretico comburendo statute, knowing that his refusal to abjure for 
unauthorized preaching will lead him, as Arundel tells him more than once, 
to follow Sautre to Smithfield. But unlike Wyche or Baxter, Thorpe never 
features his own body in his depiction of his interrogation. Admittedly, he 
does repeatedly claim that Arundel and his assistants “manassed him,” and at 
the end of the interrogation, he reiterates that he was “rebuked and scorned 
and manassid on ech side” by Arundel’s assistants (2224). But beyond those 
vague gestures, Thorpe provides no physical details of his incarceration, nor 
does he use his body as a site of resistance. Instead, Thorpe emphasizes his 
own presence as a witness on behalf of an absent audience. In doing so, he 
constitutes his interrogation as an opportunity to outline and explain his 
beliefs to those beyond the closet in which Arundel has confined him. As he 
explains to Arundel and his assistants early in the interrogation,
“I make þis protestacioun before ȝou alle foure þat ben now here pres-
ent, coueitynge þat alle men and wymmen, which now ben here absent, 
tu in vanum laboras quando vadis ad ecclesias ad adorandas sive orandas aliquas ymagines vel 
cruces mortuas.’” Heresy Trials 44.
 28. “Margeria, ut asseruit isti iurate, habuit et habet unam cartam salvacionis in utero suo.” 
Heresy Trials 49. For a discussion of Baxter’s “charter,” with reference to the Charters of Christ 
specifically and to Trinitarian metaphors of conception and pregnancy generally, see Andrew 
Galloway, “Intellectual Pregnancy, Metaphysical Femininity, and the Social Doctrine of the Trin-
ity in Piers Plowman,” YLS 12 (1998): 117–52.
 29. For a discussion of Baxter’s use of Marian imagery, see Rita Copeland, “Why Women 
Can’t Read: Medieval Hermeneutics, Statutory Law, and the Lollard Heresy Trials,” in Represent-
ing Women: Law, Literature, and Feminism, ed. Susan Sage Heinzelman and Zipporah Batshaw 
Wiseman (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1994), 253–86. For a discussion of Margery’s 
idea of a “text” inaccessible to ecclesiastical authorities, see Steiner, Documentary Culture, 231–
22, and Krug, Reading Families, 132–34.
 30. Other Lollard depictions of trials comment on their accusers’ physical roughness: the 
author of the Opus arduum, for example, takes care to mention being shackled in steel manacles. 
Cited in Curtis V. Bostick, The Antichrist and the Lollards (Leiden: Brill, 1998), 50.
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knowen þe same: þat, whateuer þing before þis tyme I haue thouȝt or don 
or seid, eiþir what þat I schal now here do or seie eiþir ony tyme heraftir, I 
belieue þat al þe olde lawe and þe newe, ȝouen and ordeyned bi þe coun-
seile o þre persoones of þe holi Trinite, weren ȝouen and written to þe 
saluacioun of mankynde.” (306–13)
Thorpe here imagines his testimony to exceed the temporal and spatial con-
straints of its occurrence, reaching beyond the four present interrogators to 
the absent men and women awaiting the text of this interrogation.
 Thorpe’s production of an absent audience directly opposes Arundel’s 
staging of the interrogation. As Thorpe tells it, he was brought before Arun-
del after sitting for several months in a prison at Saltwood Castle. At first, 
he says, Arundel “stood in a greet chaumbre” surrounded by many people, 
but when he saw Thorpe, he retreated into a “priuy closet” with only a physi-
cian named Malvern, a parson, and two lawyers (171–79). The retreat into 
a small interrogation room ostensibly gives Arundel the upper hand, isolat-
ing Thorpe from his supporters and forcing him to engage directly with the 
authorities. It also follows standard inquisitio proceedings, which were sup-
posed to be conducted in secret.31 But by invoking an audience of absent men 
and women, Thorpe rhetorically reaches beyond the closet and reframes the 
role of the Lollard body in heresy interrogations. Instead, he constructs an 
opportunity to theorize his own presence as a testifying witness, both during 
the interrogation and as a document that will endure beyond his future at 
Smithfield. In doing so, Thorpe produces what looks like a Lollard sermon 
for an imagined audience, rather than a set of responses to a standard inqui-
sition or even a text that bears witness to his experiences in Arundel’s inter-
rogation room.
 In turning away from his own body to focus on “presence,” Thorpe 
formulates his testimony as a text without a body, a document that can be 
detached from the particularities of his inquisition. The clearest statement 
of this transformation of his heretical body into documentary presence 
comes when he defines his interrogation as truth that will be continually 
witnessed by fellow believers. Responding to the specific charge of unauthor-
ized preaching, Thorpe explains,
ȝhe, þe peple to whom we prechen, be þei feiþful eiþer vnfeiþful, schulen 
be oure lettris þat is oure witnesse-berers; for truþe whanne it is sowen may 
not ben vnwitnessid. For alle þei, þat ben conuertid or saued bi herynge of 
 31. Lea, History of the Inquisition, 406.
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Goddis word and worchen þeraftir, ben witnesse-berers þat þe truþe þat 
þei herden and diden after is cause of her saluacioun. (774–79)
Thorpe establishes that his Testimony will function as an extralegal docu-
ment that constructs an audience of readers as witnesses who can testify to 
the truth of his beliefs. In conceptualizing his absent audience as witnesses, 
Thorpe draws upon an Augustinian model of readers as witnesses. In Book 
10 of his Confessions, Augustine begins his theory of memory by explaining 
his text as a revelation of truth to which his readers must attest. “Therefore I 
speak out, and in this hope I rejoice when I rejoice in a wholesome way,” he 
writes. “This I wish to do in my heart before you in confession, and in my 
writing before many witnesses” (multis testibus).32 Augustine’s invention of a 
witnessing audience extracts his Confessions from the isolation from which 
it was produced, translating the confession of his inner contrition into an 
exemplary text that can testify to the spiritual efficacy of his life’s narrative. 
Augustine is one of Thorpe’s favorite patristic authorities, and like Augus-
tine, Thorpe offers an autobiographical narrative that can move beyond the 
immediate circumstances of its composition. For Thorpe as for Augustine, 
witnessing transforms autobiographical narrative into iterable document, 
transforming individual biography into exemplary testimony.
 Moreover, by specifically representing his absent audience as witnesses 
and letter-bearers, Thorpe reconstitutes the inquisitional procedure Arun-
del attempts to follow. With interrogations conducted in secret, often with 
the mere presumption of infamy, inquisitors could proceed to convict and 
punish an accused heretic without calling upon witnesses to testify either 
on behalf of or even against the defendant. As Arundel makes clear in his 
Constitutions, a series of citations and official documents could substitute 
for the witnesses required in English canonical and even civil courts. So 
when Thorpe conceptualizes his audience both as his witnesses and as his 
letter-bearers, he co-opts the ecclesiastical power to replace witness testi-
mony with official documents. His testimony not only serves as his defense 
against Arundel’s accusations, it more broadly rejects the legal system that 
has dissolved the safeguards designed to ensure a fair trial based on clear 
proofs and public infamy. Indeed, when Thorpe reconstitutes his interroga-
tion into a production of a text that will reach a community of absent wit-
nesses, he does so specifically against the official documents Arundel has at 
his disposal. And the battle between documents—on one hand, Arundel’s 
official articles of complaint and, on the other, Thorpe’s Testimony—turns 
 32. Augustine, Confessions, trans. R.  S. Pine-Coffin (New York: Penguin Classics, 1972), 
10.1.
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on the witnessing authority they each can claim. Arundel begins by explain-
ing to Thorpe how this interrogation will go. After Thorpe forsakes his own 
opinions one by one, he says, Thorpe will then give up his friends.
 To Arundel’s frustration, Thorpe responds with a lengthy articulation 
of his beliefs one by one rather than admitting to his crimes and abjur-
ing. Arundel then instructs one of his clerks to fetch the “certificate” from 
Shrewsbury that details the “errours and þe eresies” against Thorpe. Arundel 
is very careful to enumerate the authenticating instruments that announce 
his administrative authority: “‘Take hidir anoon þe certificat þat cam to 
me from Schrouesbirie vndir þe bailyes seelis,’” he tells his assistant, “‘wit-
nessynge þe errours and þe eresies whiche þis losel haþ venymously sowen 
þere’” (618–20). He reads it aloud and then smugly puts it back in the cup-
board. Later, when Thorpe again stalwartly refuses to abjure, Arundel again 
retrieves the document from the cupboard and performs his discovery of 
an official corroboration of Thorpe’s open preaching. “‘Lo, here it is certi-
fied and witnessed aȝens þee bi worþi men and feiþful of Schrouesbirie þat 
þou prechedist þere opinli in seint Chaddis chirche þat þe sacrament of þe 
auter was material breed after þe consecracioun. What seist þou?’” (929–32). 
The cycle repeats: with every article of interrogation, Arundel retrieves the 
document with great pomp, unrolls it, and reminds Thorpe that this list of 
heresies has been “certified” by trusted witnesses and ecclesiastical seals.33 He 
even wants Thorpe to help produce documents that will lead to other inter-
rogations of heretics:
“and hem þat wol not leue þees dampnable opinyouns þou schalt putten 
vp, publischinge her names, and make hem knowen to þe bischop of þe 
diocise þat þese ben inne, eiþir to þe bischopis mynystris. And ouer þis 
I wole þat þou preche no more, to þe tyme þat I knowe bi good witnesse 
and trewe þat þi conuersacioun be suche þat þin herte and þi mouþ acor-
den trewli in oon, contrariing alle þe lore pat þou hast tauȝt herbifore.” 
(358–64)
Arundel first insists that Thorpe “publish” the names of other heretics, lean-
ing on the de se et aliis process used by ecclesiastical authorities to use witness 
testimony to produce infamia. He then suggests he will know that Thorpe 
has truly abjured when Thorpe’s statements accord with what he feels in his 
heart, taking up language from confessional manuals that imagine confes-
sional discourse to reveal what is hidden in one’s heart and soul.34
 33. See, for example, lines 1629–31.
 34. For the similarities between the work of a confessor and that of an inquisitor, see Ber-
nard Gui’s thirteenth-century inquisitional manual, which equates the inquisitor with a “medicus 
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 The gap between what happens in one’s heart and what one says by 
mouth was specifically at stake in late medieval heresy investigations, partic-
ularly in terms of the oaths inquisitors required of accused heretics.35 Inqui-
sitio heretice pravitatis sought to draw out the poisonous beliefs festering in 
the hearts of heretics to skirt around the ecclesiastical axiom that the Church 
does not judge secret crimes. Accordingly, it was designed to bring the beliefs 
of the accused out of his heart and into his mouth, thereby making his beliefs 
“public” and punishable. To accomplish this, the procedure required an oath 
ex officio, which forced the defendant to swear to tell the truth and before 
charges were even named as well as to pledge fidelity to Church law. Any 
silence in response to questions or claims of innocence could be turned into 
a potential charge of false witness, since the defendant had already vowed to 
adhere to official doctrine. (In contrast, English common law did not con-
sider it perjury to plead “not guilty,” even if the defendant were convicted of 
the charges against him.36) The oath rendered any perceived gap between 
what the defendant felt in his heart and what he said under oath a confirma-
tion of heretical belief and a breach of the vow with which the proceedings 
began.
 Accused heretics took advantage of this procedural reliance on the oath. 
For example, Richard Wyche dramatizes the paradoxical design of the inqui-
sitional oath when he bargains with his interrogators about how he will 
pledge to tell the truth. Wyche claims that, on advice of his interrogators, 
he will take an oath to obey Church doctrine with reservations in his heart 
(in corde tuo limitatum). The promise emerges out of complex negotiations 
in which Wyche agreed to obey the law of the Catholic Church because, as 
he asserts, the law of the Church is the law of God. In other words, he will 
easily pledge fidelity to the “true Church,” reserving in his heart his belief 
that the ecclesiastical hierarchy of the current Church perverts the truth of 
its doctrine. Yet he also knows that according to inquisitional procedure, he 
must pledge an oath “according to the intention of the judge,” rather than 
according to his own conscience. The interrogator reassures him that his lord 
merely wants to procure an oath pro forma; Wyche is thus willing to accept 
one that expresses his reservations and pledges his faith to Church doctrine 
“as it pertains to me.”37
animarum.” Manuel de L’Inquisiteur, ed. and trans. G. Mollat (Paris: Belles Lettres, 2006), 8.
 35. For a succinct discussion of the history of oath-taking in ecclesiastical courts and the 
argument that Wyche’s “mental reservations” dramatize his dissent against the construction of 
the public record, see Copeland, Pedagogy, 166–70.
 36. See Leonard W. Levy, Origins of the Fifth Amendment (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1968): 43–82; and H. A. Kelly, “The Right to Remain Silent: Before and After Joan of Arc,” in 
Inquisitions III.992–1026.
 37. “Dixi, volo libenter si dominus meus voluerit facere sicut vos dicitis et recipere a me 
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 Similarly, when Arundel insists that Thorpe take an oath to forsake 
his heretical opinions, Thorpe responds to Arundel with silence, instead 
complaining to his absent audience that Arundel’s request is “an vnleeful 
askynge” (366). Undeterred, Arundel reiterates that he knows “bi good wit-
nesse and trewe” that Thorpe has preached without Church authorization, 
and he goes on to enumerate that these witnesses come with official docu-
mentary authentication: “‘I wole ȝeue credence to þese worschipful men, 
which haue writun to me and witnessen vndir her seelis þat þou prechidest 
þus openly þese forseid errours and heresies þere among hem’” (639–42). 
Arundel conceptualizes “true” witnesses as the sealed documents he keeps 
in a cupboard inside the “privy closet.” Like the oath-taking negotiations 
depicted in Wyche’s letter, this scene depicts the fissures between Thorpe’s 
beliefs, held in his heart and expressed in the extralegal document he pro-
duces for an absent audience, and the official documents Arundel uses as 
evidence against Thorpe.
 The battle over the use of testifying documents and oaths emerges par-
ticularly in Arundel’s repeated attempts to get Thorpe to swear upon a book 
and renounce his heretical beliefs. Generally speaking, Wycliffite doctrine 
rejected such oath-taking practices, which Thorpe carefully explains to 
Arundel: “‘Sir, I vndirstonde a book is no þing ellis, no but a þing compilid 
togidere of diuerse creaturis, and so to swere bi a book is to swere bi dyuerse 
craturis; and to swere bi ony creaturis boþe Goddis lawe and mannes lawe is 
þeraȝen’” (336–38). Thorpe continues to say that he has no problem swear-
ing by “‘Goddis ordynaunce or word comaundid of God’” (343). Thorpe’s 
resistance specifically turns on the transcendence of the material oath-text, 
in his rejection of it as a “creature”: that is, as a mere earthly object.38 When 
Arundel again insists, more strenuously this time, that Thorpe place his 
hand upon the book and swear that he will refrain from preaching without 
official authorization, Thorpe elaborates upon his rejection of oath-taking. 
He begins by explaining that he and other Lollards know very well that no 
bishop would give them authorization papers unless they obey “þe bondis or 
terms” prescribed by the Church authorities. “And herfore,” he says,
istud iuramentum limitatum in corde meo, hoc est, quod teneor obedire legi Dei, in quantum ad 
me pertinet. Eciam dixit: Ne dubites. Tunc dixit cancellarius: Per Deum, tu iuras sicut nos volu-
mus antequam recesseris. Non respondi ei verbum. Et miles surrexit. Et cum stetisset in hostio 
domus, dixit: Richarde, in fide, vis tu tenere pactum de istis que dixisti? Eciam, si dominus meus 
voluerit tenere pactum de quibus vos dixistis. Eciam, scias illud pro certo recessit.” Matthew, 
“Trial of Richard Wyche,” 534–35.
 38. See Margaret Aston, Lollards and Their Books (London: Hambledon, 1984).
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“þouȝ we haue not ȝoure letter neiþer lettris of oþir bischopis writun wiþ 
enke vpon parchymyne, we dur not herfore leeue þe office of prechynge, 
to whiche prechinge alle presits aftire her kunnynge and her power ben 
bounden bi dyuerse witnessingis of Goddis lawe and of greet doctours, 
wiþouten ony mencioun makynge of bischopis lettris.” (761–66)
Initially, Thorpe engages with the orthodox requirement that preachers carry 
official papers with them, simply taking issue with the terms and limita-
tions these authorizing letters would impose: they are, he says, “sumtyme 
to straite and sumtyme to large” (758). But he soon dismisses the very idea 
that he needs any kind of documentary authentication by returning to the 
empty materiality of these letters. Parchment and ink are no match for the 
“dyuerse witnessingis” of Scripture and patristic commentary. Thorpe’s dis-
missal of material letters here draws upon the Wycliffite reconceptualization 
of the Johannine union between God and Word. For Wyclif, the literal sense 
of Scripture exceeds both the specificities of language and the material text, 
such that Scripture can be “indestructibly true” (infringibiliter veram).39 Wyc-
lif ’s take on John’s ideal of Christ-as-book argues that Scripture surpasses 
the “sensible signs” (signa sensibilia) that make the divine Word intelligible 
to mankind.40
 For Thorpe, the Wycliffite argument that scriptural truth cannot and 
should not be contained in material texts undergirds his refusal to take an 
ex officio oath. Thorpe elaborates his argument for disengaging the divine 
Word from material texts when Arundel asks him specifically to describe his 
beliefs about oath-taking. In response, Thorpe narrates a story in which he 
witnessed a conversation between a theologian and a lawyer about the prob-
lem of oaths, and he extrapolates out of this story a theory of book-oaths that 
returns to his definition of true witnesses as letter-bearers. Thorpe explains 
that the lawyer argued that if a sovereign asks someone to lay his hand upon 
a book and kiss it to certify obedience, he or she must do it. The theologian 
countered that such an oath does not permit any kind of resistance if the sov-
ereign asks something immoral or illegal. Thorpe then explains the “moral” 
of the story:
 39. On the Truth of Holy Scripture, trans. I.  C. Levy (Kalamazoo, MI: Medieval Institute, 
2001), 202; see De Veritate Sacrae Scripturae, ed. R. Buddensieg (London: Wyclif Society, 1905), 
I:114.19.
 40. On the Truth of Holy Scripture 99; De Veritate Sacrae Scripturae I.110.20. For a discussion 
of these passages in Wyclif and of Wycliffite thought on the material book and its influence on 
late medieval vernacular devotional works, see Nicole R. Rice, Lay Piety and Religious Discipline 
in Middle English Literature (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 62–77.
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“for euery book is noþing ellis, no but dyuerse creaturis of whiche it is 
made. þerfore to swere vpon a book or bi a book is to swere bi creaturis, 
and þis sweringe is euer vnleeful. þis sentence witnessiþ Ierom and Criso-
stom pleynli, blamynge him greetli þat bryngeþ forþ a book for to swere 
vpon, amonestynge clerkis þat in no wyse þei compellen ony lyf to swere 
wheþer þei gessen a man to swere trewe or fals.” (1684–90)
At first, Thorpe merely reiterates a point he has made a few times: since a 
material text is nothing but a series of “diverse creaturis,” it does not offer 
any specific access to God’s judgment, which exists conceptually in Scripture 
rather than in the particularities of an individual language or text. He then 
supplements his exemplary narrative by saying that Jerome and Chrysostom 
both plainly bear witness to this “sentence,” noting that both admonish those 
clerks who use books to corner men into swearing oaths. By first refusing to 
adhere to Arundel’s official witnessing practice of requiring book-oaths and 
then calling upon “plain witnesses” to support his argument, Thorpe effec-
tively transforms Arundel’s interrogation about oaths into an attestation of 
divine truth’s detachment from books. In doing so, he redirects the authority 
of witnessing away from the deceptive work of inquisitional oaths and mate-
rial texts and toward “plain” Scriptural citation.
 By this point, Arundel has realized that this interrogation has become a 
battle over hermeneutic authority rather than a proper inquisition. His first 
move is to take all of Thorpe’s books away, as he explains to his assistants:
“Lo, sere, þis is þe bisinesse and þe maner of þis losel and siche oþer: to 
pike out scharpe sentencis of holy writ and of doctours for to maynteyne 
her sect and her loore aȝens þe ordenaunce of holi chirche. And herfore, 
losel, it is þat þou coueitist to haue aȝen þe Sauter þat I made to be taken 
fro þee at Cauntirbirie, forþi þat þou woldist gadere out þereof and recorde 
scharpe verses aȝens vs. But þou schalt neuere haue þat Sauter neiþir 
ony oper book, til þat I wite þat þin hert and þi mouþ acorden fulli to be 
gouerned bi holi chirche.” (888–95)
His next move is to probe Thorpe’s knowledge of Scripture and patristic 
commentary in the absence of his research materials. He focuses particu-
larly on why Lollards use Scriptural citations to upbraid priests, rather than 
secular authorities: “‘Whi, losel,’” he asks, “‘wolt þou not and oþer þat ben 
confedrid wiþ þee sechen out of holy writt and of þe sentence of doctours 
as scharpe auctoritees aȝens lordis and knyȝtis and squyeris and aȝens oþer 
seculer men, as ȝe done aȝens preestis?’” (1573–76). Thorpe’s answer not 
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only demonstrates his facility with patristic authorities, it also illustrates how 
he imagines his Testimony to deflect the threat of death that Arundel repeat-
edly holds over his head. Calmly, Thorpe explains,
“But, sere, siþ Crissostem seiþ þat presits ben as þe stomke of þe peple, it is 
ful nedeful in prechinge and also in comownynge to be moost bisie aboute 
þis presthode, siþ bi þe viciousenesse of prestis boþe lordis and comuns be 
moost synfull effect and led into þe werst ende.” (1580–84)
Thorpe’s first purpose here is to display his knowledge of Scriptural herme-
neutics, meeting the Archbishop’s pointed questions with the same arsenal 
of patristic citations.41 But he deftly turns away from a discussion of Chryso-
stom to a condemnation of proud priests, which Arundel pursues. Arundel 
ultimately fails in his attempt to get Thorpe to renounce his reproach of 
orthodox priests. In fact, as Arundel doggedly reframes his questions in the 
hope of getting Thorpe to answer differently, his assistant pulls him aside and 
whispers, “‘Sere, þe lengir þat ȝe appose him, þe worse he is; and þe more þat 
ȝe bisie ȝou to amende him, þe more weyward he is’” (1621–23).
 Naturally, Thorpe’s refusal to submit to Arundel’s “manassing” perplexes 
and enrages Arundel, ultimately wearing him down. Toward the end of the 
interrogation, Arundel insists, one last time, that Thorpe surrender to the 
authority of the Church as authenticated in Arundel’s official documents: 
“‘Submitte þee þan now here wilfulli and mekeli to þe ordenaunce of holi 
chirche whiche I schal schewe to þee’” (2063–65). Of course, Thorpe coyly 
avoids the specific terms of the demand, saying that he is perfectly ready to 
obey Christ as the head of “holi chirche,” as well as to “þe lore and þe hees-
tis and to þe counseilis of euery plesyng membre of him” (2067–79). For 
Arundel, it is too much to bear, and he punches the cupboard that holds the 
official rolls and documents, promising that he will make Thorpe “‘as sikir as 
ony þeef þat is in Kent!’” (2074). In a narrative haunted by the mere specter 
of bodily punishment, this is the only moment of physical aggression, and it 
is an especially impotent one.
 Thorpe’s purpose in describing the moment Arundel punches the cup-
board is to deflate Arundel’s ecclesiastical and legal power to enact vio-
lence, depicting that violence as both self-inflicted and weak. When Arundel 
punches the cupboard, he attacks the very vessel that contains his official wit-
nesses, the documents that authorize his menacing interrogation of Thorpe. 
 41. For a discussion of Thorpe’s facility with university discourse, see Fiona Somerset, “Ver-
nacular Argumentation in The Testimony of William Thorpe,” in Clerical Discourse and Lay Audi-
ence in Late Medieval England (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 179–215.
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Rather than violently destroy the Lollard body that could harbor alternative, 
secret legal documents, Arundel can only commit violence against an inert 
cupboard that houses his official arrest document and the depositions of 
witnesses who have testified against Thorpe. Thorpe thus uses this moment 
to perform a model of resistance that differs from other resistant strate-
gies. Wyche and Baxter both envision their own bodies as the containers 
of “secrets” or authorizing texts, turning the kind of documentary inacces-
sibility Arundel brandishes around on itself. But this tactic is dangerous: 
the De heretico comburendo statute gives ecclesiastical authorities ultimate 
power over the Lollard body, whether it harbors a secret document of salva-
tion or not. Thorpe’s translation of his bodily presence at his defense into a 
documentary presence that transcends the time and space of the interroga-
tion succeeds in devastating the overlap between Lollard body and Lollard 
opinion upon which Arundel’s authority depends. The cupboard scene illus-
trates the success of Thorpe’s disembodied testimony: rather than carry out 
violence upon this testifying Lollard, Arundel has no choice but to carry out 
violence against his own documentary witnesses.
thorpe’s Presence, Real Presence, and Eucharistic doctrine
Thorpe’s strategy for resisting the threat of a fiery death without abjuring 
his beliefs depends on his complex management of material presence and 
textual absence. He conceptualizes his interrogation as the impetus for a 
witnessing document that can reach beyond the confines of Arundel’s “privy 
closet,” constructing an absent audience of witnesses that transcends the 
interrogators’ presence. His repeated use of the term “presence” to describe 
the work of his Testimony captures an ongoing issue at the center of Lollard 
heresy persecutions: the presence of Christ’s body in the transubstantiated 
host. As Miri Rubin has explained, orthodox sacramental doctrine promises 
Eucharistic presence, insofar as a consecrated host loses its accidental prop-
erties of bread and wine in favor of the substance of Christ’s body.42 Hetero-
dox thinking challenged this ideal of presence by arguing that a consecrated 
host retained its accidental properties, even as it contained the substance of 
Christ’s body. Thorpe’s specific intervention in debates about Eucharistic 
presence is to explore the way the laity was expected to access a consecrated 
host. Rather than consume the host, as the parable of the Last Supper pre-
 42. Miri Rubin, Corpus Christi: The Eucharist in Late Medieval Culture (Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press, 1991).
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scribes, medieval congregants typically witnessed it, watching as the priest 
murmured “Hoc est corpus meum” and then turned to face the congregation 
and elevate the host for all to see. For Thorpe, as for other Lollard writers, 
this witnessing moment is a source of frustration about the unavailability of 
Christ’s presence to a layperson’s senses and, more broadly, about the rela-
tionship between external sight and inward faith.
 The doctrine of Eucharistic presence is central to all kinds of devotional 
writing in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, both Lollard and other-
wise. Wyclif had invigorated debates around presence several decades before 
Thorpe’s Testimony when he began to question the doctrine of transubstanti-
ation. In a 1378 sermon, for example, Wyclif suggested that it was enough to 
venerate a consecrated host in the same way as a crucifix: that is, as a sign.43 
Likewise, in De apostasia, he argues that a consecrated host that contains 
Christ’s body exists in multiple registers:
The reason for this multiplication of Christ’s soul is that it is more prin-
cipally the Person of the Word than the body. The immaterial qualities, 
however, which find their subject in the soul of Christ, are multiplied 
along with it throughout the host. These include knowledge, justice, and 
the other virtues of Christ’s soul which do not require Christ’s corporeal 
pre-existence wherever they might be present.44
He goes on to say that there are several ways the body can be present in the 
consecrated host: corporeally, dimensionally (by which he means visibly or 
palpably), spiritually, and figuratively. In his De Eucharistia, Wyclif turns 
to the logic of materiality by discussing the moment the priest breaks apart 
the consecrated host. The priest breaks the host, not the body of Christ, he 
states, adding that the consecrated host is a sign of the body of Christ, not 
the body itself.45 
 In the second half of the fourteenth century through the first half of the 
fifteenth, Wyclif ’s skeptical stance on Eucharistic sacramentality was used 
 43. I. C. Levy, John Wyclif: Scriptural Logic, Real Presence, and the Parameters of Orthodoxy 
(Milwaukee, WI: Marquette University Press, 2003), 230.
 44. “Et causa huius multiplicacionis anime Christi est, quod ipsa est principalius ipso cor-
pore persona verbi. Qualitates autem immateriales, que subiectantur in anima Christi, com-
multiplicantur cum ipsa per hostiam, ut sciencia, iusticia et alie virtutes anime Christi, que non 
requirunt, ubicunque fuerint, Christi preexistenciam corporalem.” Tractatus de apostasia, ed. 
Michael Henry Dziewicki (London: Trubner & Co., 1889), 224. Cited and translated by Levy, 
John Wyclif, 290.
 45. “Satis ergo est ad honorem et potenciam sacerdotis quod ipse benedicit, consecrat et 
conficit sacramentum; quod est hostia consecrata et non corpus Chriti sed eius signum vel tegu-
mentum.” De Eucharistia Tractaus Maior, ed. J. Loserth (London: Trubner & Co, 1892), 16.
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to test accused heretics about their beliefs. Two years after censuring Wyclif 
in 1380, the Blackfriars Council examined Nicholas Hereford, John Aston, 
and Philip Repingdon, all of whom abjured their beliefs about Eucharistic 
accident by confessing mechanically that the consecrated host is truly the 
body of Christ.46 Unsatisfied with their rote responses, the Council articu-
lated its desire for stronger confessions that would admit, following Church 
teachings, that the body of Christ is identically, truly, and really present in 
the sacrament of the altar (corpus Christi est in sacramento altaris, iden-
tice, vere, et realiter, in propria praesentia corporali). Indeed, the Church’s 
stance insisted on Christ’s “plentitudinous presence” in the sacrament of 
the altar, and Church officials argued in increasingly strident terms that the 
consecrated host is Christ’s body.47 In one particularly blunt version from the 
1420s, for example, Thomas Netter, the Provincial Prior of London, argues 
that a consecrated host is definitively a “pure body without bread” (Rubin 
330).
 Nicholas Love, a Carthusian monk and prior of Mount Grace in York-
shire, directly takes on Lollard arguments against transubstantiation with a 
bit more nuance. He admits that this sacrament requires special faith. None-
theless, he argues that Christ is corporeally present in the consecrated host:
For alle oþer þinges pasede þat we haue mynde of we conceyuen in spirite 
& in herte so þat þereby we haue not þe bodily presence of hem. Bot in þis 
gostly mete & sacramentale commemoracion of oure lorde Jesu he is ver-
reyly & bodily present wiþ vs vnder an oþere forme bot soþely in his owne 
proper substance verrey god & man.48
For Love, the miracle of the Eucharist is that it performs the devotional 
work of images that help the faithful turn their minds and hearts to God. 
Unlike those images, however, the Eucharist is actually the body and blood 
of Christ, not simply a symbol of or prod toward it. Yet if orthodox views 
on the sacrament of the altar maintained the corporeality of the consecrated 
host, those who rejected transubstantiation used philosophies of Eucharis-
tic corporeality to their advantage. For example, Walter Brut, charged with 
 46. “panis quem tenet sacerdos in maibus suis, fit vel efficitur, virtute verborum sacramen-
talium, vere et realite, diem corpus Christis numero.” Fasciculi zizaniorum, ed. Rev. Walter Wad-
dington Shirley (London: Longman, Brown, Green, Longmans, and Roberts, 1858), 330.
 47. For an outline of the late medieval Church’s stance on the sacrament of the altar, see 
David Aers, “The Sacrament of the Altar in the Making of Orthodox Christianity or ‘Traditional 
Religion,’” in Sanctifying Signs (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2004), 1–28.
 48. Nicholas Love, The Mirror of the Blessed Life of Jesus Christ, ed. Michael G. Sargent (Ex-
eter: University of Exeter Press, 2005), 224.
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heresy in 1393, insists that the sacrament ought to be consumed, then cites 
Matthew to explain that the consumed host must be excreted. He uses this 
citation as proof against transubstantiation, since, he says, even Jesus notes 
that the disciples at the Last Supper chewed, swallowed, and excreted the 
bread.49 Likewise, Margery Baxter focuses on the materiality of the Eucharist 
as consumed food when she argues that if a consecrated host really were the 
true body of Christ, each day millions of Christs would be consumed and 
then excreted into vile-smelling pits.50
 The graphic arguments lobbied by Brut and Baxter rely on the idea that 
the Eucharist must be ingested to enact its sacramental power, and by pursu-
ing the corporeal ideal of transubstantiation to its logical limit, each mocks 
the idea that a consecrated host does not retain its accidental properties. 
But, as mentioned above, most medieval congregants seldom ingested the 
host, instead witnessing it as the priest held the consecrated host aloft during 
Mass.51 Thus, the Lay Folk’s Mass Book instructs the laity to revere the sight 
of the host by kneeling and lifting up their hands, since “that same es he thou 
lokes opone.”52 And late medieval Eucharistic poetry often emphasized the 
power of seeing the sacrament, as one poem from the Vernon manuscript 
does:
I þe honoure wiþ al my miht
In fourme of Bred as I þe se,
Lord, þat in þat ladi briht,
In Marie Mon bi-come for me.
þi fflesch, þi blod is swete of siht,
þi Sacrament honoured to be,
Of Bred and Wyn wiþ word i-diht;
Almihti lord, I leeue in þe.53
 49. Registrum Johannis Trefnant, ed. William W. Capes (London: Canterbury and York So-
ciety, 1816), 339.
 50. “mille tales deos et postea tales deos comedunt et commestos emittunt per posteriora 
in sepibus turpiter fetentibus, ubi potestis tales deos sufficientes invenire si oueritis perscrutari.” 
Heresy Trials, 45.
 51. See Eamon Duffy, Stripping of the Altars, 2nd ed. (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 
2005), 91–130. Between 1215 and 1222, a London synod carefully outlined when the congrega-
tion was allowed to see the host, warning priests to elevate it only once the words Hoc est corpus 
meum had been uttered to prevent idolatry of an unconsecrated host. For a discussion about 
how theologians marked the exact moment of consecration, see V. L. Kennedy, “The Moment of 
Consecration and the Elevation of the Host,” Mediaeval Studies 6 (1944): 121–50.
 52. The Lay Folks’ Mass Book, ed. T. F. Simmons, EETS 71 (London: Trubner, 1968), 38.
 53. The Minor Poems of the Vernon MS 25. See also 178 for a similar formulation of seeing 
the consecrated host.
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The turn away from consuming toward seeing the Eucharist seems to emerge 
from two concerns. First, as the anonymous lyric On the Feast of Corpus 
Christi explains, many people failed to take it seriously when they consumed 
the sacrament regularly: “ffor folk war howsild so comunly, / þai toke þe 
les reward þarby, / Ne þam-self þai wald noght ȝeme / Als to þe sacrament 
suld seme” (183). Second, it was too much work for the individual priest to 
distribute pieces of the host to every congregant. Accordingly, the fifteenth-
century chaplain John Audelay instructs the laity to worship the sacrament 
upon sight, arguing that witnessing the host enacts the relationship between 
external sight and inward belief: “Hayle! þi glorious Godhed hit may not be 
sene, / Hayle! with no freelte of flesly ȝene; / Hayle! I beleue truly in þis bred 
þat ȝe bene, / Verey God and mon.”54
 For Audelay and other orthodox officials, witnessing the host offers a 
chance to reiterate the sacrament’s miracle: while the consecrated host still 
looks like bread, faith allows true believers to recognize it as Christ’s body. 
Yet for some fifteenth-century writers, the fact that some congregants could 
only witness the host from afar only exacerbates the gap between clerical and 
lay audiences.55 For example, in one fifteenth-century antagonistic debate 
about lay access to the Eucharist, expecting the laity to witness the host is 
understood as a deliberately deceptive tactic on the part of the Church. Jack 
Upland’s Rejoinder (ca. 1420) is the third text in a back-and-forth between 
Jack Upland, a layman critical of fraternal corruption, and Friar Daw, an 
orthodox representative who defends friars’ rights to itinerant preaching. In 
the Rejoinder, Upland reproaches priests who deliberately obscure the sacra-
ment of the altar:
we sey alle þe sacrid oste þat is sene with eye
is verey cristes body; but thy sette seyþ not soo
but ȝe sey þer is cristes body, but ȝe tel not where;
but crist seyþ þis is my body & not þer is my body
whi ȝe templers messe sellers, grante ȝe not cristes wordes
syþ ȝe chafyr þus þerwith, by gylyng þe pupil
lete ȝoure sette write ȝoure byleue of þis sacrid osste,
 54. The Poems of John Audelay, ed. Ella Keats Whiting, EETS 184 (Oxford: Oxford Univer-
sity Press, 1931), 8.15–18.
 55. See Aers, who states, “the laity were encouraged to make prayers and readings which 
might often bear little relation to what was being enacted at the east end of their church. The 
Mass thus embodied and fostered the clearest division between clergy and laity.” Sanctifying 
Signs, 72.
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& preche it as ȝe write it, & sette þerto ȝoure sele
& j am sikir of my feyþ ȝe schul be stoned to deþe56
In this rather confusing claim, Upland seems to focus on priests’ garbling of 
the consecrating words by saying “There is Christ’s body” rather than cor-
rectly understanding Christ’s phrase, “This is my body.” Indeed, Upland says, 
even if priests were aware of their misstatement, they fail to show where 
Christ’s body appears. Upland seems to argue obliquely that the host retains 
its accidental properties, scoffing that the priest has failed to produce the 
promised body of Christ because he has misstated the consecrating words. 
Worse, he has beguiled his congregation into believing that the unchanged 
host has become Christ’s body, despite evidence to the contrary.
 To prevent the dissemination of the false doctrine of transubstantiation, 
Upland recommends that priests write down their beliefs and “preche it as ye 
write it,” then authorize the written text with the kind of seal Arundel’s docu-
ments boast. Based on such clear documentary evidence of their iniquity, 
Upland says, priests would be stoned to death. The quick turn from argu-
ing against transubstantiation to daring the clergy to document their false 
beliefs turns the ecclesiastical claims against unauthorized preaching against 
ecclesiastical authorities themselves. Crucial to Upland’s argument is the easy 
jump from the materiality of Christ’s body to the material documents Upland 
challenges Friar Daw to produce. For Upland, official documents (sealed 
with the material accoutrements of authorization) would reveal the empti-
ness of the consecrated host, not the heresy of those who challenge the doc-
trine of transubstantiation.
 Unlike Upland, Thorpe never engages in direct debate with Arundel 
regarding Eucharistic presence. Instead, he subtly and powerfully challenges 
the idea of transubstantiation by turning away from the problem of the con-
secrated host to his own presence as a preacher. Repeatedly pressing Thorpe 
to explain his views on the sacrament of the altar, Arundel often points to 
an accusation written in his roll that states that Thorpe preached “‘opinli 
in seint Chaddis chirche þat þe sacrament of þe auter was material breed 
after þe consecracioun’” (931–92). Rather than answer this charge directly, 
Thorpe instead challenges the orthodox link between outward sight of the 
Eucharist and inward belief by narrating a story that describes a congrega-
tion’s thoughtless, automatic responses to liturgical ritual:
 56. “Upland’s Rejoinder 2,” in Jack Upland, Friar Daw’s Reply, and Upland’s Rejoinder, 5–13.
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As I stood þere in þe pulpitte, bisiinge me to teche þe heestis of God, oon 
knyllide a sacringe belle, and herfor myche peple turned awei fersli and 
wiþ greet noyse runnen frowardis me. And I, seying þis, seide to hem þus 
“Goode men, ȝou were better to stoonden here stille and to here Goddis 
word! For, certis, þe vertu and þe mede of þe moost holi sacrament of þe 
auter stondiþ myche moore in þe bileue þereof þat ȝe owen to haue in ȝoure 
soulis þan it doiþ in þe outward siȝt þerof. And þerfore ȝou were better to 
stond stille quyetefulli and to heeren Goddis worde, siþ þoroȝ heeringe 
þerof men comen to veri bileue.” And oþer wise, ser, I am certeyne I spak 
not þere of þe worschipful sacrament of þe auter. (936–46)
Thorpe insists that this congregation would be better off staying where they 
are and listening to God’s words rather running to see another priest elevate a 
transubstantiated Host. He uses this moment to espouse his Wycliffite rejec-
tion of idols and images, arguing that “outward sight” cannot offer access to 
the inward soul, where the real sacrament resides. He thus disputes the kinds 
of arguments offered in fifteenth-century orthodox poetry that contend that 
witnessing the host should be enough for any congregant who truly believes 
in the consecrated host and who trusts that what his or her outward eye can-
not see, the soul can.
 But Thorpe moves beyond any traditional Lollard argument about the 
flimsiness of images when he strikingly envisions his own sermon as a sub-
stitute for the consecrated wafer at the Church across the square. Rather 
than turn toward a wafer that remains material bread, he tells the crowd, 
this audience should stay to hear him speak. Elizabeth Schirmer points out 
that Thorpe’s refusal to address the question of his beliefs about Eucharistic 
presence strips his discussion of the Eucharist of the miracle, and he instead 
focuses on his real-life experiences and those of his audience.57 Significantly, 
he emphasizes hearing rather than sight as the mode of sacramental access. 
He notes the “greet noyse” of the crowd when the sacring bell rings and asks 
them to “stond stille quyetefulli” to hear God’s word, “siþ þoruȝ heeringe 
þerof men comen to veri bileue” (943–45). Thorpe turns away from the rela-
tionship between outward sight and inward belief Arundel wants to draw 
out of him. Instead, Thorpe shifts from describing a listening audience to 
addressing a listening Arundel in order to emphasize the link between his 
imagined absent audience and the present one. By doing so, he can imagine 
his answers to Arundel’s questions as a kind of “sermon” preached to those 
witnesses who will read the transcript of his interrogation as an exemplary 
 57. Elizabeth Schirmer, “William Thorpe’s Narrative Theology,” SAC 31 (2009): 272–73.
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text. He thus transfers the discussion about Eucharistic presence into one 
about his own presence as a preacher, first for a public at St. Chad’s Church, 
then for Arundel and his assistants, and finally for the absent witnesses 
whom his Testimony addresses.
 Rather than worry about whether Thorpe will confess to openly preach-
ing against transubstantiation in public, Arundel now seems to care more 
about how Thorpe might explain the difficult relationship of subject and 
accident: “‘I trowe þee not, whateuere þou seist, siþe so worschipful men 
haue witnessid aȝens þee. But siþ þou denyest þat þou seidest not þus þere, 
what seist þou now? Dwelliþ þer after þe consecracioun of þe oost mate-
rial breed or nai?’” (947–50). For Arundel, Thorpe’s words are no match for 
the documentary witnesses he contains in his cupboard, yet he insists that 
Thorpe provide him with a direct answer in the interrogation so that he 
can gather clear evidence of Thorpe’s heretical beliefs. And Thorpe read-
ily answers Arundel’s question. He patiently explains the events of the Last 
Supper and then tells Arundel, “‘þe worschipful sacrament of þe auter is 
verri Cristis fleisch and his blood in forme of breed and wyne’” (968–69). 
Remarkably, Arundel concedes that the sacrament is Christ’s body in the 
form of bread, though he remains confused that the rest of Thorpe’s “sect” 
teaches that the host is bread in substance. Thorpe refuses to get into the 
academic debates about accidentem sine subiecto (though shows off his facil-
ity with these debates), instead turning, once again, to witnessing as the 
most certain form of theological knowledge: “‘Ser, bi open euydence and 
bi greet witnesse a þousand ȝeer after þe incarnacioun of Crist, þe deter-
mynacioun which I haue confessid here bifore to ȝou was accept of al holi 
chirche as sufficient of saluacioun of alle hem þat wollen bileue it feiþfulli 
and worchen þeraftir charitabli’” (1042–66). In eschewing university dis-
course for “great witnesses,” Thorpe returns to his earlier claim that his own 
witnesses will bear his teachings extra muros. For Thorpe, witnessing offers 
the best, most “open” kind of evidence of the righteousness of his beliefs, 
and, moreover, it allows him to imagine the enduring presence of his teach-
ings in an audience of absent witnesses. By “greet witnesse” he can claim 
that his complicated arguments about Eucharistic presence reach back to 
early, uncorrupted Church doctrine, and, by extension, he can suggest that 
his own status as a witness in this interrogation inserts him into this sacred 
genealogy.
 Arundel soon realizes he will get nowhere with Thorpe about Eucharis-
tic sacramentality or anything else, and the interrogation ends much as it 
began. Thorpe reiterates his willingness to submit to the teachings of Christ 
and the “true” Church, and Arundel slumps in defeat. He bids the constable 
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to return Thorpe to prison, and Thorpe sighs in relief to be away from his 
interrogators:
And I was þanne gretli confortid in alle my wittis, not oonly forþi þat I was 
þan delyuered for a tyme fro þe siȝt, fro þe heeringe, fro þe presence, fro 
the scornynge and fro þe manassinge of myn enemyes, but myche more 
I gladid in þe Lord forþi þoruȝ his grace he kepte me so boþe amonge þe 
flateryngis specialli, also amonge þe manassingis of myn aduersaries [þat] 
wiþouten heuynesse and agrigginge of my conscience I passid awei fro 
hem. (2238–45)
Thorpe here restates his investment in presence, mirroring his initial claim 
that he writes his Testimony for an absent audience of men and women. 
Bodily presence, for Thorpe, manifests in the witnessing bodies of his inter-
rogators (“þe siȝt . . . þe heeringe . . . þe presence”), but they are not true wit-
nesses. The only true witness is his own testimonial text, a treatise for those 
will disseminate his beliefs.
testimony, Martyrology, and thorpe’s Mysterious End
We do not know what happened to Thorpe after he returned to prison at 
Saltwood Castle. There is no record of his formal trial for heresy, nor is there 
a record of his abjuration or punishment. Hudson fantasizes that “it is tempt-
ing to think that Thorpe escaped from the archbishop’s hands at some time 
between the conversation recorded in the present text and that formal inves-
tigation” (xlvi), and she even suggests that Thorpe might have run away to 
Prague like Peter Payne, another English Lollard, did in 1413. The biographi-
cal sketchiness of Thorpe’s life after his Testimony certainly lends itself to 
such imaginings. As Copeland sympathizes, “There is a certain attractive-
ness in looking for another career that can be recovered in nearly all of its 
significant profile, to find a way of imagining the life of Thorpe which leaves 
almost no imprint on the historical record” (Pedagogy 192). But Thorpe’s 
own Testimony resists such a biographical reading. Indeed, his strategy of 
ignoring his own bodily existence in favor of a documentary presence that 
could be “witnessed” by an absent audience allows him to slip away both 
from Arundel’s legal authority and from our scholarly desire to recover a 
“real” William Thorpe.
 Codicologically speaking, we know a bit more. The text of Thorpe’s Tes-
timony survives in three manuscript versions (one English, two Latin) and 
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one early printed version. The ownership and provenance of these texts 
are difficult to trace, but both Latin manuscripts are written in Bohemian 
hands, and it seems that Thorpe was known in Bohemia, perhaps through 
his acquaintance with Jan Hus.58 Sometime around 1531, Richard Bayfield, 
a monk of Bury St. Edmonds, imported several books from abroad, includ-
ing a text called A boke of thorpe or of John Oldecastelle.59 This short text was 
subsequently taken up by the Protestant reformist John Bale, who reprinted 
parts of Thorpe’s Latin Testimony in 1543 (later collected in the Fasciculi 
zizaniorum). In 1563 John Foxe gathered together the narratives of four-
teenth- and fifteenth-century heretics such as Badby, Oldcastle, and Thorpe 
and placed them alongside Reformation figures such as Anne Askew and 
Thomas Cranmer in his multivolume Acts and Monuments. Indeed, Foxe is 
Thorpe’s most important champion in England, inserting his Testimony into 
English ecclesiastical history as a reformist martyrology.
 The sixteenth-century impulse to construct Thorpe as a martyr seems 
almost anticipated in his own text. Hudson suggests that the Testimony can 
be understood as a “substitute saint’s life,” insofar as Thorpe offers his own 
life as evidence of the truth of his beliefs in the face of the Church’s relentless 
persecution of Lollards.60 His quasi-hagiographical narrative indeed turns 
often to his own experiences, rather than Scriptural citation or academic 
discussion, to argue on behalf of Lollard doctrine, and he even begins his Tes-
timony with an autobiographical account of his upbringing and education. 
There, he suggests his life might be understood as inspirational, perhaps even 
saintly:
And so þanne I, ymagynynge þe greet desire of þese sondir and diuerse 
frendis of sondri placis and cuntrees, acoordinge alle in oon, I occupiede 
me herwiþ diuerse tymes so bisili in my wittis þat þoruȝ Goddis grace I 
perseyued, bi her good mouynge and of her cheritable desir, sum profit þat 
myȝt come of þis writing. For truþe haþ þis condicioun: whereeuere it is 
enpugned, þer comeþ þerof odour of good smel, and þe more violently þat 
enemyes enforsen hem to oppressen and to wiþstoonde þe truþe of God-
dis word, þe ferþir þe swete smel þerof strecchiþ. And no doute, whanne 
þis heuenli smel is moued, it wol not as smoke passe awei wiþ þe wynde; 
but it wol descende and reste in summe clene soule þirstinge þeraftir. 
(41–51)
 58. See Hudson, xxvi–xxxvii, and Copeland, Pedagogy, 191–93.
 59. Aston, Lollards and Their Books, 220.
 60. Likewise, Little compares Thorpe to St. Cecelia: Confession and Resistance 64.
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By constructing a diverse, international audience, Thorpe imagines his text’s 
broad dissemination, and he claims that God’s grace has given him the fore-
sight to imagine its wide-ranging benefits. His turn to the “good smell” of 
truth draws upon a common hagiographical metaphor, and he amplifies it by 
imagining that violence against truth would merely strengthen its odor. Of 
course, as discussed above, that violence never materializes in the Testimony. 
That he imagines it here, however, suggests that Thorpe tries to shape his 
narrative to fit the generic requirements of martyrology. Yet the Testimony 
does not narrate a martyr’s trial. Thorpe does not suffer physically as Christ 
had, and he provides little material evidence of his own bodily or even emo-
tional distress in the face of Arundel’s “manassing.” He does not even offer a 
conditional martyrology like Langland’s Book—a statement that would say 
something like “If I were to be violently struck or killed, then I will have suf-
fered for my beliefs.”
 This chapter opened by considering the relationship between biographi-
cal certitude and testimony, suggesting that the pervasive threat of bodily 
violence and death puts particular pressure on the ways testimonial narrative 
can be read biographically. We might now ask a similar question of marty-
rology: that is, how does the martyrological threat (or promise) of violent 
death structure its testimony? Death is, of course, a critical feature of any 
martyrological narrative, the moment when the martyr transcends his or her 
body and the earthly world in favor of divine exemplarity. Yet Thorpe’s death 
remains a mystery. By turning to the construction of Thorpe as a Protestant 
martyr in Foxe’s enormous mythographic project, we can extend our think-
ing about Thorpe’s testimonial presence. Whereas Thorpe’s sketchy biog-
raphy foregrounds the gaps between personal testimony and documented 
biography, the unconventionality of his narrative within Foxe’s martyrology 
foregrounds the gaps between testimony and exemplarity.
 Tracking the martyrological fate of William Thorpe in Foxe’s Acts and 
Monuments, however, potentially offers a skewed perspective of the six-
teenth-century sanctification of convicted Lollards. Though Foxe lists a 
number of Lollards in his treatise, most Lollards were not particularly ven-
erated for their deaths, and Lollard doctrine itself generally sneered at the 
kind of iconographic worship martyrology encourages. One notable excep-
tion is Richard Wyche. After his 1403 interrogation for heretical preaching, 
Wyche went on to live the life of a clerk without incident until 1440, when 
he was burned publicly for inciting rebellion.61 Chronicle accounts describe 
 61. For an account of Wyche’s 1440 trial and the events that led up to it, see Christina Von 
Nolcken, “Richard Wyche, a Certain Knight, and the Beginning of the End,” in Lollardy and the 
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an unprecedented and unrepeated response to his death, including pilgrim-
ages to the site of Wyche’s execution.62 Even John Oldcastle, who emerges as 
a central figure in fifteenth- and sixteenth-century chronicle accounts and 
literary discussions of Lollardy and dissent, does not provoke such devotion.
 Thorpe oddly achieves his status as a martyr in the sixteenth century, 
since his violent death was never witnessed, his end never accounted for.63 
Indeed, the very open-endedness of Thorpe’s life transforms him into an 
elastic figure for reformist polemic that can attest to the immediate history 
of anti-Catholic martyrology and offer an example of steadfast resistance 
for Protestant reformers. The ideal of Thorpe as a martyrological wit-
ness is robustly expressed in John Foxe’s ecclesiastical history of England, 
Acts and Monuments. As a grand compilation of myriad manuscript and 
printed sources, this work establishes the credibility of Foxes’s history—and 
by extension, of his reformist doctrine—by calling upon eyewitness reports 
and handwritten documents. As John N. King puts it, “Even when he does 
not consult manuscripts directly, he accords quasi-talismanic significance 
to monuments concerning the history of the ‘true’ church throughout the 
ages.”64
 Foxe conceives the materiality of his own project to link the apostolic tra-
dition of early Christian martyrs to sixteenth-century reformers, a link made 
possible by Wyclif and his followers. He does so by imagining his text as a 
critical witness to a new history. He begins by lamenting the fact that he is 
contributing yet another book to a world already saturated with the printed 
word:
Seeing the worlde is so replenished with suche an infinite multitude of 
bookes, dayly put foorth euery where: I shall seme (perhaps) to take a 
matter inhand superfluous and needeles, at thys present time to sette out 
so great a volume as this is, especiallye touchinge writing of historyes, con-
sidering now adaies the worlde is pestred not onelye with a superfluous 
Gentry in the Later Middle Ages, ed. Margaret Aston and Colin Richmond (New York: St. Mar-
tin’s, 1997), 127–54; and Richard Rex, “Which Is Wyche? Lollardy and Sanctity in Lancastrian 
London,” in Martyrs and Martyrdom in England, c. 1400–1700, ed. Thomas S. Freeman and 
Thomas F. Mayer (Suffolk: Boydell, 2007), 88–106.
 62. See Rex, “Which Is Wyche?” 93–96.
 63. Noting the absence of martyrological cults around executed Lollards, Thomas S. Free-
man claims, “Only Thorpe’s account of his own examinations qualifies as a popular Lollard mar-
tyrological work.” “Over Their Dead Bodies: Concepts of Martrydom in Late Medieval and Early 
Modern England,” in Martyrs and Martyrdom, 8.
 64. John N. King, Foxe’s “Book of Martyrs” and Early Modern Print Culture (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2006), 47.
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plenty therof, but of all other treatises, so that bookes maye rather seme to 
lacke Readers, then Readers to lacke bookes. Howe be it I doubt not but 
manye good men doo both perceiue, and inwardlye bewayle this insatiable 
gredines of wryting and printing, which to say the truth, for my part I do 
as much lament as many man else may do beside.65
Nonetheless, he claims, his compilation rescues reformists from the “pit of 
oblivion,” extracting these martyrs out of obscurity: 
For first of all, they geue a lyuely testimonye that there is one aboue which 
ruleth all, contrary to the opinion of the godless, and the whole nest of 
Epicures: Like as one said of Harpalus in times past, that his doings did 
liuely testifie that there was no God, because in suffering of him a great 
space together, God semed to neglect all care of reasonable creatures: So 
contrarywise, in these men we haue an assured and plaine witness of God, 
in whose lyfe appeared a certaine force of divine nature, and in their death 
a farre greater signification, whiles in such shaprenes of tormentes wee 
behelde in them a strength so constant aboue mans reache, a redynes to 
answer, patience in prison, godlynes in foreuing, cherefulnes in suffering, 
besides the manifold sense and feling of the holy ghost, which they learned 
in many of their comfortes, and we by them. (143)
Foxe’s justification for putting together such an enormous book relies on his 
production of layers of witnesses: first, the martyrs themselves who offer 
“lively testimony” of righteous doctrine, and second, those who “behold” 
these martyrs, either as eyewitnesses or as readers of Acts and Monuments. 
Indeed, the series of woodcuts that Foxe uses to illustrate the violent trials 
and executions of his martyrs offers readers a way to act as “eyewitnesses” to 
these martyrologies.66
 Thorpe’s testimony poses a particular challenge for Foxe’s agenda: there 
is no record of Thorpe’s existence after his return to Saltwood prison, either 
in the Testimony or in other documents. Since Foxe asserts in the preface to 
Acts and Monuments that a martyr’s death offers “far greater signification” of 
divine presence than even the events of his life, Thorpe’s mysterious end is a 
 65. Princeton University, William H. Schiede Library MS 11.1.2, page 143. All citations of 
Acts and Monuments are from this 1563 edition unless otherwise noted.
 66. For a discussion of how Foxe’s woodcuts offered a visual counterpoint to the martyro-
logical narratives, see the series of essays in the “Visual Culture” section of John Foxe and His 
World, ed. Christopher Highley and John N. King (Suffolk: Ashgate, 2002), esp. Andrew Pette-
gree, “Illustrating the Book: A Protestant Dilemma,” 133–44; and Thomas Betteridge, “Truth and 
History in Foxe’s Acts and Monuments,” 145–59.
Witnessing, Presence, and Lollard communities ·  183
difficult conundrum, and Foxe works strenuously to ensure that Thorpe fits 
in with his compilation of martyrological witnesses. In the apparatus around 
Thorpe’s narrative, Foxe overtly meditates on the witnessing claims of voice, 
manuscript, and document to certify the truth of Thorpe’s Testimony. He 
begins with a preface that praises Thorpe as “a warrior valiant under the 
triumphant banner of Christ,” going on to insist repeatedly that Thorpe’s 
story is his own: “written by the said Thorpe, and storied by his own pen, at 
the request of his friends, as by his own words, in the process hereof, may 
appear” (249). Foxe’s reiterations of Thorpe’s authorial “ownership” explic-
itly posit the narrative as an extralegal document, a text not written by the 
officials trying to censor Thorpe and other Lollards, as well as a direct link 
back to Thorpe’s own body and voice. Indeed, Foxe instructs the reader to 
learn the doctrinal truth professed by Thorpe and to marvel at his status as 
God’s witness, “for thou shalt behold here in this man, the marvelous force 
and strength of the Lord’s might, spirit, and grace, working and fighting in 
his soldiers, and also speaking in their mouths, according to the word of his 
promise, Luke xxi” (143).
 Foxe then turns from Thorpe’s authorial presence to his own editorial 
status, and he certifies the authenticity of Thorpe’s document by tracing 
its manuscript heritage and by claiming its proximity to living eyewitness 
sources. Attributing the first printing of Thorpe to William Tyndale, Foxe 
insists that he has stayed faithful to Tyndale’s version and praises him for 
managing both to retain Thorpe’s voice and to clarify the language for a 
modern audience: “The English though the saide Maister Tindall did some-
what amend, and frame it after our manner: yet not fully in all wordes, but 
that some thing dooth remaine, sauering the olde speache of that time” (143). 
With this admission in mind, Foxe shores up his claims to editorial authen-
ticity while lamenting the loss of Thorpe’s voice:
To the text of the story we have neither added nor diminished, but, as 
we have received it copied out and corrected by Master William Tindal, 
(who had his own handwriting), so we have here sent it, and set it out 
abroad. Although for the more credit of the matter, I rather wished it in 
his own naturall speache, wherin it was first written. Notwithstandyng, to 
put away all doubt and scruple herein, this I thought before to pre-monish 
and testifie to the reader touching the certeintie hereof: that they bee yet a 
lyve, which haue seen the selfe same copy in his own old Englishe, resem-
bling the true antiquitie both of the speache and of the tyme, the name 
of whom, as for the record of the same to avouch, is Master Whitehead. 
(143)
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He further mentions that a “maister Whithead” saw the “true auncient copy 
in the hands of George Constantine,” who then verified the text both to Foxe 
and to the printer.
 The term of verification here—an eyewitness to an “auncient copy”—
is familiar from Crowley’s preface of his 1550 print versions of Langland’s 
poem, in which he makes sure to corroborate the authenticity of his text 
by referring to the “ancient copies” to which he had access.67 In Acts and 
Monuments, Foxe amplifies the kind of editorial authority Crowley asserts 
by adding his fantasy of Thorpe’s “speache,” which could presumably seep 
through the original text, since it was penned by Thorpe himself. Indeed, as 
if trying to harness Thorpe’s authentic voice, Foxe appends a Testament, an 
apocryphal text purportedly written by Thorpe at the time of his death, dated 
to around 1460; it first appears in the 1530 Antwerp edition of Thorpe’s nar-
rative. The Testament continues Thorpe’s criticisms of the Church, focusing 
on greed and lechery among priests. The Testament offers some closure to 
the trenchant problem of Thorpe’s life after his return to Saltwood prison.68 
Perhaps it offered a similar sense of closure for Foxe. But the Testament does 
not answer questions about the end of Thorpe’s life any more than the Testi-
mony provides significant biographical corroboration of Thorpe’s existence. 
Indeed, what purpose the Testament holds, either in Foxe’s text specifically 
or in the fifteenth- and sixteenth-century legacy of the Thorpe narrative 
more generally, is not entirely clear. It certainly offers more blatant reform-
ist rhetoric, exhibiting none of the narrative qualities of Thorpe’s Testimony 
and instead tracking the kinds of abuses against which Foxe defines Protes-
tant doctrine. It also, significantly, shores up the martyrological potential of 
Thorpe’s life:
And I that am a most unworthy and wretched caitiff, shall now, through 
the special grace of God, make to him pleasant sacrifice with my most 
sinful and unworthy body: beseeching heartily all fold that read or hear 
this end of my purposed testament, that, through the grace of God, they 
dispose verily and virtuously all their wits, and able in like manner all their 
members, to understand truly, and to keep faithfully, charitably, and con-
tinually, all the commandments of God. (284–85)
 67. For a discussion of Crowley’s use of the phrase “auncient copy” to authorize his printing 
project, see chapter 4.
 68. “It has always seemed unlikely that such a prominent heretic was neither induced to 
recant nor brought to the stake, and indeed was never heard of again.” Richard Rex, “Thorpe’s 
Testament: A Conjectural Emendation,” Medium Aevum 74.1 (2005): 110.
Witnessing, Presence, and Lollard communities ·  185
Foxe emphasizes this martyrological potential in his 1563 edition of Acts and 
Monuments by moving directly from the Testament to a half-page woodcut 
depicting a bearded man in a barrel, hands held aloft, with a scroll issuing 
forth from his mouth that says “Lorde Iesus Christ helpe me.” Men on horse-
back and on foot surround him, stoking the fire beneath the barrel as flames 
encircle his body. Beneath the woodcut is a short narrative titled simply “An 
Artificer, a Lay Man” (172).
 The narrative describes an anonymous layperson condemned for argu-
ing against transubstantiation, and it is suspiciously close to the story about 
John Badby’s 1410 burning that Thomas Hoccleve includes in his Regiment 
of Princes. Foxe’s (lengthy) version goes like this:
And when as the sentence of his condemnatio(n) was geuen against him, 
and that this valia(n)t Martyr of Christ should be caried into a market 
place without the citie to be included in a pype or tunne, for so muche 
as Cherillus Bul was not then in use amongst the byshops, as it happened 
the prince the eldest sonne of kyng Henry was there present: this man as a 
good Samaritane, indeuored him selfe to saue the life of him, whome the 
unshamefast Leuites & Phariseis sought to put to death: he admonished 
and counseled him that hauing respect unto him selfe, he should spedely 
withdrawe him self out of these daungerous Laberynthes of opinions, add-
ing oftentimes threateninges, the which might haue daunted any mans 
stomack. But this valiaunt champion of Christe neglecting the princes fayre 
wordes and vanquishing all mens deuises, fully determined, rather to suf-
fer any kinde of tormente were it neuer so greuous, then so great Idolatry 
and wickednes. Whereupon being inclosed in the pype or tonne, he was 
torme(n)ted by the raging flame. The innocent soule moste miserably ror-
ing and criynge out in the middest of the fier. With whiche horrible crie the 
Prince beynge moued, he cometh agayne unto the man to reclaime hym 
unto life. (that pytie and mercye whyche commen sence of nature wrought 
in him, the same by this cruel new deuyse or new crueltie of so strau(n)ge 
death, was double in him augme(n)ted) he com(m)undede pe fyer to be 
drawen backe and take(n) away, he comforted him which was torme(n)
ted, promysing him yet hope of his lyfe, if he would consent unto his coun-
sels: adding moreover that he should haue certayne yearly stipend geue(n) 
him out of the kynges treasury, asmuch as shold suffice for his suste(n)
atio(n). But againe he refused the offer of wordly promyses, without al 
doubt being more veheme(n)tly inflamed with the spirite of God then with 
any earthly desire. Wherefore when as yet he continued unmouable in his 
former mynde, the prince commaunded him straight to be put againe into 
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the Pype or Tunne, and that he should not afterward loke for any grace or 
fauour. But as he could be allured by no rewardes, euen so was he nothing 
at al abashed at their tormentes, but as avaliaunt champio(n) of Christe, he 
perseuered inuincible unto the ende. Notwithout a great and mooste cruell 
battaile, but with muche more greatere triumphe of victory, the spirite of 
Christ hauing all wayes the upperhande in this members, maugre the fury 
rage & power of pe whole world. (172–73)
Compare Thomas Hoccleve’s description of Badby’s execution:
My lord the Prince—God him save and blesse—
Was at his deedly castigacioun
And of his soule hadde greet tendrenesse,
Thristynge sore his sauvacioun.
Greet was his pitous lamentacioun
Whan that this renegat nat wolde blynne
Of the stynkynge errour that he was ynne.
This good lord highte him to be swich a mene
To his fadir, our lige lord sovereyn,
If he renounce wold his error clene
And come unto our good byleeve ageyn,
He shold of his lyfe seur been and certain;
And souffissant lyflode eek sholde he have
Unto the day he clad were in his grave.69
Hoccleve goes on to describe the prince’s valiant but ineffective attempts 
to convert Badby, details Foxe also includes. What are we to make of Foxe’s 
inclusion of Badby’s trial and execution under the rubric of an anonymous 
layperson?
 It is possible that Foxe wanted to include Badby within the list of con-
victed Lollards he depicts in his 1563 edition of Acts and Monuments, a list 
that includes John Ball, John Purvey, Richard Wyche, William Sautre, and 
William Swinderby. But by following Thorpe’s Testament with Badby’s nar-
rative, without identifying it as Badby’s, Foxe effectively provides Thorpe’s 
story with a conclusion not offered in either his Testimony or his Testament. 
Indeed, the last few lines of Thorpe’s Testament occur at the top of the page, 
followed by the woodcut and description of the execution of the anony-
mous “layman” (figure 1). The page layout thus gives the sense of continua-
 69. Hoccleve, Regiment, lines 295–308.
Figure 1  Woodcut depicting a burning martyr atop a short narrative called “An Artificer, a Lay Man.” 
Princeton University, William H. Schiede Library 11.1.2, page 172. Ca. 1563. With permis-
sion of Princeton University.
188 •  chapter Five
tion, rather than a turn to a new martyr narrative. We are perhaps implicitly 
instructed to visualize the burning of this anonymous layman and read the 
description of his execution as Thorpe’s own end. It certainly offers a defini-
tive end to Thorpe’s life, one that supports the martyrological aims of Foxe’s 
compilation. 
 Seven years later, possibly chagrined by the disapproval lodged by crit-
ics such as Nicholas Harpsfield and Thomas Harding, Foxe omitted both 
the woodcut and the anonymous narrative after Thorpe’s Testament, instead 
moving directly on to a description of John Purvey’s trials and execution. In 
the 1570 edition, Foxe cagily avoids offering any real closure to Thorpe’s life 
and instead adds this conclusion:
What was the end of this good man, and blessed servant of God, William 
Thorpe, I find as yet in no story specified. By all conjectures it is to be 
thought that the archbishop Thomas Arundel, being so hard an adversary 
against those men, would not let him go; much less it is to be supposed, 
that he would ever retract his sentence and opinion, which he so valiantly 
maintained before the bishop; neither doth it seem that he had any such 
recanting spirit. Again, neither is it found that he was burned; wherefore it 
remaineth most likely to be true, that he, being committed to some straight 
prison, according as the archbishop, in his examination before, did threaten 
him there (as Thorpe confesseth himself), was so straightly kept, that either 
he was secretly made away with, or else he died there by sickness.70
Foxe’s conjecture has been reiterated a number of times by modern scholars 
(Copeland and Rex, for example), exposing our discomfort with the open-
ness of Thorpe’s narrative. Attending to Thorpe as a witness, with all the 
complexities that term signifies, does not offer the kind of closure that Foxe 
seeks. But it does suggest a more accurate account of what the Testimony 
of William Thorpe can and cannot provide to scholars who want to try to 
“recover” a voice from the past. Indeed, like many Lollard depositions, Thor-
pe’s Testimony challenges those looking for the “real” Thorpe, a historically 
verifiable human being who stood up for his beliefs when doing so could 
lead to public death. The value of the Testimony is not so much in provid-
ing a link to the distant past as it is in exposing the desire for that link and 
the mechanisms by which we imagine it. To what can we, as scholars of the 
medieval past, attest? What can we witness in the documents and texts left 
us?
 70. John Foxe, Acts and Monuments, ed. George Townsend, vol. 3 (London: Seeley, Burn-
side, and Seeley, 1843), 285.
t h e  q u e s t I o n s  posed at the end of the previous chapter deserve a sus-
tained answer, beginning with a brief summary of what this book has tried 
to accomplish. As this book has shown, medieval witnessing might be under-
stood both heuristically—that is, as a method to retrieve evidence that can 
uncover truth, whether legal, ethical, or doctrinal—and hermeneutically—
that is, as a method of interpretation that can produce an explanation, start 
a discussion, or point to gaps in what is considered evidentiary. Because wit-
nessing can be both heuristic and hermeneutic, it worked in the Middle Ages 
to produce cultural ideologies and obligations as well as to critique them. 
Those critiques, this book claims, emerge most dynamically and powerfully 
in vernacular literary texts, which cite, restage, and experiment with the legal 
and devotional witnessing practices charged with authenticating and disci-
plining communal obligations.
 Witnessing is heuristically and hermeneutically crucial in our own dis-
cussions of how scholarship can retrieve and interpret evidence of a medieval 
past. Notably, as I discuss in this coda, the term “witness” is used in philolog-
ical criticism to describe the documents that can attest to the events, people, 
or customs of the Middle Ages. I argue here that the use of the term in this 
context confers a sense of authenticity onto these documents by attaching 
a kind of presence to them. In other words, when philological convention 
refers to medieval documents and texts as “witnesses,” it implies that these 
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texts can offer authentic and immediate access to the words or thoughts of 
someone who was “really there,” recording an event we can now only under-
stand through those documents. Here, in assessing how the term “witness” 
functions to authorize certain modes of medievalist scholarship, I offer some 
suggestions regarding what the critical stakes of medieval testimony might 
be.
oath-taking and the Production of Evidence
This book has described witnessing as crucial to formations of and challenges 
to doctrinal, legal, and ethical communities. In doing so, it has depicted wit-
nessing broadly as a diverse set of practices and forms, including the hue 
and cry, formal depositions, and even prayer. When considered under the 
rubric of “witnessing,” all of these practices try not only to authenticate a 
truth-claim or an event but also to attest to a community’s beliefs and ethics. 
Moreover, this book has shown that a wide range of texts feature witnessing 
to explore how communities articulate and police their boundaries. Ver-
nacular poetry, sermon exempla, outlaw ballads, and fictional legal docu-
ments alike describe witnessing to imagine communities outside of official 
ecclesiastical and legal prescriptions. In doing so, these texts all use witness-
ing to examine the relationship between the divine Word and human words, 
between divine knowledge and human judgment. They juxtapose multiple 
models of witnessing to depict dynamic transactions between bodily, oral, 
and documentary testimony, transactions that reveal the complex ways wit-
nessing practices could claim the authority to articulate community customs 
and project communal ideals.
 As this book has illustrated how witnessing encompasses a wide range 
of practices that can define, articulate, and police community ties, it has 
throughout turned its attention to the oath, an important and ubiquitous 
practice that sought to yoke together divine justice and human systems of 
law. The oath relied on formulaic language to do so, proclaiming God as 
a witness alongside the oath-taker. The efficacy of oaths relied on a series 
of community networks, as when, for example, compurgatory oath-help-
ers were called upon to attest to a public reputation or when family and 
neighbors were called upon to authenticate a last will and testament. Oaths 
were also where vernacular writers could explore how human language and 
law interacted with divine justice and, in turn, how such a link between the 
divine Word and earthly language helped sanctify doctrinal or ethical com-
munity ties. In the Man of Law’s Tale, for example, divine justice exposes the 
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iniquity of the false knight’s oath in front of a crowd of onlookers, which 
can then be transformed into a Christian community under the guidance of 
a converted Alla. Likewise, in the Pistel of Swete Susan, the Elders manipu-
late the dual function of the oath as a call to divine justice and an assertion 
of community standing to mask their sexual aggression and protect their 
reputations. In Piers Plowman, Langland takes oaths as an opportunity to 
examine the relationship between personification allegory and documentary 
materiality, while William Thorpe dismantles the fantasy that book-sworn 
oaths can harness the divine Word to extract his testimony from the legal 
purpose it was supposed to serve.
 Oath-taking is a site of contention in these texts because it straddles 
any demarcating lines between heuristic and hermeneutic. Designed as a 
mode of discovery, as a formula that can make divine judgment visible to a 
watchful community, in the hands of writers such as Langland or Thorpe it 
becomes an opportunity for interpretation and literary invention. Indeed, 
vernacular writers from the period repeatedly saw in the oath the possibility 
of exploring how human language can mold—rather than simply reveal—
divine judgment and “truth.” Their depictions of oaths foreground the ways 
different truths might be constructed from the same evidence, and they 
demonstrate that the determination of what constitutes evidence can some-
times be a strategic, even tautological, shaping of events into a narrative that 
is then authenticated by an oath. Similarly, as I discuss below, examining the 
ways witnessing shapes our scholarship with respect to the past can reveal 
our own strategic modes of evidence gathering and narrative production.
Philological and Historical ‘‘Witnesses’’
Whereas witnessing was a central mode of thinking about the relationship 
between language, community, and divine justice in the Middle Ages, it also 
offers us a way to think critically about our own relationships to language, 
texts, and the past. In his account of the long history of scholarly research 
and editorial practices, D. C. Greetham has noted that “one of the indeter-
minacies of textual research is its relation to the disciplines that rely on the 
discovery and interpretation of evidence.”1 Indeed, he insists that textual 
and editorial research—that is, the search for “evidence”—should seek not 
to uncover an origin or an unassailable truth about the object of study, but 
to recognize and articulate textual variance. Greetham particularly examines 
 1. D. C. Greetham, “Textual Forensics,” PMLA 111.1 (1996): 33.
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the reliance on “textual witnesses,” a phrase that refers specifically to manu-
scripts that can uniquely establish a text’s authoritative version or origin. 
Fifteenth-century humanists such as Lorenzo Valla, Greetham states, devel-
oped a heuristic model of textual “testimony,” distinguishing between “inter-
nal” and “external” evidence as a way to root out forgeries from “authentic” 
versions of texts.2 As scholars, we continue to comb these material artifacts, 
these “witnesses,” to see how and to what they can testify about the past. Fol-
lowing Valla, we often divide the documents that constitute our research into 
“primary” and “secondary” witnesses, suggesting perhaps that “primary” 
witnesses are closer to a textual origin or the author’s hand.3 Such archival 
work is, of course, necessary for assessing and analyzing the extant materials 
of the distant period we study, offering critical and exciting insights into the 
medieval world. Here, however, I want to think briefly about what it means 
to use the term “witness” to describe archival work and to suggest that our 
own critical and historicist practices are mired in the same kinds of compli-
cations about the rhetoric of authority and “truth” that are at the heart of late 
medieval experiments in witnessing.
 The critical practices of the “New Philology,” a phrase coined by Stephen 
G. Nichols in a 1988 issue of the Romanic Review, raise “questions about 
the status of history, historicism, and contextual referentiality” by disman-
tling a post-Auerbach philological tradition, which sought to produce an 
edited text that could ossify the textual variance endemic to manuscript cul-
ture.4 As Nichols put it two years later in his introduction to the 1990 Specu-
lum volume dedicated to the New Philology, “The high calling of philology 
inherited by Auerbach’s generation installed a preoccupation with scholarly 
exactitude based on edited and printed texts.”5 In contrast, the New Philol-
ogy sets out to return to the indeterminacy of an open-ended manuscript 
culture, in which the production, translation, and rewriting of texts emerged 
out of the cultural conditions of a polyglot world that was an admixture of 
 2. See Anthony Grafton, Forgers and Critics: Creativity and Duplicity in Western Scholarship 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990).
 3. We might take Lee Patterson’s assertion into account with respect to internal and exter-
nal textual witnesses: “At heart, external evidence is nothing other than the fact that a particular 
reading occurs in one or more manuscripts, that is, attestation; internal evidence is nothing 
other than the fact that there are on many occasions more than one reading, that is, variation. 
Both internal and external evidence are evidence of originality; both are, in themselves, equally 
factual, equally objective, equally historical.” See “The Logic of Textual Criticism and the Way of 
Genius: The Kane-Donaldson Piers Plowman in Historical Perspective,” in Negotiating the Past: 
The Historical Understanding of Medieval Literature (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 
1987), 77.
 4. Stephen G. Nichols, “Editor’s Preface,” Romanic Review 79.1 (1988): 1.
 5. Stephen G. Nichols, “Philology in a Manuscript Culture,” Speculum 65.1 (1990): 3.
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oral and literate practices and conventions. Those who advocated the aims of 
the New Philological practices suggested that it could perhaps release medi-
eval studies from the exegetical stranglehold of Roberstonianism and from 
the resolutely formalist work of the New Critics.6 Moreover, as Steven Justice 
has said, the materialist practice of returning to the manuscript or printed 
text to explore its polyvocality rather than to construct and solidify a single 
master text allows us to “reconstitute not only the array of texts we might 
come to know, but also the texts we know already” (7). With this in mind, 
he suggests, the New Philology might offer important methodological tools 
that help produce a productive “skeptical historicism.”
 This “skeptical historicism” might also help posit an alternative to the 
New Historicist practices that reinvigorated Early Modern studies several 
decades ago, practices that were resoundingly asserted in the 1980 publica-
tion of Stephen Greenblatt’s Renaissance Self-Fashioning. Indeed, the New 
Philology seems haunted by the promises and practices of the New Histori-
cism, as the contributors to the 1990 Speculum volume repeatedly demon-
strate. For example, Gabrielle M. Spiegel imagines the New Philology as a 
critique of the practices of Foucauldian cultural history. For Spiegel, the fail-
ure of such historicist practice is that it dismantles the differences between 
text and context; she claims that “the problem becomes even more severe 
when we remember that so-called ‘documentary’ representations of real-
ity (charters, laws, fief lists, economic data, accounts of trade or wars, not 
to mention cat massacres and cockfights) are equally included within the 
compass of the social construction of reality.”7 Literary texts and historical 
context are not the same, Spiegel warns, and the analytic methods used for 
one should not be imported to use for the other. In addition, she reminds 
us that historical documents do not provide unproblematic access to a clear 
“truth” and should not be used to construct master narratives that can then 
be used to decode the playful ambiguities of literary discourse.8 For her, the 
New Philology offers the possibility of historical inquiry engineered by the 
belief that texts represent geographically and temporally situated instances, 
 6. Though Patterson does not discuss the “New Philology” specifically, see his discussion of 
the work of Robertsonian exegetics and the New Criticism on the production of medieval stud-
ies as a discipline: “Historical Criticism and the Development of Chaucer Studies,” in Negotiating 
the Past: The Historical Understanding of Medieval Literature (Madison: University of Wisconsin 
Press, 1987), 3–39. For a thorough assessment of the New Philology since 1990, see Sarah Kay, 
“Analytical Survey 3: The New Philology,” New Medieval Literatures 3 (1999): 295–326.
 7. Gabrielle M. Spiegel, “History, Historicism, and the Social Logic of the Text in the Mid-
dle Ages,” Speculum 65.1 (1990): 69.
 8. See also Richard Firth Green, “John Ball’s Letters: Literary History and Historical Lit-
erature,” in Chaucer’s England: Literature in Historical Context, ed. Barbara A. Hanawalt (Min-
neapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1992), 176–200.
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thus allowing scholars to focus on the locality and material specificities of 
the text or artifact at hand. The effect of such work, she suggests, is to give 
analytic weight to both the literary and the historical without absorbing one 
into the other. Thus, the promise of the New Philology is that the material 
specificity of the text will open up a way to return to the historical without 
transforming historical documents into literary artifacts or vice versa.
 Recently, a challenge has been issued in medieval literary studies to be 
“post-historical.” For Elizabeth Scala and Sylvia Federico, the editors of The 
Post-Historical Middle Ages, this means taking up Paul Strohm’s “strategic 
disregard of the literary/non-literary divide,” particularly in examining the 
usefulness of the term “text.”9 Paying attention to the wide register of wit-
nessing in the later Middle Ages performs this metacritical work, and it does 
so specifically by calling attention to the ways various media—the body, the 
voice, the document—all lay claim to, even compete for, the authoritative 
designation of “text.” As this book has shown, Piers Plowman is particularly 
dedicated to dramatizing the multiple ways the idea of “text” can be invoked, 
manipulated, and used as a tool of power. In addition, the poem’s numer-
ous editions, emendations, and marginal glosses have been a wellspring of 
historical evidence for editors and readers of the poem’s variants. Yet as Lee 
Patterson has noted, such scholarly work often grounds itself in the authority 
of assessment, insofar as “external evidence” might be understood as mate-
rial, historical, and unassailable, while “internal evidence” can be considered 
the product of individual interpretation and thus can be seen as unreliable, 
even whimsical or idiosyncratic.10 Chapter 4 demonstrated that Langland 
examines the conceptual boundaries between idiosyncratic experience and 
communal knowledge derived from books and documents. We might use 
Langland’s sustained investigation of the witness as a hinge between individ-
ual experience and communal knowledge to redraw the boundaries between 
“external” and “internal” evidence, reconsidering our own reassurances of 
what constitutes incontrovertible data and what suspiciously emerges from 
the singular mind of the reader, editor, or scholar.
 The calls to question the status of historicism as a dominant mode of 
analyzing medieval texts and culture emerge from an enduring discussion in 
medieval studies that both uses the New Historicism and critiques it as a dis-
cipline that celebrates the Renaissance as a radical shift in the history of the 
 9. Sylvia Federico and Elizabeth Scala, “Getting Post-Historical,” in The Post-Historical 
Middle Ages, 7. Paul Strohm’s text to which they refer here is Theory and the Premodern Text 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2000).
 10. “The Logic of Textual Criticism and the Way of Genius: The Kane-Donaldson Piers 
Plowman in Historical Perspective,” in Negotiating the Past, 77–78.
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subject, at the expense of the Middle Ages. To offer one especially pointed 
example, Stephen Greenblatt announced in Renaissance Self-Fashioning that 
“in the sixteenth century there appears to be an increased self-consciousness 
about the fashioning of human identity as a manipulable, artful process.”11 
This statement has, not surprisingly, raised hackles among some medieval-
ists.12 David Aers famously responded by countering that Renaissance Self-
Fashioning is innocent of the analysis of medieval culture it would need to 
satisfyingly support its argument, and Patterson similarly argued that Green-
blatt’s assertion shows how “the Middle Ages has functioned as an all-pur-
pose alternative to whatever quality the present has wished to ascribe to 
itself.”13 For Patterson, medieval selfhood can be characterized by “the dia-
lectic between an inward subjectivity and an external world that alienates it 
from both itself and its divine source.”14 Significantly, this dialectic is force-
fully visible in witness depositions such as Margery Baxter’s as well as in ver-
nacular texts that take witness testimony as the impetus for thinking about 
the relationship between an inward self and its articulation to an external 
world, both earthly and divine. The Testimony of William Thorpe also offers 
a prime example of the way internal subjectivity might be structured by the 
external discourses, such as testimony, that claim to express it.
 Strikingly, Greenblatt’s New Historicist aims require the authenticating 
testimony of a medieval witness to authorize the temporal and conceptual 
boundaries he seeks to produce. His argument about the status of the printed 
book in Thomas More’s self-fashioning turns to Foxe’s Book of Martyrs and 
begins, curiously, with William Thorpe. Noting Thorpe’s technique of falling 
silent in response to Arundel’s histrionic questioning, Greenblatt argues that 
Thorpe seeks to act like Christ at his inquisition:
A long tradition of suffering for the faith lies behind this eloquent silence, 
a tradition reaching back to Christ’s own initial silence before Caiaphas: 
“And the chief priest arose and said to him: answerest thou nothing? How 
is it that these bear witness against thee? But Jesus held his peace” (Matt. 
 11. Stephen Greenblatt, Renaissance Self-Fashioning (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1980), 2.
 12. For an assessment of the status of New Historicism in Chaucer studies specifically, see 
David Matthews, “Recent Chaucer Criticism: New Historicism, New Discontents?” Modern Phi-
lology 106.1 (2008): 117–27.
 13. David Aers, “A Whisper in the Ear of Early Modernists; or, Reflections on Literary Crit-
ics Writing the ‘History of the Subject,’” in Culture and History, 1350–1600, ed. David Aers (De-
troit, MI: Wayne State University Press, 1992), 177–202.
 14. Lee Patterson, Chaucer and the Subject of History (Madison: University of Wisconsin 
Press, 1991), 8.
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26: 29–39). Caught in a terrifying situation and facing the rage of the great 
and powerful, the heretic William Thorpe, like the imprisoned Thomas 
More, found refuge in an identification with Christ. (77)
Greenblatt further claims that Thorpe’s identification with Christ marks “a 
simultaneous affirmation and effacement of personal identity” (77). Green-
blatt’s turn to Thorpe as More’s self-fashioning predecessor is particularly 
notable given his citation of Matthew, which specifically depicts Christ as a 
witness. Though he presumably wants to show the centrality of the printed 
book in dramatic depictions of abjuration and relapse, Greenblatt here takes 
Thorpe as a flesh-and-blood figure, a biographical person from the past 
whose real-life experiences serve as a backdrop for those of Thomas More. 
He misses the layered ways in which Thorpe functions as a Christ-like wit-
ness, testifying not only to the structures of power that animate his text and 
perhaps merit its inclusion in Foxe’s compilation, but also to how a text, 
and, perhaps, a life, from the turn of the fifteenth century can all too eas-
ily be assimilated into a process of self-fashioning that has been declared a 
product of the sixteenth century. Greenblatt does not distinguish between 
Thorpe as historical actor and Thorpe as textual agent. At the very least, he 
treats Thorpe like More, although More’s biography can be assessed through 
multiple extant documents and texts in a way that Thorpe’s cannot.
 This suppression of the boundary between a historical or biographical 
figure and literary persona specifically occurs in his discussion of Thorpe as 
a witness, and it seems the implicit use of “witnessing” in his New Histori-
cist work authorizes the archival translation of literary or historical presence 
into full biography. A few years ago, Greenblatt wrote a biography of Shake-
speare, titled Will in the World: How Shakespeare Became Shakespeare, in 
which he begins with and ends with the same caveat about the insufficiency 
of historical data in reconstructing a life. For example, when he discusses the 
order of Shakespeare’s works, he writes, “After many decades of ingenious 
research, scholars have reached a relatively stable consensus, but even this 
time line, so crucial for any biography, is inevitably somewhat speculative.”15 
Later, in his “Biographical Notes,” he reminds us, “All biographical studies of 
Shakespeare necessarily build on the assiduous, sometimes obsessive archi-
val research and speculation of many generations of scholars and writers” 
(391). Undeterred by Greenblatt’s careful caveats, the playwright Charles 
Mee responded with enthusiasm for the book’s “authentic” reporting of 
 15. Stephen Greenblatt, Will in the World: How Shakespeare Became Shakespeare (New York: 
Norton, 2004), 18.
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Shakespeare’s life. “At last,” he says, “the book Shakespeare has deserved: a 
brilliant book written by a virtual eyewitness who understands how a play-
wright takes the stuff of his life and makes it into theater.”
 Mee’s designation of Greenblatt as a “virtual eyewitness” to Shakespeare’s 
life—and to the apparently intimate relationship between Shakespeare’s 
life and his works—demonstrates how witnessing sometimes operates as a 
shorthand for a kind of historical realism or authenticity, muddying the line 
between history and fiction in a way that would surely make Spiegel uncom-
fortable. It also demonstrates that the term can be extended to conceptualize 
as “eyewitnesses” those who were certainly not present at the event, turning 
the New Historicist scholar and biographer into a legalistic figure with per-
sonal and immediate access to historical truths. The term thus can transform 
a series of archival documents, or, as Greenblatt would put it, “speculations,” 
into a realized life that both emerges from those documents and precedes 
them. Notably, the same year he published Will in the World, Greenblatt 
praised David Riggs’s biography of Marlowe as a “fine, full-blooded biogra-
phy,” similarly using language that suggests the possibility that an assiduous 
researcher who makes full use of archives can animate a series of texts and 
in doing so, re-embody a historical figure and give life to the past.16 In these 
biographical accounts of early modern playwrights and poets, the philologi-
cal vocabulary of manuscript “witnesses” comes to describe the idiosyncratic 
work of the individual scholar.
Witness testimony and Premodern Biography
In pointing out these cases in which the term “witness” signals the histori-
cal accuracy and power of biography, I certainly do not want to scold the 
reviewers for their praise of these works. Rather, I want to suggest that we 
might consider witnessing as a way to refine and rehabilitate the scholarly 
opportunities of premodern biography. Indeed, another scholarly avenue 
that may emerge through the consideration of witness testimony in late 
medieval legal and literary culture is the possibility of biographical work 
in medieval studies. As Daniel Birkholz has claimed, for medieval scholars, 
“biographical desire is never absent from the system of literary interpre-
tation. Literary-historical personae, from patrons to authors to scribes to 
readers, are constructed in response to unsatisfactory prevailing wisdoms.”17 
 16. David Riggs, The World of Christopher Marlowe (New York: Henry Holt, 2004).
 17. Daniel Birkholz, “Biography After Historicism: The Harley Lyrics, the Hereford Map, 
and the Life of Roger de Breynton,” in The Post-Historical Middle Ages, 168.
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Birkholz does not advocate a recuperative kind of biography, in which the 
“real” or “hidden” life of a person is uncovered and detailed. Such work 
would not only be impossible, given the extant materials we have from the 
Middle Ages, it would work against the more complex aims of biography: 
that is, to imagine how a life can understood as and rendered into a his-
torical artifact or set of artifacts.18 Witness testimony could put a decidedly 
legalistic spin on such a project: how do legal documents account for, even 
judge, a life? How can historical and literary personae be constructed out of 
interrogations, or last wills and testaments, or writs of complaint? What are 
the historical and the literary drives that shape testimonial discourse?
 Witness testimony foregrounds that such questions are always dia-
chronic, insofar as they probe the ways the Middle Ages might have imag-
ined and constructed personae. Witnessing also foregrounds our own desires 
to animate those personae, to know them, and even to judge them ourselves. 
By paying attention to the forms and practices of witnessing, as well as to the 
implicit claims of authenticity and truth witnessing assumes, we can read 
across the past and the present to conceptualize what it means to produce 
and to analyze the “evidence” of a life. Indeed, we can ask ourselves by what 
means we produce and analyze the Middle Ages itself. If we, as scholars of 
the Middle Ages, are witnesses to it, then we must take care to recognize our 
own roles as narratores of the past. Like the Man of Law, we too sometimes 
uneasily navigate evidence and narration, truth and fiction. Like Piers Plow-
man, we must always question the media by which truth is mediated and 
manufactured. And like William Thorpe, in attesting to the medieval past 
and to our own scholarly desires, we seek to produce texts that will exceed 
their own moments of production.
 18. For an interesting discussion of this issue vis-à-vis the editorial work of gathering exter-
nal textual evidence, see John M. Bowers, “Piers Plowman’s William Langland: Editing the Text, 
Writing the Author’s Life,” YLS 9 (1995): 65–94.
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